The province of reason: a criticism of the Bampton lecture on "The limits of religious thought."

Front matter

PBJyCETON, N. J. ^

The province of reason

UNIFORM WITH THIS VOLUME.

Preface

There are some things so true and so great, as to be independent of tlie obscurity or the fame of those who assert or deny them. The humblest individual, gras2)ing them with his poor hand, possesses an advantage in their unaided grandeur and force, which no superior abilities, acquirements, and culture can command.

To me, if the principles of the Bampton Lecture on the Limits of Beligious Thought be conceded, the chief attribute of humanity, as constituted by the Great Father, is laid in the dust, the sacred Scrij^tures are an elaborate and meaningless pretence, the possibility of worship and of trust in the Supreme is destroyed, and, above all, the authority of conscience, and the immutable foundations of morality are undermined. These, I think, are reasons sufficiently jtowerful for attempting, even with inadequate means, to counteract the vill PREFACE.

influence of a work which has found a much wider acceptance than metaphysical writings, generally, meet w^ith in this country.

An independent, exhaustive, and formal discussion is not to he looked for here, of the great suhject which is placed as the title of this volume. But I am altogether at fault, if hy the criticisms and arguments wdiich follow, the rightful Province of Keason be not made out, with some distinctness.

Contents

SECTIOX FIRST.

Chapter I. Eeaction

PAGE

Its inherent Yice — History of Speculation — Oscillation from Extreme to Extreme — Impartial Investigations — Extreme Views of Brampton Lecture — Possible Medium 17

Chapter II. Rationalism

Fairly and Unfairly Defined — Right Reason harmonious with all Truth — Desire to find Harmony — Based in our Nature — Law of our Intelligence — Lower Reason, the Understanding— Higher Reason — Evil Name, Rationalism — Partly Merited 23

Chapter III. German Philosophical Rationalism

Kant — ^Hamilton's Relation to him — Kantian System — Two Chief Evils — Fichte — His Relation to Kant — Idealism — Relation to Spinoza — Pantheism, Fatalism — Deep Influence on Germany — Schelling — Personally, no Pantheist — InteUeclectual Intuition — Mysticism — Hegel, the Philosopher —

CONTENTS.

PAGE

"The Absolute"=l8t, Being; 2d, Xon-being; 3d, The Becoming=" The Idea" — Basis, mere assumption — Carried into Sphere of Religion — German Rationalism — Where ? A Rationalism, Rererent, "Wise 30

SECTION SECOXD.

COXCERXIXG APPLICATIOXS OF LOGIC.

CHAPTER I. PRELIillNARY CRITICISMS

Method of Bampton Lecture — Laid down, but Abandoned — Over-Confidence — Difficulties of Investigation — Virtually Hamilton's Arguments — " Infinite " distinguished from "Absolute" — Groundless — Two, essentially the same 59

CHAPTER II. "the infinite," "the absolute," etc

Infinity of Attributes — Contradiction — All, Actual and Possible in Absolute— " The One," "The All"— Shifting and Substitution of Terms — Contradictory Reasoning — Illustrations— Potential and Actual — Confusion — Materialistic Tendency 68

CHAPTER III. CAUSATION, etc

Hamilton's very Argument — Here, no Force — Hamilton's Idea of Cause — Of "Absolute" — Lecturer's, opposite — Hamilton's formally Abandoned — Here, Adopted — Grave, Logical Blunder — Contradictory Reasonings — Unsupported Assertion — Idea of Creation — Incomprehensible — Commencement of Finite Phenomena, not — And not Contradictory. . . 82

CONTENTS. XI

Chapter IV. Ixconceiv Ability Of "the Infinite."

PAGE

Admit Fact, Refuse Arguments — Nature of Consciousness — Equivocal " Limitation" — Infinite, Finite — Distinction Just and Real — Confusion — Inconsequent Reasonings — Consciousness of Infinite Contradictory ? — Virtual Skepticism — Natural Theism Impossible? — Not Consistent with Facts — Impeachment of the Almighty 95

Chapter V. Miscellaneous Reasonings

"Infinite," "Absolute," held Equivalent to God — Conclusions as to these applied to this — Investigation of Principles held wrong — Can never reach Principles — Content with Regulations— Truth and Falsehood — Properties of our Conceptions— Hume and Berkeley — " Mind Cramped by own Laws," etc. — Unmitigated Skepticism — Inconsistency of Reasoning — Suicidal 108

Chapter I. Relation Of The Scottish And Oxonian Philosophies

Hamilton and Mr. Maurice — Scottish System — Chief Fault — Excellences — Entire Separation from Bampton Lecture — "The Unconditioned," etc. — Assumptions of Rationalism — Cousin — Realism of Hamilton — Wrote in Interest of Philosophy, and of Logic — Lecturer, of Theology — Hamilton's Conclusions, and his, opposite 12"?

XU CONTENTS,

Chapter II. Meaning Of "the Unconditioned," Etc

FAGS

No Unconditioned, no Absolute — Never, to Created Spirit — "Infinite," Incomprehensible — 0/, concerning In&nite — No Idea, then Nothing — Word Infinite, Understood — How ? — Infinite, not Wliole Sphere of Divine — Eternal — This Infinity proper — All possible Attributes — Power, Knowledge— He, who Infinite, not all Inconceivable — Human Spirit and Highest— Human Personality and Divine — Human Intelligence and Divine — Moral Attributes and Divine — Man, true Microcosm 146

SECTIOJ( FOURTH.

CONCERNING WRITTEN REVELATION.

CHAPTER I.

NECESSARY CONDITIONS.

Must believe G-od is — That Intelligent — Free Intelligence- Truthful, Benignant — Independently, these Conclusions — If not, no Revelation to Man 113

CHAPTER II.

EVIDENCES OF REVELATION.

External Evidence — TVhat? — Impossible to Multitudes — In Fulness, to any — Book, Divine in Origin — Contents unknown— Faith to seek — Internal Evidence — What ? — Self-attestation — Its Power 183

CONTENTS. xm

Chapter III. Revelation And God

PAGE

Is Grod Revealed ? — As He is, as is not ? — Presented, represented ? — Representation — Revelation — True or False ? — Types, Images — Their Meaning and Use — Fearful, if Very God, not Revealed. 200

Chapter I. The Relative And The Real

Relation to Faculties of Knower — Phenomena — Also Noumena — Ground to believe this — Consciousness not fallacious— Knowing Faculty not fallacious — Minds generically same — Limited, not therefore unreal 225

Chapter II. Modifications Op Morality

Kant — Practical and Pure Reason — Logically wrong, morally right — Thought-Forms — Time, Space, Personality — No new Limitations — Moral Ideas not modified by Laws of Thought — Mind reflects truly — ^Not cramped by its own Forms. ... 236

Chapter III. Immutable Right And Wrong

Incapable of judging of Divine ? — Infinite Morality ? — Absolute Morality ? — Contradictory — Bolingbroke — Practical Rules — Eternal Principles — No Modification — Varied Applications— Conscience — Supreme Authority 248

Xiv CONTENTS.

Section Sixth. Concerning Reason And Faith

PAGB

Faith, as Act of Understanding — Knowledge, Basis, and Measure of — Its Distinctions — Consciousness — Intuitions of Sense — Of Reason — Sphere of Responsibility — Character of Faith — Determined by its Grounds — Fact of Consciousness, enough — Its own Ground — Mere Act of Faith, nothing— Primary Beliefs— Mansel's Statements — Hamilton's — Ground of Faith — Always understanding, Higher Reason, or both — Revelation — God trustworthy — Understanding, Reason, and Conscience proclaim — Harmony of these powers— No Discord — Spirit of Fault — Piercing Eye — The Perfect Light 2*73

Section First. Introductory

Chapter

I. — Reaction.

II. — Rationalism.

III. — Geeman Philosophical Rationalism.

PROVINCE OF REASON.

Chapter I. Reaction

Its inherent Vice — History of Speculaton — Oscillation from Extreme to Extreme — Impartial Investigation — Extreme Views of Bampton Lecture — Possible Medium.

The old truism renews itself, with each age, in each struggle of opinions, bearing not partially on one side of a debated question, but honestly and equally on both. " Reaction rarely can be temperately wise or even simply just/' The vice is inherent, ineradicable. The excess which provokes reaction, by a law as constant as any power in material nature, never fails to beget its counterpart, in a compensating excess, in the opposite direction. In the moment of keen, perhaps passionate debate, truth is never, only and altogether^ with either of two antagonist sections, but partly with both, and often in marvellously equal proportion. A silent verity lies underneath every position, which has the force to attract around it resolute and honest adherents. There is, also, always lurking error in the selectest combination, let the party symhol embody ever so large an amount of truth. In the middle space between opposite extremes, verging now in the direction of the one, and again in the direction of the other, will be found that, which is far above all parties — the imperishable, the immutable, the divine.

The history of speculation reveals an incessant action and reaction of the mind of the ages, on the highest subjects of human thought. Instead of normal and j^rogressive intellectual efforts, springing from mthin, from a wdsely-balanced organism, obedient to its governing laws, men have been provoked or betrayed into opinions, have been hurried by prejudices, have been blindly enamored of some peculiar theory, perhaps their own, have been inflamed by a passion for victory, instead of a love for truth, and have acted in a spirit of partizanship and of rivalry ; or they have obeyed the secret force of mental idiosvncracies, the existence of which in themselves they did not suspect. The result has been, successive oscillations, from extreme to extreme, always both right and both wrong, though in unequal degrees. The periods of dispassionate, catholic and steadily advancin2; invcstio:ation have been often remote from one another, nidelv broken up by exaggerations and extravagances in one direction, which again have given birth to exaggerations

REACTION. 19

and extravagances, as great or greater in the opposite direction.

In this country, and at this moment, we seem to be in the presence of a strong reaction, as well in the department of mental philosophy, as in a higher and more sacred sphere still. Opposite schools are in collision ; no one, as yet, being acknoAvledged to have made good a j)ermanent, exclusive occupation of the vantage ground. Such a state of things may have its unquestionable benefits, but there is also no small peril to the interests of the highest truth, which may be sacrificed to unfounded prejudices, or to the violence of unworthy passions. Perhaps only one thing is quite certain, neither extreme of the opposing sections will be wholly right, neither will be wholly wrong. To discover that, in each, which is true, is the brave and great work imposed on us by our age, and it demands an impartial, searching, fearless, candid, broad spirit of investigation.

No injustice is done to the celebrated work of which we are about to venture a criticism, in saying that it is the birth of a reaction, and is formally designed to crush what is deemed an excessive and dangerous rationalism. The lecturer states as much in plain terms, and perhaps his deservedly admired production bears upon it, sufficiently strongly marked, the peculiar taint of a reactionary efi'ort. It is extreme — and here, without reasoning at all,

I may be allowed to cluster together in as few sentences as possible the first strong impressions produced on my own mind, which may also have been awakened in other minds, by this book. "It is extreme. It goes too far, to be quite within the law of equity and wisdom. It is too exterminating, too mercilessly destructive to be wholly merited. The efiect also is utterly depressing and prostrating. Limited as human powers confessedly are, we shudder at abject intellectual denudation. It is one thing to admire heartily the extended and varied learning of an accomplished writer, the vigorous, sometimes eloquent periods that flow from his joractised pen, his dialectic power, his logical subtilty, facility and courage, and to bow unfeignedly to the purity of his motives ; but it is quite another thing to consent to the justice of his conclusions. No. The impression abides and deepens— it is too much : it can not be true ; these principles are not in harmony with the deep convictions lodged in our nature, or with our most cherished hopes. Man must be able to know more of the Great Being than this writer will allow, must be able to reach some essentially true thoughts, respecting him. Nor is it doubtful, as he asserts it is, whether what constitutes virtue, moral excellence on earth among men, does also constitute virtue, moral excellence, among all orders of rational creatures. Conscience is not a temporary

REACTION. 21

guide for this world only, is not the proclaimer of arbitrary distinctions and of mere human modifications of morality, but a divine voice in the soul, announcing what is eternally, immutably, universally right — right in itself, right for men, right for all rational beings, and light for ever and ever !

'' Here is a high and extended argument — an elaborate book ! On what ? The Infinite, the Unconditioned, the Absolute. This author boldly goes into the region of inconceivable, a prioi^i truths, the region of pure abstraction, the region of mere subjective logic. But the principle which he seeks to establish, is that the human mind is incapable of reasoning respecting the Infinite, incaj^able of conceiving the Infinite at all. Either his course is legitimate, and then his principle is demolished ; or his course is illegitimate and nugatory, and then his principle is yet undefended, unestablished. In any case, the false impression is created that human reason must be an irreconcilable foe to Christians and to <i;)hristianity for nothing, it seems, will content them but to forbid imperatively every efi'ort of reason to approach and adore the Great Being. And then, the evil is a grave and terrible one, that j^hilosophy and religion alike are left surrounded with insoluble contradictions and impenetrable uncertainties. Is not the inference inevitable, that in this case, it is the part of wisdom to have as little as possible to do with either ? So far as this book is concerned, many will fairly judge, that men have two and only two things before them. Either, they must blindly accept as divine a revolution, whose external evidences — and with these the author maintains, and these only, reason has anything to do — it is literally impossible for myriads of them to examine, flattering themselves that this is faith ; or they must hopelessly suiTender to a universal scepticism, calling this the light of reason."

Such, I believe, will be the first involuntary impressions of at least one class of minds, after the perusal of these Lectures. The question is, Can our first impressions bear second thoughts ? Have they solid ground to rest upon ? This remarkable book, professedly a defence of Kevelation and a determination of the legitimate province of human reason, which has been welcomed cordially by a large ]3ortion of the public — dare we venture to suspect that it may, after all, be unsound in its fundamental principles, injurious to our most sacred interests, and dishonoring to one of the noblest endowments with which man has been gifted by his Maker. Let us examine and judge.

Chapter II. Rationalism

Fairly and unfairly defined — Right Reason harmonious with all Trutli — Desire to find Harmony — Based in our Nature — Law of our Intelligence — Lower Reason, Understanding — Higher Reason— Evil Xame, Rationalism — Partly merited.

Among the minor, but decisive proofs of the reactionary character, which pervades the work before us, we mark the language, and especially the tone in which rationalism so called, is described. The word, not without just occasion, has come to be of bad odor ; but in its etymological sense, it is a faultless and excellent word. The idea which it conveys is in entire harmony with the nature of rational beings, is indeed the proper and necessary demand of that nature.

Rationalism, rightly so called, is not a sectional, but a universal faith. He who accepts cordially a doctrine laid down in what he holds to be the Book of Inspiration, does not hesitate to ask, and expects to find, and does actually find, in most cases, that, besides its external authoritative sanction, it is commended to his mind as true in itself, and in harmony with other truths, and with those general principles of belief, which belong to the constitution of our rational nature. Without exceptiouj all who are capable of any mental effort, are conscious of a profound desire to discover a consistency between the dictates of their intelligence, and the articles of their faith, be that faith what it may. Very many things they may be unable perfectly to harmonize, and are satisfied to leave unsolved. But the effort in other directions is continued, notwithstanding. The desire is not extinguished. It is hrepressible. It belongs to our nature, to search and strive after inward harmony, after the reconciliation of things, which must be really one, whether we be able to discover their unity or not. So universal, so irrepressible, is this tendency, that it can only be looked upon as a law of our intelligence. And how vain to force back the rushing spirit of investigation, which obeys a power as mighty as that which governs the ocean in its ebb and flow ! How vain to deter men from that to which the structure of their minds prompts them ! How worse than vain, to stigmatize as crime an act of obedience to a constitutional principle !

The fact is, that the desire to reconcile our reason (using the word in its current popular sense, as synonymous with general human intelligence,) and our creed, be that creed what it may, Jewish, Christian, Mohammedan, or Pagan, rests on a foundation as deep as any which our nature knows. Let it be ovanted on the one hand that there is an outward -syritten revelation. But it is as surely believed, on the other hand, that there is, also, an inward unwritten revelation in our intelligent nature. Both have the same origin — they must be perfectly harmonious. The voice of truth from without must be essentially at one with the voice of truth from within. That is the secret conviction of every mind, and it is indestructible. If consciousness — as Sir William Hamilton, and we presume Mr. Manseil, holds — be a revelation of the facts of our inward being, it admits of no doubt at all, that not the least authoritive portion of the revelation must be that w^hich embodies the data of our higher reason. Our native cognitions, be they many or few, the necessary truths lying in the depths of our minds, our rational, and most of all our moral intuitions, are to us the voice of the Being who created us. And nothing can be more certain than that He cannot contradict himself. The outward, written revelation may contain treasures unknown to the inward revelation, and unutterably more precious. But so far as they go the two must he in perfect, absolute harmony, whether we be able to make it out, or not.

Even our lower reason — reason in the common meaning of the word, the fair and sound conclusions , of the understanding proper, the comparing and judging faculty — must be essentially at one with all truth. Imperfect and fallible as the humnn understanding is, it is the highest, it is the only instrument of judging, which our Maker has granted to us. Within its own sphere, wisely and rightly employed, it must be trustworthy ; at all events, we have nothing else, as rational beings, by which to compare, discriminate and affirm, or deny, in any case. But be the confidence which we repose in our mere understanding ever so limited, we are compelled to put unlimited trust in our higher reason, in the primitive data of our rational and moral nature. These must be altogether divine. The mysterious intuitions that result from no experience of ours, but come forth from that locus principioruniy to whose contents we have contributed nothino- and can never contribute anvthino;, are a true and proper revelation from our Creator, and can only be in perfect harmony with every other communication from the same great source. We may mistake the inward message, as we may mistake the outward. There may be interpolations and various readings in the one, as there are also in the other. And different commentators and critics, American, Asiatic, African, European, German, French, British, according to their mental structure or their training, or their taste, may be prompted and may find it possible, to bring out different meanings from the one, as they have also from the other. But the essential harmony of the two is indubitable.

This is the foundation, the deep ground of that tendency, which is strictly universal, though often unavowed, perhaps, even, often unperceived. And shall ifc be denounced as wicked ? Is the desire an impious one, to perceive the essential harmony between the nature with which our Creator has endowed us and what claims to be His written revelation ? Is the mental effort to search till we discover, and as far as it is possible for us to discover this harmony, of such a nature, that a philosopher must frown upon it and forbid it peremptorily ? On the contrary, is it not in every way becoming, and right, and imperative, forced on us by a clamorous want within, and demanded, as a sacred duty, springing out of veneration of the Great Being ?

It is not denied that there are evils, possible and real evils, connected with the free exercise of the understanding within the domain of religion. Instead of humility, and reverence, and faith, a hardened, j)resumptuous, impious spirit shall create most revolting confusion between the respective claims of man and his Creator. But every good thing on this earth must be accepted, if accepted at all, with grievous deductions. Liberty always and everywhere, is in danger of degenerating into licentiousness, yet with all its chances of abuse it may not be exchanged, one instant, for the Upas shade of despotism. Truth in like manner may be pushed to extreme, and may pass into extravagance and absurdity, but it must be left perfectly free nevertheless, exposed to all manner of perversions, and is only endangered by pretended safeguards, material or spiritual. And that desire, deeply based in our nature, the desire not to bring the dictates of our intelligence to revelation or revelation to them, for either would be dishonest, but to make out, ever in greater extent, the real and perfect harmony between the two ; this desire is not to be crushed, to whatever possible evils it may give rise. It cannot be crushed. Desire or do what we may, it will not be crushed ; and the attempt to crush it is ignoble as it is futile. Virtually, it is the old struggle revived, ever in vain, between might and right, between authority and intelligence, between blind superstition and enlightened faith. What the faggot and the fire of other times failed to accomplish is not likely to be accomplished by a ponderous and rigorous dialectic, a hard, cold, and passionless logic. Divine Kevelation and right reason have one source ; it is a very sacred thing to strive to see, it would be very wrong not to strive to see that they utter one voice.

But Rationalism, so called, has a general evil reputation. Deservedly it has an evil reputation, owing to misapplications and abuses sanctioned by some of its nominal disciples, perhaps amongst uSj certainly, in other quarters. The power of the understanding has been exaggerated and a much wider province has been claimed for the human faculties, than belongs to them rightfully. The most sacred authority has been invaded and the proper liberty of scientific criticism has passed, in some instances, to licentiousness. This is the extreme on one side, and it is worthy of just condemnation. But it is not just to represent, as the Bampton lecturer has done, the extreme as the thing itself — the extreme, too, in its very worst form, a form unknown to this country, limited, at all events, to a few solitary individuals who reject Chistianity altogether, and are, certainly, not worthy of prominent consideration, or entitled to the rank of leaders of public opinion.

Chapter III. Geeman Philosophical Eationalism

Kant— Hamilton's Relation to him— Kantian System— Two Chief Evils — Fichte — His Relation to Kant — Ideahsm — Relation to Spiaoza — Pantheism, Fatalism — Deep Influence on Germany — Schelling — Personally, no Pantheist — Intellectual Intuition — Mysticism— Hegel, the Philosopher — " The Absolute"= 1st. Being; 2d. Non-Being; 3d. the Becoming=" The Idea— Basis, mere Assumption — Carried into Sphere of Religion — German Rationahsm — Where ? — A Rationalism, Reverent, Wise.

GrERMANY IS the imagined birtli-j)lace and home of rationalism proper, which, as currently understood, simply means the wildest infidelity. The philosophy and theology of that country are associated in the minds of many with all that is lawless, absurd, and impious. And certainly, in no other region, shall we find any thing answering to the modes of thought which are exposed in the Bampton Lecture. Those who are unacquainted with Gi-ermany can scarcely be capable of doing justice, either to the errors which the lecturer assails, or to his method of combatting them. There was needed for most of his readers, I apprehend, in order to intelligent appreciation, some account — ^if touching only the leading, uppermost points — of the speculations of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, to whom chiefly allusion is made. I find myself obliged, for my own sake, and that my future statements and reasonings may be understood, to attempt something of this kind, though it can only be very imperfect and very general. The difficulty is unusually great, of putting into small compass, an account at all intelligible and satisfactory.

My statement can have little value save that, as the mode in which a common mind has striven to bring a hard subject within its conception, it may be the more easily apprehensible by ordinary men.

Emanuel Kant is esteemed the arch-heretic of Germany, the father of a rationalism, which for more than half a century flooded the Continent, almost unchecked, and well-nigh swept away the most sacred mental heritage of the nation. Were this true, or anything like truth, that grave and 2;ood man must have thorouo;hly misunderstood his own office and actual w^ork. His conscious and determined aim was directly the reverse. At a time when the idealism of Hume had found disciples all over Europe, and when the materialism and atheism of Voltaire, D'Holbach, and the Encyclopaedists had infected Germany to its very core, and were spreading fast and far, Kant stood forward a philosophic, I might say, a religious reformer. He, at least, honestly intended to build up an impregnable defence for philosophy and for religion against the worst assaults of scepticism. If the actual effect was widely different from the original intention — if, as has been said with some bitterness, but also with a little truth, he has only laid a more thoroughly logical basis for infidelity — at least his sincerity is unquestionable. And his philosophy, now better understood and more fairly applied, forms a grand landmark in the progress of European enlightenment. Many who vehemently cry out against the transcendental nonsense of Kant, the same persons who eagerly take refuge in the system of Sir William Hamilton, as the bulwark of religion, are little aware of the actual relation which these two philosophical chiefs bear to one another.

There are seveml and very important points of difference between the Scottish and the Kantian philosophies. But, passing over the terminology, which, in the one case, is simple, and in the other, is barbarous and nearly unintelligible, none wdia are acquainted with both, and without prejudice against either, will dispute that the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton is virtually and essentially the philosophy of Kant. The points of resemblance are leading and striking. Consciousness, the authoritative witness of all mental phenomena, is the basis of both. The two mental forms of time and space, which mold the acts of consciousness, are common to both. So also are the fact of pure a priori truths made known by consciousness, and the two principles of universality and necessity by which such truths are tested. So also is the grand, general disti'ibution of all the phenomena of consciousness into those of knowledge, and feeling, and conation, or desire and will. And on wdiat may be called Sir William Hamilton's great principle, of a philosophy of the conditioned being alone possible, has anything more explicit been uttered than these words of Kant ? " This refusal of our reason to afford a satisfactory ausw^er to speculative questions, extending beyond this life, is a hint from it, to divert our self-cognition from fruitless transcendant specidation to fruitful practical use ; w^iich, although it is always directed only to objects of experience, still takes up its principle at a higher point, and thus determines its procedure, as if our destiny extended infinitely far beyond experience, and consequently out beyond this life."'-''

But notwithstanding the close relation of the two philosophies, it is not difficult to account for the aversion — to use no harsher term — with w^hich Kant has been and is regarded among us, and for the actual, evil results to which his system gave occasion in his own country. That all our knowledge can be only relative, not absolute, that it is of phenomena only and not of things in se, is not

2* peculiar to him, but is equally maintained by Sir William Hamilton. The chief vulnerable points in the Kantian system, the sources of that fatal direction which it gave to speculation, appear to me to be the two following :

I. The false valuation of the subjective and the objective resj)ectively. The non-ego ^ with Kant, is next to nothing ; the ego is all but everything. The reality of the non-ego is not denied. He finds it in consciousness. He finds it also a pure understanding-cognition, under the category of substance. But it is reduced to the smallest possible minimum. There is an unknown substratum of phenomena ; but the phenomena, excepting this inherence in an unknown substratum, are wholly dependent on the ego, a result arising from the laws of our sensibility and the forms of the understanding. The non-ego is all but phenomenal, far more subjective than objective. Even the ego itself is, in a wide sense, phenomenal ; that is to say, the ego of consciousness is only the manifested, the phenomenized ego. The I, thinking, feeling, or willing, is a phenomenon of consciousness. But there is something else, and far more, which never comes up as phenomenon. The real ego is behind, underneath — an unknown substratum, substance. It is impossible not to see the tendency of this to lead either to scepticism, on the one hand, or to pure subjective idealism, on the other — a tendency which was too speedily developed in both directions.