Man, in his relations to society

Preface

Although this volume is one, the preparation of which has been attended with more labour, and more necessity of guarding against error, than some others of the series, yet I am not sure but some may regard the title of it as, in part at least, a misnomer ; and therefore the few prefatory remarks which I mean to offer, may perhaps be most usefully directed to a little explanation on this point. The mistake, if it should arise, will probably be occasioned by the subject of the book being the adaptations of Man to society, and not the conventional regulations which societies of men establish, as they suppose, for the general weal, or, a.t all events, for the weal of the parties making the regulations. But, with all due submission to the authorities, I must be permitted to state, that codes of laws, whether civil, criminal, or of any other denomination, are not and cannot become matters of any kind of philosophy. They are mere inferences from the nature of Man, and his adaptation to society ; and therefore they can be good and true only in so far as the contrivers of them understand their subjects, and act in conformity with them. Nor is this all ; for even admitting the regulation to be good at the time when made,

III. A

IV PREFACE.

and put in execution, society is in itself so mutable, and this mutability constitutes so important a quality of it, that, in a very short time, the best law, or combination of laws or other regulations, that can possibly be made, must become antiquated, and the continuance of it a bane to society, and not a blessing. Any one who looks at the system of regulation in an old country, more especially if that system is complicated, will find abundant proofs of what has now been stated, as well as of the pertinacity with which mere habit induces, and, indeed, compels even sensible men to cling to old customs and regulations, after the spirit and usefulness of them are gone, and their corrupting carcases are spreading pestilence through the social atmosphere. We name none of them, but there are few reflective readers to whom many will not occur, in which not only the sins but even the virtues, or, at all events, the virtuous intentions of the parents continue to be visited upon the children after the lapse of many generations, — rendering the war which the present generation has to wage against the absurdities of antiquity far more serious than the whole physical evils with which the present generation have to contend.

Feeling the unphilosophical nature of this subject, and the impossibility of dealing with it, without a constant warfare against absurdities and evils which ought long ere now to have been exploded, I have studiously avoided all analysis of the conventional regulations of society, and, indeed, all allusion to principles upon which these regulations ought to be made. Society is a perfect Proteus ; for while one

PREFACE. V

attempts to seize it in one form, it instantly changes to a very different one. Therefore, Man himself, the component part, by the multiplication or aggregation of which society is formed, is the only subject with which we can deal in a matter which can bear the test of philosophic scrutiny. To Man, therefore, the attention of the reader of this volume is directed. In the first chapter, I have endeavoured to point out and to illustrate every man's original relation to society, his obligation to it, and the duty which that imposes upon him ; and in this I have made the illustrations as copious and as original as I possibly could. In the second chapter, I have treated of the reciprocal duties of Man, and the society of which he is a member; and I have illustrated the general principle by a few instances which appeared to me as being at once the most popular and the most striking.

This may be regarded as the general statement of the case; and from this I have proceeded to what maybe called the elements of useful society, as founded in Man himself. In doing this, I have first considered the social adaptations of Man in a general point of view ; and then through the medium of the immediate, the retrospective, and the prospective emotions, — endeavouring to point out the consequences resulting from the proper and from the improper management of all the leading ones. In doing this, I have had occasion to examine some of the favourite theories of moral good and evil with some attention, but not, as I flatter myself, with any bitterness, or any desire but for the truth. I have endeavoured to make the work true in prin-

VI PREFACE.

ciple, moral in tendency, and as plain and simple in expression as possible ; and with the statement of these my endeavours, I leave my success or failure to the candour of that public to which I am under so many obligations.

ROBERT MUDIE.

Winchester, July 1, 1839.

ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS.

Chapter I. Preliminary Remarks

Man's original relation to society— Obligation thence arising— Length of every man's pedigree— All men equal at birth — Man has no original rights— Man's claim on society in equity- Relative obligations in different countries — Extent of the primary obligation and duty thence arising— Man independent and alone— Milton's Adam— The real first man— Man's original ignorance— Man and society — Laws are not philosophical- Religious and political disputes and their evils— Probable cause of holy rancour— State of the argument . . page 1 — 43

Chapter II. Reciprocal Duties Of Man And Society

Duty to God— Its real nature — Its infantine display— Its progressive displays— Duty to be mentally active— Agitation and its corrective — Our primary obligation— Education— Our second obligation — Love and self-love— States of society— True and false guides — Character and reputation — Negative duties — Justice— Passive loyalty— Distinctions of ranks and their duties —Resident and non-resident proprietors — Corn-laws— Duties of landlords— Claim of society on landlords— Duties of society —Public institutions— Public opinion . . . 44 — 91

Chapter III. Social Adaptations Of Man

The'solitary — The social principle not instinctive— Various meanings of society— Society not generally definable— Sections of

Viii CONTENTS.

society— A man of the world— An outcast— Attachments and idolatry of classes — Stealing a march on society — Duty of society— Limitations of the study — Farmer and manufacturer — The arts— Quacks— Parson and clown . . .page 92—115

Chapter IV. The Social Emotions Of Man— Immediate Emotions

General definition of the emotions— Social emotions— Moral physiognomy—Necessary caution— Emotion of beauty— Importance of the emotions— An iufant thief— Feeling a virtue— Use of law — Relation of virtue and beauty — Young emotion— Sympathy, its power, use, and benefit— Despair— Magical power of sympathy—Sympathy with nature and its effects— Love and hate — Pride and humility— Honest pride— Haughtiness— Vanity— Its contrast with pride— Reflection .... 116—164

Chapter V. Social Emotions— Retrospective Emotions

General nature of such emotions— Several kinds of them— Gladness — Regret — Gloom — Contrast of character — Stimuli to thought and action— Conscience and consciousness— Influence of conscience — Moral feeling — Error respecting moral feeling — Bad men have moral feeling — Gratitude and anger — Motive for gratitude — Its real foundation— Its effects— Its regulation — Causes of anger— Evils and uses of anger— Public indignation — Furor of the mob — Restraining of anger . . . 165—201

Chapter VI. Social Emotions — Prospective Emotions

Dangerous error on this subject — Animal life knows neither past nor future — The human body is in the same predicament— Connection of the past and the future — Nature and regulation of the prospective emotions — Nature and regulation of desire — Erroneous education — Ennui — Process of desire and reasoning — Uncertainty and variableness of desire— Habits and their influence—Contrast of the over-tended and the neglected— Self-formed characters— Physical good — Desire of life — Desire of long life — Moral good and evil — Differences of profession— The

CONTENTS. IX

cobbler and the thief— The heathen gods— London abominations Idea of moral good— The divine-right theory— The Tory principle — The hypocritical theory — Illustration of a thieves' attorney — Theory of the fitness of things — Utility and utilitarians — Utility no virtue— Fallacy of Hume— Moral feeling — Important influence of moral feeling — Misery of the mean-spirited — Contrast of the vicious and the virtuous— The sympathetic hypothesis—Absurdity of the selfish system— The sacerdotal hypothesis— Fallibility and the fall of Man— The error of Dr. Paley, and its destructiveness of all virtue — Relation between virtue and religion— True religion and its counterfeit— State of the social mind— State of the public mind— Religion and politics- Various desires and fears 202—280

Chapter VII. Social Institutions

Idea of social institutions— Difficulties of social regulation— Intentions and law-making— Difficulties in making wholesome laws— Illustrations— Law-makers— Conclusion . 281—292

M A N,

IN HIS RELATIONS TO SOCIETY.

Chapter I. Preliminary Remarks

As concerns the foundation of morals, and the eternal well-being of Man, the relation in which he stands to his Maker is unquestionably the highest in importance ; and, viewing Man as a being who must act upon knowledge of his own acquiring, the relation in which he stands to physical nature, as an observer of the properties of its substance, and the laws of its phenomena, so that he may turn the one and the other to his use and comfort, as occasion requires, is also of such importance, that it is indispensable to his very existence.

But, although these two relations are so important to every member of the human race that they may be said to be his all for eternity and for time, yet they are to the individual only, — to every one of the race singly, and by and for himself; and if, in the latter relation — perhaps even in the former, if he were to be thrown as completely and exclusively upon himself

'J MAN'S NATURAL OBLIGATION

for his means as he is for his end, his condition would he mean, wretched, and miserable, as compared with the condition of even the least comfortable of those we see around us in such a country as England. Therefore, in a practical point of view, the most important branch of the knowledge of Man is that of the relations in which he stands to society. This is general, and applicable to the whole race, in so far as they are known to, or have any influence upon, each other ; and its importance is not, in any, measured by the deserts or by the knowledge of the individual. So far, indeed, is this from being the case, that a man's faults always, and his deficiencies in knowledge generally, are crimes against that society of which he is a member.

Thus, before we can come fairly and fully prepared to the consideration of the simple and temporary relation in which a man stands to society, to their respective mutual and reciprocal duties, and to the means which they have or ought to have for the right performance of those duties, there is a preliminary question, of far more consequence than any which is met with at the threshold of our other inquiries concerning Man, and one which demands our attention at some considerable length. For the sake of a general point upon which the several parts of the inquiry may be concentrated, the preliminary question may be enunciated in these words, — " In what relation does Man, that is, every man, stand to society at the moment of his birth ? "

When put in these general terms, the question does

TO SOCIETY. 3

not admit of a direct answer; and before we can get an answer which shall be precise and definite, we must narrow it to the case of some one individual of the human race, a foundation so narrow that no reasoning could be founded upon it. No doubt this is the very form in which every man ought to put the question to himself; and not merely put it, but get a full and clear understanding of it, otherwise, he will not be able either to do his duty to society as he ought, or to live happily in it. A veiy large proportion of the misunderstandings, discontents, broils, distractions, squabbles, and absolute outbreaks and wars, which disturb the peace, retard the improvement, and destroy the comfort of society, have their source in ignorance of this question, and in nothing else ; and we hesitate not to say that, if it were generally understood, and habitually acted upon, men would be at peace with each other, and all would be prosperous and happy.

But this result, delightful as it would be in itself, and simple as the means of its accomplishment appear, is, we fear, to be classed among the desirable only, and not in any wise among the expected. At least, as society and the means of schooling society in knowledge stand at present, there is nothing mooted which in the least tends to its accomplishment. Indeed, though the school of pupillage and of the world were as good as they are confessedly — no, not " confessedly " — demonstratively bad, we know not in what manner they could introduce this question as a part of their system. That is a hopeless sort of teaching

4 EVERY MAN HAS

in which the pupil has all the necessary information and the teacher none ; for the teacher, let him be as gifted as he may, cannot tell how the information — the elements of that which is to be taught, ought to be applied, unless he first is made acquainted with what they are ; and this is all the knowledge that is wanted in the present case.

No man can, indeed, bring the question into such perfect apposition to his own individual case, as that he can see the full weight of obligation which the relation may impose ; because he cannot know all the circumstances which led to the condition of the society in which he was born, or to the states, the characters, and the habits of his parents, and those others who may have been about him, and have had an influence in the formation of his character, and in opening up a way in the world for his reception. Even if he knew all this perfectly, it is only one link of a very long chain, and a chain which branches out into many parts at each link. We cannot tell who or what influenced those who were immediately about us, and far less who and what influenced their ancestors in every one of the numerous generations, the majority of which were, in as far as this world is concerned, gone to oblivion before we saw the light. A Welsh pedigree is proverbial for its length, but the longest of these is a mere span to the moral and social pedigree of the humblest man of the most obscure lineage in England. The most laborious and lynx-eyed antiquary in the country cannot trace his ancestry backward to the time when his progenitors were at the

A LONG PEDIGREE. .J>

very depth of savage ignorance, or even upon what spot of the earth's surface they existed when they were in that condition ; and as little can he detail the means by which they escaped from that state, or the number of alternations of savage and demi-savage through which they were compelled to vacillate before civilization had become a plant of such permanence and vigour in their horde, as that it was able to maintain its place, and continue its growth, despite the wars of chiefs, and the turbulences and broils of vassals.

Yet has every man reason to believe that, by some means or other, the race or the family to which he belongs, how long and how illustrious soever its flourish may be in the Heralds' College, as Right Worshipful, or Most Noble, — by some means or other they have come from such an origin, and through such vicissitudes as those which we have named ; and, for every advance which they have made, in this long and varied chain of succession, the man who is now born of the race or the family, is a debtor to some party or some circumstances or other, how ignorant soever he may be as to who or what they were.

Thus, we cannot possibly know the position in which society must have stood to us at the moment of our birth ; and this ignorance, of which we never can get rid, is enough to reprove us in the sharpest manner when we feel inclined to boast of our own independence and importance. But, though we do not know the conditions on which society met us when we virtually entered into the social compact with our

b 3

6 ALL MEN EQUAL

nation or our tribe at our birth, we do know, by observation, though not by personal knowledge, the condition in which we ourselves were to this same compact. We came to it in utter ignorance, not only of all that had been done by men to prepare society for our reception, but of the existence of the world and every thing in it, and even of the fact of our own existence. This is true of the natural condition of all men, whether they are born at a time and in a country when and where the light of science is in its greatest splendour, and all the arts, useful and ornamental, are in the highest degree of perfection, or whether we are born in a land in which the inhabitants have not yet learned to frame a canal, form a spear, or kindle a fire. And, as it is true of the distinctions of nations and hordes, so it is true of the distinction of ranks in society, whatever the grounds of the distinction may be. The son of the most profound philosopher is in as utter ignorance at the moment, as the son of the most demented idiot to whom a son can be born ; and the son of the proudest monarch that ever lived, is in as total ignorance at his birth, and in himself as unfit for the acquiring of any knowledge, as the son of the houseless beggar that passes his nights in the shelter of a bush upon the common. Then, as in knowledge, so in strength and resource, they are all utterly and equally helpless ; and, if left to themselves, the one and the other would alike perish, as a matter of nature and necessity.

Therefore, one and all of us come to the social compact, enter into society at the moment of our

AT THEIR BIRTH. /

birth, upon what may be called a perfect moral equality. None of us has any ground to reproach another afterwards upon any inequality ; and though some foolish individuals do boast of their high and honourable birth, they are little aware how the real case of the elevation and honour stands, or, assuredly, they would be very silent and humble upon the point. When men boast of their high birth, or of the rank and fortune prepared for them at their coming into the world, to what, in truth and reality, does the boast amount ? Why, simply to this, that they are under greater obligations to society, and have more important and imperious duties to discharge to that society, than men who have no such advantages of birth. We do not in the meantime inquire into the manner in which the title, the rank, or the fortune was obtained. It may have been in the most honourable manner, or it may have been the very opposite — for we have examples of both kinds and all degrees ; but, however it came, is a question for those by and to whom it did come, and not for their children. The descendant of a really great man has no share whatever in the greatness ; and the descendant of a successful villain is in no wise answerable for any share of the villany. The plain question, — and it is so plain that nobody can possibly mistake it, — is, e ' What claim can the individual ground upon his own merits at the moment of his birth ?" — and the universal answer to this question — the answer which admits not of one single exception, is <f None," — " Naked they " all "came into the world;55 and this nakedness — this

3 MAN S ORIGINAL CLAIM.

utter destitution, is the only claim that they, or any of them, originally have upon society. Therefore, when a man boasts that, in the estimation of the world, his father was " a great man," the personal truth of the boast is, that he is himself "a great beggar," — or " great debtor," if the words are preferred, but the meaning is the same.

This is the natural condition of the whole human race, with reference to society. They come into the world utterly helpless and incapable ; and, therefore, they are indebted to society, or to some part of society, for the simple fact of the preservation of their lives, during that period when they are incapable of doing any thing for themselves. If there is any thing more ■ — if, in consequence of his birth being in one country and of one parentage rather than in another country and of another parentage, a man shall derive any distinction or advantage in society, that advantage, whatever it may be, is not a credit to him, — it is a debt. The common phrase runs that a man is " creditably born;" but this is the very reverse of the truth; for the man is really the more a debtor, the greater the advantages of his birth ; and therefore the expression ought to be " debitably born ;" for the more he is born to, the more he is a debtor to society.

It must not be supposed that, in these observations — observations which have their foundation in the original truth of the case, and cannot be shaken by sophistry, how much soever they may, like all truths, be liable to be beaten down by the rod of authority — it must not be supposed that we are in any way quar-

ALL MEN DEBTORS. ^

relling with the conventional arrangements of society, or even in the slightest degree hinting that men should not inherit thus or thus, according to whatever the custom and the law, — which is only custom supported by authority, and ought not to be made amenable at the bar of abstract justice, — may rule or direct in the matter.

We shall probably have occasion, in a future chapter, to say something about conventional customs, and when the time comes, we shall endeavour to do it as fairly as possible, though with what approbation we need not now say. But in the meantime we have nothing to do with such matters, our object being simply to see the grounds upon which society and any individual man meet each other at the very first, because that is the only true foundation upon which any argument can be built.

In this view of the matter, all men come into society equal in themselves, and with no equivalent which they can presently give for the trouble that it may take to save them ; and thus they are all debtors to society from the very outset, and that in the exact ratio of their advantages, whatever those advantages may be.

It may be supposed, and even said, that the gratitude of the child is to its parents, for personal or hireling attention during the period of its nonage, and we should regret the statement of any thing that would tend to lessen the very proper feeling of filial duty. But, in reality, the attention which a parent bestows upon his children — apart altogether from

10 MAN HAS NO ORIGINAL RIGHTS.

the pleasure with which nature has endued the office, is not so much a credit to the parent, as the discharge of an obligation which he himself has lain under since the time of his own helplessness, during which he also received the attention of his parents. This paternal duty ought not, therefore, to be mixed up with the question of a man's obligation to society ; for it is a sort of debtor and creditor matter which balances itself, the debt owing to the parents of the individual being naturally payable to his children. There are some other of the domestic duties which compensate themselves in a similar manner; and consequently they, too, ought to be omitted in the argument.

The original state of the social compact, with regard to every individual of the human race, is, that the man brings nothing into society, for that most plain and cogent of all reasons, that he really has nothing to bring. To talk of the " Original Rights of Man," is therefore to talk of that which, in the nature of things, can have no existence. Man has no original right except the right of discharging what he owes to society ; and there are perhaps not many, in any country or age, who discharge those debts to the full extent. It may so happen, however, that the conventional laws and institutions of society may give a man what appear to be natural rights. Whether they may be so intended or not, is not the present inquiry ; but it is certain that enacted laws rarely, if ever, affect all the members of society with that equality of adaptation which strict justice between man and man reman's claim in equity. 11

quires. Now, if the burden of the conventional law press too heavily upon any one member of society, that member has a " right" — a natural right if you will — a right far more sacred than any mere fiscal regulation, or any mere matter of government, to be released from the extra pressure. Depriving the man of this right is a very serious wrong ; for the crimes which the law commits are always far more injurious to the welfare of society than those which are committed in violation of the law. This is the reason why nations which are governed by legislation are sometimes more unjustly treated than those which are governed by despotism ; but the point is a nice one, and belongs not to this part of the argument.

The conclusion at which we must arrive, therefore, is, that society owes nothing to Man at the outset ; but that Man owes everything to society; and the remainder of the inquiry, in the case of any individual man born of any nation during any age, turns upon what this " every thing" may amount to. The general answer is, " Every advantage which being born of that nation and during that age may give him."

This general answer is, however, exceedingly vague ; and we cannot give it much precision without destroying its general applicability. There are some obvious points, however, which will give us at least some shadowy notion of it. The more civilized the country is, and the more equitable and just all its institutions are, the greater the obligation which a man is under for being born in it. A man owes more for being born in New Zealand than in the Australian

12 RELATIVE OBLIGATIONS TO

bush ; more for being born in the Sandwich Isles than in New Zealand ; more for being born in the American States than the Sandwich Isles ; and more for being born in Britain than perhaps in any other country. Of course there are both national and individual opinions on these points, which are founded on feeling, not on fact ; and therefore, though they are quite unfit for argument, they ought to be respected — as it is very difficult for men to alter their feelings, however wrong they may be. Again, a man is under obligation for being born in a district where the inducements to virtue predominate over the allurements to vice ; and, coeteris paribus, it is an obligation to be born in a populous and well-informed district, where the natural and the artificial means of acquiring knowledge, and employment, and the necessaries of life, are easily accessible. If however, we pursue this part of the argument, or the investigation rather, too far into details, we are apt to come to conflicting circumstances, where the good on the one side and the evil on the other are not very easily balanced.

Being born in an old country, that is, in a country having a long history* and containing many memorials and monuments of successive ages and their events, and which has, in the lapse of those ages, produced a numerous succession of illustrious men, lays a man under very considerable obligations. There are some persons, smit with admiration at what are called Utilitarian doctrines, but with no very clear perceptions of what " utility '• really means, that affect to ridicule the influence of such recollections as those to

DIFFERENT COUNTRIES. 13

which we have alluded ; but such is the influence of our feelings, for good or for evil as may be, that it is doubtful whether any man ever became truly great without beginning his career with the admiration of some other men, who were then, or had formerly been, great in the very matters in which he became great himself, or in matters very nearly allied to them. So true is this, that it is highly probable that the memories of the illustrious men who have been connected with the Universities have probably more effect upon the students than all the prelections of the existing tutors. For the same reason, probably, great men appear in constellations in particular places, with blanks of dulness or mediocrity between, proportional in length to the natural want of stimulus in the place.