Improvement of the understanding, Ethics and Correspondence of Benedict de Spinoza

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Contents

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ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING . I

Of the ordinary objects of men's desires I

Part I. Concerning God 39

Prop. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications . 40 Prop. II. Two substances, whose attributes are different,

have nothing in common 40

Prop III. Things, which have nothing in common, cannot

be one the cause of the other 41

Prop. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other either by the difference of the attributes of the substance, or by the differences of their modifications 41

Prop. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more

substances having the same nature or attribute ... 41 Prop. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another

substance 41

(xiii)

xiv SPINOZA

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THE ETHICS — Continued.

Part I. Concerning God — Continued.

Prop. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substance . 42

Prop. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite . . 42

Prop. IX. The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the number of its attributes 45

Prop. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself 45

Prop. XI. God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists 45

Prop. XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived, from which it would follow that substance can be divided . . 48

Prop. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible , 48

Prop. XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived 49

Prop. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived 49

Prop. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways — that is, all things which fall within the sphere of infinite intellect 53

Prop. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature,

and is not constrained by anyone 54

Prop. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things 57

Prop. XIX. God and all the attributes of God are eternal 57

Prop. XX. The existence of God and his essence are one and the same 58

Prop. XXI. All things, which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God, must always exist and be infinite, or, in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute 58

Prop. XXII. Whatever follows from any attribute of God, in so far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as infinite through the said attribute, must also exist necessarily and as infinite .... 60

Prop. XXIII. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as infinite 60

Prop. XXIV. The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence 60

Prop. XXV. God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence . . . . . 61

Prop. XXVI. A thing, which is conditioned to act in a particular manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned

CONTENTS xv

PAGB

THE ETHICS — Continued.

Part I. Concerning God — Continued.

by God ; and that which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to act 61

Prop. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned 62

Prop. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite and has a conditioned existence ; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also is finite and has a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity 62

Prop. XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature ... 63

Prop. XXX. Intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God, and nothing else 64

Prop. XXXI. The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, as will, desire, love, etc. , should be referred to passive nature, and not to active nature 64

Prop. XXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary cause 65

Prop. XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being by God in any manner or in any order different from that which has in fact obtained 66

Prop. XXXIV. God's power is identical with his essence . 70

Prop. XXXV. Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God, necessarily exists 70

Prop. XXXVI. There is no cause from whose nature some effect does not follow 70

Part II. Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind ... 78 Preface 78

Prop. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a think-

ingthing 79

Prop. II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing 80 xvi SPINOZA

THE ETHICS — Continued.

Part II. Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind — Continued.

Prop. Ill In God there is necessarily the idea, not only of his essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his essence 80

Prop. IV. The idea of God, from which an infinite number

of things follow in infinite ways, can only be one . . 81

Prop. V. The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far as he is unfolded in any other attribute ; that is, the ideas both of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own as their efficient cause their objects, or the things perceived, but God himself, in so far as he is a thinking thing 81

Prop. VI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any other attribute 82

Prop. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things 82

Prop. VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes are contained in the attributes of God 83

Prop. IX. The idea of an individual thing actually existing is caused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected by a third idea, and so on to infinity . 84

Prop. X. The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man — in other words, substance does not constitute the actual being of man .85

Prop. XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually existing 87

Prop. XII. Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea, which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of the said occurrence. That is, if the object of the idea constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in that body without being perceived by the mind 88

Prop. XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which actually exists, and nothing else . . . . 88

J

CONTENTS xvii

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THE ETHICS — Continued.

Part II. Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind— Continued.

Digression on the nature of bodies — Axioms I., II. Lemmas I. — III 90

Axioms I., II 91

Definition — Axiom III. — Lemmas IV., V 92

Lemmas VI., VII 93

Postulates 94

Prop. XIV. The human mind is capable of perceiving a great number of things, and is so, in proportion as its body is capable of receiving a great number of impressions 94

Prop. XV. The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of ideas 94

Prop. XVI. The idea of every mode, in which the human body is affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human body, and also the nature of the external body 95

Prop. XVII. If the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way as to exclude the existence of the said external body 95

Prop. XVIII. If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterward imagines any of them, it will straightway remember the others also 97

Prop. XIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications, whereby the body is affected . • 99

Prop. XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in God, following in God in the same manner, and being referred to God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human body 99

Prop. XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind,

in the same way as the mind is united to the body . . 100

Prop. XXII. The human mind perceives not only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications 100

Prop. XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body . . 101

Prop. XXIV. The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body 101 xviii SPINOZA

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THE ETHICS — Continued.

Part II. Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind — Continued.

Prop. XXV. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body 102

Prop. XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the modifications of its own body 102

Prop. XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself 103

Prop. XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused 103

Prop. XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind 104

Prop. XXX. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body 104

Prop. XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of particular things external to ourselves 105

Prop. XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true 105

Prop. XXXIII. There is nothing positive in ideas, which ~ causes them to be called false 106

Prop. XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and perfect, is true 106

Prop. XXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve 106

Prop. XXXVI. Inadequate or confused ideas follow by the same necessity as adequate or clear and distinct ideas . 107

Prop. XXXVII. That which is common to all, and is equally in a part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any particular thing . . . . . . 107

Prop. XXXVIII. Those things, which are common to all, and are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived except adequately 107

Prop. XXXIX. That, which is common to and a property of the human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human body, and which is present equally in each part of either or in the whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind 108

Prop. XL. Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas,

which are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate 109

CONTENTS xix

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THE ETHICS — Continued.

Part II. Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind — Continued.

Prop. XLI. Opinion is the only source of falsity, reason and intuition are necessarily true 112

Prop. XLII. Reason and intuition, not opinion, teach us to distinguish the true from the false 112

Prop. XLI 1 1. He who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived 112

Prop. XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent, but as necessary 114

Prop XLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particular thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God 115

Prop. XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God, which every idea involves, is adequate and perfect 116

Prop. XLVI I. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God . . .116

Prop. XLVI II. In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this last by another cause, and so on to infinity 118

Prop. XLIX. There is in the mind no volition, or affirmation and negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves 119

Part III. On the Origin and Nature of the Emotions . 127 Postulates 129

Prop. I. Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain cases passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas, it is necessarily active ; and in so far as it has inadequate

ideas, it is necessarily passive 129

Prop. II. Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind determine body to motion or rest, or any state

different from these, if such there be 130

Prop. III. The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate ideas; the passive states of the mind depend

solely on inadequate ideas 134

Prop. IV. Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause

external to itself 135

Prop. V. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in the same object, in so far as one is capable of

destroying the other 135

Prop. VI. Everything in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being 135

XX

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THE ETHICS — Continued.

Part III. Origin and Nature of the Emotions — Continued.

Prop. VII. The endeavor, wherewith everything endeavors to persist in its own being is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question 136

Prop. VIII. The endeavor, whereby a thing endeavors to persist in its being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite time , 136

Prop. IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavors to persist in its being for an indefinite period, and of this endeavor it is conscious . . . 136

Prop. X. An idea, which excludes the existence of our body cannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto 137

Prop. XI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind . 137

Prop. XII. The mind, as far as it can, endeavors to conceive those things, which increase or help the power of activity in the body . 139

Prop. XIII. When the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder the body's power of activity, it endeavors, as far as possible, to remember things, which exclude the existence of the first-named things . . . 139

Prop. XIV. If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterward affected by one of the two, be also affected by the other ......,.<.... 140

Prop. XV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of

pleasure, pain, or desire . .140

Prop. XVI. Simply from the fact that we conceive that a given object has some point of resemblance with another object, which is wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said emotions, we shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate . 141

Prop. XVII. If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing, which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same time we shall love it . . .142

Prop. XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully by the image of a thing past or future, as by the image of a thing present 143

CONTENTS xxi

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THE ETHICS— Continued.

Part III. Origin and Nature of the Emotions — Continued.

Prop. XIX. He who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved, he will feel pleasure .... . 144

Prop. XX. He who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure 144

Prop. XXI. He who conceives that the object of his love is affected pleasurably or painfully will himself be affected pleasurably or painfully; and the one or the other emotion will be greater or less in the lover, according as it is greater or less in the thing loved . 145

Prop. XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects some object of our love, we shall be affected with love toward that thing. Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an object of our lOve painfully, we shall be affected with hatred toward it .... 145

Prop. XXIII. He who conceives that an object of his hatred is painfully affected will feel pleasure. Contrariwise, if he think that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel pain. Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred 146

Prop. XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an object of our hate, we shall feel hatred toward him also. If we conceive that he painfully affects the said object, we shall feel love toward him . . 147

Prop. XXV. We endeavor to affirm, concerning ourselves and concerning what we love, everything that we conceive to affect pleasurably ourselves or the loved object. Contrariwise, we endeavor to negative everything, which we conceive to affect painfully ourselves or the loved object 147

Prop. XXVI. We endeavor to affirm, concerning that which we hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and contrariwise, we endeavor to deny concerning it everything which we conceive to affect it pleasurably 147

Prop. XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion, to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion .... 148

Prop. XXVIII. We endeavor to bring about whatsoever we conceive to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavor to remove or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to v conduce to pain . . .149 xxii SPINOZA

THE ETHICS— Continued.

Part III. Origin and Nature of the Emotions — Continued.

Prop. XXIX. We shall also endeavor to do whatsoever we conceive men to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from 150

Prop. XXX. If anyone has done something which he conceives as affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as a cause ; in other words, he will regard himself with pleasure. On the other hand, if he has done anything which he regards as affecting others painfully, he will regard himself with pain 150

Prop. XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates anything which we love, desire, or hate, we shall thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love, etc. On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from something that we love, we shall undergo vacillation of soul 151

Prop. XXXII. If we conceive that anyone takes delight in something, which only one person can possess, we shall endeavor to bring it about, that the man in question shall not gain possession thereof 152

Prop. XXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves, we endeavor, as far as we can, to bring it about that it should love us in return . 153

Prop. XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we conceive a loved object to be affected toward us, the greater will be our complacency 153

Prop. XXXV. If anyone conceives that an object of his love joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he himself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred toward the loved object and with envy toward his rival . 154

Prop. XXXVI. He who remembers a thing, in which he has once taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances as when he first took delight therein 155

Prop. XXXVII. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater , . , . . 155

Prop. XXXVIII. If a man has begun to hate an object of his love, so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his former love 156

CONTENTS xxiii

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THE ETHICS — Continued.

Part III. Origin and Nature of the Emotions — Continued.

Prop. XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavor to do him an injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue to himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the same law, seek to benefit him 157

Prop. XL. He who conceives himself to be hated by another, and believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate that other in return 158

Prop. XLI. If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love that other in return 159

Prop. XLII. He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from motives of love or honor will feel pain, if he sees that the benefit is received without gratitude . . . .159

Prop. XLIII. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated,

and can on the other hand be destroyed by love . . .160

Prop. XLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes into love; and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not preceded it 160

Prop. XLV. If a man conceives that anyone similar to himself hates anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will hate that person 161

Prop. XLVI. If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by anyone of a class or nation different from his own, and if the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or nation, the man will feel love or hatred not only to the individual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation, whereto he belongs 161

Prop. XLVII. Joy arising from the fact that anything we hate is destroyed or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by a certain pain in us 161

Prop. XL VIII. Love or hatred toward, for instance, Peter is destroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain involved in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea of another cause ; and will be diminished in proportion as we conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion 162

Prop. XLIX. Love or hatred toward a thing, which we conceive to be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if it were felt toward a thing acting by necessity 163

Prop. L. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope or fear 163 xxiv SPINOZA

PAGE

THE ETHICS — Continued.

Part III. Origin and Nature of the Emotions — Continued.

Prop. LI. Different men may be differently affected by the same object, and the same man may be differently affected at different times by the same object .... 164

Prop. LII. An object, which we have formerly seen in conjunction with others, and do not conceive to have any property that is'not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so long as an object which we conceive to have some property peculiar to itself . . . .165

Prop. LIU. When the mind regards itself and its own power of activity, it feels pleasure ; and that pleasure is greater in proportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and its own power of activity . . . 167

Prop. LIV. The mind endeavors to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity 167

Prop. LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels pain thereat 167

Prop. LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love, hatred, hope, fear, etc., as there are kinds of objects, whereby we are affected 169

Prop. LVI I. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion of another individual only in so far as the essence of the one individual differs from the essence of the other 171

Prop. LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and desire, which are attributable to us, in so far as we are active 172

Prop. LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or pain 173

General Definition of the Emotions 187

Part IV. Of Human Bondage or the Strength of the Emotions 189

Preface 189

Axiom 194

Prop. I. No positive quality possessed by a false idea is removed by the presence of what is true in virtue of its being true 194

CONTENTS xxv

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THE ETHICvS — Continued.

Part IV. Of Human Bondage — Continued.

Prop. II. We are only passive in so far as we are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts 195

Prop. III. The force whereby a man persists in existing is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes 195

Prop. IV. It is impossible that man should not be a part of Nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes, save such as can be understood through his nature only as their adequate cause 195

Prop. V. The power and increase of every passion, and its persistence in existing, are not defined by the power, whereby we ourselves endeavor to persist in existing, but by the power of an external cause compared with our own 196

Prop. VI. The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the rest of a man's activities or power, so that the emotion becomes obstinately fixed to him . . . 197

Prop. VII. An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by another emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for controlling emotion 197

Prop. VIII. The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof 198

Prop. IX. An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive the cause to be with us ... . 198

Prop. X. Toward something future, which we conceive as close at hand, we are affected more intensely than if we conceive that its time for existence is separated from the present by a longer interval ; so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to have not long, passed away we are affected more intensely than if we conceive that it has long passed away . . . .199

Prop. XI. An emotion toward that which we conceive as necessary is, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotion toward that which is possible, or contingent, or non-necessary 200

Prop. XII. An emotion toward a thing, which we know not to exist at the present time, and which we conceive is possible, is more intense, other things being equal, than an emotion toward a thing contingent 200 xxvi SPINOZA

PAGE

THE ETHICS— Continued.

Part IV. Of Human Bondage — Continued.

Prop. XIII. Emotion toward a thing contingent, which we know not to exist in the present, is, other conditions being equal, fainter than an emotion toward a thing past . 201

Prop. XIV. A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion .... 201