Is life worth living?

II Jjtpkob Of M The New Bepublic,* Etc

'* Man walketh in a vain shadow, and disquieteth himself in vain.'*

" How dieth the wise man? As the fool That which befalleth the sons of men

befalleth the beasts, even one thing befalleth them : as the one dieth so dieth the other, yea they have all one breath ; so that man hath no preeminence above a beast ; for aU is vanity."

JOHN

NEW YORK:

WURTELE LOVELL. 1880.

33 cTiod^ • Ml

I INSCRIBE THIS BOOK

TO

JOHN RUSKIN.

TO JOHN RUSKIN

My dear Mr. Ruskin, — You have given me very great pleasure by allowing me to inscribe this book to you, and for two reasons ; for I have two kinds of acknowledgment that I wish to make to you — first, that of an intellectual debtor to a public teacher; secondly, that of a private friend to the kindest of private friends. The tribute I have to offer you is, it is true, a small one ; and it is possibly more blessed for me to give than it is for you to receive it. In so far, at least, as I represent any influence of yours, you may very possibly not think me a satisfactory representative. But there is one fact — and I will lay all the stress I can on it — which makes me less diffident than I might be, in offering this book either to you or to the world generally.

The import of the book is independent of the book itself, and of the author of it ; nor do the arguments it contains stand or fall with my success in stating them ; and these last at least I may associate with your name. They are not mine. I have not discovered or invented them. They are so obvious that any one who chooses may see them ; and I have been only moved to meddle with them, because, from being so obvious, it seems that no one will so much as deign to look at them, or at any rate to put them together with any care or completeness. They might be before everybody's eyes; but instead they are under everybody's feet. My occupation has been merely to kneel in xii.

To John Ruskin.

the mud, and to pick up the truths that are being trampled into it, by a headstrong and uneducated generation.

With what success I have done this, it is not for me to judge. Bufc though I cannot be confident of the value of what I have done, I am confident enough of the value of what I have tried to do. From a literary point of view many faults may be found with me. There may be faults yet deeper, to which possibly I shall have to plead guilty- I niay — I cannot tell — have unduly emphasized some points, and not put enough emphasis on others. I may be convicted — nothing is more likely — of many verbal inconsistencies. But let the arguments I have done my best to embody be taken as a whole, and they have a vitality that does not depend upon me ; nor can they be proved false, because my ignorance or weakness may here or there have associated them with, or illustrated them by, a falsehood. I am not myself conscious of any such falsehoods in my book ; but if such are pointed out to me, I shall do my best to correct them. If what I have done prove not worth correction, others coming after me will be preferred before me, and are sure before long to address themselves successfully to the same task in which I perhaps have failed. What indeed can we each of us look for but a large measure of failure, especially when we are moving not with the tide but against it — when the things we wrestle with are principalities and powers, and spiritual stupidity in high places — and when we are ourselves partly weakened by the very influences against which we are struggling ?

But this is not all. There is in the way another difficulty. Writing as the well-wishers of truth and goodness,

To John Ruskin.

we find, as the world now stands, that our chief foes are they of our own household. The insolence, the ignorance, and the stupidity of the age has embodied itself, and found its mouthpiece, in men who are personally the negation? of all that they represent theoretically. We have men who in private are full of the most gracious modesty, representing in their philosophies the most ludicrous arrogance; we have men who practise every virtue themselves proclaiming the principles of every vice to others; we have men who have mastered many kinds of knowledge acting on the world only as embodiments of the completest and most pernicious ignorance. I have had occasion tc deal continually with certain of these by name. With the exception of one — who has died prematurely, whilst this book was in the press — those I have named oftenest are still living. Many of them probably are known tc you personally, though none of them are so known to me and you will appreciate the sort of difficulty I have felt better than I can express it. I can only hope that as the falsehood of their arguments cannot blind any of us tc their personal merits, so no intellectual demerits in my case will be prejudicial to the truth of my arguments.

To me the strange thing is that such arguments should have to be used at all ; and perhaps a thing stranger still that it should fall to me to use them — to me, an outsidei in philosophy, in literature, and in theology. But the justification of my speaking is that there is any opening for me to speak ; and others must be blamed, not I, if

" the lyre so long divine Degenerates into hands like mine."

At any rate, however all this may be, what I here inxiv.

To John Buskin.

scribe to you, my friend and teacher, I am confident is not unworthy of you. It is not what I have done ; it is what t have tried to do. As such I beg you to accept it, and to believe me still, though now so seldom near you,

Your admiring and affectionate friend,

W. H. MALLOCK.

NOTE

In this hook the words "positive" " positivist" and "positivism11 are of constant occurrence as applied to modern thought and thinkers. To avoid any chance of confusion or misconception, it will be well to say that these words as used by me have no special reference to the system of Comte or his disciples, but are applied to the common views and position of the whole scientific school, one of the most eminent members of which — I mean Professor Huxley — has been the most trenchant and contemptuous critic that "positivism" in its narrower sens© has met with. Over "positivism" in this sense Professor Huxley and Mr. Frederic Harrison have had some public battles. Positivism in the sense in which it is used by me, applies to the principles as to which the above writers explicitly agree, not to those as to which they differ,

H. M.

Chapter I. Page

The New Import of the Question •••••••• I7

CHAPTER IL

Morality and the Prize of Life 47

CHAPTER IIL

Sociology as the Foundation of Morality 62 CHAPTER TV.

CHAPTER V.

Love as a Test of Goodness r H*J

CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER VIII.

The Practical Prospect 192

CHAPTER IX.

CHAPTER X.

CHAPTER XI.

CHAPTER XII.

Universal History and the Claims of the Christian Church .... 303

CHAPTER XIII.

Belief and Will 32G

Is Life Worth Living?

CHAPTER I.

THE NEW IMPORT OF THE QUESTION.

" A change was coming over the world, the meaning and direction of which even still is hidden from us9 a change from era to era." — Froude's History of England, ch. i.

HAT I am about to deal with in this book is

• * a question which may well strike many, at first sight, as a question that has no serious meaning, or none at any rate for the sane and healthy mind. I am about to attempt inquiring, not sentimentally, but with all calmness and sobriety, into the true value of this human life of ours, as tried by those tests of reality which the modern world is accepting, and to ask dispassionately if it be really worth the living. The inquiry certainly has often been made before ; but it has never been made properly; it has never been made in the true scientific spirit. It has always been vitiated either by diffidence or by personal feeling ; and the positive school, though they rejoice to question everything else, have, at least in this country, left the worth of life alone. They may now and then, perhaps, have affected to examine it ; but their examination has been merely formal, like that of

Is Lijfe Worth Living?

a custom-house officer, who passes a portmanteau which he has only opened. They have been as tender with it as Don Quixote was with his mended helmet, when he would not put his card-paper visor to the test of the steel sword. I propose to supply this deficiency in their investigations. I propose to apply exact thought to the only great subject to which it has not been applied already.

To numbers, as I have just said, this will of course seem useless. They will think that the question never really was an open one ; or that, if it ever were so, the common sense of mankind has long ago finally settled it. To ask it again, they will think idle, or worse than idle. It will express to them, if it expresses anything, no perplexity of the intellect, but merely some vague disease of the feelings. They will say that it is but the old ejaculation of satiety or despair, as old as human nature itself; it is a kind of maundering common to all moral dyspepsia ; they have often heard it before, and they wish they may never hear it again.

"But let them be a little less impatient. Let then; L-:voiv * ■ i liie question closer, and more calmly ; and it will not be long before its import begins to change for them. They will see that though it may have often been asked idly, it is yet capable of a meaning that is very far from idle ; and that however old they may think it, yet as asked by our generation it is really completely new — that it bears a meaning which is indeed not far from

The New Import of the Question.

any one ot them, but which is practical and pressing— I might almost say portentous — and which is something literally unexampled in the past history of mankind.

I am aware that this position is not only not at first sight obvious, but thaV oven when better understood, it will probably be called false. My first care, therefore, will be to explain it at length, and clearly. For this purpose we must consider two points in order ; first, what is the exact doubt we intend to express by our question ; and next, why in our day this doubt should have such a special and fresh significance.

Let us then make it quite plain, at starting, that when we ask "Is life worth living?" we are not asking whether its balance of pains is necessarily and always in excess of its balance of pleasures. We are not asking whether any one has been, or whether any one is happy. To the unjaundiced eye nothing is more clear than that happiness of various kinds has been, and is, continually attained by men. And ingenious pessimists do but waste their labour when they try to convince a happy man that he really must be miserable. What I am going to discuss is not the superfluous truism that life has been found worth living by many • but the profoundly different proposition that it ought to be found worth living by all. For this is what life is pronounced to be, when those claims are made for it that at present universally are made ;

Is Life Worth Living?

when, as a general truth, it is said to be worth living ; or when any of those august epithets are applied to it that are at present applied so constantly. At present, as we all know, it is called sacred, solemn, earnest, significant, and so forth. To withhold such epithets is considered a kind of blasphemy. And the meaning of all such language is this : it means that life has some deep inherent worth of its own, beyond what it can acquire or lose by the caprice of circumstance — a worth, which though it may be most fully revealed to a man, through certain forms of success, is yet not destroyed or made a minus quantity by failure. Certain forms of love, for instance, are held in a special way to reveal this worth to us ; but the worth that a successful love is thus supposed to reveal is a worth that a hopeless love is supposed not to destroy. The worth is a part of life's essence, not a mere chance accident, as health or riches are ; and we are supposed to lose it by no acts but our own.

Now it is evident that such a worth as this, is, in one sense, no mere fancy. Numbers actually have found it; and numbers actually still continue to find it. The question is not whether the worth exists, but on what is the worth based. How far is the treasure incorruptible ; and how far will our increasing knowledge act as moth and rust to it ? There are some things whose value is completely established by the mere fact that men do value1

The, Npm Import oj the Question. 21 them. They appeal to single tastes, they defy further analysis, and they thus form, as it were, the bases of all pleasures and happiness. But these are few in number ; they are hardly ever met with in a perfectly pure state ; and their effect, when they are so met, is either momentary, or far from vivid. As a rule they are found in combinations of great complexity, fused into an infinity of new substances by the action of beliefs and associations ; and these two agents are often of more importance in the result than are the things they act upon. Take for instance a boy at Eton or Oxford, who affects a taste in wine. Give him a bottle of gooseberry champagne ; tell him it is of the finest brand, and that it cost two hundred shillings a dozen. He will sniff, and wink at it in ecstasy; he will sip it slowly with an air of knowing reverence ; and his enjoj^ment of it probably will be far keener, than it would be, were the wine really all he fancies it, and he had lived years enough to have come to discern its qualities. Here the part played by belief and associations is of course evident. The boy's enjoyment is real, and it rests to a certain extent on a foundation of solid fact; the taste of the gooseberry champagne is an actual pleasure to his palate. Anything nauseous, black dose for instance, could never raise him to the state of delight in question. But this simple pleasure of sense is but a small part of the pleasure he actually experiences. That pleasure, as a whole, is a

V

Is Life Worth Living?

highly complex thing, raid rests mainly on a basis that, by a little knowledge, could be annihilated in a moment. Tell the boy what the champagne really is, he has been praising ; and the state of his mind and face will undergo a curious transformation. Our sense of the worth of life is similar in its complexity to the boy's sense of the wrorth of his wine. Beliefs and associations play exactly the same part in it. The beliefs in this last case may of course be truer. The question that I have to ask is, are they ? In some individual cases certainly, they have not been. Miss Harriet Martineau,for instance, judging life from her own experience of it, wTas quite persuaded that it was a most solemn and satisfactory thing, and she has told the world as much, in no hesitating manner. But a part at least of the solemn satisfaction she felt in it was due to a grotesque over-estimate of .her own social and intellectual importance. Here, then, was a worth in life, real enough to the person who found it, but which a little knowledge of the world would have at once taken away from her. Does the general reverence with which life is at present regarded rest in any degree upon any similar misconception ? And if so, to what extent does it ? Will it fall to pieces before the breath of a larger knowledge ? or has it that firm foundation in fact that will enable it to survive in spite of all enlightenment, and perhaps even to increase in consequence of it ?

The New Import of the Question.

Such is the outline of the question I propose to deal with. I will now show why it is so pressing, and why, in the present crisis of thought, it is so needful that it should be dealt with. The first impression it produces, as I have said, is that it is superfluous. Our belief in life seems to rest on too wide an experience for us to entertain any genuine doubt of the truth of it. But this first impression docs not go for much. It is a mere superficial thing, and will wear off immediately. We have but to remember that a belief that was supposed to rest on an equally wide basis — the belief in God, and in a supernatural order— has in these days, not been questioned only, but lias been to a great degree, successfully annihilated. The only philosophy that belongs to the present age, the only philosophy that is a really new agent in progress, has declared this belief to be a dissolving dream of the past. And this belief, as we shall see presently, is, amongst civilized men at least, far older than the belief in life; it has been far more widely spread, and experience has been held tc confirm it, with an equal certainty If this then is inevitably disintegrated by the action of a widening knowledge, it cannot be taken for granted that the behet in life will not fare likewise. It may dc so; but until we have examined it more closely we cannot be certain that it will. Com- Vmon consent and experience, until they are anayscd, are fallacious tests for the seekers after

Is Life Worth Living?

positive truth. The emotions may forbid us to ask our question ; but in modern philosophy the emotions play no part as organs of discovery. They are facts in themselves, and as such are of course of value ; but they point to no facts beyond themselves. That men loved God and felt his presence close to them proves nothing, to the positive thinker, as to God's existence. Nor will the mere emotion of reverence towards life necessarily go any farther towards proving that it deserves reverence. It is distinctly asserted by the modern school that the right state in which to approach everything is a state of enlightened skepticism. We are to consider everything doubtful, until it is proved certain, or unless, from its very nature, it is not possible to doubt it.

Nor is this all; for, apart from these modern canons, the question of life's worth has, as a matter of fact, been always recognized as in a certain sense an open one. The greatest intellects of the world, in all ages, have been at times inclined to doubt it. And these times have not seemed to them times of blindness; but on the contrary, of specially clear insight. Scales, as it were, have fallen from their eyes for a moment or two, and the beauty and worth of existence has appeared to them as but a deceiving show. An entire book of the Hebrew Scriptures is devoted to a deliberate exposition of this philosophy. In "the most high and palmy state" of Athens it was expressed fitfully also as the deepest wisdom of her most triumphant dramatist/" And in Shakspeare it appears so constantly, that it must evidently have had for him some directly personal meaning.

This view, however, even by most of those who have held it, has been felt to be really only a halfview in the guise of a whole one. To Shakspeare, for instance, it was full of a profound terror. It crushed, and appalled, and touched him; and there was not only implied in it that for us life does mean little, but that by some possibility it might have meant much. Or else, if the pessimism has been more complete than this, .it has probably been adopted as a kind of solemn affectation, or has else been lamented as a form of diseased melancholy. It is a view that healthy intellects have hitherto declined to entertain. Its advocates have been met with neglect, contempt, or castigation, not with arguments. They have been pitied as insane, avoided as cynical, or passed over as frivolous. And yet, but for one reason, to that whole European world whose progress we are now inheriting, this view would have seemed not only not untenable, but even obvious. The emptiness of the things of this life, the incompleteness of even its highest pleasures, and their utter powerlessness to make us really happy, has been, at least for fifteen hundred years, a commonplace, both with saints and sages. The conception that

* Vide Sophocles, CEdipus Coloneus.

Is Life Worth Living?

anything in this life could of itself be of any great moment to us, was considered as much a puerility unworthy of a man of the world, as a disloyalty to God. Experience of life, and meditation on life, seemed to teach nothing but the >same lesson, seemed to preach a sermon de enntemptu mundi. The view the eager monk began with, the sated monarch ended with. But matters did not end here. There was something more to come, by which this view was altogether transmuted, and which made the wilderness and the waste place at once blossom as the rose. Judged of by itself, this life would indeed be vanity; but it was not to be judged of by itself. All its ways seemed to break short aimlessly into precipices, or to be lost hopelessly in deserts. They led to no visible end. True; but they led to ends that were invisible— to spiritual and eternal destinies, to triumphs beyond all hope, and portentous failures beyond all fear. This all men might see, if they would only choose to see. The most trivial of our daily actions became thus invested with an immeasurable meaning. Life was thus evidently not vanity, not an idiot's tale, not unprofitable ; those who affected to think it was, were naturally disregarded as either insane or insincere : and we may thus admit that hitherto, for the progressive nations of the world, the worth of life has been capable of demonstration, and sale beyond the reach of any rational questioning.

T/ie J\ew Import of the Question. 27

But now, under the influence of positive thought, all this is changing. Life, as we have all of us inherited it, is colored with the intense colors of Christianity; let us ourselves be personally Christians or not, we are instinct with feelings with regard to it that were applicable to it in its Christian state ; and these feelings it is that we are still resolved to retain. As the most popular English exponent of the new school says : "All positive methods of treating man, of a comprehensive kind, adopt to the full all that has been said about the dignity of man's moral and spiritual life." But here comes the difficulty. This adoption we speak of must be justified upon quite new reasons. Indeed it is practically the boast of its advocates that it must be. An extreme value, as we see, they are resolved to give to life ; they will not tolerate those who deny its existence. But they are obliged to find it in the very place where hitherto it has been thought to be conspicuous by its absence. It is to be found in no better or wider future, where injustice shall be turned to justice, trouble into rest, and blindness into clear sight ; for no such future awaits us. It is to be found in life itself, in this earthly life, this life between the cradle and the grave ; and though imagination and sympathy may enlarge and extend Ihis for the individual, yet the limits of its extension are very soon arrived at. It is limited by the time the human race can exist, by the space in

Is Life Worth Living?

the universe that the human race occupies, and the capacities of enjoyment that the human race possesses. Here, then, is a distinct and intelligible task that the positive thinkers have set themselves. They have taken everything away from life that to wise men hitherto has seemed to redeem it from vanity. They have to prove to us that they have not left it vain. They have to prove those things to be solid that have hitherto been thought hollow; those things to be serious that have hitherto been thought contemptible. They must prove to us that we shall be contented with what has never yet contented us, and that the widest minds will thrive within limits that have hitherto been thought too narrow for the narrowest.

Now, of course, so far as we can tell without examining the matter, they may be able to accomplish this revolution. There is nothing on the face of it that is impossible. It may be that our eyes are only blinded to the beauty of the earth by having gazed so long and so vainly into an empty heaven, and that when we have learnt to use them a little more to the purpose, we shall see close at hand in this life what we had been looking for, all this while, in another. But still, even if this revolution be possible, the fact remains that it is a revolution, and it cannot be accomplished without some effort. Our positive thinkers have a case to be proved. They must not beg

The ]\ew Import of the Question. 29 the very point that is most open to contradiction, and which, when once duly apprehended, will be most sure to provoke it. If this life be not incapable of satisfying us, let them show us conclusively that it is not. But they can hardly expect that, without any suqh showing at all, the world will deliberately repel as a blasphemy what it has hitherto accepted as a common-place.

This objection is itself so obvious that it has not escaped notice. But the very fact of its obviousness has tended to hide the true force of it, and coming so readily to the surface, it has been set down as superficial. It is, however, very constantly recognised, and is being met on all sides with a very elaborate answer. It is this answer that I shall now proceed to consider. It is a very important one, and it deserves our most close attention, as it contains the chief present argument for the positive faith in life. I shall show how this argument is vitiated by a fundamental fallacy.

It is admitted that to a hasty glance there may certainly seem some danger of our faith in life's value collapsing, together with our belief in God. It is admitted that this is not in the least irrational. But it is contended that a scientific study of the past will show us that these fears are groundless, and will re-assure us as to the future. We are referred to a new branch of knowledge, the philosophy of history, and we are assured that by this all our doubts will be set at rest. This

Is Life Worth Living?

philosophy of history resembles, on an extended scale, the practical wisdom learnt by the man of the world As long as a man is inexperienced and new to life, each calamity as it comes to him seems something unique and overwhelming, but as he lives on, suffers more of them, and yet finds that he is not overwhelmed, he learns to reduce them to their right dimensions, and is able, with sufficient self-possession, to let each of them teach some useful lesson to him.

Thus we, it is said, if we were not better instructed, might naturally take the present decline of faith to be an unprecedented calamity that was ushering in an eve of darkness and utter ruin. But the philosophy of history puts the whole matter in a different light. It teaches us that the condition of the world in our day, though not normal, is yet by no means peculiar. It points to numerous parallels in former ages, and treats the rise and fall of creeds as regular phenomena in human history, whose causes and recurrence we can distinctly trace. Other nations and races have had creeds, and have lost them ; they have thought, as some of us think, that the loss would ruin them : and yet they have not been ruined. Creeds, it is contended, were imaginative, provisional, and mistaken expressions of the underlying and indestructible sense of the nobility of human life. They were artistic, not scientific. A statue of Apollo, for instance, or a picture of the