Émile Durkheim's contributions to sociological theory

Preface

As the title of this study suggests, the scope of it is relatively limited. " Sociological theory " has been taken to include the study of the psychological phenomena conditioned by man's social life; the method and scope of sociology; the problem of the conduct relations of the individual as a member of a social group; "social morphology"; the causes of social changes; in short, what is usually denominated " general " sociology. Into the field of Durkheim's specialized work on primitive social life no excursions have been made save for material illustrative of points coming up in the discussions of theory. Furthermore, no attempt has been made to attack the problem of the influences that have helped to shape our author's views. This question has been treated by M. Simon Deploige,1 with the result of an acrimonious argument between Deploige and Durkheim.2 This controversy will be considered later.5 It seems scarcely worth while to do more than to point out, in this connection, similarities between the thought of Durkheim and that of several other writers, and to accept his ^statement as to the origin of his ideas.

Professor fimile Durkheim was born April 15, 1858. From 1879 to 1882 he was a student at the Ecole Normale Superieure. From 1882 to 1887 he served as professor of philosophy in various lycees. In 1887 he became a member of the Faculte des lettres of the Universite de Bordeaux, jfirst as n charge d'un cours", later, in 1896, as Professor of Social Science. In 1902 he was called to Paris, serving at {first as " charge d'un cours ", and since 1906, as Professor (of Sociology and the Science of Education in the Faculte [des lettres in the Universite de Paris. He is a member of

1 Le Conflit de la morale et de la sociologie, ch. iv.

71 7

8 PREFACE [8

the " Comite des travaux historiques et scientifiques, section des sciences economiques et sociales ".

Beside a large number of articles Professor Durkheim has published four important books : De la division du travail social (1893) J Les Regies de la Methode sociologique (1895) > Le Suicide (1897) ; Les formes elementaires de la vie religieuse (1912). He is, in addition to this, founder of, director of, and collaborator on, the series of volumes appearing periodically under the title of the " Annie Sociologique 'V

The author wishes here to acknowledge his indebtedness to a number of persons who have been of assistance to him in the prosecution of this study. To Professor Durkheim, himself, the author is under great obligation for the kindness of the former in personally revising the bibliography of his works, since without this assistance there would have been serious gaps in it. To Professor Henry L. Moore, of Columbia University, he is indebted for the suggestion of the subject, and for a criticism of the earlier drafts; to Professor Franklin H. Giddings, for continued advice and encouragement; to his colleague, Professor J S. Moore, and to Professor G. G. Laubscher, of Randolph- Macon College for Women, for assistance in their respective fields; to his sister, Mrs. C. F. Miller, for aid in the reading of proof ; to Mr. H. N. Shenton, of the Department of Sociology of Columbia University, for reading and criticising the study in the proof-sheets. His greatest debtl however, is to Professor J. E. Cutler, of the Department oi Sociology of Western Reserve University. To the lattcr's unfailing encouragement and consideration, as well as tc his kindness in reading and criticising the study in manuscript, its present appearance is largely due. However, the author wishes to assume all responsibility for its shortcomings, whether of matter or form. C E G April 27, 1914.

1 Vide infra, pp. 122, 185.

Introduction

The scope and purpose of the study 15

Preliminary definitions 16

Durkheim's psychology of the individual mind 19

The compounding of mental elements 20

His "interactionist" philosophy, and his criticism of Wm. James. 21

Comparison of Wundt's psychology and that of Durkheim ... 25

CHAPTER II The source and mode of origin of social representations 28 v/

Characteristics of social representations; they are exterior to the /

They are qualitatively different from individual representations and

differ among themselves 33 %/

They are superior in impressive power to the individual representations 36 /

They are internal with reference to the individual mind 41

The purely individual elements of the content of the mind of the

individual are of slight importance. . . 43

Refractions of the social representations within and by the mind of

the individual 45

The categories of individual thought, e.g., class, space, time, force,

etc., are of social origin 46

Criticism of Durkheim's use of the term " category " 52 /

The sociological role of education 53 - V

Resemblance of Durkheim's general position to that of certain

American anthropologists , 54 ».

9] 9

I0 CONTENTS [io

CHAPTER III Social facts; their criteria are exteriority and constraint 58 *

v Durkheim's theory of social causation; his criticism of other theories. 64 y^

— The individual cannot be an originative factor in the social process. 67 y**

— This is consistent with Durkheim's social psychology 67 \/\

— The cause of the social fact is to be sought in the social milieu . . 70 V

This theory illustrated from Durkheim's works 71 </

Its mechanistic character 75 >s

Distinction between sociology and psychology; " socio-psychic " >

facts 78 /

Durkheim's conception of collective psychology compared with

Wundt's 80

Durkheim's philosophical position; his psychological realism ... 84 \/ / Durkheim and Bergson : Durkheim's view and the pragmatic view^S. S of religion / 88\

CHAPTER IV V/ The Major Premise in Durkheim's Thinking

Durkheim's critics have usually attacked his conclusions only, and not his premise 93

This premise is the " mind-stuff" theory 94

Durkheim's intellectualist position in psychology 96

J He over-emphasizes the social origin of the content of the individy ual mind; hence the weakness of his social-causation theory . . 97 V' ^ The genius; Durkheim's failure to allow for varying mental powers. 98

The "mind-stuff" theory is not necessary to account for the importance of social elements in the content of the individual mind. 100

The latter fact can be adequately explained on the basis of an "individualistic" psychology 101

Durkheim's interest is in the content, not in the functioning of mind 104

He has neglected to give a true explanation of the origin of the social mind 104 y/

The "social reality" is explainable without Durkheim's psychological premise 105

CHAPTER V Sociology and the Special Social Sciences - Durkheim's early views as to the field of sociology 108

• His attitude toward "general" sociology no

1/

H] CONTENTS Hi

Logical consequences of his definition of social facts for the delimitation of the field of sociology in

The history of sociology; the faults of Comte and Spencer .... 112 Durkheim's criticism of the modern conceptions of "general"

sociology, especially those of Mill, Giddings, and Simmel . . . 114

The faults of modern " general" sociology 115

In what respects the special social sciences are branches of sociology 118 The Annee Sociologique as illustrative of Durkheim's position on

this point 122

CHAPTER VI Durkheim's Method Basic principles of the study of social phenomena 126 ^

Social facts must be objectively treated . — 127 ^J

Distinction between normal and pathological ; various criteria . . 132

Durkheim's criterion for the normal is generality 133

The constitution of social types 136

Durkheim's system of classification of societies is practically that

of Spencer 137

Durkheim's criticism of the "ecole anthropologique" 138 -

The major premise of this school is the principle of the uniform

evolution of culture, which is held also by Durkheim 140 -

Methods of proof in sociology: he follows Mill, with modifications. 143 -

Durkheim's emphasis on the method of concomitant variations. . 145 —

Criticism of Durkheim's method and his applications of it ... . 147 -.

CHAPTER VII Durkheim's Ethical Theories Vo«*s-,<

Durkheim's persistent interest in ethical problems i . 150

Definition of the science of morals and of moral facts 151

Durkheim's ethical theories are in general consistent with his "■ — !

psychological premise 156

The psychology of morality and its evolutionary aspects 157

Problem of the relation of the division of labor to morality . . . '. 158" The psychology of "mechanical" and of "organic" social solidarity 159

The development of "organic" solidarity; the moral role of the

occupational group 162

Causes and conditions of the increase of the division of labor . . . 166

t/Three abnormalities of the modern division of labor 168

The present crisis in morality, and Durkheim's remedy for it;

namely a strengthening of the occupational unit of society ... 171 ><T

12 CONTENTS [IZ

Durkheim's views compared with those of the syndicalists and with

those of the anarchist Kropotkin 176

Some inconsistencies in Durkheim's ethical theories 178

Conclusion

A brief resume of Durkheim's theory 182

His emphasis on social control is in line with much American sociological theory 183

Durkheim's theories and the French social milieu 183

List of abbreviations of titles of books and articles to which m'st frequent reference is made.

Div. Tr. — De la division du travail social. Meth. — Les Regies de la methode sociologique. Suic. — Le Suicide.

Vie Rel. — Les formes elementaires de la vie religieuse. " Rep. Ind." — " Representations individuelles et representations collectives."

A. S. — Annee Sociologique.

Rev. Phil. — Revue Philosophique.

Rev. Met. — Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale.

13] 13

CHAPTER I Introduction

The aim and purpose of the study is to present in a leasonably detailed and yet compact form the essentials of Durkheim's sociological theory. Only one of his works, Les Regies, is purely theoretical and methodological; his system — so far as he may be said to have a " system " — is so scattered throughout his works that only a careful reading and collation of material from a number of them would give even the average technically interested reader a fair idea of his contribution. Durkheim's importance as one of the leaders of modern sociological thought and research in France makes an interpretation and summary of his works of some value to the English-speaking sociologist who cannot spare the time for a thorough reading. It is with the hope that it may serve this purpose, that this study is put forward.1

Its plan is briefly to examine Durkheim's works with reference to his social psychology, his ideas of social causation, his conception of the field of sociology, of the method of sociology, and his treatment of the phenomena called moral. Little emphasis has been laid on tracing the development of Durkheim's ideas, largely for

1 The general practice of the writer has been to translate the French, when quoting, as nearly literally as possible, adding the key words in the original when it seemed necessary. Sufficiently accurate references have been given to permit a more exact examination of the original than this text affords in its English versions of Durkheim's language.

15] *5 the reason that, since the publication of his earliest articles, (which were merely reviews of books by several prominent German writers of that time), there has been no fundamental change in the views that he has published; and to analyze minutely each shifting of emphasis would not have been profitable within the scope of this study. This relatively static nature of Durkheim's theorizing has made possible the utilization of works of his different periods as a set of almost indiscriminately authentic sources. Whenever a change of position has seemed significant, it has been duly noted.

This introductory chapter will contain : first, a discussion of terminology; and second, a setting forth of Durkheim's conception of the mind of the individual, as preparation for the examination of his social psychology.

Several preliminary definitions are here in place. The terms " societe ", " esprit ", " time ", as found in Durkheim's works, need to be clearly defined.

The term " societe " Durkheim uses first of all in the sense of an aggregate, a group, of concrete individuals; e. g. " dans toute societe 'V " les societes plus vastes ",z " la structure politique d'une societe ",3 " d'une societe a Vautre ",4 " societes de meme race ".5 The second use of the word is in a psychological sense. In these cases there is frequently some ambiguity. The emphasis seems at times to be on society functioning as a psychic whole composed of individuals, and at other times the word is used as an equivalent term for " I'ame collective " , " conscience collective " , "vie collective", "vie sociale" ; i. e. for the system of social states of mind composing the unity expressed by these

iy] INTRODUCTION I7

terms. As illustration of this latter usage we have : " cette synthese sui generis qui constitue toute societe " ,x " le compose, c'est-d-dire la societe "/ " La societe a pour substrat";z of the former usage, with an implied contrast: " de la societe et de la vie collective "* " La vie sociale est essentiellement spontanee et la societe line chose naturellc"? To avoid confusion, then, the terms "social group" will be used when the emphasis is on the concrete nature of the aggregation; "social mind", "collective mind", " social consciousness ", or " collective consciousness ", when the aggregation of individuals is considered as a psychic unity; and the term " society " when the large, the national or integral, group is meant.

Durkheim's definition of the nature of the mind may well be indicated at this point although the discussion of it will appear later. " La vie mentale;' he says, " est faite de representations "." (This means, almost, " of ideas " ; the German term " Vorstellungen " is nearer *k the French than our word " ideas ". The term " representations " will be used throughout this study in its French significance, rather than the word " ideas ".) This notion of the mental life is something like William James' conception of it as " the stream of consciousness ", as these quotations from Durkheim will show : " For the psychologist the representative life is nothing else than an ensemble of representations " ; T " There is no such thing as ' thoughtsubstance ' " ; 8 " The psychic life is a continuous succession of representations."9 As for UV esprit", he defines it:

TS DURKHEIM'S SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY [^

" the mind (I'esprit) itself, i. e., the representations present and past which constitute it" x And again, " It is not necessary to imagine a soul (time) separated from its body and leading in I know not what place (milieu) an existence shadowy (reveuse) and solitary." 2

Durkheim's words, " Society has for a substratum ",3 suggests the need of indicating what this " substratum " is. By it is meant the social group or " social aggregate " 4 whose mental interactions produce the states of the social mind. Concretely considered, this " aggregate " means for Durkheim, the political-social unit, either in its primitive manifestation as horde,5 clan,6 tribe,7 and confederation,7 or in its later forms as city-state,8 a civilized nation,9 and imperial state.10

The political society in its integrity is, however, not the only " social aggregate " ; there are also the groups which it includes : " religious sects, political schools, literary schools, occupational organizations (corporations professionelles)".11 The general criterion by which to recognize a " social aggregate " is its tendency to act, as a group, coercively toward its constituent individuals. It is possible then to have " aggregates " concentric about the individual, all acting upon him, but in different and characteristic ways.

An " aggregate " differing from these just named, but

* Durkheim uses this term, Mith., p. 103.

IQ] INTRODUCTION IO/

still characteristically social in its nature, is the family. It acts coercively on its members; and as in other groups, its situation affects the form and intensity of this action.1

It is clear then that Durkheim does not mean " Society ", but rather, " a society ", when he uses the term " societe " as connoting a concrete aggregate of human beings. In this regard he differs from Comte and resembles Herbert Spencer ; 2 though his thought is not always quite consistent as regards this principle.

Without an understanding, on the reader's part, of our author's conception of the mind of the individual, his social psychology would be comparatively difficult to grasp; and without a knowledge of his psychology, individual and social, his work as a whole would be almost completely unintelligible. If it seems that a disproportionately large part of this study is occupied with this discussion, the fact has its justification in this characteristic of Durkheim's work. Even the somewhat extended treatment of these topics to be found here can not be said nearly to exhaust the possibilities of the subject. At every point of the psychological theory interesting bypaths of investigation have had to be passed by. Part of the material for this preliminary discussion is scattered throughout his works ; the larger part of it is, however, concentrated in one article.3 A citation in this article will serve as a starting point.

For if the sensations, which are the primary basis of the individual consciousness, cannot be explained save by the state

* Rev. Phil., vol. lv, pp. 469-470, " Sociologie et Sciences Sociales." 3 " Representations individuelles et representations collectives," Rev. Met., vol. vi, p. 273 et seq.

of the brain and of the organs — otherwise, whence could they come? — once they [sc. the sensations] exist, they compound themselves according to laws of which neither cerebral morphology nor cerebral physiology are capable of rendering any account. Thence come the images, and the images, grouping themselves in their turn, become concepts, and, in the degree that new states thus add themselves to the old, since they are separated by more numerous intermediaries [intermcdiaires] from that organic base upon which, indeed, the whole mental life rests, they are also less immediately dependent. Nevertheless, they do not cease to be psychic; it is rather in them that one can best observe the characteristic attributes of mentality.1

We note here the following points :

(a) Sensations, the primary elements of the individual's states of mind, are referable, necessarily and directly, to cerebral states.

(b) Once existing, the sensations compound themselves in a manner impossible to explain in the terms of cerebral physiology, merely.

(c) The compounds thus formed are images; these may in turn be compounded into concepts ; and the process does not necessarily end at that stage.

Let us take up these points in order. The first is evidence of an " interactionist " philosophy so far as the relation of mind to brain is concerned; i. e., that mental processes are due to, are caused by, the cerebral processes. That is one phase of this philosophy; the other is that mental processes in turn may be the cause of physical (i. e., physiological) processes. The origin of the most elementary process seems to be this: that by the interaction of the cerebral

1 " Rep. Ind." p. 300. Reference to the original will show the source of whatever obscurity this passage may possess.

2i ] INTRODUCTION 21

cells somehow or other a sensation is produced. This is quite clearly expressed in the following excerpt :

Finally, it is also, it seems, the only way to comprehend how the sensation depends on the brain, while still constituting a new phenomenon. It depends on it because it is compounded out of molecular modifications : [otherwise, of what would it be made and whence would it come?] but it is at the same time something else, because it results from a new synthesis sui generis, wherein those modifications enter as elements, but wherein they are transformed by the very fact of their fusion.1

This point, however, is to be carefully noted : that it is the mutual action of many cells, not the solitary action of one, that produces the sensation : 2 " But if then each idea or at least each sensation is due to the synthesis of a certain number of cellular states, combined according to laws and by forces still unknown, it is evident that it can be the prisoner of no particular cell." 3 It is independent of the individual cell but dependent on the whole cerebrum as a functioning totality. This point is of considerable importance in the analogy which Durkheim draws between the individual and the collective representations, to be discussed in the next chapter. As for the action of the psychic elements on the body, Durkheim says : " A representation does not appear without acting on the body and on the mind [esprit]." 4

That this interactionist theory is an hypothesis somewhat difficult to defend is a commonplace of psychology and philosophy. Durkheim rejects the " automatism " and " epiphenomenalism " of Huxley and Maudsley which make

1 " Rep. Ind.," p. 296 ; see also ibid., 297, " L'dme est dans le monde," etc.

4 " Rep. Ind.," p. 286, also 287, and Div. Tr., p. 64, " Une representation," etc.

of consciousness a mere glow from the cerebral process, a mere " epiphenomenon ", and make of the individual conscious self a mere interested spectator, helpless to interfere in the automatic process that is being carried on in the brain.1 2 Consciousness, " the faculty of knowing what goes on within us," as Durkheim himself has defined it, increases pari passu with the decrease of the automatism of psychic life, and is therefore a reality. For it acts as a cause, decreasing the mechanism characteristic of physical phenomena. Here our author agrees with James and on practically the same grounds.3

James is, however, in Durkheim's estimation, just as " materialistic " as Huxley and Maudsley. This for two reasons. First, James makes the element of retention in memory a function of the cerebral tissue.4 5 Second, he makes association of ideas by similarity also a function of the brain-tracts, i. e., makes it association by cerebral contiguity. Against the first view Durkheim urges the objection that it makes of memory, so essential a process in the building of character, a merely neural process. That, he says, is virtually an automatistic conception.6 Moreover, in his opinion, such a retention theory implies the necessity of the reappearance of images in the same order in which they were impressed on the cerebral substance.7 James' second proposition, that association by similarity is

* See Wm. James, Principles of Psychology, vol. i, p. 128, for an exposition and criticism of this view of Huxley and Maudsley. s James, op. cit., vol. i, p. 138 et seq.

T But James refutes this type of argument, op. cit., vol. i, p. 577.

23] INTRODUCTION 2<$

explained by the simultaneous or immediately successive stimulations of the two different brain-tracts involved, Durkheim subjects to a criticism somewhat too detailed to be here reproducible.1 2 As a substitute he proposes the solution, that, like animate and inanimate entities, representations (or images) may have a tendency to group themselves by similarity. The similarity then has a dynamic value and exists in the ideas,3 4

Durkheim is thus attempting to place his psychological theory on a " spiritualistic " basis,5 i. e., to make it nonmaterialistic. But this lays him open to exactly the same suspicion of " materialism " that he holds against James. The latter adheres to the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism : that " the ascertainments of a blank, unmediated correspondence, term by term, of the succession of states of consciousness with the succession of total brain processes " is the " simplest psycho-physical formula " and the " last word" of a scientific psychology.6 James' . assumption is one made for methodological reasons. With his philosophical position on this point we have nothing to do here.

In his criticism of James, Durkheim assumes a position much like that of Binet, who accuses the parallelists of being very cautious materialists.7 As a matter of fact, Durkheim, as was stated a few lines above, lays himself open to this

1 James, op. cit., vol. i, p. 578 et seq and p. 500 et seq. 8 " Rep. Ind.," p. 286.

* For James' criticism of this view see op. cit., vol. i, pp. 554, 578, 59°- See also A. Binet, Mind and Brain, pp. 111-112.

5 Cf. his commendation of the spiritualiste psychology in Div. Tr., pp. 340-1, and Meth., pp. vii-viii.

6 James, op. cit., vol. i, p. 182 ; see also Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 80; and Titchener, Outlines of Psychology, p. 360 et seq.

1 Binet, Mind and Brain, p. 215.

charge of adhering to a materialistic philosophy. The definition of Renouvier: "One calls materialistic every philosophy which defines thought as a product of a compound whose elements do not imply thought," * applies to Durkheim without qualification. To call his theory " spiritualiste" (in the philosophical, not the sectarian sense of the term, of course) is then to give an unusual meaning to that word. He bases his claim to being " spiritualiste " on the fact that he makes thought a form of energy different from that exhibited in the physiological processes of the brain-cell ; and he endeavors to bolster up his theory by comparing the transformation of brain energy into mind energy with the transformation of energy of motion into energy of heat. Disregarding the fact that both motion and heat are forms of kinetic energy, can we not say that Durkheim is making of mental energy a form of physical energy merely? 2 Mental processes are caused by the functioning together of physical units; in turn the former affect the latter. The only way in which Durkheim can satisfactorily vindicate his claim to being " spiritualiste " is by proving himself to be in philosophy an " idealist ". In that case the brain-cell would no longer be matter; it itself would be mind.

After this metaphysical excursus let us next consider the second and third points in Durkheim's psychological theory : a namely, the compounding of sensations into images, and the compounding of these into concepts which

1 Quoted by Binet, op. cit., p. 205.

* Durkheim almost admits this in " Rep. Ind.," p. 293 : " There is no realm in nature which is not related (tienne) to the other realms. Nothing would then be more absurd than to erect the psychic life into a kind of absolute which sprang from nowhere and was attached in no way to the rest of the universe. It is quite evident that the state of the brain affects all the intellectual phenomena, and is the immediate factor among certain of them [the pure sensations]."

25] INTRODUCTION 25

are, in turn, compounded into still more complicated products. This theory of the compounding of mental states has been called by James the " mind-stuff theory " ; ' it is, he says, the theory used by the evolutionists, notably Tyndall and Spencer.2

Wundt has stated it quite explicitly, as the following extract shows : 3

In the first place, the psychical elements unite to form composite psychical compounds which are separate and relatively independent of each other in the continual flow of psychical processes. Such compounds are, for example, ideas. . . . Other examples are composite feelings, emotions, or volitions. . . . Thus, ideas unite to form larger simultaneous ideational complexes or regular successions, while affective and volitional processes form a variety of combinations with one another and with ideational processes. In this way we have the interconnection of psychical compounds as a class of synthetical processes of the second degree, consisting of a union between the simpler combinations. . . . The separate psychical interconnections, in turn, unite to form still more comprehensive combinations. ... In this way combinations of a third degree arise, which we may designate by the general name psychical development. . . . The ascertainment of the laws of psychical phenomena depends upon the investigation of all the combinations of different degrees, the combination of elements into compounds, of compounds into interconnections,, and of interconnections into developments.4

The similarity between this statement and that of Durk-

1 James, Pr. of Psych., vol. i, p. 145 et seq.

2 Spencer, Pr. of Psych., par. 60, quoted by James, op. cit., vol. i, PP- I5I-3-

8 See also Durkheim's review of Wundt's Ethik, in Rev. Phil., vol. xxiv, p. 113 et seq. of the article "La Morale en Allemagne."

4 Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 25-26 : italics are Wundt's or the translator's.

heim x is strong enough to warrant our considering them as parallel. A more detailed discussion will be devoted to this theory in connection with the views of our author on the nature of the social mind. Another feature of the psychological position of Durkheim, his intellectualism, must also be postponed as a topic of discussion.2

We may now be in a position better to understand our author's criticism of James' theory that retention in memory is a neural process, not a psychic one, and that association by similarity is likewise a function of the cerebral substance.3 Durkheim defends the theory that representations persist as such, i. e., as psychic rather than merely physiological entities.4 This follows readily from the mind-stuff theory. Since only the sensations are the direct, immediate product of the molecular action of the brain-cells, and since all elements of mind-process higher than sensation are the products of an autonomous interaction of simpler elements, there is nothing to tie them to the cerebral substance, although James attempts to do so. Why should they not " soar in the vast void ", free from cellular shackles? Only by liberating the representation from the physical substratum does Durkheim seem to be able to conceive of a " spirituality ". Moreover, to explain the continued absences of these representations from the field of consciousness (from one active recalling of them to the next), he makes the assumption that consciousness is not a necessary condition for the existence of a representation/' This position is somewhat reminiscent of that of Paulsen