A manual of Buddhist philosophy 1923

Contents

Introduction 1. Tae Stupy or Buppuist PHILOSOPHY 2. Tue DIVISIONS oF BUDDHIST COSMOLOGY 8. Tart THREE COSMOLOGICAL SCHOOLS 4. Sources oF REFERENCE : i f ‘ PARTICULAR AUTHORITIES SELECTED FOR THE PRESENT WORK Part I 1. Cosmic SYNTHESIS t : ; 2. Cosmic GEOGRAPHY : A : y 8. THe DIVISIONS OF THE THREE DHATUS : 4. THe WORLD OF SENTIENT BEINGS Part II: Cosmic Analysis . . ...

Part III: Cosmic Dynamics 1. Tue NATURE AND SCOPE OF CAUSALITY 9. THe Law or Cavusauity APPLIED TO THE

INDIVIDUAL , , ; A : :

Introduction

LL forms of Buddhism, however divergent, claim to have but three objects of worship, viz. the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha. The first is the founder of the faith, the second the teaching which he gave, and the third the order which he founded. Regarding each of the Ratnas or jewels, as they are called, an enormous amount of speculation has grown up, with many different opinions concerning the proper method of interpretation.

Questions concerning the Sangha are largely dealt with in the various versions of the Vinaya Pitaka, or books of Canon law, and their later commentaries. These are concerned with the proper organization of the monasteries, the rites which should accompany the reception of men and women into the order, and the food, clothing, and furniture which should be used by them afterwards. All these questions lie entirely outside the scope of philosophy, and hence outside the scope of our present undertaking.

Speculations concerning the Buddha, or, rather, the Buddhas, together with less elevated beings such as Pratyeka Buddhas and Arhats, have played an even greater part in Buddhist history, for fierce controversies have been waged concerning the nature and powers of each type of Being, and the means by which such rank might be achieved. But as all such problems are more closely associated with religion than with philosophy, they are equally foreign to our present work.

The dharma or law taught by the Buddha to his disciples and thence transmitted to later generations who gradually modified and reinterpreted the older doctrines, was the basis upon which Buddhist philosophy, properly so called, was later erected. Primitive Buddhism was much more a simple

B religious and ethical code than a metaphysical attempt to solve the problems of the universe, but as time elapsed and later commentators, delighting in subtlety, strove to further truth and enhance their own reputations by applying the old formule to a rational explanation of the whole universe, the old Dharma was supplemented by a new Abhidharma. Abhidharma is usually called metaphysic, but the first Abhidharma works were but dogmatic treatises, giving a would-be systematic classification of the older doctrinal categories, gradually fitting in others as these came to be © formulated.

As yet there was little formal logic or even rational argument from universally accepted data. The basis of truth was considered to be the body of doctrines laid down by an omniscient teacher, and the most that a commentator could do was to give a new and better arrangement to the old dharma-paryayas, and to bring out the ideas which were considered to be inherent in the older statements. Consequently the old or Canonical Abhidharma is more to be ranked with what we should call theology (save that Buddhism theologized without a thesis) than with philosophy.

Controversy between the various Buddhist sects necessitated the introduction of more abstract reasoning, but appeal could still be made to the siitras, or, at least, to those stitras which were held to be sacred by all the schools, so that the most important developments of Buddhist philosophy were made when the Buddhist speculators came into violent conflict with fully developed alien philosophies. This took place, as far as India is concerned, between the first and the fifth centuries A.D., and in China between the fifth and ninth centuries A.D.

Beginning with Buddhaghosa, the Pali school of Buddhism in Ceylon and later in Burma made many important doctrinal additions to the Buddhist lore, but for the most part the Pali school remained sufficiently sheltered to make it predominantly theological rather than philosophical in tone.

Those who would study Buddhist philosophy must turn their attention to the Abhidharma works, including in that term not only the original Canonical books of such schools as the Sarvastivadins and Sthaviravadins, but also and more especially the later commentaries, with particular reference to those works in which the Buddhist monks set out to defend their doctrines from outside attack. For the Pali theories we have, of course, to turn to the works of Buddhaghosa and Anuruddha and their followers. For the Hinayana ' tradition of India proper, we must look to the Sarvastivadin school, including therein the Mahavibhasa, and the works of Vasubandhu and Sanghabhadra. For the Mahayanists of India we have the great representatives of the two principal Mahayana schools, the Madhyamika and the Yogacarin systems, including Nagarjuna, Arya Deva, and Candragomin for the former, and Asanga, Vasubandhu, Dignaga, Dharmapala, and Dharmakirtti for the latter. The mainsprings of the Chinese Buddhist philosophy are to be found in the writings of the patriarchs of the T‘ien T‘ai and Hua Yen schools.

Here, however, we meet with great initial difficulty. The Pali texts have indeed come down to us, and the Pali Text Society has rendered, and is rendering, very valuable service in making them accessible to the Western public by means of new editions in the original tongue, and by means of English translation. But the labour of those who would study the more philosophic works of Sanskrit Buddhism is rendered difficult by the fact that most of the important philosophic texts are no longer extant in their original form, for with the destruction of Buddhism in India, much of the literature of Buddhism likewise perished, and though a number of Siitras, chiefly Mahayana, and Avadanas or pious tales have remained, the more serious works have disappeared. From among the numerous Abhidharma works of the

1 For the definition of Hinayana and Mahayana and for the chief points of difference between the two branches of Buddhism see the introduction _ to my Introduction to Mahayana Buddhism.

Sarvastivadins, only a single commentary on the Abhidharma Koga remains. Though we have in the Madhyamika Vrtti a fair exposition of the Madhyamika school, most of the philosophic texts of the Yogacarins have been lost, and what remain are like the Stitra Alamkara, devotional handbooks for the aspirant after Buddhahood, rather than textbooks of metaphysics.

Fortunately a certain number of texts were translated into Tibetan, and as years go by, these will probably be revealed tous. But, alas, the Tibetan texts are by no means complete. The Tibetan people, prior to the introduction of Buddhism, were possessed of practically no culture of their own. They were ignorant even of the art of writing, so it is little wonder that when they adopted Buddhism there was a greater demand for Sitras, Avadanas, Jatakas, and Dharanis 1 than for abstruse works dealing with the minutie of ontology and phenomenology. Rather must we be thankful for what has been preserved. |

On many points where the Sanskrit remnants are silent, however, and where even the Tibetan Canon can give no help, we find a full explanation in the Chinese translations of the Buddhist works, which are generally though somewhat incorrectly known as the Chinese Buddhist Tripitaka. Here are to be found all the important works of the Sarvastivadins, Madhyamikas, and Yogacarins, in addition to the original works of the philosophers of the T4en T‘ai and Hua-yen schools, to whom reference has already been made.

Consequently, he who would make a study of Buddhist philosophy, either of its final systematic form or of the stages of its development, must apply himself to learned treatises on the ultimate nature of the noumenon and phenomena in a language of monosyllables, most of whose characters may be a noun, or a verb, or a preposition, according to the context or the whim of the author or translator.

1 For these and other branches of Buddhist literature see introduction to Burnouf’s Bouddhisme Indien.

Owing to the linguistic difficulties which beset the path, it is no small wonder that in spite of the enormous strides which Oriental scholarship has made in the last few years, much of Buddhist philosophy remains unknown. We may, indeed, claim to know a good deal of the religious side of Buddhism, particularly of the Pali school, for most of its five Nikayas have found their way into one or other of the European languages. Some five or six well-known Mahayana siitras have also been translated, while of the Vinaya we have at least the more than adequate rendering of the Pali version by Oldenburg and Rhys Davids. Our knowledge of Buddhist philosophy, however, or even of Buddhist theology is confined to three or four translations from the Pali Abhidharma lore, precious as a foretaste of what is to come, but insufficient to satisfy those who seek for a more substantial philosophical diet. Almost nothing has as yet been done to render the Northern philosophical works accessible to the Western reader, and it may be safely said that even the Pali works cannot be fully understood until their tenets are compared with those of the other streams of Buddhist tradition.

The present work is a not altogether successful attempt to further, in an infinitesimal degree, our knowledge of the history of Buddhist philosophy. At the best we can but nibble at the vast storehouse of material before us, and then scurry away into print before the immensity of the subject shall have dawned upon us to such an extent that we are awed into silence.

But if we are to nibble at all, let us at least attempt to do so systematically, and in such a way as will assist further exploration in the future, gnawing indeed but a tiny hole in a giant structure, but a hole which may serve for re-entry both for ourselves and for others. Consequently, instead of trying to cover the whole field of Buddhist philosophy within the limits which, perforce, must be ours, let us single out some one line of inquiry, and attempt to institute a somewhat detailed survey thereof.

A suitable subject is not difficult to find. Buddhism has all along recognized a distinction between relative and transcendental philosophy, between theories concerning the analysis of phenomena and theories concerning the ultimate nature of things. The first covers much of the ground which in Europe has become the special field of the particular sciences, such as astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology, while the latter is more in accord with the Occidental delimitations of philosophy, or metaphysics proper. It is here that we find the kernel of Buddhist philosophy, its would-be solutions of problems touching upon the reality or non-reality of external phenomena, its evaluation of the universe from the standpoint of optimism and pessimism, and all the other eternal insoluble riddles which make philosophy so interesting.

Of these two divisions of the subject matter of Buddhist philosophy, our impulse, naturally, is to choose the latter for our special consideration, and this for several reasons. In the first place there is greater chance for treasure trove, for the Buddhists in common with other Orientals had a better chance to vie with Occidental metaphysicians than with Occidental scientists. The measured and weighty dialectic of the Buddhist sage on the ultimate nature of things is sometimes almost as impressive as the polysyllabic proofs of his Western cousin, but Buddhist astronomy and geology is not even quaint enough to prevent its falsity jarring upon us. It is faintly possible that one out of the many contradictory solutions of noumenal problems offered by the Buddhists may be right if for no other reason than that some philosopher among them seems to have given every possible answer to the problem, but even the wiliest of Orientals would find it difficult to allegorize away the improbabilities of Buddhist physics.

In the second place we should prefer to deal with the transcendental side of Buddhist philosophy, because it is here that Buddhism was most original and escaped furthest

INTRODUCTION f\ from the bonds of tradition, Buddhist or Tirthaka. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that the earlier works gave minute details concerning relative philosophy, and very little about noumenal matters. Consequently, when the great thinkers of Buddhism, such as Vasubandhu, Dignaga, and Dharmapala, arose, they dared not alter the older myths concerning the size or composition of the sun or moon, but were able to formulate highly interesting views concerning the ultimate nature of any and every form of matter and mind. For these and many other reasons, then, we should prefer to deal with the transcendental side of Buddhist philosophy. Practical necessity, however, keeps us to the other and less interesting aspect of the subject, in this initial survey, if for no other reason than that Buddhist transcendental philosophy is completely unintelligible without a knowledge of the relative philosophy upon which it is based. Modern Western philosophy is far more comprehensible without a knowledge of Western science than is Buddhist metaphysics without a knowledge of Buddhist pseudo-science. A Buddhist can only discuss the reality of the universe in terms of dharmas, paramanus, caitasikas, citta-viprayukta dharmas, dhatus, ayatanas, and skandhas—and, unless we are acquainted with the implications of these terms, none of which have exact Western equivalents, we shall have studied Buddhist philosophy in vain. The atheism, polytheism, pantheism, and monotheism of the various aspects of Buddhism can only be properly understood when one knows of the devas of the Kama dhatu, and of the Brahmas of the Riipa dhatu. Consequently, in order that we may lay the foundations for a later, more serious study of Buddhist philosophy, it is necessary that we flounder among mythical continents and impossible seas. We must seek to solve the problem hotly disputed between the Sarvastivadins and the Mahasanghikas, as to whether the lictors of Hell are really sentient beings, or are specially created automata. We must wander through long, dull, and badly arranged lists of states of consciousness, and when all this has been accomplished we may claim indeed, not to have become acquainted with Buddhist philosophy, but to have become capable of discussing its problems.

9. Tue Drvisions or BuppuHist CosMOLOGY

This relative philosophy of Buddhism we have chosen to call Buddhist cosmology, not that the term is particularly appropriate, but because a better is lacking. Thus defined, the subject has three main divisions: (1) Cosmic synthesis ; (2) Cosmic analysis ; (3) Cosmic dynamics.

(1) The first covers the myths concerning cosmography, the nature, size, and shape of the phenomenal universe taken as an existing entity and unanalysed. This covers the field of what in the West would be called astronomy and geology, save that the Buddhist astronomer would aspire to Dante’s role, and explain not only the stars, but also the heavens and the various inhabitants thereof.

This is the point on which Buddhism is least original. Most of its myths were not only borrowed from contemporary Indian thought, but were even part of that primitive cosmography which Warren, in his book on the subject (Paradise Found) sought to explore. Nevertheless, once incorporated in the Buddhist system, it had an important part to play in the moulding of later speculation, as when the commentators drew up their list of states of consciousness upon the threefold division of the universe into Kama, Ripa, and Aripa dhatus.

During the course of our present work, it will be seen that it is upon this mythology that all systems of Buddhism are most agreed, which shows that the main structure of Buddhist cosmography was an integral part of Buddhism at a date prior to its division into variant schools. This gives us a very early date. The embellishments of the later commentators (those of Ceylon may be seen in Spence Hardy’s Manual of Buddhism) never succeeded in altering the essential structure.

Here, however, we have to distinguish between (a) cosmography proper or the map of the present material world, with its central mountain rocky rings, oceans, and continents, which are in accord with the myths outside of India; (6) and. the development of the Heaven and Hell idea into the various divisions of the three dhatus. This is almost purely Indian in its origin, and as regards the order of the upper layers of the heavens, represents the order of development of thought in India. . The fact, for example, that the Devas are placed above the Asuras goes back to the time when the Persians and the Indians were united. The thirty-three gods who inhabit the summit of Mount Meru are a remnant of the theological development of the Vedas. The heavens of Mahabrahma represent the later Brahmana and Upanisad struggle after some higher ideal than the Vedic deities. The four Aripa dhatus are Buddhist attempts to show the inferiority of contemporary ideas concerning the highest bliss as compared. with their own Nirvana.

Details concerning the inhabitants of these abodes are largely the work of the ever-ready Buddhist commentators working upon the material already provided. The great age of most of Buddhist cosmology is further shown by the fact that all versions of the Dirgha Agama contains an account of the cycle of creation and destruction. As far as we know, this doctrine of the never-ending cycle of creation and destruction was only evolved by the Aryan mind after the period of the Vedas, and is therefore comparatively modern. It is certainly pre-Buddhist, however, though the Buddhist acceptance of the doctrine did much to further the central idea.

(2) Cosmic Analysis —tIn addition, however, to accepting contemporary myths regarding the geography of the phenomenal universe, the Buddhists made a great forward step in trying to split up this variegated whole into a number of fundamental units, of which all phenomena are but compounds or combinations. This striving to reduce the complex to a small number of simple and uniform ultimates played a@ very important part in Buddhist philosophy. Though some centuries were to elapse before the full and final list of elements could be given, yet the tendency towards cosmic analysis began with the first days of Buddhism, as may be seen from such primitive categories as the five skandhas, twelve ayatanas, and eighteen dhatus. The marked disagreement between the various schools on these factors of existence, apart from these primitive categories, however, shows that cosmic analysis was developed later than cosmic synthesis, and was the result of much careful and reasoned thought. No longer are non-Indian and pre-Brahmanic elements found, and very little indeed seems to have been borrowed from rival systems of thought, except perhaps the atomic theory, so that the Buddhist classification of the elements of existence is an only original even though valueless contribution to human thought. Of even more importance from the philosophical standpoint are the theories which the Buddhists advanced concerning the nature of their own or any other list of the factors of life.

The development of this ultimate-factors-of-life theory was as important to Buddhism as was the discovery of the elements by the modern scientists to the recent philosophers of the West, save that the eighty odd elements of our own science are all material, while the Buddhist elements are mostly mental, since the Buddhists regarded the mind as no less @ compound than the body or any inanimate object. Unfortunately, the Buddhists were too busy with religioethical considerations in their enumeration of these elements for their lists to be of much value for the modern psychologist or philosopher, but with some justice it may be claimed that their analysis is quite as acute as that of any other school of Oriental philosophy.

(3) Cosmic Dynamics.—This refers to the causal forces which bring into combination the factors of existence. The development of this theory was an answer to the question as to how the analysed universe became the synthesized universe, as to why a certain number of elements should not remain disassociated but combine to form the human personality. According to some thinkers, this combination of the elements to form concrete phenomena might be due to chance, the spontaneous will of the elements themselves, fate or destiny, or the decree of God. To the Buddhists, however, none of these explanations were acceptable, and they strove to show that the formation and dissolution of compounds was due to an endless cycle of fixed causes. In the earlier stages this consideration of causes was largely made from the personal point of view, and had particular reference to the doctrines of Karma and reincarnation taken over by primitive Buddhism from earlier thought. At this point the doctrine of causality was largely of a mythical or religious nature, as may be seen from the numerous Jatakas and Avadanas, stories showing how the performance of a good deed in a past life brings about a happy rebirth in this. Associated with this side of causal theory is the old rune known as the Pratitya Samutpada.

But in addition to this more popular conception of causality even the oldest Siitras show that consideration was given to the philosophical problem of how one thing is caused or conditioned by another, and when the personal aspect of causality came to be overshadowed by the cosmic or universal co-ordination of causes, Buddhism made an important step along the path of philosophic progress. As. might be expected, this was one of the later developments of Buddhist thought, and one which was entirely posterior to the time of the Buddha and the early Church; for whereas all branches of Buddhism agree as to the main points of cosmography (cosmic synthesis), and there are certain categories such as skandhas, ayatanas, and dhatus, which are also common to all forms of Buddhism, however much they may disagree upon other points of cosmic analysis, yet the twenty-four pratyayas or types of causal relationship given in the Pali works are different not only in name, but also in philosophic significance from the types of causes and conditions é enumerated by the North Indian schools. Among all the later philosophers, however, problems concerning the number of causal influences were of such great importance that cosmic dynamics deserves to rank on an equal plane with the other divisions of cosmology.

3. Tur THree CosmMoLoGgIcAL SCHOOLS

We have thus succeeded in laying down the limits and internal divisions of our present undertaking, but it is also necessary to ascertain what aspects of Buddhism are to be included and what are to be excluded from our present survey, for the word “ Buddhism ” covers every conceivable type of creed, religious and philosophical. Within the ample bosom of the Buddhist order are to be found schools teaching realism, idealism, nihilism, pantheism, and pragmatism, so that before we can begin using the glib formula “ Buddhism says’, or “ Buddhism teaches’’, it is necessary to state explicitly just what branch of that vast congeries of associated. faiths we intend to be implied, by the use of the general title.

For certain branches of Buddhist research it would be necessary to survey almost every sect and sub-sect before we could say that our investigation was complete. But, having limited ourselves to matters touching upon cosmology, we are more fortunate, for only three schools of Buddhism have paid sufficient attention to cosmological matters, or made sufficiently original contributions to the subject, to warrant our careful examination.

The three schools in question are: (1) The Ceylonese school, founded on the Pali tradition, which claims to be the direct descendant of the earliest Buddhist school known as the Sthaviravadins or Theravadins. We are not yet in a position to know how close was the filiation between the true Sthaviravadins and the Ceylonese school, but for the present we have given the Singhalese scholastics the benefit of the doubt (a rather serious doubt) and dub all those who follow the Pali Canon genuine Sthaviravadins.

(2) The second school is that of the Sarvastivadins, the learned and philosophical school of Hinayana as it developed in India proper, whose canon was probably in some Prakrit originally, but was later transformed into Sanskrit, which henceforth became its canonical language.

(3) The third school is that of the Yogacarins, who were also frequently known as the Vidyamatrins, or Vijfianavadins. This differs from the preceding by being Mahayana rather than Hinayana. Consequently it had an idealistic rather than a realistic interpretation of cosmological problems. Nevertheless, historically, it was closely filiated with the Sarvastivadin school, and its philosophical and other works were likewise composed in Sanskrit.

The schools which are not of importance for the study of Buddhist cosmology may be summed up in the following way :

(1) Indian Hinayana schools other than those representing the Sthaviravadin and Sarvastivadin tradition. We are told’ that there were eighteen principal Hinayana sects in India, though no two accounts give quite the same list of names or specific points of difference. Nevertheless, some eight or nine of these were of such considerable influence that remnants of their philosophy have come down to us. From these we may see that practically all of the Himayana sects were concerned to a greater or less extent with cosmological matters, but that only two of them (the Sthaviravadin and Sarvastivadin) composed an Abhidharma Pitaka or wrote elaborate commentaries on philosophical matters, so that not only are these two the only schools concerning which we have exact information, but they alone seem to have been possessed of a definite and systematic cosmological philosophy as opposed to the general discussion and counter-discussion of the other sects.

(2) Indian Mahayana schools other than that of the Yogacarins. Tradition? tells us that there were but two main

1 Cf. Points of Controversy for Pali account, Nanjio’s 1284, 1285, 1286 for Chinese account, and Rockhill’s Life of the Buddha for Tibetan account. 2 Cf. introduction to Takakusu’s translation of I-tsing.

philosophic systems of Mahayana in India, one the early Madhyamika school, represented by Nagarjuna and Arya Deva, and the other the Yogacarin school, represented by Asanga and Vasubandhu. For the present purpose the Madhyamika school may be completely excluded, for it had nothing whatever to add to cosmological speculation. It was absorbed in disputes concerning the nature of absolute truth and the ultimate nature of reality. From the absolute standpoint the universe was completely non-existent—why, therefore, should one bother to classify the fictitious. From the relative standpoint the Madhyamika philosophers accepted the Sarvastivadin categories without altering them in any respect.

An examination of the various Mahayana Sitras and Sastras rendered into Chinese shows that there were a number of important points of view prevalent among Indian Mahayanists which found presentation in neither of the two above-mentioned schools, but these may also be neglected, first, because they were never developed ina systematic form, and secondly (and even more important), because such works are more concerned with metaphysical or ontological matters than with problems of cosmology.

(3) Chinese and Japanese schools of Buddhism. For the most part, Buddhist communities founded outside of India were content to derive their fundamental philosophic conceptions from the original Indian schools of thought, though, for this purpose, it may be necessary to count Ceylon, the home of the later Sthaviravadin movement, as part of India. Thus Burma and Siam have accepted their cosmology as well as their ontology from the Pali Abhidharma works. The Tibetan and Mongolian monks when not executing devil dances, or composing incantations and charms, study the philosophical systems of India, adding thereto very little of their own. Chinese and Japanese Buddhism, however, have developed schools of thought which are quite original and important, and any general history of Buddhist philosophy must or should give considerable attention to these. innovations, more particularly the development of the Indian Buddha Ksetra cult into philosophical monotheism, and of the Madhyamika nihilism into realistic pantheism ; but these developments had little reference to cosmology, and the new schools were content to accept the cosmic geography evolved by either the Sarvastivadin or Yogacarin schools.1

We have seen, then, that a study of the three schools, Sthaviravadin, Sarvastivadin, and Yogacarin, is sufficient to make us familiar with the whole field of Buddhist cosmology. In order, however, that the history of the development of cosmological ideas may be understood, it is necessary to say a word concerning the chronology and inter-relation of these three schools.

(1) The Sthaviravadins,? or, at least, the school which flourishes in Ceylon, Burma, and Siam, and which lays claim to that title, occupies a curiously isolated position among the various Buddhist schools. Its Siitra and Vinaya Pitakas are essentially the same as those of the other Hinayana schools, as may be seen by comparing the Pali versions with the various Hinayana Sitra and Vinaya works contained in the Chinese Buddhist Canon, but its chief claim to philosophical distinction is its Abhidharma Pitaka, which seems to have been brought from Ceylon shortly after the conversion to Buddhism of thatisland by Mahinda (Mahendra), the son or nephew of Asoka, in the third century B.c. It is doubtful if the whole of the Pali Pitaka was brought over at this time, or even that the work of composition had been completed at so early a date. In any case, the transmission was oral and subject to interpolation. But the seven Abhidharma works must have existed very much in their

1 Cf. the cosmological sections of the [YJ riya Es for Tien-t‘ai and Hi @% i for Hua-yen.

2 The general history of Buddhism in Ceylon is too well known to make it necessary to quote authorities ; compare, however, Geiger’s translation of Mahavamsa, and the section on Ceylon (vol. iii, p. 11 ff.) in Sir Charles Hliot’s new book Hinduism and Buddhism.

present form at the beginning of the Christian era, about which time they were reduced to writing. At this period, although the Canon was kept in Pali, a number of commentaries were written in, or translated into Singhalese, but these have now been lost. Thereafter the most important period of Pali Buddhism, during which this school was almost, though never quite, transformed from a theology into a philosophy, is represented by Buddhaghosa, about 4.D. 400. He wrote a number of new commentaries (if history can be trusted), destroyed the older commentaries, and came to be considered the official interpreter of the Pali school. After the time of Buddhaghosa, though from a material point of view the Buddhist order experienced many vicissitudes, its philosophical development was very slow and gradual. As the Ceylonese type of Buddhism eventually dominated Burma and Siam, where it seems to have supplanted other forms of Buddhism, the Buddhism of Buddhaghosa is now the predominant form of Hinayana, and therefore the system of thought best known to the West.