Religion as credible doctrine; a study of the fundamental difficulty

Chapter I Page

The object of this volume is to exhibit theistic religion generally as a system worthy of reasonable acceptance ....

The readers specially addressed are those who desire to assent to a theistic system, but find it difficult to do so in face of the verified facts of science .......

In this volume the facts of science are accepted on the one hand, and the conclusions of theistic religion are defended on the other

The faulty methods at present pursued by controversialists on both sides, and the confusion which arises in consequence

What is wanted primarily is an intellectual accountant who will go carefully over the books of both parties. This work will be attempted here .......

Definition of the limited meaning in which the word Religion is used in this volume .......

The word here means an intellectual assent to the objective truth of three primary propositions .....

Reasons for thus limiting the meaning of the word here

CHAPTER H

THE FALSE AND THE TRUE STARTING-POINT OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE

The primary difference between religion and science with regard to the

first cause and the active power of the Universe . . .11

V vi Religion as a Credible Doctrine

PAGE

The difference between the two no longer a difference between a

materialistic system and a spiritual . . . .12

The difference one between a monistic system and a dualistic . .13

An elementary explanation of the nature and attributes of what we call

matter, and their relation to mind, and their dependence on it . 14

The complete change that has come over the scientific view of matter

is evidenced by Mr. Herbert Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable 17

Matter no longer conceived of by science as lifeless and inert . .18

The fundamental difference which still exists between the theistic idea

of God and the modern scientific idea of matter . . .19

The modern monistic theory of the universe no\. privtd facie unreasonable, as the old materialism was . . . . .20

The scientific theory is practically that of theologians themselves, so far

as the inorganic universe is concerned . . . .21

The objections that have been drawn from the theory of Entropy

considered . . . . . . .22

This theory suggests no such God as the theist postulates . .23

Organic life is the phenomenon which first brings into practical existence a difference between the monist and the dualist . .25

But both theists and men of science attach a false controversial importance

to the question of the origin of organic life . . .26

The question of biogenesis and abiogenesis, as such, has nothing to do

with the existence or non-existence of the theistic God . .27

The religious theory of the universe depends not on the manner in

which we account for the origin of life . , . .28

As can be easily seen . . . . . .29

But on the alleged possession by human life of certain qualities possessed

by nothing else in the universe . . . . -30

Mere organic life, as such, does not possess these qualities . .32

The theologian in testing religion by science has to concern himself not with organic life as such, but with human free-will, and human immortality ....... 34

The doctrines of free-will and immortality arc defended at present

by arguments which are utterly worthless . . -36

Chapter III

Two methods of defence adopted by the religious apologists of to-day.

The quasi-scientific and the metaphysical -37

Contents vii

PAGE

The quasi-scientific method will be dealt with first . . -38

Two recent volumes of quasi-scientific apologetics taken as examples . 39 The writers of these volumes on the origin of organic life . . 40

They admit that all life originates in the simple cell . . .42

They thus admit that all life has a common origin . . -44

This admission precludes them, so far as the present argument goes,

from imputing any special qualities to human life . .45

The theist, in reality, is concerned solely with those qualities in human Hfe which he alleges to be peculiar to it — namely, freedom and immortality . . . . • • .46

Contemporary theology admits that such is the case . . .46

Chapter IV The Religious Doctrine That The Human Animal Is

IMMORTAL

Theologians use two arguments in favour of human immortality . 47

The first is based on the facts of consciousness generally, as being in

their essence distinct from matter . . . .48

The futility of this whole line of argument explained . • -49

The second argument is based on alleged difi"erences in kind between

the mind and mental powers of man and those of the other animals 5 1 Intellect and certain specific intellectual faculties alleged to be present in

man, and utterly wanting in all other animals . . -52

Judgment and reflection and attention — do these belong to man alone? 53 Self-consciousness — is this peculiar to man ? . . . -54

The mental differences between man and the other animals are differences

of degree only. It is impossible to show that they are differences

The human body and the dawn of self-consciousness . . • 5^

Can man alone form universal concepts ? . . . -58

Rudimentary concepts are formed by animals . . . -59

Observation can establish no sharp line between the animal intellect and

Animals alleged to have no real affections : animals non-progressive . 60 The higher faculties alleged to be peculiar to man, are alleged also to

have no special organ in the brain . . . .61

These arguments, urged by theologians, shown to be absolutely

valueless . . . . . . .61

The counter-arguments which monistic science opposes to theology . 67 viii Religion as a Credible Doctrine

PAGE

Even theologians admit the right of monistic science to speak . . 67

Modem theologians compelled to admit the general truth of the

evolutionary theory . . . . . .68

Embryology as an evidence of evolution . . . .71

The modern advance of embryology . . . . .72

The origin of the individual life the same in man and the higher

The evidence of ontogenesis. The gill-clefts in the human embryo . 74 The tadpole and the frog . . . . . -76

Ontogenesis of the mind . . . . . -76

Vain attempts of theology to weaken the evidences that connect human

with animal life . . . . . . -77

Absurdities involved in the attempt to give any scientific form to the

doctrine of the introduction into the human ovum of a soul

separate from matter • . . . . .80

Chapter V Five Different Aspects Of The Free-will Problem

The idea of freedom essential to the religious idea of morality . . 86

Early perceptions that there is an element of determinism in human

St. Augustine on free-will and original sin . . . .88

St. Augustine on sin as related to God's power and goodness . . 89

Subsequent theologians on conduct as determined by motive . . 90

Their speculations re-stated and elaborated by modern psychology . 91 The determinism of psychology re-stated by physical science . . 92

The determinism of the individual organism . . . '93

The determinism of heredity . . . . . -93

CHAPTER VI The psychology of will simple in all its essentials . . '9^

Every act determined by the desires of the agent . . -96

When two desires are present action follows the strongest . . 97

When only one desire is present only one kind of act is possible . 98

Contents ix

PAGE

99 99

lOI

The complexity of actual facts hides, but does not alter these truths The ass between the two bundles of hay ....

Desire determines action. Can will determine desire ? . . Desires primarily determined by a man's constitution and external

circumstances . . . . . . .102

The desire to eat is an example . . . . .102

Does the variety of desire in men indicate any free power to determine

their desires ? . . . . . . .103

An indefinite variety in desire is obviously referable to congenital

character and circumstance . . . . .104

Modern psychologists are driven to admit that freedom, if it exists at

all, can operate only within very narrow limits . . .105

This is shown by the admissions of the Roman Catholic philosopher.

Dr. Ward's attempt to differentiate "resolve" from "spontaneous

Dr. Ward's illustration of his meaning . . . .107

Dr. Ward's illustrations and arguments refute himself . . .109

Resolve and spontaneous impulse alike require and are determined by

motive and circumstance . . . . .110

The resolves of St. Antony in the desert . . . .115

Christ's words with regard to determinism . . , .118

Determinism in spiritual biography . . . . .118

No psychological escape from absolute determinism . . .119

Freedom cannot be expressed in any thinkable form , . .120

All attempts to defend free will involve confusion of thought . .121

And misconception of the real arguments of the determinists . .121

Hobbes and Kant alike admit that, when viewed psychologically, the

doctrine that the will is free, is nonsense . . . .123

CHAPTER VII The individual living organism, and heredity . . . .125

Free-will and the physics of the brain . . . .126

Free-will and the conservation of energy . . . .129

Attempts to reconcile free-will with the general uniformities of the

physical universe . . . . . .128

Complete failure of these attempts . . . . .129

The verifiable influence of the brain on mental action . . -131

X Religion as a Credible Doctrine

The theory that the brain is the mere passive instrument of mind and will ......

This theory now refuted by experimental facts

Changes in the brain impose changes on will and character

The celebrated case of Phineas Gage .

Memory and the brain ....

Fear and courage at the mercy of the brain Religious faith at the mercy of the brain Honesty at the mercy of the brain Chastity at the mercy of the brain and other connected parts of the organism .....

The organism itself determined by heredity

Heredity and innate ideas ....

Idiosyncrasies of character dependent primarily on heredity

Eccentricities of amative imagination .

Mental peculiarities transmitted like physical .

The character like the body depends on parentage

Heredity takes away the last refuge of freedom

Science leaves no room either for human immortality or freedom

Does science leave any room for belief in the theistic God ?

PAGE

139 142

143 144

144 146 146 148 149 149

CHAPTER VIII The mere philosophic God not the God of religion

A large part of the ordinary apologetics of theism utterly worthless for

the real purposes of the theist ..... Science and religion both recognise the supremacy of Mind. The

question is, What attributes do they impute to it ? Is it purposive

and conscious ? .

The old theistic argument based on purpose in man The old theistic argument based on human consciousness Consciousness rises out of the unconscious .... Much seemingly purposive action is demonstrably unconscious No philosophic proof exists that the Supreme Mind or the God of

philosophy is either conscious or purposive The idea that the Cosmos indicates any ethical qualities in the Supreme

Mind is purely fanciful ......

The boasted order of the Cosmos no proof of purpose or wisdom

153 154 155 156

157 159

161 162

Contents xi

Chapter IX Page

God and the means by which life in its various grades has been evolved 1 64 Does the process of evolution suggest either purposive wisdom or love

for individuals, in the supreme Mind ? . . . .165

The waste involved in the process . . . . .166

Frustrated purpose. Attempts to explain this away . . .167

The process of conception — its reckless wastefulness . . .168

The sacrifice of the unfit . . . . . .170

Further attempts to apologise for this . . . • 1 7 1

Ethical theism implies that God loves the unfit . . • 1 7 1

The sacrifice of the individual to the species opposed to the whole

theory of ethical theism . . . . . '173

Attempts to apologise for God's past injustices by promises of his future

Compensation in another life not a scientific, but an arbitrary, hypothesis . . . . . . . -175

The kind of personal God which nature really suggests . .176

Impossible to treat the idea of such a Being seriously . . .177

The God suggested by Nature has at all events no special regard for

The sentimentality of Tennyson and others about law . .179

Law and Monistic determinism . . . . ,180

God, Law, and the Universe scientifically inseparable . .182

Science identifies life with the automatic properties of the Universe . 183 If the Supreme Mind is, in any relation, not bound by and identified with the invariable laws of the Cosmos, science gives us no hint of the fact . . . . . . .184

Ordinary theistic argument wholly fails in its attempt to deduce a

theistic God from the facts of the universe . . ,185

Idealism has lately been making the same attempt, which will be

considered in the next chapter . . . . .186

Chapter X

The idealists and metaphysicians of to-day superior to their predecessors

in that they do not scoff at science, but are serious students of it . 187 xii Religion as a Credible Doctrine

PAGE

As religious apologists their great endeavour is to reconcile freedom of

the will with a cosmos of otherwise determined phenomena . i88

Instead of attacking the details of science, like the theologians, they

admit the doctrines of science to be truths — but only abstract truths 189 They maintain that the only reality is "the duality in unity of subject

and object " . . . . . 191

How does this doctrine differ from the monism of Mr. Spencer and

others, which it is intended to circumvent, by denying any universe

independent of conscious mind ? ...

It is merely Mr. Spencer's monism repeated, minus one essential

element ......

The new idealists deny to the external universe any existence at all

outside the mind of conscious beings The absurdity of the theory which is implied in this doctrine . The new Idealism tested by the facts which it itself admits Berkeley's theory coincident with Mr. Spencer's Difference between the new idealists and Berkeley Why the new idealists have adopted their absurd position which is the

very opposite of Berkeley's ....

The new Idealism, if true, would not vindicate moral freedom Idealism and the determinism of motive

The new Idealism leaves moral freedom as unthinkable as it finds it Negative criticism of modern religious apologetics concluded . No intellectual reconciliation between the cosmic and the moral order

Chapter XI

In asserting the truth of religion we must assert a doctrine absolutely opposed to the doctrines of science which we are compelled to assert also .....

How is this assertion of contradictories to be justified ?

There is a similar assertion of contradictories underlying our belief in everything .....

The theistic idea of God a synthesis of contradictories

The monist's idea of the universal Substance a synthesis of contradictories also .....

Contradiction involved in the idea of atoms and empty space

Similar contradiction involved in the idea of ether

194 196 198 208 209

210 211 214 216 217

219 219

220 221

224 225 226

Contents xiii

PAGE

Ether and God, two expressions of the same difficulty . '235

Contradictions involved in the ideas of space and time . . 236

The thinkable is a mere oasis in the middle of the unthinkable . 237

All knowledge, if pushed far enough, ends in contradictories . .238

Our practical beliefs not invalidated because this element of the contradictory is involved in them ..... 239

A belief in contradictories not necessarily unreasonable . . 240

But to justify a belief in contradictories some practical grounds are

Are there such practical grounds for a belief in religion ? . .241

CHAPTER XII Reasons for supplementing our belief in science by other beliefs which

contradict the first principles of science .... 242 Science can tell us nothing of those subjective values of things which

make up the practical life of all men .... 243 What would life be without an order of beliefs for which science leaves no

place, such as the belief in moral freedom ? . . . 245

The effect on life of a practical belief in absolute scientific determinism 246 A practical belief in determinism destructive of all mental civilisation . 247 A behef in a freedom, for which science leaves no room, is implied in

all that is most valuable in human experience . . . 248

Effects on mental civilisation of the belief in God and immortality' . 249 The mental enlargement and elevation of life which is due to a belief

in God and immortality ...... 250

A belief in God and immortality necessary to make the process of

history and evolution rational . . . . 251

Men of science, as moral philosophers, recognise the necessity of some

belief that shall be the practical equivalent of religion . .253

Professor Huxley's vain attempts to reconcile freedom with science . 255 Mr. Herbert Spencer's attempts to find a substitute, compatible with

his own scientific principles, for theistic religion . . .257

Religious belief has the quality of an act of will . . . 259

A belief in the external world is a similar act . . . 260

Hume shows that this is so . . . . . . 260

Neither the belief in God nor in an external world is an act of reason . 261 Men of science, as moralists, admit that a purely scientific conception

of life would ruin life ...... 262 xiv Religion as a Credible Doctrine

PAGE

Analysis of Professor Huxley's attempt to make his moral repudiation of determinism agree with his scientific assertion of universal causation ....... 263

Mr. Spencer's religion of the Unknowable a vague theism in disguise . 265 Professor Huxley's last essay on ethics .... 267

The hopelessly illogical character of Professor Huxley's ethical reasoning 269 Professor Huxley's argument is a testimony at once to the practical necessity for religion, and the utter impossibility of intellectually reconciling religion with the essential doctrines of science . .270

Chapter XIII

Belief in religion and belief in science equally necessary, and yet intellectually incompatible ...... 272

The denial of religion and the denial of an external world equally absurd 273 The instinctive judgment of humanity with regard to an external world 274 Ordinary or instinctive belief, not science, gives science its subject-matter ... .... 275

No one maintains this more vigorously than Hume . . . 276

The instinctive belief in the moral order characterises the most powerful

civilised, and progressive races . . . . .277

Reason deals with the data supplied by instinctive belief in the moral

order and the cosmic order alike . . . .278

The specifically religious emotions an important fact in human nature . 279 The two opposed orders of things which the practical reason must accept 280 Each of these orders, as the human intellect apprehends it, is inconsistent, not only with the other, but with itself . . .281 Our entire idea of moral conduct is inconsistent, not only with determinism, but with itself ...... 282

To believe in the cosmic and the moral world together, not more

irrational than to believe in either separately . . . 283

The folly of all attempts to discover a formal reconciliation . . 284

The intellect must definitely and consciously accept its own limitations 285 The synthesis of contradictories supplied by the whole experience of

Reasonableness of acquiescence in the co-existence of two orders of

things, not reconcilable in terms of reason . . .287

Chapter I

In this book I propose to deal with the question The subject of

ot how tar that theory of hie which is associated with the name of religion, is a theory to which, under existing conditions of knowledge, a reasonable man can any longer assent. This is a question in which the ordinary man of the world has just as much concern as the man with the temperament of a saint ; and I shall, in discussing it, appeal to the reader's intelligence very much oftener than I shall to his devout emotions.

Now, writers of books which deal with controversial subjects would in most cases do well to give some indication at starting of the kind of conclusion which they are setting out to establish ; but this is specially true of books such as the present, which deal critically with religion, as an element in life or as a theory of it. The reader who begins a book on this intimate but intricate subject, knowing something of the direction in

B

Chapter i

The conclusions which this volume aims at establishing.

which the writer intends to take him, has the same advantage over a reader from whom such knowledge is withheld, that a man who with open eyes is being led across a difficult country has over one who is led with his eyes bandaged. Let me say at once, then, that though the arguments which I am about to urge on the reader differ from those adopted by most religious apologists, and will in some ways be unwelcome to some of them, and to some of them profoundly irritating, the object with which I urge them is precisely the same as theirs. It is to exhibit as worthy of a reasonable man's acceptance, not indeed the dogmas of any one religion in particular, but those fundamental doctrines which are equally essential to all religions, and which are, moreover, the doctrines against which modern science, as generally understood, directs its fundamental protests.

Such being my object, let me briefly indicate also the kind of reader whom I specially have in view. As related to religion, men, at the present day, may be broadly divided into three classes as follows : Firstly, there are those who, relying on positive science as the sole source of any real or progressive knowledge, are eager in rejecting the religious view as illusory, and welcome each fresh discovery which supports them in this attitude ; secondly, there are those who, convinced that the religious view is true, are determined to maintain that every fact which conflicts with it, either is not a fact at all, or is a fact that has been wrongly interpreted ; and thirdly, there are those who are chapter i doubtful of the religious view or deny it ; but The dl^of who, in doubting or denying it, do so against their addressed. will, and are looking about them in vain for some intellectual road by which they may reach again a position of religious certainty.

It is to the doubts, the convictions, the sympathies, of this third, this last class of persons, that I shall, in the present volume, most directly appeal. Each, however, of the two other classes also — the class which, relying on science, is the determined opponent of religion, and the class which, in defence of religion, is attacking the authority of science — will find me, though partly disagreeing with it, yet partly in complete agreement. I shall seek to show that the latter is right in its final conclusions, but is seeking to support them by methods hopelessly futile. I shall seek to show that the former is, in its conclusions, wrong ; but that the arguments which it adduces to support them are in themselves invulnerable.

The details of the method by which we are to find our way to reconciling positions seemingly so opposed as these must be left to explain themselves in the course of the following chapters ; but something may be said in advance with regard to their general character. Of the various facts and considerations brought to the reader's notice, not a single one, if considered separately, will be new. The reader will recognise each as something already familiar to him, much as he might recognise the

Chapter i itcms of a forgottcn bill in a drawer : but he will

Thefts of probably find that there is one thing with which

comrXiau he is not familiar at all— which the more he reflects

'^'^- on it will cause him the more surprise : — and that

is the result which these facts yield, when taken

together, and arranged in logical order.

My meaning will become clear when I have briefly called attention to a marked characteristic of the religious controversy of to-day. A variety of arguments are used by thinkers on either side ; but on either side it is the tendency of each individual disputant, not to consider the arguments which it is open to him to use, as a whole, or to consider, as a whole, those which are capable of being used against him, but to confine his attention to issues which are artificially limited, and from which many of the factors vital to his real position are missing. We have thus between the defenders of religion and their opponents a series of duels or skirmishes — a kind of guerilla warfare ; but nothing that approaches a general or decisive action. In other words, what is wanted at the present day is not the production of facts and arguments that are new, but a sorting, a summing-up, a balancing, of those that are at our disposal already.

Now this sorting, summing-up, and balancing form a wholly different task from that of establishing and formulating such facts and arguments separately. The latter is one which belongs to, and has been very diligently performed by, the professed men of science and scientific thinkers on the one side.

and the professed theologians and theistic philo- chapter i sophers on the other ; but to sort, to sum up, and The faults oi to balance, what each of these classes has accom- controvCTs'i^- plished, is not a task which properly belongs to '''^• either. On the one hand, the leaders of scientific thought and discovery represent but one of the two contending parties ; and not only does this fact in itself tend to unfit them for a full understanding of such arguments as support the conclusions of their opponents, but the very habit of mind and the temperament which are favourable to scientific eminence tend to unfit them, in a general way, for understanding the philosophic significance of the facts of which they are themselves the discoverers. The theologians, on the other hand, are in a position that is no better. The convinced theist, and more especially the convinced Christian, is apt to be incapacitated, in proportion to the fervour of his faith, for fairly appreciating the value of a set of arguments and evidences which, in the opinion of those who have marshalled them, reduce his faith to nothingness, and are fatal to everything which he himself holds valuable. He may try to treat them seriously, but he fails to treat them completely. He altogether misses their collective strength, because his main concern is to find in them particular weaknesses.

An accurate estimate or analysis of the positions of religion and science is not, then, the proper work of either the scientific or theological specialist. It is the work of a person much humbler, whom argument here pursued

Chapter! we may call the intellectual accountant. His Nature of the primary business is not to say things for either side, but to examine and tabulate what either side has to say — to reduce the arguments of each to their clearest and simplest forms ; to note and strike out such as are inconsistent with the others ; and so to exhibit the entire affairs of both, that the reader may see how on each side the account really stands.

Such is the task, limited and unambitious as it may seem, to which, in the present volume, I propose first to address myself; and though, when we have reached such results as the accountant's method will yield us, I shall not leave them to speak, without comment, for themselves, yet they will in themselves be far more instructive and startling than many readers may be at all inclined to anticipate. Firms and individuals are often vaguely aware that they owe a number of sums, and that a number of sums are owed to them ; and when each of these items is submitted to their notice separately, they will at once recollect and recognise it : but as to the totals which are due to them and by them, and their own consequent condition of solvency or insolvency, they find that they were, before their accounts were made up for them, in a state of complete ignorance, or else of preposterous error. And with most of our thinkers who are arguing in defence of religion and in opposition to it, the case at the present moment is practically much the same.

The first task, therefore, on which I propose to enter is to go rapidly but carefully over the chapter i intellectual ledgers of both, and draw up some Th e sense in which the word clear statement of the respective assets and rehgionTslere liabilities of the scientific philosophers who reject ^^^^ religion, and the theological philosophers who defend it.

But here, before going farther, there is one most important point with regard to which it is necessary that I should make my meaning clear, and this is the sense in which I use the word religion. Religion is a word which may with equal propriety be used in either one or the other of two different senses. It may be used to mean an emotional habit of mind, which is commonly described as a certain state of the heart ; and also to mean, on the other hand, a mere act of the intellect — that is to say, an assent to a series of doctrinal propositions which purport to deal with matters of external fact. Sentimentalists of various schools, as we all know, often insist that religion is really an affair of the heart only, and that it is essentially independent of an assent to any cold propositions whatsoever. When used in mere rhetorical protest against the wholly opposite view, that religion is an assent to propositions and practically nothing more, such language as this may possess an intelligible meaning ; but if we interpret it literally, what it asserts is nonsense. In order that religion in its full sense may exist, it is as necessary that certain assents be added to the element of emotion, as it is that a certain emotion be added to the element of assent. Religion as the