Paley'S Moral Philosophy

Front matter

PALEY’S MORAL. PHfLOSOPHY

;WITII

BY

Chap. I. Definition and Use of the Science

II. The Law of Honour.x x

III. The Law of the Land.13

IV. Tho Scriptures. 14

V. The Moral Sense.17

VI. Human. Happiness.31

VII. Virtue.43

book n.

MORAL OBLIGATION.

Chap, I. Tho Question, Why am I obliged to keep my Word 1

considered.fid

II. What we mean, when we say a Man is obliged to do

a thing ..57

III. The Question, Why am I obliged to keep my Word ?

resumed.59

IV. The Will of God -.‘ 7 °

V. This Divine Benevolence. 74

VI. Utility .80

VII. The Necessity of General Rules.81

VIII. The Consideration of General Consequences pursued . 84

IX. Of Right.86

X. The Division of Rights.91

XL The General Rights of Mankind.95

VI

CONTENTS.

Part I. Of Relative Duties Which Are Determinate

Chap. I. Of Property .103

II. Tlie Use of the Institution of Property . ... 104

III. The History of Property .106

IV. In what the Right of Property is founded .... 107

V. Promises . 112

VI. Contracts . 124

VII. Contracts of Sale . 125

VIII. Contracts of Hazard .• , 128

IX Contracts of Lending of Inconsumable Property . . 130

X. Contracts concerning the Lending of Money . . . 131

XI. Contracts of Labour—Service ....... 135

XII. Contracts of Labour—Commissions . , * . ... 138

XIII. Contracts of Labour—Partnership .141

XIV. Contracts of Labour—Offices .... 14.2

XV. lies.i !4 4

XYI. Oaths ..

XVIL Oath in Evidence .j,-.

XVIII. Oath of Allegiance . . *.

XIX Oaths against Bribery in the Election of Members of

Parliament ..

XX Oath against Simony .jgg

XXL Oaths to observe local Statutes.ig t

XXII. Subscription to Articles of Religion . . 162

xxin. wais . .168

PART n.

OP SEDATIVE DUTIES WHICH ABE INDETEBMINATE, AND OP THE CRIMES OPPOSITE TO THESE.

Chap. I Charity.

II. Charity—The Treatment of our Domestics and De¬ pendents . ..

HI. Slaveiy.

*74

*74

if6

CONTENTS. Vii

Chap. IY. Charity—Professional Assistance ....... 179

Y. Charity—Pecuniary Bounty.181

YI. Resentment.188

YII. Anger.189

YIII. Revenge.191

IX. Duelling.".194

X. Litigation.197

XI. Gratitude.200

XII. Slander. 201

Part III

OF RELATIVE DUTIES WHICH RESULT FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SEXES, AND OF THE CRIMES OPPOSED TO THESE.

Chap. I. Of the Public Use of Marriage Institutions .... 203

II. Pomication. 204

III. Seduction .. .209

IY. Adultery ..211

Y. Inoest . .214

YI. Polygamy.213

YIL Divorce ... 219

YIII. Marriage.225

IX. Of the Duty of Parents.228

X. The Rights of Parents..

XI. The Duty of Children.241

AUTHOR’S PREFACE.

I N the treatises that I have met with upon the subject of morals , I appear myself to have remarked the following imperfections; —either that the principle was erroneous, or that it was indis¬ tinctly explained, or that the rules deduced from it were not sufficiently adapted to real life and to actual situations. The writings of Grotius, and the larger work of Puffendorff, are of too forensic a cast,—too much mixed up with civil law and with the jurisprudence of Germany—to answer precisely the design of a system of ethics,—the direction of private consciences in the general conduct of human life. Perhaps, indeed, they are not to be regarded as institutes of morality calculated to instruct an individual in his duty, so much as a species of law-books and lawauthorities, suited to the practice of those courts of justice, whose decisions are regulated by general principles of natural equity, in conjunction with the maxims of the Roman code; of which kind, I understand, there are many upon the Continent, To which may he added, concerning both these authors, that they are more occupied in describing the rights and usages of inde¬ pendent (immunities than is necessary in a work which pro¬ fesses not to adjust the correspondence of nations, but to deli** neate the offices of domestic life. The profusion also of classical quotations with which many of their pages abound seems to me a fault from which it will not be easy to excuse them. If these extracts be intended as decorations of style, the composition is overloaded with ornaments of one kind. To anything more than ornament they can make no claim. To propose them as serious arguments,—gravely to attempt to establish or fortify a moral duty by the testimony of a Greek or Roman poet,—is to trifle with the attention of the reader, or rather to take it off from all just principles of reasoning in morals.

author’s preface.

a

Of our own writers in this branch of philosophy, I find none that I think perfectly free from the three objections which I have stated. There is likewise a fourth property observable almost in all of them, namely, that they divide too much the law of Nature from the precepts of Revelation; some authors industriously declining the mention of Scripture-authorities, as belonging to a different province; and others reserving them for a separate volume; which appears 'to me much the same defect, as if a commentator on the laws of England should con¬ tent himself with stating upon each head the common law of the land, without taking any nolice of acts of parliament; or should chuse to give his readers the common law in one book, and the statute law in another. ‘ When the obligations of morality are taught/ says a pious and celebrated writer, e let the sanctions of Christianity never be forgotten; by which it will be shown * that they give strength and lustre to each other: religion will appear to be the voice of reason, and morality will be the will of God.’ 1

The manner also in which modem writers have treated of sub¬ jects of morality is, in my judgment, liable to much exception. It has become of late a fashion to deliver moral institutes in strings or series of detached propositions, without subjoining a continued argument or regular dissertation to any of them. This sententious apophthegmatising style, by crowding propositions and paragraphs too fast upon the mind, and by carrying the eye of the reader from subject to subject in too quick a succession, gains not a sufficient hold upon the attention to leave either the memory furnished, or the understanding satisfied. However useful a syllabus of topics or a series of propositions may be in the hands of a lecturer, or as a guide to a student, who is sup¬ posed to consult other books, or to institute upon each subject researches of his own, the method is by no means convenient for ordinary readers; because few readers are such thinkers as to want only a hint to set their thoughts at work upon; or such as will pause and tarry at every proposition, till they have traced Mfc its dependency, proof, relation, and consequences, before “it themselves to step on to another. A respectable

1 Fftefkoo to The by Or. Johnson,

.author's preface.

writer of this class 1 has comprised his doctrine of slavery in the three following propositions:—

* No one is born a slave; because every one is bom with all his original rights.'

( No one can become a slave; because no one from being a person can, in the language of the Roman law, become a thing, or subject of property.'

f The supposed properly of the master in the slave, therefore, is matter of usurpation, not of right.'

It may be possible to deduce from these few adages such a theory of the primitive rights of human nature, as will evince the illegality of slavery: but surely an author requires too much of his reader, when he expects him to make these deduc¬ tions for himself; or to supply, perhaps from some remote chapter of the same treatise, the several proofs and explanations which are necessary to render the meaning and truth of these assertions intelligible.

There is a fault, the opposite of this, which some moralists who have adopted a different, and I think a better plan of com¬ position, have not always been careful to avoid; namely, the dwelling upon verbal and elementary distinctions, with a labour and prolixity proportioned much more to the subtlety of the question than to‘ its value and importance in the prosecution o x the subject. A writer upon the law of nature, 3 whose explica¬ tions in every part of philosophy, though always diffuse, are often very successful, has employed three large sections in endea¬ vouring to prove that e permissions are not laws.' The dis¬ cussion of this controversy, however essential it might be to dialectic precision, was certainly not necessary to the progress of a work designed to describe the duties and obligations of civil life. The reader becomes impatient when he is detained by disquisitions which have no other objecHhan the settling of terms and phrases; and) what is worse, they for whose use such books are chiefly intended will not be persuaded, to read them' at all.

I am led to propose these strictures, not by any propensity to depreciate the labours of my predecessors, much less to invite a comparison between the merits of their performances and my

1 Dr. Ferguson, author of Institutes of Moral Philosophy, 1767. a Dr. Rutherford, author of Institutes of Natural Lsm, author’s preface.

own ; but solely by the consideration, that when a writer offers a book to the Public, upon a subject on which the Public are already in possession of many others, he is bound by a kind of literary justice to inform his readers, distinctly and specifi¬ cally, what it is he professes to supply and what he expects to improve, The imperfections above enumerated are those which I have endeavoured to avoid or remedy. Of the execution, the reader must judge: but this was the design.

Concerning the principle of morals it would be premature to speak : but concerning the manner of unfolding and explaining that principle, I.have somewhat which I wish to be remarked. An experience of nine years in the office of a public tutor inone of the universities, and in that department of education to which these chapters relate, afforded me frequent occasions to observe, that in discoursing to young minds upon topics of morality, it required much more pains to make them perceive the difficulty than ,to understand the solution; that, unless the subject was so drawn up to a point as to exhibit the full force of an objection or the exact place of a doubt, before any expla¬ nation was entered upon,—in other words, unless some curiosity was excited before it was attempted to be satisfied, the labour of the teacher was lost. When information was not desired, it was seldom, I found, retained. I have made this observation my guide in the following work: that is, upon each occasion I have endeavoured, before I suffered myself to proceed in the disquisition, to put the reader in complete possession of the question; and to do it in the way that I thought most likely to stir up his own doubts and solicitude about it.

In pursuing the principle of morals through the detail of cases to which it is applicable, I have had in view to accommo¬ date both the choice of the subjects and the manner of handling them to the situations which anse in the life of an inhabitant of this country in these times. This is the thing that I think to be principally wanting in former treatises; and perhaps the chief advantage that will be found in mine. I have examined no doubts, I have discussed no obscurities, I have encountered no errors, I have adverted to no controversies, but what I have seen actually to exist, If some of the questions treated of appear to a more instructed reader minute or puerile, I desire such reader to be assured that I have found them occasions of author’s preface.

difficulty to young minds; and what I have observed in young minds, I should expect to meet with in all who approach these subjects for the first time. Upon each article of human duty,

I have combined with the conclusion of reason the declarations of Scripture, when they are to be had, as of co-ordinate autho¬ rity, 1 and as both terminating in the same sanctions.

In the manner of the work, I have endeavoured so to attemper the opposite plans above animadverted upon, as that the reader may not accuse me either of too much haste, or too much delay.

I have bestowed upon each subject enough of dissertation to give a body and substance to the chapter in which it is treated of, as well as coherence and perspicuity: on the other hand, I have seldom, I hope, exercised the patience of the reader by the length and prolixity of my essays, or disappointed that patience at last by the tenuity and unimportance of the conclusion.

There are two particulars in the following work, for which it may be thought necessary that I should offer some excuse. The first of which is, that I have scarcely ever referred to any other book; or mentioned the name of the author whose thoughts, and sometimes, possibly, whose very expressions, I have adopted. My method of writing has constantly been this : to extract what I could from my own stores and my own reflections, in the first place; to put down that, and afterwards to consult upon each subject such readings as fell in my way; which order, I am con¬ vinced, is the only one whereby any person can keep his thoughts from sliding into other men’s trains. The effect of such a plan upon the production itself will be, that, whilst some parts in matter or manner may be new, others will be little else than a re¬ petition of the old. I make no pretensions to perfect originality* I claim to be something more than a mere compiler. Much, no doubt,is borrowed; but the fact is, that the notes for this work having been prepared for some years, and such things having • been from time to time inserted in them as appeared to me worth preserving, and such insertions made commonly without the name of the author from whom they were take#, I should, at this time, have found a difficulty in recovering those names with sufi: ficient exactness to be able to render to every man his own. Nor, to speak the truth, did it appear to me worth while to repeat the search merely for this purpose. When authorities are relied upon, names must be produced: when a discovery has bee* author’s preface.

mtu^pi in science, it may be unjust to borrow the invention without acknowledging the author. But in an argumentative treatise, and upon a subject which allows no place for discovery or in¬ vention, properly so called; and in which all that can belong to a writer is his mode of reasoning, or his judgment of proba¬ bilities ; I should have thought it superfluous, had it been easier to me than it was, to have interrupted my text, or crowded my margin with reference to every author whose sentiments I have made use of. There is, however, one work to which I owe so much, that it would be ungrateful not to confess the obligation: I mean the writings of the late Abraham Tucker, Esq., part of which were published by himself, and the remainder since his death, under the title of The Ught of Nature pursued, by Edward Search , Esq . I have found in this writer more original thinking and observation upon the several subjects that he has taken in hand than in any other, not to say, than in all others put together. His talent also for illustration is unrivalled. But his thoughts are diffused through a long, various, and irregular work. I shall account it no mean praise, if I have been sometimes able to dispose into method, to collect into heads and articles, or to exhibit in more compact and tangible masses, what, in that other¬ wise excellent performance, is spread over too much surface.

The next circumstance for which some apology may be ex¬ pected is the joining of moral and political philosophy together, or the addition of a book of politics to a system of ethics. Against this objection, if it be made one, I might defend myself by the example of many approved writers, who have treated de officiis hominis et civis , or, as some chuse to express it, * of the eights and obligations of Man, in his individual and social capa¬ city/ in the same book. I might allege, also, that the part a member of the commonwealth shall take in political contentions, the vote he shall give, the counsels he shall approve, the support he shall afford, or the opposition he shall make to any system of public measures,—is as much a question of personal duty, as much concerns the conscience of the individual who deliberates, as the determination of any doubt which relates to the conduct of private life; that consequently political philosophy is, pro¬ perly speaking, a continuation of moral philosophy; or rather indeed a part of it, supposing moral philosophy to have for its aim the information of the human conscience in every deli?

beration that is likely to come before it. I might avail myself of these excuses, if I wanted them; but the vindication upon which I rely is the following:—In stating the principle of morals, the reader will observe that I have employed some in¬ dustry in explaining the theory, and showing the necessity of general rules ; without the full and constant consideration of which, I am persuaded that no system of moral philosophy can be satisfactory or consistent. This foundation being laid, or rather this habit being formed, the discussion of political subjects, to which, more than to almost any other, general rules are appli¬ cable, became clear and easy. Whereas, had these topics been assigned to a distinct work, it would have been necessary to have repeated the same rudiments, to have established over again the same principles, as those which we had already exemplified, and rendered familiar to the reader, in the former parts of this. In a word, if there appear to any one too great a diversity or-too wide a distance, between the subjects treated of in the course of the present volume, let him be reminded, that the doctrine of general rules pervades and connects the whole.

It may not be improper, however, to admonish the reader, that, under the name of politics , he is not to look for those occasional controversies, which the occurrences of the present day, or any temporary situation of public affairs, may excite; and most of which, if not beneath the dignity, it is beside the purpose, of a philosophical institution to advert to. He will perceive that the several disquisitions are framed with a reference to the condition of this country, and of this government: but it seemed to me to belong to the design of a work like the following, not so much to discuss each altercated point with the particularity of a political pamphlet upon the subject, as to deliver those universal princi¬ ples, apd to exhibit that mode and train of reasoning in politics, by the due application of which every naan.might be.,enabled te attain to just conclusions of his own- I am not ignorant e#an ohf

jection that has been advanced against nil ahsteaft concerning the origin, principle, oK -hm itat i wof civil authority ; namely, that such speculations possess, little or no influence upon 1 the conduct.either of the State or of the subject, of the governors or the. governed; nor are jdWded, with any useful consequences to .either: that in times of tranquillity they are not wanted* m times of confusion they are never heard. This repi^njatim^

,authok's Preface.

however, in my opinion, is not just. Times of tumult, it is true, are not the times to learn; but the choice which men make of their side and party, in the most critical occasions of the commonwealth, may nevertheless depend upon the lessons they have received, the hooks they have read, and the opinions they have imbibed, in seasons of leisure and quietness. Some judicious persons who were present at Geneva during the troubles which lately convulsed that city, thought they perceived, in the conten¬ tions there carrying on, the operation of that political theory, which the writings of Rousseau, and the unbounded esteem in which these writings are holden by his countrymen, had diffused amongst the people. Throughout the political disputes that have within these few years taken place in Great Britain, in her sisterkingdom, and in her foreign dependencies, it was impossible not to observe in the language of party, in the resolutions of public meetings, in debate, in conversation, in the general strain of those fugitive and diurnal addresses to the Public which such oc¬ casions call forth, the prevalency of those ideas of civil authority which are displayed in the works of Mr. Locke* The credit of that great name, thejsourage and liberality of his principles, the skill and dearness with which his arguments are proposed, no less than the weight of the arguments themselves, have given a re¬ putation and currency to his opinions, of which I am persuaded, in any unsettled state of public affairs, the influence would be felt* As this is not a place for examining the truth or tendency of these doctrines, I would not be understood by what I have said to express any judgment concerning either. I mean only to remark, that such doctrines are not without effect; and that it is of practical importance to have the principles from which the obligations of social union, and the extent of civil obedience, are derived, rightly explained and well understood. Indeed, as far as I have observed, in political, beyond all other subjects, where men are without some fundamental and scientific principles to resort to, they are liable to have their understandings played upon by cant phrases and unmeaning terms, of which every party in every country possesses a vocabulary. We appear astonished when we see the multitude led away by sounds; but we should remember that, if sounds work miracles, it is always upon igno¬ rance. The influence of names is in exact proportion to the want of knowledge*

ANNOTATIONS ON THE AUTHORS TBESACE.

These are the observations with which I have judged it expe¬ dient -to prepare the attention of my reader. Concerning the personal motives which engaged me in the following attempt, it is not necessary that I say much: the nature of my academical situation, a great deal of leisure since my retirement horn it, the recommendation of an honoured and Excellent Mend, the autho¬ rity of the venerable prelate to whom these labours are inscribed, the not perceiving in what way I could employ my time or ta¬ lents better, and my disapprobation, in literary men, of that fastidious indolence which sits still because it disdains to do little, were the considerations that directed my thoughts to this design. Nor have I repented of the undertaking. Whatever be the fete or reception of this work, it ow.es its author nothing. In sick¬ ness and in health 1 have found in it that which can alone alle¬ viate the one, or give enjoyment to the other,—occupation and engagement.

ANNOTATIONS ON THE AUTHOR’S PREFACE.

Tucker’s Light of Nature, from which Paley derived, as he has here informed us, a great part of his System of Morals, is a Work of great originality and ingenuity in many parts, and contains much that is very valuable, mixed up with no small amount of very inferior Matter. It may be compared to a gold-mine, in which there are many particles, and several con¬ siderable masses, of precious metal mixed with gravel and day.

The portion which Paley fixed on for adoption is one which cannot, I think, be reckoned among the most valuable. Bishop Butler would have been a far safer guide.

For the rest, the mode of making use of previous Writers which our Author describes himself as having pursued, is one strongly to be recommended. ‘My method,’ be says, ‘of writing has constantly been this f to extract what I could from my own stores and my own reflections, in the first place j to put down that, and afterwards to consult upon each subject such readings as fell in my way; which order, I am convinced, is the only one whereby any person can keep his thoughts from sliding into other men’s trains.’

PALEY’S

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

Chapter I. Definition And Usb Ob The Science

M ORAL Philosophy, Morality, Ethics, Casuistry, Natural Law, mean all the same thing; namely, that science which teaches men their duty and the reasons of it.

The use of such a study depends upon this, that, without it, the rules of life, by which men are ordinarily governed, Often¬ times mislead them, through a defect either in the rule, or in ’ the application.

These rules are, the Law of Honour, the Law of the Land, and the Scriptures.

Chapter II. The Daw Ob Honour

T HE Law of Honour is a system of rules constructed by people of fashion, and calculated to facilitate their inter¬ course with one another; and for no other purpose.

Consequently, nothing is adverted to by the Law of Honour, but what tends«to incommode this intercourse.

Hence this law only prescribes and regulates the duties ii Moral Philosophy. [Book i.

betwixt equate ; omitting such, as relate to the Supreme Being, as ■well as those which we owe to our inferiors.

For which reason, profaneness, neglect of public worship or private devotion, cruelty to servants, rigorous treatment of tenants or other dependents, want of charity to the poor, injuries done to tradesmen by insolvency, or delay of payment, with numberless examples of the same kind, are accounted no breaches of honour ; because a man is not a less agreeable companion for these vices, nor the worse to deal with, in those concerns which are usually transacted between one gentleman and another.

Again ; the Law of Honour, being constituted by men occu¬ pied in the pursuit of pleasure, and for the mutual conveniency of such men, will be found, as might be expected from the character and design of the law-makers, to be, in most instances, favourable to the licentious indulgence of the natural passions.

Thus it allows of fornication, adultery, drunkenness, prodi¬ gality, duelling, and of revenge in the extreme; and lays no stress upon the virtues opposite to these.

ANNOTATION.

Perhaps the ‘ Law of Honour 5 might not improperly be taken in a wider acceptation, as embracing any system of rules established by some Class of persons, who require a conformity * thereto of all members of their Society, and which are to be observed on pain of exclusion from that Society, or, as we sometimes say, ‘ losing Caste. 5 Hence, these rules vary in each Nation, Sex, or Circle; what would be in one a breach of honour, such as would cause a person to be despised jand shunned by those of his Class, being no such offence in another circle. A Chinese for instance, is very little ashamed of being detected as a cheat; but he would be disgraced by not treating his parents with due respect, or.not keeping the Tombs of his Ancestors in good repair. And he is not disgraced by being flogged; but he would be ready to die of mortification at having his hair cut off.

And in the same nation, different Classes of persons have different points of Honour. The Honour of the Male Sex for instance, and of the Female, are not the same.

The Law of the Land.

*3

Chapter III. The Law Of The Land

T HAT part of mankind, who are beneath the Law of Honour, often make the Law of the Land their rule of life; that is, they are satisfied with themselves, so long as they do or omit nothing, for the doing or omitting of which the law can punish them.

Whereas every system of human laws, considered as a rule of life, labours under the two following defects:

I. Human laws omit many duties, as not objects of compul¬ sion ; such as piety to God, bounty to the poor, forgiveness of injuries, education of children, gratitude to benefactors.

The law never speaks but to command, nor commands but where it can compel; consequently those duties, which by their nature must be voluntary , are left out of the statute-book, as lying beyond the reach of its operation and authority.

II. Human laws permit, or, which is the same thing, suffer to go unpunished, many crimes, because they are incapable of being defined by any previous description. Of which nature are luxury, prodigality, partiality at voting at those elections in which the qualifications of the candidate ought to determine the success, caprice in the disposition of men's fortunes at their death, disrespect to parents, and a multitude of similar examples.

For, this is the alternative: either the law must define before¬ hand and with precision the offences which it punishes; or it mus{ be left to the discretion of the magistrate, to determine upon each particular accusation, whether it constitute that offence which the law designed to punish, or not; which is, in effect, leaving to the magistrate to punish or not to punish, at his pleasure, the individual'who is brought before him; which is just so much tyranny. Where, therefore, as in the instances above mentioned, the distinction between right and wrong is of too subtile or of too secret a nature to be ascertained by any pre¬ concerted language, the law of most countries, especially of free States, rather than commit the liberty of the subject to the dis¬ cretion of the magistrate, leaves men in such cases to themselvefe*

H

Moral and Political Philosophy .