Sketches of moral and mental philosophy: their connection with each other; and their bearings on doctrinal and practical Christianity

Front matter

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5 THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, J Princeton, N; J.

I

Preface

There seems a special necessity in the present times, for laying, open to the light of day every possible connexion, which might be fancied or alleged between Theology and the other Sciences. All must be aware of a certain rampant infidelity that is now abroad, which, if neither so cultured nor so profound as in the days of our forefathers, is still unquelled and resolute as ever ; and is now making fearful havoc, both among the disciples of the other learned professions, and among the half educated classes of British society. The truth is, that infidelity, foiled in its repeated attacks on the main citadel of the Christian argument, now seeks for auxiliaries from every quarter however remote of human speculation. There is not perhaps one of the sciences which has not, at some time or other, been pressed into the service ; and the mis¬ chief is, that, in very proportion to their ignorance of these sciences, might the faith of men be un¬ settled by the imagination of a certain wizard power, that each of them, on the authority of some great infidel name, has been said to possess — a power, not only to cast obscuration over the truth of Christianity, but bid the visionary fiction alto¬ gether away into the shades from which it had been conjured. And accordingly, at one time there arose Geology from the depths of the earth, and entered into combat with a revelation, which, pillared on the evidence of history, has withstood the onset. At another, from the altitudes of the

VI

PREFACE.

upper firmament was Astronomy brought down, and placed in hostile array against the records of our faith ; and this assault also has proved power¬ less as the former. Then, from the mysteries of the human spirit has it been attempted, to educe some discovery of wondrous spell by which to dis¬ enchant the world of its confidence in the gospel of Jesus Christ ; and many an argument of metaphysic form has been taken from this department of philosophy, to discredit both the contents and the credentials of that wondrous manifestation; and these have been successively, though per¬ haps not yet fully or finally disposed of. Even, in quest of argument by which to prop the cause of infidelity or to find some new plausibility in its favour, the recesses of physiology have been explored; and from Lecture-rooms of Anatomy, both in London and elsewhere, have the lessons of materialism been given, and that to the conclusion of putting a mockery on all religion, and if possible expelling it from the face of the earth. But per¬ haps the most singular attempt to graft infidelity on any thing called a science, is by those who associate their denial of the Christian Revelation with the doctrines of Phrenology — as if there were any earthly connexion between the form of the human skull, or its effect upon the human character upon the one hand, and the truth or falsehood of our religion upon the other. For, granting them all their organs, it no more tells either to the confirmation or disparagement of our historical evidence for the visitation of this earth by a messenger from Heaven, than it tells on the

historical evidence for the invasion of Britain bv

PREFACE.

VU

Julius Caesar. And we venture to affirm of all the other sciences, that no discovery has been made in any of them, which is not in e\ery way as incon¬ sequential to the point at issue; and that the truths of all Philosophy put together as little inter¬ fere with the truths of the Gospel, as the discov¬ eries of the astronomer interfere with the discov¬ eries of the anatomist. But so it is. While each science rests on an evidence of its own, and, con¬ fining itself to its own legitimate province, leaves all the other sciences to their own proper credentials and their own claims — the science of Theology has been converted into a sort of play-ground for all sorts of inroads, and that from every quarter of human speculation. Nor are we aware of a single science in the vast encyclopedia of human know¬ ledge, which has not, in some shape or other, been tnrned, by one or more of its perverse disciples, into an instrument of hostility against the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Nevertheless it too has an evi¬ dence of its own, alike unassailable and beyond the reach of violence from without. It is not by the hammer of the mineralogist, that this evidence can be broken. It is not by the telescope of the astronomer, that we can be made to descry in it any character of falsehood. It is not by the knlie of the anatomist, that we can find our way to the alleged rottenness which lies at its core. Most ridiculous of all, it is not by his recently invented cranioscope, that the phrenologist can take the dimensions of it and find them to be utterly awaating. And las.dy, may it be shown, that it is no’ by a dissecting metaphysics, that the philosopher of the human miud can probe his way to the

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PREFACE.

secret of its insufficiency ; and make exposure to the world of the yet unknown flaw’, which incur¬ ably vitiates and so irreparably condemns either the proofs or the subject-matter of the Christian faicn. All these sciences have, at on<} time or other, cast their missiles at the stately fabric of our Christian philosophy and erudition; but they have fallen impotent at its base. They have offered insult but done no injury, siive to the defenceless youth whose principles liiey have subverted, or to those n*en of ambitious vanity yet imperfect education whose little learning is a dangerous thing. If pedantry be defined the untimely introduction of science, with its imposing nomenclature, either into companies that cannot understand it, or into subjects where it is wholly inapplicable, then is this the most mischievous and unfeeling of all pedantry. It were well to expose it and disarm it of its power over the imaginations of ignorance — to prove that Theology has an independent domain of her own, where, safe in her own inherent strength and in the munitions by which she is surrounded, she can afford to be at peace with her neighbours, and, free from all apprehension or envy, can rejoice in the prosperity of all the sciences.

Analogous with these repeated attempts on the part of a vain philosophy to destroy the credentials of our faith, is the attempt, and under the guise of lofty science too, of that transcendental scripture criticism which flourishes in Germany, to vitiate and transform its subject-matter.* Now the way

* We all tlie more ■vvillinglv advert to tliis topic, that it fur¬ nishes the opportunity of expressing our regret, in not having boen hitherto able from want of room, to fulfil our intention of

I'HLIACE.

IX to meet the ignorant pedantry of this attempt, is to make d'lstinction between such a scripture-criti¬ cism as that which accomplished the English trans¬ lation of our Bible, and that very best and highest scripture-criticism, which, if brought to bear on this our own popular version, might confer on it the utmost improvement or rectification of which it is susceptible. The one might be termed the ordi¬ nary scripture-criticism of which we enjoy the benefit in our own land, the other, the transcen¬ dental scripture-criticism, most cultivated in Ger¬ many while comparatively unknown among our¬ selves. Now what we affirm is that the ordinary scripture-criticism brings the whole substance of theology within our reach ; and that in our autho¬ rized version, the product of that scripture criti¬ cism, not only are all the articles of theology accurately rendered ; but that every article of the least importance, whether estimated practically or scientifically, is therein to be found. And it further admits, we think, of sound and impregnable demon¬ stration — that it lies not within the power of the transcendental scripture-criticism either to change or to undermine this theology. It might make certain infinitesimal additions to our former know¬ ledge, in things minute and circumstantial, and by all means let us have these ; but we utterly mis¬ take and overrate its powers, when we think that, by its means we shall ever be able — either to make any material additions by which to enlarge, or any material alterations by which to transform

discussing the subjects of Scripture Criticism and Systematic Theology — a discussion that we must now postpone to a future volume of the series.

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PREFACE.

the system of doctrine, that, with slight variations^ has been espoused by all the reformed churches of Christendom. It might defend the faith ; but it will not enlarge the faith. As an instrument of defence it is most valuable ; but as an instrument of discovery it is a microscope, and not a telescope — dealing in things that are minute, but not in things that are momentous. There are certain nuffcs difficiles which it can master, certain scriptural enigmas which it can resolve, certain eclair cissemens which we should like it to prose¬ cute to the uttermost. But as to the capita Jidei, as to all the moralities of the Christian practice, or all the beads and articles of the Chris¬ tian faith, it can make no additions to these, it can make no changes on these. It is powerful as a protector of the great truths we have ; but not as a discoverer of more — as a shield to our existing orthodoxy, but not as an architect by which either to take it down, or to substitute another orthodoxy in its place. We are not refusing its pretensions to a very high place in our schemes of ecclesiasti¬ cal education j for by its means, we repel the in¬ roads of heresy, and raise a bulwark to the faith* But we utterly refuse the mischievous pretensions which have been made for it, to amend, or to alter, or even to subvert that faith. They who put forth such extravagant pretensions wholly misun¬ derstand the instrumentality and the functions, not of the ordinary, but of the superlative scripture criticism; and this attempt to injure and to un¬ settle, by means of the science of scripture-criti¬ cism, is of a piece with the attempts to turn to the same unhallowed purpose all the other sciences.

Contents

Chav. L On the Distinction between the Moral and Menial

Philosophy, . 13

11. On the peculiar Difficulty in the Study of Mind

Chapter I

On the Distinction between the Moral and Mental Philosophy.

1. The two terms Moral and Mental are often held as synonymous with each other. In its primi¬ tive and right meaning, Moral stands opposed to vicious or immoral, and so is tantamount to the virtuous or good in character. In its later mean¬ ing, it stands contrasted with Material ; and thus by the moral world, we are made to understand the world of minds — and so Moral Science is equi¬ valent to Mental Science, or that Philosophy, the object of which is to assign the laws and properties of the substance Mind, in contradistinction to that other Philosophy, which, comprehensive of many sciences, assigns the laws and properties of the substance Matter. It is thus that Moral Philo¬ sophy has greatly widened, of late, the field of its topics and inquiries; and, instead of being what it wont, a manageable and well-defined science, has become a medley of incongruous subjects — charg¬ ing itself with a sort of mastery or control over all the sciences ; and, on the principle perhaps, that, in virtue of the cognizance which it takes of mind, it might extend this cognizance to all which the mind has to do with — making inroads on every territory of human speculation, and ranging ini¬ mitably or at pleasure over all the provinces of human thought.

2. It were well to reduce this strange concre¬ tion ; or to marshal aright into proper and distinct groups, the ill-sorted members of this vast and varied miscellany. And first, regarding the mind as the seat of certain affections and processes, we would assign to Mental Science as its legitimate and sole office, the investigation of these viewed simply as phenomena. The record of these would form the Natural History of the mind. The classification of these would form its Natural Philosophy. The Mental Science comprehensive of both ; taking cognizance of aU the various states of mind, with the changes or sequences which take place on these in given circumstances, as so many facts which it must describe aright and register aright — it thus presents us with the Physics of the Mind, with the Physiology of Dr. Thomas Brown, with the Pneumatology of an older generation. It is thus that Mental Science lies as much within the domain of experimental or observational truth, as does the Science of the Material Universe. The one is as much the science of actual events or of existent objects, as the other. The quid est of Mind, whatever can be predicated thereof as de¬ scriptively or historically true, belongs to Mental Science — just as the quid e.st of Matter, whatever can be predicated thereof as descriptively or his¬ torically true, belongs to Material Science. Each

MORAL AND MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

is a science of pure observation ; and the Inductive Philosophy of Lord Bacon is alike applicable to both.

3. But the quid est is not to be confounded with the quid oportet; and Moral Truth is in every way as distinct from the facts or principles which make up the actual constitution of the human mind, as Mathematical Truth is distinct from the actual laws and properties of the material world. The question, What are the affections or purposes of the mind, is wholly distinct and dissimilar from the question which relates to the rightness and wrongness of these affections or purposes. My knowledge that such a purpose or passion exists, is one thing ; my judgment of its character is another. In the one case, it is viewed historically as a fact ; in the other it is viewed morally as a vice or a virtue. In the one aspect, it belongs to mental ; in the other, to moral science — two sciences distinct from each other in nature, and which ought never to have been so blended, as to have been treated like one and the same science in our courses of philosophy.

4. It is true that every moral perception or moral feeling has its being or residence in the mind ; but this forms no greater reason for Tiewing moral as identical with mental science, than for so viewing any physical or even mathe¬ matical science. Every perception of external nature, or even of the properties in geometry, has as much its residence in the mind, as have our perceptions of Ethical truth ; and the thing per¬ ceived should no more be confounded with the perception, in the one department than in the other. The objective truth is alike distinct from the subjective sense or notion of it, in all the sciences. In looking to the rightness or wrong¬ ness of certain acts and certain dispositions, the mind is no more looking to itself — than when looking abroad on the fields, or taking an obser¬ vation in Astronomy. The judge on the bench needs no more have been looking inwardly during the currency of a protracted trial, than the mathe¬ matician during the whole process of a lengthened algebraical investigation. Mental Science is as distinct from all other sciences, including the ethical and the logical, as our notions of things are from the things themselves. In the act of estimating what is right in morals, or what is sound in reasoning, or what is correct in taste, we no more look to the mind — than we do in the act of estimating what is true in Geometry, or of estimating any of the properties of material sub¬ stances. If Mental Science, then, have absorbed the Moral and Intellectual Sciences, it might claim for itself the monopoly of all the sciences. Moral Philosophy is the Philosophy of Morals, not tlie Philosophy of Mind.

5. But, as we have already in part intimated. Mental Science has not only usurped the Science of Ethics, but also Logic and the Philosophy ot Taste. There is no sufficient reason for this. The mind is not thinking of itself at all, in the act either of constructing a syllogism, or of pro¬ nouncing on the legitimacy of its conclusion. And it is as little thinking of itself, when estimating the beauties of a landscape, as when forming an estimate of its magnitudes and distances.

6. In spite however of these considerations, there has been in these sciences a process, not of further subdivision, as in the Philosophy of Matter; but, marvellous to say, a process of annexation and • monopoly. Once that the Moral became ecfuivalent to the Mental Philosophy, then it broke forth, by an act of violent aggression, beyond the confines of its own legitimate territory, and usurped a right of cognizance and domination, not only over the whole sciences of our spiritual and intellectual nature, but over other sciences standing in the same relation to that of mind as itself does. As if the Ethical department did not afford a sufficient range. Moral Philosophy has gone forth, and made forcible seizure on the prin¬ ciples of Taste, on the Metaphysics of Grammar, on the w'hole physiology of the mind, with all its feelings and all its faculties, and lastly on the laws and methods of the human understanding. It is certainly strange that while all other Philosophy is more shared and subdivided than before, with the accumulation of its materials — all these subjects should thus have been heaped together into one aggregate under the title of Moral Philosophy, and the w hole burden of it laid upon one solitary Pro¬ fessorship. Even centuries ago, a separation was deemed necessary, as may be inferred from the very existence in our Universities of a Logic along with a Moral Philosophy class — and it does seem inexplicable, that, in proportion as truths otq multiplied, the smaller should be the number of repositories in which they are laid. It is thus that Moral Philosophy is now in a state of com¬ pression; and that its Lectureship has, in some degree, become a heterogeneous medley of topics which are but ill adjusted with each other. VVe have for years been in the habit of regarding this not merely as incommodious for the practical business of a University ; but in itself as unphilosophical. We hold the whole of this domain to be wide enough for being broken down into its sections and its provinces ; and, both to reduce the plethoric magnitude of one subject as well as to save an invidious usurpation on the right and property of others, we do think it expedient, that when there is for the Philosophy of Taste a class of Rhetoric, and for the Philosophy of Knowledge a class of Logic, the distinct and appropriate business of this one class should be the Philosophy of Duty.

7. And we apprehend that down to the days of Hutcheson, and even of Dr. Adam Smith, Moral Philosophy was mainly and substantially the Philosophy of Morals. Both of these eminent writers were chiefly ethical; and did, we under¬ stand, in their University courses, very much confine themselves either to the principles of virtue, or to its motives and practical applications. It was, we imagine, in the days of Hume, that Moral Philosophy first broke over its original barriers, and made the widest diffusion of itself throughout the other departments in the science of human nature. Certain it is, that the infidelity of that distinguished philosopher bore a threatening aspect on the very foundations of morality ; and called torlh, at his

MORAL AN! MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

first appearance, a noble reaction of vigilance and alarm, on the part of its defenders. Among these the professors of Moral Philosophy took, as became them, a conspicuous place ; and seized on every outpost of advantage, friun which they might repel the inroads of this wasteful and withering scepticism. But it was mainly a warfare on the grounds of evidence or belief — and so, a careful review had to be taken of , the intellectual powers ; and the champions of morality, directing their main force to the quarter of attack, felt themselves principally called upon at that period to guard and illustrate the whole philosophy of the understanding. It was thus that in the hands of Reid and Beattie, the moral and the me?taphysical came to be so intimately blended; and even after they had achieved the important service on wRich they went forth, did they still linger on the field of combat, and neither they nor yet their successors have retired within the limits of the original encamp¬ ment. In this way the proper and the primary topics of a Moral Philosophy class have been in a great measure overborne ; nor do we see, in the writings either of Stewart or Brown, any tendency to restore these topics to the place and the pre¬ eminence which belong to them.

8. We are informed by one of Dr. Smith’s biographers, that, “ In the professorship of Logic, he soon saw the necessity of departing widely from the plan that had been followed by his predecetisors ; and of directing the attention of his pupils to studies of a more useful and interesting nature, than the Logic and Metaphysics of the schools.

Accordingly, after exhibiting a general view of the powers of the mind, and explaining so much of the ancient logic as was requisite to gratify curiosity, with respect to the artificial mode of reasoning which had once occupied the universal attention of the learned, he dedicated all the rest of his time to the delivery of a system of Rhetoric and Belles

Lettres _ He afterwards became Professor of

Moral Philosophy in Glasgow, which he treated purely as the Science of Morals, and divided it thus into four parts. The first contained Natural Theology, in which he considered the proofs of the Being and Attributes of God, and those principles of the human mind upon which religion is founded. The second comprehended Ethics strictly so called. In the third he treated at more length of that branch of morality which relates to justice; and which, being susceptible of precise and accurate rules, is capable of a more systematic demonstra¬ tion. In the fourth he explained those political regulations which are founded upon expediency, and which are calculated to increase the riches, the power, and the prosperity of a state.”

9. Now this may serve as a specimen of what Moral Philosophy once was — standing in wide contrast to what it now is, since it suffered the transformation of which we have been speaking. When engaged in the duties of a Professor of Logic, Dr. Smith did feel himself called upon to exhibit a general view of the powers of the mind, and to explain the most useful parts of Metaphysics . — and, besides grafting the distinct subject of Rhetoric upon his course, to examine the several ways of communicating our thoughts by speech. And when from this professorship, he entered upon that of Moral Philosophy — instead of availing him¬ self, as he well might, of the preparations that he had already accumulated — if Moral Philosophy had then been what it has now become in our present day — he evidently sets himself to it as altogether a new subject, and feels as if he w as entering on a wholly distinct region of speculation. In the sketch now given of his labours in his second chair, we read of Natural Theology, and Ethics, and Jurisprudence, and Political Economy — but not one word of Metaphysics. And we venture to afifirm, that, without any aid from this last science, he both conceived and brought to maturity his most valuable speculations.

iO. It is very true that, in virtue of his previous attentions to Logic, he might have been better qualified for the prosecution of his new labours in Moral Philosophy — just as a certain mathematical preparation is indispensable to the study of Natural Philosophy. But this does not affect our position of the subjects being distinct, and that they ought to be laid on distinct professorships. We should esteem it a most oppressive imposition on him, whose office it is to unfold the doctrines of Natural Philosophy — were he also required to teach all the Geometry and Algebra, that might be indispen¬ sable to the understanding of his demonstrations. And it were surely equally unreasonable, it were blending two professorships into one, it had to a certain extent been translating Dr. Smith to sub¬ stantially the same professorship under a different name, should it have been held incumbent on him, or on any of his successors in office, instead of laying an immediate seizure on the truth which directly belonged to their own appropriate science, to have entered on an analysis of the powers by which truth is investigated. This is the office of another labourer ; and, if it must be fulfilled upon the student — ere he is a fit subject for the demon¬ strations of Ethical Science, this is only saying that Logic should precede the Moral, even as Mathematics precede the Natural Philosophy.

11. But in point of fact, the truths of Ethical Science may be apprehended without any antece¬ dent investigation on our part of the apprehending faculty. In like manner as the visible qualities of an object, may all be looked to and so ascertained without once thinking of the eye — so there are many thousands of objects in every department of Science, and Moral Science among the rest, which may all be regarded with most correct and intelli¬ gent observation, without the bestowing of so much as a thought on the observant mind. There is one philosopher who has outstripped all his pre¬ decessors in those high efforts of analysis, by which he has unravelled the operations and powers of our mental system. But admitting the soundness, as we do the talent and originality cf hL specula¬ tions, stiU we refuse to acknowledge them as fore¬ runners and scarcely even as auxiliaries to the study of Moral Philosophy. We question their subserviency to the demonstrations of Natural Theology, or Ethics, or Jurisprudence, or Poli¬ tical Economy. Admitting many of his positions

MORAL AND MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

regarding the Physiology of the mind to be truths, still they are truths irrelevant to the proper object of Ethical Science. And, however much it may startle the admirers of one who emitted so power¬ ful a light during his short but brilliant day, and who has left in posthumous authorship a monument of proud endurance behind him — ^yet we shall esteem the conclusive separation of his Mental from the Moral Philosophy, to be as great a deliverance for the latter, as Dr. Smith seems to have felt, when, departing widely from the plan that had been followed by his predecessors, he cleared away from the business of his first pro¬ fessorship the Logic and Metaphysics of the schools.

12. But this great philosopher himself is thoroughly aware of the distinction ; and, we think too, must have been aware of the independence in a great degree of the two subjects of the Intellectual and the Moral Philosophy. “ If, however, during the flourishing periods of Greek and Roman letters, this intellectual analysis was little cultivated, the department of the philosophy of the mind, which relates to practical Ethics, was enriched, as I have said, by moral speculations the most splendid and sublime. In those ages, indeed, and in countries in which no revealed will of Heaven had pointed out and sanctioned one unerring rule of right, it is not to be wondered at, that, to those who were occupied in endeavouring to trace and ascertain such a rule in the moral nature of man, all other mental inquiries should have seemed comparatively insignificant. It is even pleasing thus to find the most important of all inquiries regarded as truly the most important, and minds of the highest genius, in reflecting on their own constitution, so richly diversified and adorned with an almost infinite variety of forms of thought, discovering nothing, in all this splendid variety so worthy of investigation, as the conduct which it is fitting for man to pursue.” Brown — Lecture I.

13. At a time then when the intellectual analysis was little cultivated, the department of Ethics was enriched by splendid and sublime moral specula¬ tions. We are aware of a prejudice by which many are disposed to think that when there is much splendour, there is no solidity. But we affirm that there might be solid as well as subhme moral speculations, by those who cultivate the intellec¬ tual analysis as httle as the ancients did — just as a man can not only be dazzled by the glories of a landscape, without so much as the consciousness of that retina which hath taken in the impression of it ; but can also take accurate cognizance of all the objects which are there placed before him.

14. We regard splendour as at best a very am¬ biguous compliment, when ascribed to any specu¬ lation. But what we contend for is, not that splendid, but that sound ethical speculation may be formed without the aid of the intellectual analysis. We are not at present inquiring into the justness of this analysis, and offer no reflection either on the truth or the importance of Dr. Brown’s speculations on the physiology of the mind. But every thing in its own place. And what we affirm is, that, to make the antecedent