An introduction to mental philosophy, on the inductive method

Preface

Some eight years ago I published a small work, entitled "Elements of Psychology," Part I., in which I gave a brief sketch of the development of the intellectual faculties, and expressed my intention of completing that sketch by a similar analysis of the emotions and the will. That intention has never been fulfilled. On reconsidering the subject, I found that the whole treatment of psychology required to be thrown into a more regular and scientific form ; that outlines needed to be filled up with details ; and that the speculative element required to be more completely eliminated from the inductive application of facts. In place, therefore, of perfecting the sketch already published, I determined to commence again de novo ; to enter more minutely into the analysis of the intellectual powers ; to carry that analysis onward to the phenomena of volition and feeling ; and then to issue the whole in a complete form. This determination I have now carried into effect. The work herewith presented to the public is, consequently, not in any sense a re -elaboration of the former one. It is entirely distinct, both in its method and in its execution, and

a 2 iv PREFACE.

will be found, I venture to hope, more directly calculated to excite interest and suggest renewed effort in the cause of psychological inquiry.

It may be useful to the student, as it is certainly just to the authors, to indicate here, in the preface, some of the sources from which I have derived assistance, in working out the systematic view of psychology contained in the following pages. And, first of all, let me advert to the labours of those who have been for some time investigating psychological questions from the basis of physiology. Since the time when Sir C. Bell discovered the distinction between the sensational and the motor nerves, and Dr. Marshall Hall followed it up by the demonstration of the phenomena of reflex action, the attention of physiologists has been much drawn to the elucidation of the functions of the nervous system generally, in relation to mental manifestations. Dr. Carpenter, in his " Human Physiology," took up Dr. Marshall Hall's line of research, and showed that the phenomena of reflex action, when traced upwards, are found to exist, not only unconsciously, but in connexion with sensations, also, thus producing actions of which we are cognizant, but over which we exercise no volitional control; nay, that the cerebral hemispheres themselves may be set in action by various causes, and give rise to mental results with which the consciousness itself is frequently unacquainted, and with which the will has nothing whatever to do. Dr. Laycock, again, in his work on the " Mind and Brain," has shown the correlation of the physical and mental functions from the most varied points of view, and laid the foundation for a system of

PREFACE. . V

Medical Psychology, which future efforts will have to work out into its many practical results. In addition to those above-mentioned (who may be regarded as the pioneers), several other writers, viz., Sir H. Holland,* Sir B. Brodie,f Dr. Noble, of Manchester, J Mr. Robt. Dunn, of London, § and Mr. G. H. Lewes, || have written popular treatises on psychology in its connexion with cerebral physiology, which have tended to disseminate and establish many important facts and principles hitherto but little known or regarded by the ordinary writers on mental philosophy. Physiologists on the Continent of Europe have also, for some time past, been engaged in similar researches, amongst whom the names of Muller, Cams, Virchow, Wagner, Brown Sequard, Lotze, and Volkmann deserve to be specially mentioned. Not being myself an experimental physiologist, I have based many of the doctrines here brought forward upon the results which have followed from the investigations of these and similar writers ; and I am glad to take the present opportunity of acknowledging the great debt we owe, as psychologists, to the growing researches of physiology, in this department.

I must refer, next, to the modern school of German Psychology, more particularly that which has sprung out of the life and labours of Herbart. Herbart had the merit, during the long period that German Philosophy

* " Chapters on Mental Physiology."

t " Psychological Enquiries."

% "Medical Psychology."

§ " Physiological Psychology."

|| " The Physiology of Common Life."

VI PREFACE.

was wrapped in the dreams of Idealism, of maintaining a realistic basis in all his speculations, and of never merging the facts of consciousness in mere dialectical forms and phrases. As the rage for these absolute systems gradually passed away, the value of the Herbartian psychology began to gain credit with the philosophical public ; and, up to the present time, this credit has been steadily increasing. The principal writers, who during the last few years have tended to popularize and establish the fundamental ideas of Herbart's Psychology, are Drobisch,* Waitz,f and Volkmann,| to whom might be added many other authors who have applied the same principles to particular departments of philosophical investigation. § The whole doctrine of the elaboration of ideas, — their action and reaction, — the method of their passing in and out of consciousness, — their blending by the law of similarity, — and their combination in groups and series, &c, is due mainly to the labours of the Herbartian school; and, though I have here reconstructed the whole in accordance with my own general views of mental philosophy, yet I must freely acknowledge that, without the aid of these authors, I should, in all probability, have never been able to combine

J Grundriss der Psychologic 1856.

§ I have only this week met with an intelligent German (Dr. Pick) who has been lecturing before many learned Societies in Germany, France, and England, on the subject of Memory and the Association of Ideas ; — the groundwork of his lectures being laid entirely in the principles of the Herbartian Psychology.

PREFACE. Vll

the phenomena of the human mind as they now appear into one connected psychological system.

In addition to those philosophical writers who represent the school of Herbart, properly so called, I ought also to acknowledge my obligations to Professor George, now of Rostock (Lehrbuch der Psychologie), for his elaborate investigations into the processes of sensation and perception ; to Professor Lazarus, of Berne (Das Leben der Seele), for his analysis of the psychological basis of language; to Professor Pichte, of Tubingen (Anthropologie), for many valuable hints respecting the preconscious phenomena of the human soul ; and to Professor Ulrici, of Halle (Glauben und Wissen, Logik, &c), for his admirably clear and lucid statements respecting the fundamental laws of the human intelligence, and the processes by which our knowledge, our natural beliefs, and our personal convictions, are constructed in accordance with them. Neither ought the long-continued labours of the late lamented Beneke to be forgotten — labours which, although they have not issued in any distinct school, have yet acted more or less directly upon all the phases of modern psychology, as well as its varied applications to practical life.

Amongst modern English Psychologists, the author to whom I have been most indebted in this work is Mr. Herbert Spencer ; * more especially to the very able analysis which he has given of the process of reasoning in its qualitative and quantitative forms. Of course, in a purely psychological work, it is not necessary, and would not have been proper, to enter, with any detail, into * Principles of Psychology.

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logical questions ; but, so far as I have touched upon the theory of reasoning at all, I have followed to a large extent the pathway which he has pointed out; and which appears to me the most successful analysis which this subject has yet received in our own country.

With regard to the method which I have followed in the general treatment of the subject, some few explanations will be necessary. The data of mental science are presented to us in the actual phenomena of the human mind when viewed in its mature and developed state. To keep strictly in accordance with the inductive method, as employed in natural science, we ought to take these phenomena as we find them, arrange and classify the facts, analyse those which are complex into their simpler elements, and thus proceed gradually from the mature to the more primitive forms of mental activity. This method would be the only possible one were we really standing at the historical commencement of the science, and making our first efforts towards its elucidation. This, however, is not the case. The facts of the human mind, and their relation to vital phenomena, have been investigated over and over again, so that the materials, in their simpler forms, lie already before us, and only need to be properly comprehended in relation to each other in order to give us a. connected view of mental science.

The question, therefore, now presents itself to the psychologist, whether it may not better subserve the purpose he has in view, to accept the results which have been already gained, and endeavour to reconstruct them synthetically, so as to exhibit the structure of the human

PREFACE. IX

mind in the natural, or, as it might be better termed, the genetic order of its growth. This latter plan I have adopted, as combining many advantages, although not being, perhaps, so strictly in consonance with the more usual method of inductive science. The inductive method, indeed, admits both of the analytic and synthetic treatment of phenomena ; and when considerable progress has been made in any line of research, and many of the simpler elements have been extricated (as, for example, in chemistry), it will frequently be found highly conducive to scientific progress to use these elements synthetically, and reconstruct out of them the phenomena of nature with which we are familiar in their complete and complex form. Some such a reconstruction I have here attempted in regard to mental phenomena; and the reader will find the advantage of this method of procedure by not having his mind confused with too many facts at the commencement, and by seeing the elements arrange themselves into their proper order as we go forward from one step to another.

With regard to the execution of the work, I may here remark that I have always kept before my eyes a wholesome horror of creating an overgrown and unwieldy book. I have consequently studied brevity and compression as far as possible, laying the chief stress upon the great points to be kept in view, even, perhaps, to the fault of repetition ; and leaving the minor results and applications for the present very much in abeyance. Some of the analyses (such as that of the philosophy of language) will, I fear, be found too compressed ; but I would rather err on this side than the other, and leave

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the less important questions for future development and illustration, according as experience and criticism may show that they are needed.

As to the phraseology employed, I have kept as near as possible to well-known and universally-received terms, only employing others when there seemed to be an absolute necessity for it. The principal — indeed, the only — novelty, I believe, in this way, is the adoption of the term "Residua" As some expression, however, is absolutely necessary to embody the idea of Residua as employed in the Herbartian psychology, and adopted in the present volume ; and as no expression exists in the English psychology which could convey this idea without involving misapprehension, I thought it far better to adopt a new term altogether, and to take one with a Latin root, which should express the notion now embodied in it with the least chance of misconception. The only other strictly un-English term I have employed is the word Ideation — a term, I believe, first coined by Mr. James Mill. This, however, I have used but rarely, and then in such a way as to point it out rather as a ] mere technicality than an approved philosophical expression.

Lastly, I must crave the indulgence of the reader for a book written in the comparatively few and often distant intervals of active life, and which I am well aware is deficient in much which only more time and more concentrated labour could give it. Many there are who have experienced how great a relief it is to throw off their hands a labour which has been occupying their few spare moments for months, and even years ; and will be

PREFACE. XI

able to sympathize with my present determination to do so, even with the conviction that a more close elaboration of the subject might have issued in a book with fewer defects, and larger claims upon the attention of those to whom Mental Science is a study and a delight.

J. D. MORELL.

Bowdon, Nov. 1, 1861.

Part I. On The Primordial Forms Of Mental Activity

Chapter I. Fundamental Distinctions of Vital Phenomena 27 Chapter II. Consideration of the Point at which the Mental

Phenomena diverge from the Purely Yital 36 Chapter III. Preconscious Mental Activity . . .46 Chapter TV. Primordial Mental Activity accompanied with

Consciousness . . . . . .55

Chapter V. The Doctrine of Individuality ... 64

Chapter VI. Classification of Simple Perceptions . .106

Chapter VII. Perception in relation to the External World 114 Chapter VIII. Perception of Space . . . . .123

Chapter IX. Further Development of the Space-Perceptions . . . • • • .129 Chapter X. The Measurement of Space . . .135 Chapter XL Perception Completed . . . .149

Chapter II. Nature and Origin of the Feelings . .404

Chapter III. On the Classification of the Feelings .' . 415 Chapter IY. Feelings which are independent of any special

Class of Ideas . . . . . .427

Chapter Y. Feelings which are dependent upon special

Classes of Ideas . . . . .435

Chapter YI. On the Desires and Passions . . .446 Chapter VII. On Character 460

INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON METHOD.

In the present work I propose to treat of Mental Philosophy on the plan, and according to the principles, of a natural science. By natural science I mean the investigation of any series of facts or phenomena, for the purpose of discovering the more general laws by which they are regulated. Such investigation is carried on by what is usually termed the inductive method ; and, as this is the method we propose to follow, it will be well to state, in the outset, what are the leading principles on which it is now, by common consent, understood to be grounded ; and how far those principles are directly applicable to mental investigation.

The main points which form, as it were, the guiding ideas of all scientific research, in the modern sense of that term, are the following • —

1. Every real science (as opposed to those which are purely abstract and formal — such as logic and mathematics) must be based upon facts, which in some sense or other lie open to actual observation.

2. Our induction of facts within the range of the

INTRODUCTION.

science, of which we are treating, must be as large and as varied as possible.

3. As the phenomena which lie open immediately to our observation are usually the results of a number of simpler agencies, they should be carefully analysed, for the purpose of discovering, as far as possible, the more elementary facts of which they are constituted.

4. Hypotheses may be properly employed, while investigation is going on, as necessary tentative efforts, to grasp the general law, to which the facts conform ; but we must ever be ready either to transform or abandon such hypotheses according as the subsequent teaching of the facts may require.

5. The natural course of all science is a gradual progression from one degree of generality to another, the less general result being included in the more general ; until we arrive at what are termed, " The Universal Laws of Nature."

6. The different sciences are closely connected and affiliated; so that what is established in one becomes afterwards of essential consequence as data for the investigation of another. No real science, therefore, can stand simply on its own facts, isolated from all the other results of scientific research.

7. The principal instrument by which we are enabled to analyse phenomena and discover the simpler and more universal agencies by which they are upheld is experiment.

8. And lastly, where the possibility of experiment is precluded by the nature of the case, we must generally be guided in our investigations by the more uncertain light of analogy.

These, which form the leading principles of inductive research, have been so frequently illustrated, and are now so universally accepted, that they do not require any further discussion at present. What we have now to determine is, whether they apply to mental philosophy as surely and as completely as they do to the natural sciences.

And first of all, with regard to the facts on which Mental Philosophy is based, it must be admitted that they are not observed exactly in the same way as are those of natural science. The latter, for the most part, appeal directly to our senses ; while the former elude the eye of sense, and can only be known by inward observation. This does not make any difference, however, as to the application of the general principle — that mental as well as natural science must have a basis of fact on which to rest ; for no one can rationally refuse to admit that our instincts, propensities, sensations, perceptions, mental reproductions, associations, passions, emotions, reasonings, and so forth, form as veritable a body of actual phenomena, capable of being observed and expressed, as are the outward facts with which any other conceivable science is conversant. The mere circumstance of the one being observed by the outward senses, and the other by the inward consciousness, does not at all alter the scientific aspect of the question in relation to method. In the one case, as in the other, we have a body of facts which can be known and expressed ; — facts, too, which are not arbitrary, but which follow definite laws in regard to their production and sequence. To determine the sequences and laws of mental phenomena is the problem of mental science, just as it is the aim of the natural sciences to determine the laws and sequences of nature. In whatever way, therefore, the facts may be observed, they exist equally in the science of mind as in that of matter, and form the starting point from which all scientific observation must set out.

Secondly. The range of our induction in the case of

b 2 mental as well as natural science has to be as broad as possible. Most systems of mental philosophy hitherto constructed have failed in this particular. Instead of taking the science of mind as embracing the whole range of human phenomena, whether within or without the sphere of consciousness, they have confined their researches to a comparatively limited region of observation, and thus rendered it almost impossible to arrive at any highly generalised results. It is by taking examples as widely as possible separated from each other, and then tracing out what is common to them all, that we are enabled most readily to detect the more general and fundamental facts of every science. Eminently is this the case with mental philosophy. It is, in truth, only since the activity of the mind has been recognised as one particular province of the vital energies, and the facts of life and consciousness have been brought into correlation with each other, that any well-grounded hopes of extending and developing the compass of mental philosophy have been seriously entertained. In this respect, therefore, as in that before stated, the general principles of induction have shown themselves strictly applicable to mental researches.

Thirdly. With regard to the analysis of complex phenomena, we may easily show that this is one of the main points always to be aimed at by the psychologist ; and that it is fully as essential to mental as it is to all natural science. In nature we very rarely meet with simple elements and primary phenomena. Almost everything that appeals to our observation is a complex result ; and, as has often enough been shown, the main object of scientific research is to separate these results, so as to discover the simpler agencies by which they are brought about. But mental phenomena, as they usually present themselves, are fully as complex as natural. Acts of memory, of judgment, of abstraction and generalisation, emotional states, and determinations of the will, are all highly complex in their nature. We cannot take a single idea, however familiar it may be, and investigate the history of its origin and growth, without finding that a great number of simpler mental operations have been engaged in its rise and development. In fact, the main purport of all true psychology is to trace back our ordinary mental states to their origin ; to discover the few simple processes from which they proceed ; and to follow the steps by which these simple processes have grown up into all the variety and richness of our inner life. Mental analysis occupies, therefore, fully as large a place in the science of mind as the analysis of ordinary phenomena occupies in the science of nature. In this respect the inductive method is equally applicable to both.

Fourthly. In respect to the use of hypotheses, the very obscurity which still hangs over a large portion of the facts of mind, and the immaturity of mental science generally, both render the employment of hypotheses, at least for the present, quite indispensable. Even the most probable theories which modern psychologists have propounded respecting the origin of our ideas, and the relationship existing between the nervous system and the powers of mental manifestation, can only be regarded at present as hypothetical. And yet without such hypotheses to work with, it seems impossible to marshal the facts together, to investigate their mutual relations, and work onwards towards the discovery of general laws. All we have to do is to employ them sparingly — not to stand by them blindly— and always to be ready to bring them anew to the test of experience, whether it lead to correction or perchance to total abandonment.

Fifthly. Psychological science involves a regular progress from the less to the more general, exactly as is the case (according to the best authorities) in all physical science. In contemplating human nature as a whole, we meet with a vast number of facts which at once excite our attention. Thus we have hourly presented to us the phenomena of physical motion and of nervous sensibility, and after these the varied facts of instinct, emotion, volition, intelligence, and so on ; all of which, as we see them, are highly complex, and, for that very reason, occupy in each instance as facts a very low degree of generality.

As the process of investigation goes on, these particular and highly complex phenomena are compared and analysed. By degrees we begin to find certain points of resemblance which run through them ; and this leads us again to separate the simpler elements which they contain, and to view them apart, until we are at length enabled to grasp some of the more general laws of mental activity.

Thus it is, e.g.) that we arrive at the law of redintegration, or the reproduction in consciousness of all our previous mental impressions. In the same way we find, that the law by which similar impressions blend together into more complex facts of mind is one which runs more or less throughout the whole of our mental activity. In fact, all the more general laws of our mental constitution (the statement of which we cannot at present anticipate) are gradually brought to light exactly in this same way ; namely, by analysing the immediate and the particular, and rising step by step to the more primitive, and for that reason the more general, elements of our mental life. It is only by pursuing this process onwards and upwards that we shall ever be enabled to bring the entire activity of human nature under the operation of i few grand and universal laws.

Sixthly. In pursuing the course above pointed out, it will not do to isolate mental science, any more than we can isolate any other, from the relationship which it bears to all the previous and comparatively simpler branches of inductive investigation.

The distinction between mind and matter has often been supposed to be so fundamental and thorough-going, that no real connexion could exist between the two series of facts ; and that, as a consequence of this, no dependency could be traced between mental and physical science. This delusion has now, however, been fully dissipated. The deeper researches into the physiology of the brain and nervous system, with which recent times have been characterized, have rendered it quite certain that the philosophy of the human mind has the closest points of contact with the science of all organized and living nature. The analogies between them, indeed, are so great, and the phenomena of mind are known to be so dependent on physical conditions, that it would now be as vain to expect to make any real and substantial progress in psychology apart from physiology as it would be to investigate structural botany without a previous knowledge of chemistry. Mind is the crown and summit of nature, and cannot be reached as a valid branch of scientific research except through the results and teachings of all the lower sciences. The whole of our investigations will tend to show that the science of mind, instead of standing alone, is now prepared really to take its place in the co-ordination of the sciences at large, and only in this way can find a solid foundation on which its whole superstructure may rest.

With regard to the two last points we have laid down as characterizing the principles of induction — namely, the employment of experiment and analogy — the only remark we have to make here is, that in mental science the application of experiment is comparatively rare and difficult ; and that, as a consequence of this, we have to make the greater use of analogy. In the lower regions of conscious life, — in determining, for example, the action of the nervous system under peculiar circumstances, — in watching the force of the instincts, — in comprehending the mental peculiarities of infancy, insanity, &c, — we are sometimes able to make experiments successfully ; but, beyond this extent, the power of experimenting almost wholly ceases. In purely mental operations we are guided mainly by observation and analogy ; and must, for this reason, proceed with the greater caution and hesitancy in laying down general principles, or enunciating general laws. All I wish here to enforce is, that the comparative want of the power of experimenting does not raise any real barrier between mental and physical science in relation to method. In all physical science analogy is a legitimate instrument to employ ; and the more or less sparing use of it must be determined, throughout all the walks of science alike, by the nature of the case, and the difficulty which attends the more safe and beaten path of experiment. The precise mode in which analogy is employed to' throw light upon the laws of mental action need not be at present explained; it will be abundantly illustrated in our subsequent investigations. We conclude, then, generally, that, in every essential point of view, psychology may be treated as an inductive science.

Before closing these preliminary remarks on method, it will be useful briefly to consider how far the actual attempts which have been hitherto made to found a valid science of mind have usually deviated from the pathway above pointed out.

I. Many of the past systems of mental philosophy have been conducted entirely on the speculative method. Wherever investigators have begun by laying down a

PRELIM [NARY REMARKS ON METHOD. 9

general conception of mind, and have then proceeded to explain all mental phenomena out of this fundamental idea, we have an example of what may be termed a purely speculative psychology. Examples of this we see, more or less, in Descartes, in Spinoza, in Wolff, and, more recently, in Hegel, and some other German metaphysicians. No doubt a sagacious mind may often arrive at valuable conclusions in this speculative way, just as some of the more ancient natural philosophers grasped many important truths, as it were, per saltum, without toiling up the rugged path of inductive demonstration, from one degree of generality to another. Moreover, it is almost inevitable, from the nature of the case, that this speculative mode of procedure should continue longer in connexion with mental than with physical science. The reason of this is obvious. All science is made up of two primary elements, viz., facts and conceptions. Thus the fall of a stone to the earth is a fact palpable to the senses ; the law of gravitation is a co?iception, by which this fact, and a multitude of others, is accounted for and explained. Now, in physical science, we can always make a clear separation between the facts and the conceptions on which any branch of investigation is based ; inasmuch as the former appeal to the senses, while the latter do not. But, in mental science, both the facts and the conceptions are to a large extent equally internal phenomena ; and it is by no means so easy to separate the real and indubitable facts of mind from the acquired notion we entertain respecting them. How many are there at this moment who would regard the existence of a number of separate faculties as an undoubted fact of mind; and yet, perhaps, there is hardly a single conception which has stood so much in the path of a true mental science as this. The difficulty which lies in the way of distinguishing between mental facts and mental theories has been one of the main reasons why the science of mind has failed to assume hitherto its purely inductive form, and is alone fully sufficient to account for much of the fruitlessness which has attended its career. We should not forget that physical science was equally fruitless so long as it laboured under the same difficulty.