Psychology: the motive powers, emotions, conscience, will;

Front matter

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Book I. The Four Elements Ob Aspects Of Emotion

CHAPTER L

FiBST Element : Appetences ob Motives. sionoN

I. What Appetences are 13

II. Primarj Appetences 15

III. Secondary Appetences 22

IV. Supplementary: Evolution of Emotions 24

V. Supplementary : Do the Derivative Appetences hear a Conscious Reference to the Original Ones f 25

VI. Differences of Appetences in Diflferent Individuals 27

VIL Conspiring Appetences 29

Vin. Conflicting Appetences 31

IX. Dominant Appetences 35

X. Undeveloped Appetences 37

XI. The Motiveless Man 40

A (RBCAP)

IV CONTENTS.

CHAPTER n.

Second Element ob Aspect: The Idea (Phantasm).

SXCnON PAOB

I. Nature of the Idea which calls forth Emotion . .42

II. Works of Fiction 50

III. Association of Emotions. — Bnrgts of Passion .52

IV. Spontaneous Flow of Thought . . . 57

Chapter III

Emotions called forth by Inanimate Objects. The ^Bsthetic.

I. JEsthetical Theories 130

II. Physical Beauty 134

III. Intellectual Beauty 139

IV. The Idea raising the JEsthetic Feeling . .- . 143 V. What is the True Theory of Beauty ? 148

VI. Influence of Association on Taste 150

VIL Complexity of the iBsthetic Affections 151

CONTENTS. V

sicnoir PAOB

VI^. The Picturesque 153

IX. The Ludicrous 156

X. The Sublime 161

XL Beautj in Natural Objects 164

Xn. The Fine Arts 171

CHAPTER IV. Continuous Emotions

I. Afiections and Passions 175

n. Emotions coming up in Groups 176

m. Temperament 178

IV. Temper 180

V. The Prepossessions 181

VI. Prejudice 183

VIL Fickleness of Feeling 1 85

Vm. Ruling Passions 186

IX. Community of Feeling 190

Conclusion 192

THE CONSCIENCE.

CHAPTER I. These is such a Powbb 195

CHAPTER 11.

Thb Conscience as a Cognitive Power 201

CHAPTER IIL The Conscience as a Motive Power with Emotions . . 205

CHAPTER IV.

What the Conscience reveals 206

CHAPTER V.

The Conscience in Actual Exercise 211

CHAPTER VI.

Development and Growth op the Conscience . . 220

J yi CONTENTS.

THE WILL, OR OPTATIVE POWER.

CHAPTER L

PASB

The Essential Natube op Will 231

CHAPTER n.

Vabious Fobms op Voluntabt Acts 234

CHAPTER m.

The Will assooiatino Itself with otheb Mental Acts . 240

CHAPTER IV.

The Will as exeboised in the Mobal Yibtues . 249

CHAPTER V.

Will in the Chbistian Gbaoes 250

CHAPTER VI.

The Will as an Element in Love 252

CHAPTER Vn.

The Influence of the Will on Chabacteb .... 255

CHAPTER Vni.

The Will has Fbeedom 258

CHAPTER IX.

The Will the Seat of Responsibilitt 261

CHAPTER X.

Ideas given by the Motive Powebs 264

CHAPTER XL Conclusion. — Man's Religious Tendencies . . . .265

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE COGNITIVE AND MOTIVE POWEBS.

Fbom a very old date there was a distinction drawn, more or less loosely, between the powers of mind which give knowledge and those which stir up feeling and lead to action. In the Hebrew Scriptures we read on the one hand of "understanding," "comprehension," "imagination," " reins," and on the other hand, of bowels of pity and compassion. The word " heart," in the Old Testament and in the New, seems to include all that is in the mind prior to action, all " thoughts," " devices," " imaginations." Plato and the Greeks generally had, on the one hand, such powers as aurOrjiTK^ vov^, X6yo% So^, vioTL^i on the one hand, and vdOrj, Ovfios, hnOv/iriTiKoVf on the other. Aristotle drew the distinction between the Nostic power on the one hand, and the Orective power on the other, and this was more definitely expressed by his commentator, Philoponus.^ This last phrase was translated into Latin and called the Appetent or Motive. Cicero says, " Motus animorum duplices sunt ; alteri cogitationes, alteri appetitus," ^ the one inquiring into truth,

1 Aristotle, IIL 10; Philoponns's Proem : in Lib. de Ardtna Arts. See Monboddo*8 Ancient Met. B. IL 7, where great importance is attached to the distinction.

2 Cic, De Offie. L 29.

2 GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

the other impelling to action. In the scholastic ages the distinction was between the intellect (meni) and the will; in modern English theology between the understanding and the will; in common literature between the judgment and the feelings ; in common conversation between the head and the heart. In appears to me that it is of great importance to keep up this twofold distinction.

Haying treated of the cognitive powers in a previous volume, I am in this to unfold the characteristics of the motive, as they have been called the orective, the impulsive, the appetent powers; the feelings, the affections, the sentiments, the heart.

The most common division of the faculties in the present day is the threefold one adopted by Kant : cognition, feeling, and will. It proceeds on a real and important distinction, which must ever be kept in view. Unfortunately, as I think, it leaves out the moral power or conscience, which is entitled to have a separate place as one of the characteristics of man, specially distinguishing him from the lower animals.

It is of moment to keep up the old twofold division as being the deepest, as having run through the ages, and as being embodied in our habitual thoughts and common literature. There are some advantages in keeping the feelings and the will under one head : the motive. Under the two grand heads, with their sixfold subdivisions, we can rank all the leading powers and manifestations, and determine their offices and their differences. In particular, under the second division, that of the motive powers, we distinguish between the feelings and the will while we include the moral power.

Having treated of the cognitive powers in Vol. I., I am in this to unfold the characteristics of the motive

GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 3

powers, as they are called the orective, the appetent, the impalsiye powers ; the feelings, the sentiments, the affections, the heart, as distinguished from the Gnostic, the cognitive, the intellect, the understanding, the reason, the head.

These motive powers fall under three heads : the emotions, the conscience, the will. It is not to be understood that these are unconnected with each other, or with the cc^nitive ; emotions contain an idea which is cogaitive. The conscience may be r^arded as combining characteristics of each of the two grand classes; being cognitive as discerning good and evil, and motive as leading to action ; the will has to use the other powers as going on to action.

Emotion occupies more room than the other two in this treatise, inasmuch as its operations are more varied, and as the account usually given of it (so it appears to me) is more defective.

THE EMOTIONS.