The new psychology and the Hebrew prophets

Front matter

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Foreword

By H. CrIicHTON MILLER, M.A., M.D., Hon. Director, Tavistock Clinic.

Major Povah has given me the opportunity of reading this book in typescript. He asks me to write a foreword and this I do most gladly. A few months ago I thought I knew a little about the Old Testament. This belief was shaken by a modest course of Dr. Moffat’s translation. Now Major Povah makes me feel that I know considerably less than nothing. This is salutary for me, no doubt. But as a compensation I cling to the belief that I know something of modern Psychology. This being so, I venture to say that our author’s views are thoroughly sound in so far as they involve psychological considerations. He has read widely —as will be obvious to every reader. He has also assimilated thoroughly, and that cannot be said of all who have read widely. Furthermore he has brought to the study a mind so open and a judgment so acute, that he has escaped the all too frequent fate of becoming the blind partisan of one school or another.

It is this psychological equipment which Major

Povah utilises in his study of the Old Testament.

Vill FOREWORD

No wonder he finds it a rewarding subject. Mythology, primitive religions, racial culture have been subjected to treatment of this sort with very fruitful results. But the Bible has been largely exempt and the Old Testament entirely so. Yet I have always believed it to be essential to study the New Testament in the light of its Judaic background and origin. If this be so, it is clearly necessary to apply this psychological approach to the Old Testament as well as to the New Testament.

This volume is certain to cause offence, and that for the simple reason that it will present an unwelcome challenge to many readers; a challenge similar to that which was presented many years ago by the students of Higher Criticism, and which still continues to prove a stumbling block to a certain number. Criticism challenged faith in the sense that it made harder a simple undiscriminating faith in divine omnipotence and divine purpose. It challenged the student to take a wider view; to enlarge his horizon so as to embrace a God who worked through human channels.

But the present challenge is likely to be unwelcome for more personal reasons. The interpretation that Major Povah offers, reveals the subjective in what was previously regarded as merely objective. In other words what before was historical and outside ourselves, turns out to be of ever-recurring human interest and to involve problems that are our own. Elijah’s retreat to the wilderness and then to the cave on the mount of God was previously an episode in the life of one of God’s servants. But treated

FOREWORD ix from the point of view of analytical psychology it presents an intensely personal problem ; a problem that demands solution in a man’s own soul; and withal a problem that has hitherto eluded the theologian.

There is another service which this study renders. It helps to break down still further that dangerous isolation of the Bible which modern criticism condemns. The study of history, anthropology, archeology and contemporary languages has made us realise the numberless points of contact between the Bible and the world of its day. Here is another strong link. The symbolism which the psychologist of to-day recognises in many an Old Testament legend, is often the same symbolism that he has met in Greek, Persian, or Egyptian mythology. And from this too great gain should accrue.

I hope that this book will find its way, not only into the libraries of theologians, but also into the hands of many general readers, who are, like myself, unversed in theology yet capable of appreciating a subject so vital and rewarding.

Preface

By Rev. W. R. MATTHEWS, M.A., D.D., Dean of King’s College, London

I GLADLY write a few words of introduction to this book by my friend and former pupil. Apart from its intrinsic interest, it has some of the qualities of a pioneering work. No one, of course, could complain that the new psychologists have left us without attempts to enlighten us on the subject of religion ; on the contrary their excursions into this field have been numerous and exciting. But we may perhaps lament that they should have evoked in the ordinary theological reader admiration for their courage rather than respect for their knowledge of the facts of religious history. The originality of Major Povah’s book lies in this—that it is an essay on the psychology of the Hebrew Prophets by one who really knows something about the Prophets and can base his analysis upon a foundation of genuine Biblical scholarship.

The amazing nonsense which has been written by great psychological authorities on the subject of religion has unfortunately led many intelligent people to conclude that their psychology is as unscientific as their history. This would be a mistake.

PREFACE xl

There can be little doubt that Major Povah is right in believing that the main conclusions of the psychoanalytic school are sound, though there are points in which the author of this book speaks with greater confidence than I should venture to feel. The new psychology will certainly profoundly affect the psychology of religion, though it is not yet clear what the final result of the new method will be. At least we may say that the study of the psychology of religion has become much more exciting and more coherent. What was formerly a series of rather disjointed remarks about various aspects of the religious life or comments upon doubtful statistics based on misleading questionnaires, has now become transformed into an inquiry which clearly is concerned with the very foundations of our lives. It is the normal result of new knowledge or new points of view to disturb accepted beliefs. We need not be surprised therefore that in the hands of many exponents the New Psychology has been used as a weapon of offence against religion. We may take comfort from the thought that every scientific | advance has been regarded by the faint-hearted as" subversive of faith. Biblical criticism, evolution, the comparative study of religions, have all been in the long run the means of bringing religious faith more into harmony with reality and of deepening our conception of God and His relation with men. The same result may be expected from the scientific study of human experience. As Major Povah well brings out in this book, the source of much evil and -weakness in the individual is failure to face reality, xii PREFACE cowardice which builds a fantasy wherein to shelter from the hard tasks which life offers. Much the same is true of Theology. The position of Theology at the present day is intensely exciting to one who strives to look ahead. New light is coming on the nature of God. It is plain that we shall move towards a more widespread negation or towards a surer confidence and deeper insight unto the Divine.

The study of religious experience from the standpoint of modern psychology by men who have a first-hand knowledge of religion as a fact of life and of the historical records of the formative periods in religious development is an urgent need to-day. The attempt to bring together the psychologist and the Old Testament scholar is of great interest. No one would claim that Major Povah’s conclusions are all certain. Much still remains to be done on the lines of this book. It can at least claim to be a serious contribution to a living problem and to be written under the guidance of those two loyalties which in the end are not two but one—to the truth of science and to the vision of God.

Chapter I “ ? 7 ~

The New Psychology—The unconscious mind—Rationalisation—Repression—The Buried Complex—Projection.

Chapter II ~ _ =

The primary unconscious and the secondary unconscious— Man’s psychic energy is instinctive—The libido—Man can sublimate part of his libido on condition that he (a) recognises his instincts and (b) has a sufficiently high ideal—The Christian ideal and its critics.

CHAPTER III ra - ; * ws

The phases of a normal boy’s development—Regression— Nitvana or ‘ the flesh pots of Egypt’—Peter Pan—Magic —Jung’s view of Christianity—Freud’s theory of the primitive father—Tansley’s theory of the moral sense—The ‘‘ stumbling block” in Christianity.

CHAPTER IV = . : * rs

The Hebrew scriptures—A glance at Old Testament history in the light of modern scholarship—The J school—The E school— The D school—The P school—The compilation, expansion, etc., of books such as Amos or Hosea—The Septuagint—Hebrew writers (a) do not employ footnotes, (6) seldom use indirect speech, (c) make their characters think aloud.

Chapter V - . - *

The wind and the dust—Life and death—The abnormal and the normal—God and man—tThe destructive wind—Chance—The abnormal and the normal in psychology—Second Sight— Dreams—‘“ Seeing red.”

Chapter VI - - - - *

Early Hebrew psychology—Man an animated body—His soul simply his instincts—A temporary ego, but sense of personality weak—The intellect—Life impossible without a body —Early Yahweh religion not concerned with a future life.

CHAPTER VII * > oy . ~

JE’s theology and Freud’s theory of the primitive father —JE’s view of history—Meaning of name Yahweh—JE’s view of the instincts ; life is good—JE’s psychology of inspiration.

CHAPTER VIII - - - - ee The early prophets and Tansley’s theory of the moral sense —Micaiah-ben-Yimlah—Elijah on Horeb—Amos and _ the ee eR i of the role of preacher of justice from that of ‘“‘ Mad Mullah.”

CHAPTER IX - - - - - Hosea and Gomer—tThe sex and parental instincts—Yahweh’s relation to Israel—Difference between Old Testament and Homer—tTranscendence of Yahweh—Hosea’s favourite word —Hosea and the new psychology.

xiv TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER X x = * : s

The prophets and the unconscious mind—Myths and dreams —Dream symbolism—lIsaiah’s call to become a prophet— Isaiah’s hopes; their connection both with mythical ideas and also with history.

CHAPTER XI = . > : :

The book of Deuteronomy—Its use of suggestion and auto-suggestion—Its effort to reduce the moral idea to a code— Jeremiah—His psychology—His relation to history—The religion of the prophets is not dope.

CHAPTER XII - - ~ - H Ezekiel—His call in Babylonia—His appeal to history—His insistence on free-will—His view of the false prophets—False prophecy is true prophecy perverted—False prophets think they are true prophets—Deutero-Isaiah—His appeal to history—Transcendence and Immanence of Yahweh—Yahweh’s Dabar (word)—Why the prophets predicted—Comparison of prophet to scientist—Deutero-Isaiah proclaims a wordreligion—Uniqueness of this world-religion—Meaning of word Torah in the prophets.

CHAPTER XIII - ¥ 9 *

Contrast between psychology of Haggai and that of ‘‘ Judges” —Holiness—Growth of sense of importance of the individual to Yahweh—Growth of thought of the resurrection—Difference between the Hebrew thought of the resurrection and the Greek thought of immortality—Apocalyptic projects the spiritual into the shy—Christianity replaces the dualistic view of man by the sacramental view.

CHAPTER XIV + * = - rs

The New Testament cannot be properly studied apart from the Old—vThe axioms of prophecy—vThe uniqueness of the Hebrew idea of Chokmah, wisdom—The New Psychology challenges, not only belief, but also unbelief.

CHAPTER XV > 7 -

The prophets’ mental picture of Sin is connected, not with Adam, Eve and the Serpent, but with the ‘‘ Great Refusal”’ of Israel in the days of Moses—The “‘ Servant of Yahweh ” as Psycho-therapist.

ABBREVIATIONS

E. = Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics. Z.

NOTE

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IgI

Roe.

In Biblical references quoted in the foot-notes, passages of late date are sometimes given along with passages of early date, if they illustrate an idea which was present at an early date.

Chapter I

HE New Psychology differs from the Old in that it lays stress on what is called the unconscious mind.

Objections have been raised against the New Psychology, both on the ground that the term unconscious mind is self-contradictory, and also on the ground that the New Psychologists have built up their theories on their experience of psychoneurotic patients, that is to say, of abnormal persons.

“Why ’—it is asked—‘‘ should the ordinary, normal, man worry his head with such paradoxical notions as that of the unconscious mind, or become morbidly introspective by endeavouring to find processes, akin to those which obsess the madman, at work in his own mind ? ”

To this it must be replied that the hypothesis of the existence of the unconscious mind is merely a hypothesis put forward to account for certain facts ; that it was these facts which led psychologists to postulate the existence of the unconscious mind ; that these facts would be no more affected by the abandonment of the hypothesis of the unconscious mind and the substitution for it of another hypothesis, than the trajectory of a given shell, fired under given atmospheric conditions, at a given elevation and a given muzzle velocity, from a given gun, would be—or has been—affected by the substitution of the views of Einstein for those of Newton by the experts in the School of Gunnery; that, though it was pathological cases which first drew the attention of psychologists to the class of facts under consideration, yet, now that these facts have been pointed out, it is within the power of any intelligent and candid person, however normal, to demonstrate for himself the reality of that unknown x which—whether fortunately or unfortunately— the New Psychologists call the unconscious mind ; and that, unless both the Christian preacher and the Greek philosopher are entirely wrong in urging men to know themselves, a man owes it to himself— and his neighbours—to face that unknown ~ in his own mind, to which the New Psychology is calling his attention.

What then is meant by the unconscious mind ? It is perhaps desirable to point out that it is not to be confounded with the foreconscious.

The term foreconscious is used in connection with all those memories which, although not at the moment in the field of consciousness, can be recalled to consciousness at will—either immediately (as in the case of the multiplication table) or after “ refreshing the memory ” (as in the case of the dates of the Kings of England).

But the term unconscious is used in connection with processes in a man’s mind, of which he is quite unaware, and in connection with experiences which he has not only forgotten (as a normal man forgets the date of Henry VII), but is also prevented by a resistance within his mind from remembering without assistance of quite a different kind from that furnished by repeating ‘‘ William the Conqueror, 1066; William II, 1087, etc.”

“ But,” it may be asked, ‘‘ if no one is conscious of the contents of his unconscious mind, what grounds has anyone for inferring the reality of the unconscious mind ? ”’

The ordinary man can, perhaps, most easily become aware of the reality and the subtlety of what is called the unconscious mind, by a candid consideration of such questions as—‘‘ What sort of things do I forget most easily ?’’ ‘‘ Why does this talk about an unconscious mind irritate me ? ”

It is fairly obvious that our opponent’s real reason for doing a thing or holding an opinion is not always the reason which he thinks is the real reason. The vehemence with which he maintains his political or religious views against our own, is often inversely proportional to his real knowledge of the matter about which he is arguing. If he belongs to the Labour Party, it is often, not, as he imagines, because he thinks that the Labour Party’s policy is good for the country, but because he envies the rich. If he belongs to the Conservative Party, it is often, not, as he imagines, because he thinks that the Conservative Party’s policy is good for the country, - but because he prefers to give money “in charity ”’ rather than in wages.

We can hardly fail to recognise that the reasons advanced by our opponents for holding their opinions—yes, the reasons which our opponents really believe to be the true reasons—are not always reasons at all, but what are called rationalisations.

Rationalisation is ‘‘ the inventing of a reason for an attitude or action, the motive of which is not recognised ”’ (Baudouin).

Very little study of one’s neighbours is required to see that rationalisation plays an enormous part in men’s lives. A man does not like to admit to

B himself that he is, for instance, a miser, a petty tyrant, or a bad workman. It is pleasanter to have recourse unconsciously to that form of rationalisation which is known as a “ defence reaction ’’—a rationalisation which enables a man both to have his cake and to eat it too, both to retain his good opinion of himself and also to indulge his hoarding propensity, his petty tyranny, or his slackness. Tansley in The New Psychology says that a defence reaction is ““ often the homage which vice pays to virtue .... a miser will excuse his parsimony on the ground that he has to provide adequately for his children, : . an employer or foreman will excuse the petty tyranny which he shows towards his workpeople on the ground that they are unruly and that discipline must be maintained, whereas the real motive is the love of exercising power over others. ‘A bad workman,’ as the Proverb says, ‘ finds fault with his tools,’ and he does it, of course, to conceal the incompetence which he will not recognise.”

We have, then, caught a glimpse, as it were, of our -neighbour’s unconscious mind, and detected him unconsciously manufacturing reasons to mislead himself and forgetting the thing which it is embarrassing to consciousness to remember.

But, having proceeded as far as this, can one stop and refuse to proceed further ? Does not the suspicion dawn on oneself that even that highly rational person, oneself, may not be immune from rationalising, from forgetting what it is inconvenient to remember ?

Now, it is clear that if one’s rationalisation is to be successful in enabling one to indulge in conduct which one repudiates in other people, without losing one’s good opinion of oneself, it is absolutely necessary that the real reason, the true motive of one’s conduct, should be forgotten. Indeed rationalisation, seeing it does not imply conscious insincerity— for it is the “‘ inventing of a reason for an attitude or action the motive of which is not recognised ’’— is impossible unless and until the real reason for one’s attitude, or the real motive for the conduct “defended’”’ by the defence reaction, has been forgotten.

Moreover, it is clear to anyone who is candid with himself, that we all have a tendency at any rate to forget what it is inconvenient to remember. It is, for instance, easy to forget a kindness shown one by a man one does not like, or the good qualities of a political or theological opponent. It is easier to forget to pay a bill than to render one—to forget to go to the dentist than to go to the theatre.

“ But ’’—it may be asked—“‘is it always easy, or indeed possible, to forget what it is inconvenient to remember? Is not one sometimes haunted by an anxiety, the ‘inconvenience’ of which is unfortunately equalled by the difficulty—indeed, the impossibility—of forgetting it ? ”

It is obvious that one may be haunted, obsessed, by an anxiety such as this. But why? Is not the obsessing anxiety itself a defence reaction to save one from facing a certainty? Is not the anxiety lest one may die to-morrow, a defence reaction against facing the thought that one is certainly going to die some day or other ?

Cowards die many times before their deaths ; The valiant never taste of death but once. Of all the wonders that I yet have heard, It seems to me most strange that men should fear ; Seeing that death, a necessary end, Will come when it will come.

[Julius Cesar.)

Cesar, having faced the thought that he is certainly going to die some day or other, is not anxious as to whether he may happen to die on the Ides of March. For anxiety is associated with uncertainty, not with certainty. The very anxiety of the “cowards ’”’ as to whether they will die to-morrow, seeing that it is always uncertain whether they will or not, is a defence reaction which saves them from facing the thought that they will certainly die some day—whether to-morrow or some other day. Their inability to forget their anxiety as to whether they may die to-morrow, is due to the success with which they have forgotten that they must die some day. What is wrong with them is in reality, not their anxiety, which is only a symptom of their disease, but their repudiation of the thought of death. Being unconscious of the source of their anxiety, they cannot control it; for a man can only control himself in so far as he knows himself. They can only be cured by becoming conscious of the whole mental process of which the anxiety is merely a symptom. But if they can be helped to face the unpleasant thought of the certainty of death, they will become conscious of the whole mental process and be able to control their anxiety.

We note then that forgetting is an unconscious process, that one cannot forget by trying to forget, and that to try to forget is a sure way of remembering. So the rationaliser is not a conscious hypocrite; he deceives himself more successfully than he deceives anyone else—for he has forgotten his true motive. The thought of the true motive is bottled up in the unconscious mind—or, to use the language of modern psychology, repressed.

‘ Repression is the keeping from consciousness of mental processes that would be painful to it.”! It is to be noted that repression is in the main an unconscious process ; it is unconsciously rather than consciously that a man represses. Repression of a thought follows hard on, but is not equivalent to, the conscious refusal to face it. The conscious refusal to face an inconvenient thought brings into action a kind of mental machinery which works automatically, unconsciously, to protect consciousness from the intrusion of the inconvenient thought. This mental machinery dams up, as it were, the channel by which the inconvenient thought might emerge directly into consciousness. The incon- : venient thought is thus repressed into the unconscious mind.

But the unconscious mind resembles a river rather than astagnant pond. It is not static but dynamic. Far from being dead, the repressed thought is thoroughly alive “and kicking.” It is “ dissociated ’’ from consciousness, cut off from the man’s control. But it becomes the centre of a parasitical system within the man’s mind—a system which he cannot control, for he is ignorant of its existence—a system which squanders without his knowledge in unconscious repression the psychic energy which he needs to make a success of life.

This parasitical system, moreover, which is commonly called a complex, is as sensitive as a sensitive abscess.

It cannot bear to be “touched up.” ‘“ All the feelings and ideas carried in association with it, have to be ‘shut off’ or ‘ dissociated’ from consciousness ; a‘ knot’ in the strands of the emotional being is created, by means of which fresh entangle-

See “ Glossary’ at end of English translation of Studies in Psycho-Analysis. Baudouin.

ments are ever being formed. Thus the need for Repression leads to the creation of Complexes, and in their turn the Complexes give rise to ever fresh Repression. The commonest simple example is the ‘forgetting’ of a name because that name is associated (in the Unconscious) with some painful psychic experience which has given rise to a Complex.” | [Psycho-Analysis—A Brief Account of the Freudian Theory. Barbara Low.]

But a thought which has been repressed by the building of, as it were, a dam across its normal channel of emerging into consciousness, is not under the control of the will. It is like a river which has been dammed up and overflows its banks. It breaks out into consciousness indirectly. And the form in which it appears in consciousness is a disguised form. ;

For instance, a man consciously refuses to face the thought of an unpleasant duty. At once the unconscious process called repression begins. The thought of his duty is forgotten, but is still working in the unconscious mind, so that the man is ill at ease. He does not know why he is ill at ease, but his conduct reveals an effort to regain his mental equilibrium by what is called compensation. The man who sweats his employés, may give away much money in “charity.”” The man whose business methods are dishonest, may make his religion a torture to himself. The woman who has repressed the parental instinct, may describe small objects as “darlings.”’ The man who has repressed the thought of religion, may become the slave of superstition.

But repression is not the only way in which one can be protected from thoughts damaging to self-esteem. Projection serves the same purpose. Tansley says in The New Psychology—

“Projection . . . . consists in attributing parts of the mental content to outside entities. In projection, as in repression, the mind refuses to acknowledge part of its own contents, but instead of refusing attention to the existence of the content in question, it recognizes the existence, while denying the ownership. The ownership of the content in question is too painful or too sublime to be compassed within the limits of its weakness, and an external substitute is sought, whether as scapegoat or support.”

Just as one may project one’s own fancies on to the shadow on the wall, the coals on the fire, or the sunset sky—so one may project one’s hopes or fears on to chance events and find them reinforced by omens of success or disaster ; just as one may project one’s repressed self-pity on to a dog and say “poor old dog ’’—so one may project the responsibility for one’s bad temper on to its victim, or one’s unconscious indignation against oneself on to one’s friends. One may work off one’s dislike of a quality one does not wish to recognise in one’s self, by abusing it in other people; or seek to improve the visibility, impaired by the presence of a rafter in one’s own eye, by offering to extract a bit of grit from one’s neighbour’s eye.

Enough has perhaps been said to show that, whether the term unconscious mind be well chosen or not, it stands for something which really affects thought and conduct, and that the resentment displayed by some towards the “‘ New Psychology,” may conceivably be due, less to scientific objections, than to the processes called Repression, Rationalisation and Projection.

CHAPTER II / E have so far considered the term “ un

\ y conscious ”’ as representing that region of

the mind into which repudiated thoughts and ‘‘ forgotten memories ’”’ are repressed, and we have seen that this region of the mind resembles, not a stagnant pond, but a river which has been dammed up. We have now to consider the term “ unconscious ’’ as representing that vast hinterland behind consciousness—that unexplored continent whence arise the rivers which repression dams up. If there were no flow, there could be no overflow; if there were no energy “ welling up” from behind consciousness, there would be no need of repression. So the unconscious we considered in the last chapter—the unconscious “‘ developed as the result of repression ’’—is secondary to the unconscious we have now to consider—the unconscious postulated as the source of psychic energy.

Tansley in The New Psychology says that the “ primary unconscious is quite distinct from the FREUDIAN! unconscious, which is secondary and developed as the result of repression.” Again— “Repressed complexes constitute what we called ... . the secondary or FREUDIAN unconscious, as

1S0 called because of Professor Freud’s discoveries and researches regarding repression.

THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY II distinct from the unexplored primary unconscious | which is the centre and core of our psychic being.” Again—*‘ To the primary unconscious . .. . there are no barriers. This region of the mind is rather unexplored .... than shut off from the rest of the mind.” This primary unconscious contains racial elements—it contains man’s psychic inheritance from all his ancestors.1 And—to quote Tansley again—‘‘ The primary unconscious is to be regarded . . . . as the basis of the entire mind, as the centre or core of the psychic organism. The mental elements corresponding with the great primitive instincts are originally seated in this region, and from it the psychic energy . as continually welling up.’

Now, according to Tansley “it is to his instincts that he (man) owes the primary driving forces of his psychic being’’; for ‘all human driving force is instinctive.”’ It is inherited instincts which ‘ form the groundwork of the whole structure of the mind, and upon them are built up all the complex elaborations which characterize the manifold activities of man.’ Again—‘‘ Man cannot create the internal forces which impel him to action any more than he can create the forces of external nature. In either case he can only use them, diverting one into a new channel, letting a second have full play in its own, skilfully combining a third and fourth.”

Now, whether all the New Psychologists entirely agree with all the above extracts from Tansley’s New Psychology or not, it seems that they all accept the view that “it is to his instincts that man owes

1Compare—‘‘ As the racial unconscious represents the sum total of the past experiences of the race, it must necessarily contain elements both egocentric and altruistic.”” (The New Psychology and the Preacher, chapter 2. Crichton Miller.)

the primary driving forces of his psychic beirig.’’ It is at any rate unnecessary, for our present purpose, to discuss the matter further. For it is clear, as we shall see in chapter 6, that this view is the view of the Old Testament writers.*