A short history of ethics, Greek and modern

Front matter

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170.9

Preface

This book is mainly descriptive but also critical. My primary object has been to provide a brief and accurate description of the leading Greek ethical systems, and of those systems which appear to represent the best types of modem philosophic Ethics, from Hobbes to the end of the nineteenth century ; systems which may be regarded as contemporary are ex¬ cluded. My secondary object has been to show, by criticism and comparison, the connecting links between systems and the movements of thought by which new systems arise — movements which express both reaction and expansion. Scholastic doctrines receive little attention, because, as the title indicates, they do not come within the scope of the work ; the omission is not intended to suggest that the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is antiquated or wanting in depth — from what I know of it I conclude that it is remarkably profound and subtle, — but as his system, in its non -theological features, is largely a

v VOQVR,

VI

A SHOBT HISTOEY OF ETHICS commentary on, and expansion of, Aristotelianism, its omission in an elementary history is, I think, justified. Some other familiar names are omitted, because I have sought to give types of thought rather than names of thinkers. Beid’s ethical doctrines, for example, are, in my opinion, represented by Butler’s, and those of the French empiricists by Hume. J. J. Eousseau, though his influence was wide, is not mentioned, because his teaching was an appeal to the feelings rather than a systematic philosophy. More recent systems like those of Wundt, Paulsen, Nietzsche, and the Pragmatists are also omitted.

This book is, as I have said, mainly descriptive, but I wish to emphasise the importance of recognising that a critical history of philosophy may be used as a method of positive philosophical construction, and that its results need not be negative or sceptical. The history of thought shows that the idea of objective human good contains, in some of its forms, a con¬ tradiction, or an irrational element, which it is the business of Pure Ethics to expose and, if possible, to remove. The method of historical criticism examines the different attempts that have been made to remove this irrational element, and selects provisionally that system which appears, on the whole, the most satis¬ factory from a logical and practical point ol view.

PBEFACE

Vll

The history of Ethics shows that the irrational element is clue to a conflict between two opposite tendencies. The first is to lay undue stress on the emotional con¬ stituents of the Good ; I believe the only logical issue of this is Exclusive Egoism (Cyrenaics, Epicurus, Hobbes), which solves the difficulty only at the cost of admit¬ ting that objective social good is a self- contradictory conception. The second tendency is represented by Moral Purism (Cynics, Stoics, Kant), which uses the principle that the satisfaction of particular feelings or of the feelings of particular individuals cannot be the right guides to conduct ; by a strained use of this true principle it is inferred that pleasure has no ethical worth. The eighteenth -century intuitionists recognised the difficulty, but they took the wrong way of escape; they endeavoured by various artifices to prove that conscience and the desire for happiness lead, or ultimately will lead, to the same result, namely, a general harmony between the pleasures of all persons. But assuming that such a social harmony could result, it would be merely external, not inward and spiritual; the irrational element cannot be abolished in this artificial way.

Evolutional Naturalism has shown that different forms of life are not independent, and that the idea of an organism is not that of a single isolated body,

b viii A SHOET HISTORY OF ETHICS

but a form connecting the individual with the past of living Nature. But the National Idealists have effected what is more important for Pure Ethics in leading us to the notion of the inward unity between the individual manifestations of the higher forms of consciousness ; this is the unity of self-conscious Reason. Without this notion the irrational element in Ethics cannot be removed. It is through this unity that individuality is transcended without being abolished. The reality of “ common good ” depends on this trans¬ cendence, the recognition of which alone makes it possible for a person to identify social good with

his own.

As this book is of an elementary character, I have avoided metaphysical arguments as far as possible. But the preceding remarks illustrate the truth, which should never be forgotten, that a complete philosophy of Ethics involves some very profound metaphysical problems. Eor some writers the practical and specu¬ lative views are almost inseparable, e.g. Plato and Hegel : in others, e.g. Kant and Aristotle, the two can& be separated for a time, but not when the final problems are faced; Aristotle’s ideal life, theona , is the union of speculative and practical wisdom, and connects his Ethics with his Metaphysics ; Kant, though teaching that the practical and speculative

PREFACE ix spheres are distinct for human experience, often implies that the distinction is not final, being due to the present limitation of our faculties. The two apparently opposite schools of Rational Idealism and Pragmatism agree at least on this point that our practical and speculative Reason have a common roof The Ethics of the “ moral sense ” school is the least dependent on metaphysics, but this is not in its favour, being merely the result of superficiality.

I have written a comparatively long “ Introduction,” m the hope that it will be useful to those who are beginning the subject ; it is intended chiefly to define the scope of Ethics, and to give an idea of the nature of the problems that arise. Fixed meanings are given to some words for the sake of definiteness, but it will be found that few systems W a precise terminology, and that the terminologies of those which are precise differ inter se. This inexactness is partly due to the fact that writers on Ethics often treat the subject as a branch of popular literature rather than as an exact science, partly to the fact that the ideas of Ethics are so complex and so liable to change and develop¬ ment, even in the individual mind, that it becomes exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to combine philosophic breadth with precision in the use of terms. Spinoza, in his Ethica, was able to overcome

X this difficulty, but it is a curious fact that no one else uses his terminology and definitions, and that his admirers have found it necessary to explain his thoughts in language less precise than his own.

Besides the works of the writers themselves — where this was possible — I have used various histories of philosophy, especially Eitter and Preller’s Historia Philosopliiae Graecae , the histories of Ueberweg and Windelband, and Hoffding’s History of Modern Philosophy. In dealing with Hegel, 1 have made use of the language of Wallace’s translations.

I desire to express my gratitude to Hr. Mahaffy for reading the proof-sheets and giving me the benefit of his wide experience, and to Professor J. I. Beare and Mr. G. W. Mooney for many useful criticisms and suggestions.

Contents

PAGE

Subject-matter of Ethics ...... 1

Ultimate Ends ........ 3

Part I Greek Ethical Systems Chapter I

PAGE

The Sophists, Socrates, and the Socratic

Schools . 31

A. The Sophists . . . . . .31

C. The Cynics ....... 37

D. The Cyrenaics . . . . .39

Chapter II

A. The Idea of Justice . . . . .43

The Cardinal Virtues . . . . .44

Justice in the Individual . . . .46

Its Worth for the Individual. . . 47

Social and Private Good . . . .47

The Ideal State . . . . . .47

The Ideal Ruler . . . . . .48

Education of the Rulers . . . . .50

B. The Theory op Ideas . . . . .52

The Absolute Good . . . . .55

The Ideal and the Actual . . . .57

C. Pleasure, Good, and Rational Order . . 59

Is Pleasure the Good ? . . .60

CONTENTS xm

PAGE

C. Pleasure, Good, and Rational Order (contd.) — ^

The Harmonious Life . . . . .61

Reason in the Universe . . . . .62

CHAPTER III The Separation of the Sciences . . . .64

The Highest Science . . . . . .65

Criticism of some Ethical Theories . . . .66

General Conception of Well-being . . . .67

Division of Virtue . . . . . .68

Characteristics of Moral Virtue . . . .69

The Doctrine of the Mean . . . . .70

Voluntary Actions and Responsibility . . .72

Temperance . . . . . . . .73

Friendship . 76

Self-Love and the Love of Others . . . .76

Pleasure, Pain, and the Good . . . . .77

Knowledge and Virtue . . . . . .78

The Ideal Life . . . . . . .79

General View of the Ethics of Plato and

CHAPTER IV Epicurus . 85

Theory of Knowledge . . . . . .86 xiv A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS

PAGE

Ethics . . 87

Social Virtues ...... 89

Criticism of Egoistic Hedonism . . .90

CHAPTER V Knowledge and Well-being . . , . .93

Theory of Knowledge . . . . . .94

Virtue and the Good . . . . .96

Virtue and Knowledge . . . . .98

Resignation . . . . . .98

Pleasure and Emotion . . . . .98

Modifications . . . • . .100

The Ideal Man . . . . . .100

Social Ethics . . . . . .101

CHAPTER VI General Survey of Greek Ethics

CONTENTS xv

Part II Modern Ethical Systems

PAGE

Intervening Systems . . . . . . .113

Influence of Greek on Modern Ethics . . . .115

Moral Obligation . . . . . . . .118

Naturalism and Intuitionism . . . . .119

Other Types of Ethical Thought . 123

CHAPTER I Earlier Naturalism . 125

A. Egoistic Naturalism — Hobbes . . .126

Philosophy and its Worth . . . .126

Division of Philosophy . . . , .127

Materialism . . . . . . .127

Psychology . 128

Action, Pleasure, Pain, Good, Evil . . .129

Will . 130

The Desire for Power — Egoism . . .130

Exclusive Egoism . . . . . .132

The Warfare of Man with Man . . .132

Articles of Peace; the Laws of Nature . . 133

Civil Government the Guardian of the Laws

of Nature . 135

Summary of Hobbes’ Ethics . . . .136

XVI

PAGE

A.

Egoistic Naturalism — Hobbes ( contd .) —

Criticism of Hobbes’ Ethics

Inconsistencies in Hobbes’ General Philo¬

B.

Rationalistic Naturalism — Spinoza

CHAPTER II English Intuitionism

A.

Rational Intuitionism

Cudworth — Immutable Morality, Reason

Clarke — The Rules of Righteousness

B.

Aesthetic Intuitionism .

Shaftesbury — Virtue and Happiness

Hutcheson — The three “ Calm Determinations”

Criticism of “ Moral Sense ” .

C.

Sympathetic Intuitionism

Adam Smith — The “ Impartial Spectator ”

CHAPTER III English Intuitionism ( continued )

D.

Autonomic Intuitionism — Butler .

The Social Nature of Man ....

The Moral Nature of Man ....

Man is a Law to Himself ....

Human Nature a System ....

The System of Active Principles

CONTENTS

xvii

Applications .....

PAOH

Conscience and Reasonable Self-Love

Criticism ......

Relation of Butler to tlie Greeks

Individualism and Responsibility

CHAPTER IY

Sympathetic Naturalism — Hume.

Impressionism ......

Morals a Science ......

Reason and Passion .....

Moral Sense and Virtue ....

Motive and Moral Approbation

Natural and Artificial Virtues

Obligation .......

Motive to Justice ......

Origin of Justice ......

Pleasure, Sympathy, Utility ....

Criticism .......

Impressionism .....

Psychological Hedonism ....

Defect in Naturalistic Methods

Influence of Hume ....

CHAPTER V Moral Purism — Kant

•

Relation to Preceding Systems

•

The Goodwill ; Motive and Effect ; Duty

and

Inclination ......

xviii A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS

PAGE

The Categorical Imperative . 194

Illustrations . . • • • .195

Humanity an End in Itsell . . . . . 196 j

Autonomy and tlie Kingdom of Ends . . .197

Connection between the Three Forms of the

Categorical Imperative . . . . .199

Free-will and the Laws of Nature . . . .199

Happiness and Virtue ; the Three Postulates of

Good and Moral Law . . . • • .202

Particular Duties . , . • • • • .202

Formalism . . . . . • . 202 j

Virtue and Happiness . . . • .203

Motive and Effect. . • • • 294

Nature and Freedom ..... 206

Permanent Influence of Kant . . .207

Links between Kant and Subsequent Systems „ 209

Chapter VI

C. Hegel

Introductory . 215;

2. The Philosophy of Nature . . .217

3. The Philosophy of Mind . . . 217 ;

CONTENTS xix

PAGE

The Philosophy of Mind . . . .217

I. Subjective Mind /The Soul, Conscious¬ ness, Reason) . . . . .218

II. Objective Mind . . . . .221

(a) Legal Right . . . .222

(c) Social Ethics . . . .224

III. Absolute Mind ..... 227

D. Remarks on the Ethics of German Rational

Relation to Naturalism and Intuitionism . 229

Relation to Positivism and Subsequent Systems 230

Chapter VII

A. Egoistic Utilitarianism — Jeremy Bentham . 235

Virtue, Motive, Punishment . . . .236

B. Sympathetic Utilitarianism — J. S. Mill . 237

Proof of Utilitarianism . . . . .237

Quality of Pleasures . . . . .238

Self-Sacrifice and Conventional Moralitv. . 239

Virtue as an End . . . . . 240

Criticism of Bentham and Mill . . .240

C. Intuitional Utilitarianism — Henry Sidgwick 242

Problem and Methods of Ethics . . . 242

Criticism of Common-Sense and Dogmatic

Intuitionism . . . . . .244

And of other Methods . . . . .244

XX

TV* OK

Philosophic Xntuitionism . . . .245

The Rational Axioms . . . .245

Proof of Utilitarianism . . . .246

Utilitarianism and Common-sense . . 247

Applications, Positive Morality . . 248

Egoism and Altruism . . . .248

D. General Criticism of Utilitarianism . . 249

Ethical Hedonism . . . . . .250

Quantification of Happiness . . . .253

Logical Defect in Utilitarian Idea of Good . 254

The Unity of Good ... . . . 256

CHAPTEE VIII

Evolutional Naturalism . 257

Historical Position . . . . .257

A. Charles Darwin . 259

B. Herbert Spencer . . . . . .261

The End imposed by Nature — Life . . 261

The Subject of Ethics . . . . .261

Good and Bad ...... 262

The Ethical End — Pleasure . . . .262

Spencer on the Evolution of Conduct

The Four “ Views ” .... 263

Feeling and Function . . . .263

The Sense of Duty . . . .264

The Individual and the Type . . . 265

CONTENTS xx;

PAGE

Limit of Social Evolution . . .266

Egoism and Altruism . . . .266

Compromise . . . . .269

Spencer's Theory of Justice

“ Sub-Human ” Justice .... 269

Human Justice. The Formula . 271

The Sentiment and the Idea of Justice . 271

Error of Communism . . . .272

Authority of the Formula of Justice . 273

Applications . . . . . .273

Criticism of Spencerian Ethics

Are the Fittest to Survive the Ethically

Ethical Judgment Free, not Mechanical . 274

Confusion between Naturalism and In-

tuitionism . . . . _ .275

Hedonism and the Limit of Evolution . 278

C. The Different Types of Evolution . .279

CHAPTER IX English Rational Idealism . 282

T. H. Green . 282

Relation to Predecessors. . . . .282

Metaphysic . 282

Will, Reason, and Freedom of Will . 283

The Good Will — Criticism of Hedonists and

Kant . 284 xxii A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS

PAGE

Character of the Moral Ideal . . . .285

Origin of the Ideal . . . . .286

Development of the Ideal . . . .287

Concluding Bemarks . . . . .288

Applied Ethics . . . . .290

The following questions will serve to give the reader a general idea of the nature of the problems which Ethics 1 attempts to solve : — Is happiness the ultimate end of action ? Is virtue preferable to pleasure ? How do pleasure and happiness differ ? TV hat is meant by saying that I ought to perform some particular action, or to respect some general precept such as the keeping of promises ? Am I under any obligation to seek the welfare of other persons, as well as my own ? If so, what is the right proportion between the two welfares? What is meant by “ freedom of the will ” ? Is feeling or reason the right guide to conduct ? What do the terms good, “ right,” “ obligation,” “ duty,” “ conscience ” signify, practically and theoretically ?

These problems and others associated with them form the subject-matter of Ethics, which may be described as the science which investigates the general principles for determining the true worth of the ultimate ends of human conduct. These principles, if they could be discovered and exactly formulated, so

The word “ ethics was originally a plural (ra the science of

morals), but it is now generally used as a singular. The same applies to £k mathematics,” ‘£ physics,” ££ metaphysics,” and other words of like termination.

IS 1 B that the rules of conduct could be deduced from them, would constitute Ideal Morality. Positive Morality is the body of laws (the ethical code) accepted by an age or community as correct principles for determining the true worth of actions, and expressed in the form of judgments of approval and disapproval. For example, the Positive Morality of our age approves of industry, temperance, honesty, and a regard for human life, while it condemns their opposites.

It must not be taken for granted that Positive Morality and Ideal Morality coincide, since the former is partly based on unreflecting traditions, conventions, and customs ; it is often inconsistent with itself, and varies in different times and countries. The burning of so - called witches and the torture of persons suspected of crime or heresy were once regarded as justifiable. At the present time vivisection is con¬ demned by some, whereas others, equally humane and intelligent, hold that, if properly restricted, it is a justifiable method of seeking for the cures of diseases. The divergence between the moral customs of civilised and of savage nations is well known ; cannibalism, polygamy, the destruction of infants and of old persons, — these and other extraordinary customs have been justified by the Positive Morality of certain savage tribes.

But since Ethics cannot detach itself completely from the accepted morality of the community, and since it must start from some kind of data, ethical writers — as the sequel will show — usually assume provisionally that the Positive Morality to which they are accustomed contains valuable truth. They endeavour to exhibit the general principles underlying this Positive Morality, to criticise or justify them, and possibly to extend them beyond their commonly recognised limits. The origin, in the individual and the race, of common moral judgments is also much discussed in modern Ethics, in the belief that light will thereby be thrown on the validity of those judgments.

Ultimate Ends. The end of a deliberate action is that for the sake of which it is performed ; it is something which the agent wishes to realise. Some ends are pursued chiefly, or altogether, as means to the realisation of other ends ; wealth, for example, though an end of many actions, is sought — except perhaps by misers — as a means of acquiring power or happiness. An ultimate end, however, is one that is desired for its own sake, quite apart from its utility in helping towards the attainment of other ends.

Ethics deals with the ultimate ends of human con¬ duct. This characteristic distinguishes it from every other science and brings it into close connection with Metaphysics, which, as understood by Aristotle, investigates the ultimate principles underlying all reality.

That the ethical problem arises quite naturally may be seen by inquiring into the reasons for under¬ taking any inquiry, or for performing any deliberate action. If we ask, for instance, why Geometry is studied, three answers may be given. Eirst, because there exists in some minds a free spontaneous interest 1

1 An interest may be described as anything that attracts or tends to attract attention, so that a person is led to think, act, or feel in a particular way, and finds some degree of satisfaction in such thoughts, actions, or eelmgs. Desire is a movement of the mind towards an object or end that interests. Thus desire and interest are inseparable. But they are not in geometrical knowledge, and the pursuit and capture of such knowledge gives direct satisfaction. This is an ethical answer, for it means that Geometry is good for those whom it interests ; and as we shall see, that which interests and satisfies desire is good, when con¬ sidered by itself alone. But no human occupation is quite isolated ; we must therefore pursue the question further, and inquire whether the external effects of a study of Geometry are also good. Secondly, then, we find that Geometry is studied because it is useful for other sciences, sucii as Astronomy, Statics, Engineering, and Architecture. This, however, is not an ethical answer ; we must next inquire what are the reasons for studying Astronomy and the other sciences. Besides the answer that they gratify a spontaneous interest, and are so far good, we may reply that Astronomy (say) is useful for navigation, and navigation is useful for commerce, war, and travelling. If we followed such trains of reasoning to their conclusions we should find that the ultimate justification — over and above the constantly operating spontaneous interest — for engaging in these pursuits, is that they help men to achieve objects which are desired, at least partly, for their own sakes. It is the function of Ethics to provide general principles for estimating the real worth of these ultimate ends, or to criticise the general principles that are used for this

synonymous ; a desire is a particular conscious state, but an interest may be permanent— e.g. a man may take a permanent interest in football, but be has not a permanent desire to watch or play the game. Again, a desire when it is satisfied ceases to occupy consciousness, but the satisfac¬ tion of an interest consists partly in the fact that it occupies conscious¬ ness and receives more attention than other things. We do not desire to go to the theatre when we are watching a play, but interest may be present in full vigour.

purpose. Thirdly, Geometry is studied because of its educational value. It is the business of Ethics to estimate the real worth of the spontaneous interests j which education helps to foster and to gratify

All of these answers converge to one point, and if we ask the question more generally we shall be led to the same conclusion ; pursuits and studies are undertaken, and deliberate actions performed because « they tend either directly or indirectly, or in both ways, to satisfy one or more human interests. They are valued either as means or as ends, or as both means and ends.

We are now confronted with the main problem of Ethics. Are the satisfactions of these interests, the attainment of these desired objects, good in themselves, or is there some ultimate criterion, some principle or set of mutually consistent principles by which we may determine the intrinsic excellence of the satisfaction of these interests ? One might be disposed to think that the mere existence of such interests in human nature would be a sufficient justification for trying to satisfy them. If this were so the science of Ethics might stop at this point. But the answer is not so simple ; the difficulties in Ethics are due to the follow¬ ing causes, which compel further inquiry. (1) It is not possible for an individual to satisfy all his interests, and he must therefore use some principle of ethical selection, according to which some interests are to be preferred to others. (2) Some interests, if they are allowed to absorb the attention beyond a certain limit, are destructive of their own satisfactions, and interfere with the satisfaction of other interests. This is true, for example, of the interests arising from

A SHOBT HISTORY OF ETHICS bodily appetites; these, if indulged too far, lead to sensual cravings, and to bodily and mental ill-health, thereby diminishing the force and vigour of other interests. (3) The interests of one person often con¬ flict with those of others, and Ethics has to try to find a practical harmony between the interests of the different members of society.

The first two causes give rise to Individual Ethics, the third to Social Ethics.

Good and Moral Good. — Ethics seeks for a principle that will determine the true worth of the ends of con¬ duct. That which is apprehended as having true worth is said to be good. Accordingly, Ethics has sometimes been called the Science of the Good, so far as this is attainable by human conduct, i.e. by human actions deliberately aiming at ends.

Strictly speaking “ good ” is a conception that cannot be accurately defined. In . a sense the main problem of systems of Pure Ethics is to determine this conception with greater accuracy, and Applied Ethics aims at giving a practical meaning to the conception in concrete life. The following remarks are intended, not to give an exact definition of “ good,” but to render more intelligible the nature of the problems “ What is good?” and “What is moral good ? ” and to show how these problems naturally arise.

“ Good,” “ desire,” and “ interest ” are closely con¬ nected with each other. Though we cannot follow Hobbes in identifying “ good ” with that which any one desires, — for a person’s desires may be misleading or they may conflict with each other, or with those of other persons, — yet it is true that the satisfaction of a desire is good, when considered by itself alone, apart from its possible interference with other desires. More generally, that which, whether preceded by desire or not, is consciously approved by a person for its own sake is good, when considered by itself alone. In this limited sense a pleasurable feeling is gooxl ; or the attainment of any desired end, such as the passing of an examination, or the acquisition of wealth ; or any occupation that interests. In the same limited sense the satisfaction of any interest is good.

But this view of good is clearly narrow and incomplete. Some pleasurable feelings, for example, may be followed by injurious consequences ; wealth may yield less satisfaction to the possessor than a moderate competence ; and when we say that wealth is wrongly acquired, we generally mean that it was acquired in a way that interfered with the interests of other persons. Here we reach the difficulty which is the original stimulus to ethical inquiry. When different “ goods ” or “ interests ” are practically in¬ compatible, we require an ethical scale to determine which is to be preferred. In comparing one limited good with another, we may have to consider (as Bentham did in reference to pleasures) the quality, duration, and intensity of the satisfaction yielded by each, as well as the tendency which each may have to help or hinder the attainment of other goods by the agent or by other persons. In this way there arises a natural distinction between immediate and remote good. Immediate good gives a simple momentary satisfaction experienced by a single person. Remote good, in general, is distinguished from immediate

A SHOKT HISTOEY OF ETHICS good by the fact that the satisfaction it yields is not confined to the present moment or to the experience of one individual. The ends sought by Temperance and J ustice, for example, have the characteristics of remote good ; a temperate man refrains from sacrificing his future interests to the pleasure of the moment ; a just man does not prefer his own interests to those of other persons.

Eemote good, however, for beings whose conscious¬ ness is in Time, is dependent on immediate goods, since its fruition is in moments of Time, and cannot be postponed for ever ; and since society consists of persons with distinct experiences, a social remote good must be realised in the experiences of individuals. Thus Temperance is not a purely negative abstinence from the satisfaction of particular desires, nor is J ustice a merely negative impartiality in the distribu¬ tion of benefits ; the former virtue requires that healthy desires and interests should be positively satisfied in due degree, the latter that benefits should be actually received by individuals.

Immediate good, then, is relatively simple, being either momentary or confined to a single person ; but remote good is a complex whole consisting of inter¬ related parts, which are either immediate goods, or useful in the production of immediate goods. The fundamental difficulty which we have described as the original stimulus to ethical inquiry, may now be expressed as follows : Immediate goods often have to be surrendered in order to secure remote good, which seems, therefore, in such cases, to contain an injurious element ; why should we sacrifice the ! interests ol the present to those of the future, or our own interests for those of other persons? It will be seen that various attempts have been made to overcome this difficult)7. The results are often one¬ sided ; the Cynics, for example, tend to underrate the worth of immediate good, and the Cyrenaics overrate its worth, identifying the highest good with the pleasure of the moment. The problem presents itself inevitably to every thinking person ; and the answer to it means formulating, more or less definitely, some kind of ethical scale, by reference to which the relative worths of different forms of satisfaction are to be estimated.