Principles and problems of Imperial defence

Introduction

I have been induced to write the following pages by some, probably most partial, friends, who have assured me that they would help the study of Imperial defence. It was with considerable hesitation and reluctance that I acceded to such representations, because I felt that 1 should have to refer to many topics which could be better dealt with by a sailor. On the other hand, lay the argument that the part our army must play in world warfare was sometimes underrated, and that, though secondary to the navy, its efficiency was still an essential element in the force which secured our safety or existence. Imperial defence, although it cannot be carried out at all without a navy, cannot be accomplished by a navy alone ; and, the two services being complementary to one another, it seemed not illogical to endeavour to view them in combination and lay stress on the correlation that exists between them. But that all the armed forces we possess should be regarded as a whole was a view I had long held ; and such being my opinion, I had the less difficulty in persuading myself to write. In addition, an even more powerful motive actuated me. A constant examination of the history of past campaigns had impressed on me the value of a habit of examining war, and the preparation for war, from the business point of view. A continual search for the causes that lay at the root of success or failure had established the fact that, whereas the glowing pages of military history often attribute victory to the personal courage vi INTRODUCTION

or readiness of individuals, triumphs have most frequently been arranged for at the desk.

From immemorial ages poets have glorified the warrior ; painters and sculptors have exhausted their imaginations in the effort to idealise and exalt the actions of the heroes whose names they have sought to perpetuate. Even Religion has not withheld the promise of spiritual advantage to the resolute fighter. Fanaticism, patriotism, ambition, greed, even fear, are in turn invoked to nerve men to the sticking-point. Ardent rhetoric and glowing colours, storied stones and imperishable verse, each in turn are made to appeal to the pride or vanity of great or little men. To hide the hideousness of war, or warm the chill virtue of self-abnegation, every device has to be resorted to. Therefore we find the great leaders of all ages entering, as it were, into the conspiracy, still further inflaming popular imagination, and appealing rather to the emotions than to the reason of those whom they command. Generals and admirals, artists, poets, and politicians, are all thus joined together in diverting attention from the prosaic side of war ; while the experiences of savage warfare, where something of the old chivalry still lingers and the personal factor has still a considerable share in influencing the combat, assist to give a false idea of what a great struggle in modern times will involve.

To the people of England a great war would mean more than it would in the case of any other nation. Almost every transaction of daily life would be upset. Every cottager would have to adjust his means to vastly altered conditions. An ever-increasing pressure would be imposed on the resources of our workingpeople during every month that hostilities went on. On the Continent it is true that nations in arms would face one another, but in our case the healths

INTRODUCTION vii

and lives of wives and children, as well as those of husbands and brothers in the ranks, would be involved. Because food, not for the armies only but also for the inhabitants of our country, would have to be provided. When the effects of war make themselves keenly felt in every village, errors and miscalculations have far-reaching consequences and are not readily condoned. Much more than the military reputations of individuals or the lives of fighting men are at stake. Mismanagement will be resented, as any other mismanagement that costs lives on a large scale is resented and condemned in civil life.

In short, the conduct of war is, or should be, made a business transaction. The healths and lives of his men represent the capital of a general. He cannot reckon on unlimited funds : he must exercise economy, and utilise what he has to the best purpose. The force that can be provided by the country is limited, and it must be made to go as far as possible. Apathy in peace, and panic in war, are the dangers that have to be avoided ; and of these the former is perhaps less dangerous than the latter, — panic, the child of forgetfulness and the mother of waste, which calls ruinous prodigality into being to destroy what careful economy has painfully succeeded in building up, which endeavours in a week to make good the omissions of a decade, and sees the edifice reared by strenuous exertion crumble away when just completed and just ready for use.

We have recently witnessed a most salient example of what spasmodic effort can accomplish, and we have been surprised by the warlike vigour which the country has shown. Yet the army and its administration has met with the most severe criticism, because it was felt that the exertions made during the war exhibited energy rather than skill, and zeal rather than wisdom.

viii INTRODUCTION

And now, no doubt, it is to be feared that when the skies have cleared, the uproar will die away. When the rains are over, many reputable rivers in South Africa disappear. Innumerable grains of sand have waylaid and obstructed the thin trickle of the failing stream. Split into millions of tiny drops, the mighty volume of the great watercourse has finally become obliterated amid the infinity of the little particles ; and you may walk across the dry sands of a river-bed incredulous that water can for years have flowed there. Yet if you dig a little way below the surface you will perhaps find forms of aquatic life ; it may be that there are even fish ; just as amid inimical conditions spirit and vigour may survive. When the inevitable storms break in due season, a raging torrent will again appear rolling millions of gallons of water in wanton prodigality to the sea. It is possible to rescue those wasted waters, to dam and save, to cut channels judiciously and irrigate, — the generosity of one season being called to redress the parsimony of another ; the same quantity of water making a whole countryside green, where now a narrow band of verdure alone marks the course of the wayward stream. Energy, imagination, and forethought, as well as water, are sometimes smothered and lost amid the illimitable little worries and obstructions of routine. Thousands will come forward at moments of national danger to swell the wild surges of unorganised force. Then the tumult, short-lived as it is violent, will subside, leaving no permanent trace of its volume or even of its existence behind.

To legislate to make the most of what we have, to employ it so that it may be productive and remunerative in the future, should be our aim ; so that we can obtain men without a panic, as it is possible to obtain water without a flood. These are

INTRODUCTION ix

the true lessons of the war. We have fought in an abnormal country against an abnormal foe. We have, perhaps, learnt how to act in that particular region and against that particular enemy. We know his strength and his weakness, and we can gauge our chances against him. But tactics vary with the circumstances of the moment, with the character of the enemy, with the armament on both sides, and, above all, with the ground. While certain very valuable lights have been thrown on technical matters, on the manufacture, pattern, and durability of equipment, on the effect of fire both of infantry and artillery, and, to some extent, on formations, the value of our deductions is not absolute but relative. Against an European foe we might find South African formations fail, and we know that they would not be adopted against a savage enemy. But the lessons we have gleaned as to the warlike spirit that still inspires our fellow-citizens, the vital necessity for trustworthy intelligence, for preparation, for method, are applicable to every period and to every war. The great truths of strategy have again asserted their immutable and inexorable force. Politics and strategy should go hand-in-hand. The plan of campaign should be adapted not only to the force of the enemy, but to that with which we can take the field. The security of lines of communication, the danger of an open base — these are absolute lessons, and no matter where we may next fight we shall infringe them at our peril. But beyond them we have been given lessons equally absolute, more original, and, for us, even more important. The need for cultivating, not only the intelligence but the characters of both officers and men, the inculcation of soldierly virtues, self-reliance, determination, discipline, patience — what may be termed the moral qualities of a good soldier, these must not be left out of sight. And we have learnt the x INTRODUCTION

importance of training for war, not for any particular nature of warfare, but for war generally — principles and not rules, manoeuvre and not drill, military instinct and not pedantry. Most of all, when Imperial defence is considered, have we learnt the value of Colonial assistance, and the undeveloped possibilities that lie before our Colonies. Yet, on the subject of the training of our Colonial forces, or even of their place in Imperial defence, I have said but little. As regards the latter I have, in the chapter on organisation, given the reasons which have kept me silent ; as regards the former much might be said, but it is not my place to say it The training of our Colonial troops for war is in the hands of competent men, who will do whatever is needed, and are now doing it. To my comrades of the Colonies, or to those of them who may perhaps imagine that spontaneous and individual efforts are of more value in war than any that bear the imprimatur of official sanction, I may, however, say that when we next fight shoulder to shoulder it will help us if we completely understand one another's methods and ideas. All soldiers under one flag should speak the same tactical language. The broad methods of every man succeeding to leadership should be the same ; thus shall the system flourish when the individual passes away, the chances of error diminish, the rubs of friction be reduced to vanishing-point. And if intelligent and genial co-operation be demanded on the battlefield, how much more are they to be sought and secured when land and sea forces join against a common danger?

The co-operation of the services is, indeed, the corner-stone of Imperial defence ; co-operation, above all, in the council chamber. It can be readily learnt in actual practice. We have had some experience, and the results have been encouraging ; but far-

INTRODUCTION xi

reaching and not quickly to be amended are the misunderstandings of great principles. Co-operation in conception is more important even than in execution, and in weighing the relative importance of naval and military needs it is the fate of the nation which is often swinging in the balance.

Edward S. May.

Chapter I

The Basis of our Empire is Sea-Power — Our Empire primarily a Commercial Organism — The Outcome of Individual Enterprise and of Natural Selection — Warfare hinges on Communications — They are as essential to Commerce as to Armies and Fleets — On what does Sea-Power depend? 1 ' Great Shipping " — Water and Land Transport — The Internal Communications of a Country and their Protection — The Protection of the Greater Lines of Supply and of the Trading Station — The Evolution of Naval Bases — England specially favoured in the Development of Sea- Power — The Population of an Island can concentrate its Attention on the Sea — Natural Advantages of our Southern Coasts — Disabilities of our Opponents — Russia, Denmark, Germany, Holland, France, Spain, Italy — The Effect of the Nature of a Country in developing Sea-Power — Cold and Want Incentives to Industry — Venice, Holland, Carthage — The Prosperity of England compared to that of Holland — The Necessity to bear in mind the Commercial Basis of our Empire — The Relation of the Mercantile-Marine to War-ships — The Quality rather than the Quantity of Recruits must be considered — The former Naval Resources of France and England compared — Reserve Forces are of as much Importance as ever — The Beneficent Nature of a Sea -Power based on Commerce — Aggression leaves small substantial Results — The Effect of the Manner in which Wealth is acquired — The Necessity to protect Merchant-Shipping called forth Naval Strength — The Aims of Commercial Activity have Continuity of Purpose — The Foreign Policy of Cromwell — The Influence of our Rulers has assisted us — The Efforts of Colbert— Fatal Policy of Louis XIV.— The Dangers of a Commercial Spirit ....

xiv CONTENTS

Chapter II

The Analogy between Land and Sea Warfare and their influence on one another

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The Art of War is applicable to Sea as well as Shore Operations — Former distinction between the Crew that fought and the Crew that propelled or navigated the Ships — At former periods Leaders often commanded on both Elements — Prince Rupert, Don John of Austria, Monk, Coligny — War an effort of Force, and in our case must always have a Naval element — -The Army and Navy complementary to one another — The broad Principles of Strategy are applicable to both — An Analogy may be established between Land and Sea Warfare— Neither a purely Naval or purely Land War possible for us — All our Forces should be used in Combination — Communications must be secured — A great Fortress in Isolation becomes a splendid Tomb — Bazaine, Mack, Cornwallis, Menou

— Imperial Strategy regards Sea- Power as Indispensable — The various Aspects of the Sea — Its very Openness baffles us

— Physical Features of a Country often help Strategy — Nothing circumscribes the Mobility of Ships — We may not be able, to reach our Enemy — But we may make the Enemy acknowledge our Predominance — Crimea, Turkey, Franco- German War — The special Characteristics of Naval War — Evasion is easy to Ships, Flights may be continuous, Vessels do not grow weary — "The Fleet in Being" — Its Counterpart on Shore — The Russians in 1877 — Napoleon in 1 814 — The Allies in the Crimea — The War between China and Japan — A Fleet at large is, however, always Dangerous — Fixed Defences only valuable to free the Fleet — Fortresses unprepared for War may hamper rather than assist Armies — Geographical Points in themselves of small value where Sea Warfare is concerned — Only valuable if they supply Bases to powerful Fleets — On Shore, too, Mobility is demanded if River Lines or Frontiers are to be defended — Strategic "Keys" — "The Key of India is London" — Our Objective must be the hostile Fleets — The principles of Defensive Strategy are the same on Sea and Land — The Imperceptible Force of Strategy ....... 25

Chapter III

The Safety of the Empire founded on Sea Supremacy, but not on Sea Supremacy alone — Claims on the Exchequer by Army and Navy — How is Naval Strength to be measured? — The

CONTENTS xv

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Two- Power Standard — The Frontiers of the Empire — The Policy of Blockade — Its Monotony and Strain, but its Value towards Training — Its true object — Menace of a Fleet at large — Cervera's Squadron — The Distribution of the Fleets — Necessity for good Intelligence — Blockading, Then and Now — The Enemy must be brought to Battle — Difficulties in doing so — Speed of Fleets — Duty and Strength of Navy defined by St Vincent's Policy — Proportion of Battleships and Cruisers — Cruisers for .Commerce Protection — Protection of Interests in Foreign Waters — Is our Navy equal to the task? — Lord Brassey's Opinion — How Force is judged in War — The Quality of our Seamen formerly — The Value of Practical Training — The American War of 1812-14 — More Ships the most Pressing Cry in Imperial Defence — The Safety not only of England but her Dependencies rests on the Navy — The Transport of Troops to India and Canada — The Defence of the Commonwealth — Special attributes of Sea- Power — Special Colonial Squadrons need not be tied to Colonial Waters — The Enemy must start from a Base in the Northern Hemisphere — The Security of the Colonies depends on the Navy — Commence Protection falls also to the Navy . 46

Chapter IV

Dependence of the Army on the Navy — A predominant Navy has its Limitations — All the Forces we can command must take a Share in the Defence of the Empire — Army and Navy must play into one another's Hands — At the opening of a great Struggle the Army" will play a Subordinate Part — The Army holds the Communications of the Navy — A Navy cannot live on the Country — The Army holds the Bases for the Navy and thus frees the Navy — The Protection of Bases against Raids — Safety of Coal and Ammunition — Protection of Commerce — How Strong must Garrisons be? — Bombardments — Dangers from the Land Side — Landing Parties — Difficulties of Limiting Defence — Mobility of Garrisons — Co-operation between the Services — Element of Time — The Size of a Garrison often a Deterrent— Large Expeditions necessitated — Small Works can be bombarded — Margins for Waste — Civil Population — We must make Counterstrokes — Ships confer Mobility on Troops — Possible Objectives — Three Army Corps and a Cavalry Division — No Jealousy between Army and Navy should exist — The Potentialities of Combined Operations — The Peninsular War — The Crimea — The Black Sea Littoral — The Danger of a Raid on our Home Territory — The Home Army frees the Navy — Summary — Invasion must never be . .70 xvi CONTENTS

CHAPTER V Combined Naval and Military Operations

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Conditions of Warfare of the Present Day — Railroads, Telegraphs, and Steamships — Disabilities of an Invading Force — Balance of advantage to Sea- Power not so great as formerly — Capacities of Warships in Transporting Men — Disembarkations from big Ships slower than from small — Opportunities for over-sea Expeditions — Choice of Objective — A substantial Impression on the Enemy must be sought — Difficulties of a Blockade — An Expedition to seize a Hostile Port — Examples from the American War — Seizure of Strategic Points such as Gibraltar and Malta — Expeditions against Semi-Civilised Races — Naval and Military Expeditions in Shore — The Federal Ships of War in the Mississippi — Rivers compared to Railways as a means of Transport — Federal Strategy in 1861 — Forts Donelson and Henry — Porter and Vicksburg — Expeditions to effect Diversions — Expeditions to foment Discontent — Co-operation of Navy and Army to effect a change of Base — Examples of the Operation — France and Germany in 1870 — Command of the Sea essential to the Success of Expeditions

— Preparation for Contingencies — Ill-considered Expeditions — The question of Command — The Duties of the two Services in embarking and disembarking Troops — Desiderata in such Operations — The Landing at Aboukir Bay 1801 — At Maceira Bay in 1808 — Algiers 1830 — The Operation as difficult as ever — Number of Transports for a Force — Calculation of Tonnage required — Co-operation does not necessarily cease when the Disembarkation is finished — Examples from the Expedition to Egypt 1801, and the Crimean War — Chinese Expeditions — Expedition to Egypt 1882 — Japan and China 1894— Success

can be assured by careful Preparation . . • 97

Chapter VI

Distinction between Naval and Military Bases — The Naval Fighting Line carries its Impedimenta with it — Relation between Coal Endurance and locality of Coaling-Stations — Coal Endurance of Ships — Taking in Coal at Sea — Commerce Destroyers — Our Position as regards Coaling-Stations — Classes of Coaling-Stations — Our Fleet Stations and their Bases — The Mediterranean — The South African Station — Mauritius — Chagos Islands — East Indian Station — China Station — Straits Settlements— Hong Kong — Wei- Hai- Wei— Australian Station

— South - East American Station — Falkland Isles — North

CONTENTS xvii

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American and West Indies Stations — Bermuda, Halifax, Jamaica, St Lucia, Barbadoes — Pacific Station — Esquimault — The Duties of our Army with regard to these Bases — Various forms of Attack — Raids — Torpedo Boat Attack — Bombardment of Coast Towns — Set form of Attack — Transference of Garrisons — Considered in the case of Hong-Kong and Wei-Hai-Wei — Dangers from Land Attack at Hong-Kong — At Esquimault — Garrisons of Labuan — Sierra Leone — Sufficiency of Naval Bases in each Fleet Station — The Situation as regards India — Objections to adding further to our Responsibilities — Decentralisation in Manufacture of Warlike Stores, etc. — The Eastern Question is shifting to the far East — Growing importance of Hong-Kong — The reply to Port Arthur should be a great Base in Australia — The Isthmian Canal — Who will command it? — A Squadron and Base in the Caribbean Sea — The Burthen of Empire grows heavier daily . . . . . .132

CHAPTER VII The Great Cable Communications of the Empire

Facility of Communication throughout the Empire — A Strategic need — Cables called into being by Commerce — The Cables of the World described — They favour us, because mostly in our own Hands — Importance of Secrecy to our Navy — The History of the "All-British Cable "—Route of the "All-British Cable" — Report of Inter-departmental Committee, 1902 — Call for cheap Cablegrams — New German and Dutch Cable — The Neutrality of Cables in War Time — Importance of Time in Commercial Transactions — Influence of All-British Cables in Uniting the Empire — Further Arguments in favour of All- British Cables — Cypher Codes — Cutting of Cables by Warships — Experiences of Spanish- American War — Action of American Government — Absence of International Claims in Cuba — Efforts of the Wampatuck — Attempts at Ponce and Porto Rico — Cutting of two Cables in July — Cuba remained in Communication with Spain — Dewey's Action at Manila — The extent to which our Cables are open to Interruption — Commercial and Military Lines considered — The Danger off Newfoundland — A Reserve of spare Cables and Material for Repair — Experiences during former Wars — The Cable will follow the Fleet — Capacity of the Country for Cable Production and for Repair of Cables — Number of Cable Ships in the World — Policy in Protecting Cables — The weaker Navy will be forced to deep Waters — Wireless Telegraphy — The Cape to Cairo Railway and Telegraph . .163 xviii CONTENTS

Chapter VIII Page

Acreage under Wheat in England — Importations of Foreign Corn — The Example of Rome — Corners in Wheat — Financial Difficulties in their Way — The Transport across the Sea of our Food Supplies — Some Statistics from the Past — Increase of our Population — The Remedies suggested — A Duty on Imported Wheat — Establishment of Granaries — Mr Marston's Scheme — Silos at Malta — Mr Yerburgh's Suggestions — Experiments which have been made — Subsidies to Private Firms and Farmers — The System of Rationing the Population — The various Estimates of Supplies available in the Country — Objections to the various Remedies — The Effect of Shortage of Coin on other Nations — Demand creating Supply — Change in the Sources of our Food Supply — Future Developments — Effect of Government Interference — Supply of Raw Material in War Time — Supply of Food other than Corn — The Pressure of War on our Poor — Our Experiences in the Past — Our grounds for Hope in the Present — The Power of our Wealth — A Lesson from the Crimean War — Our Sea- Power the true Safeguard — Legislation to keep down Prices in Times of War — Our Food Supply in War not the most pressing Demand on us at Present . . . . .188

CHAPTER IX The Protection of our Commerce

The two Aspects of the Question — The Guerre de Course no Substitute for Naval Victories — Figures as to the Size of our Trade and Mercantile-Marine, and the Proportion our Warships bear to them — Difficulties of the Convoy System — The Protection of a Neutral Flag would not help us — Effect of the Declaration of Paris — Efficacy of Blockades— Illustration from the American War of Secession — Danger from hostile Mercantile Auxiliaries — The Menace of the Torpedo Boat — How it will be combated — The Conditions of the Past and Present compared — The Experiences of the American War of Secession discussed — The Factor of Coal-Supply — Demand that Merchant-Ships should be subsidised by Government — Speed of our Mail-Steamers — Suggestions for a System of subsidised Mercantile Auxiliaries — Views of Lord Brassey, Sir Donald Currie, and others — British and Foreign Merchant-Vessels compared — Mr Ismay on the Transfer of Ships to Foreign Powers — Experiences of Manoeuvres, and the Spanish- American War — The Shipping Combine — Importance to

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the Army of a large and efficient Mercantile-Marine — Part taken by the Army in the Protection of Commerce — Necessity for secure Harbours — Importance of preserving Confidence at Home . . . . . . . .211

Chapter X

The Defence of our great Dependencies and of the outlying portions of our empire

Brief remarks on the North- West Frontier of India — On Canada — The Commonwealth and New Zealand — South Africa — Local Defence not to be considered — Estimate of Force required to leave our Shores in the Event of War on the North- West Frontier — The Integrity of Afghanistan — Difficulties in securing Continuity of Policy or of Plan — Foreign War hinges on Communications — Examples from Military History — The Efficiency of our Mercantile- Marine — We shall always have to resort to Railways — Also strategical Railways to assist the Defence of our Indian Frontier — The Security of Canada — Her small Expenditure on Armaments 239

CHAPTER XI Home Defence

Why Home Defence is discussed last — Our Position towards other Nations — Foreign Views on our Expansion — Growth of Colonising Tendencies Abroad — We stand in their Way — Imperial Defence centres in the Southern Counties of England — Possibilities of Invasion or Raids — Napoleon's Schemes — The Condition of our Navy at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century — Our Condition in 1872 — Views on the Subject of Invasion in that Year — Condition of Foreign Mercantile Navies Thirty Years ago — The Situation To-day — The German Mercantile- Marine of To-day — Number of Transports an Expedition would require — Admiral Mend's Estimate of Time — The Attempt at Invasion would be made when our Hands were full — Factors in military Strength — Quality of Troops — Training — Knowledge of Country — The Levde en masse — War is a Business Transaction — Organisations for Home Defence — The Situation on the first Outbreak of War — Provision for Counterstroke — The Question of Entrenchments— Coast Defence — Lessons of the Spanish-American War in this Respect — Systems of Fortification — Preparation the Key-note of Home Defence — Reconnaissances of our xx CONTENTS

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Home Counties — Training of Officers — Finding of Men — Military Training in Board Schools — Federation for Imperial Defence — Let us train and organise what we have got . 250