An inquiry into the modern prevailing notions : respecting that freedom of will which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame

Preface

Many find much fault with the calling professing Christians, that differ one from another in some* matters of opinion, by distinct names ; especially calling them by the names of particular men, who have distinguished themselves as maintainers and promoters of those opinions: as the calling some professing Christians Arminians, from Arminius; others Arians, from Arius; others Socinians, from Socinus, and the like. They think it unjust in itself; as it seems to suppose and suggest, that the persons marked out by these names received those doctrines which they entertain, out of regard to, and reliance on, those men after whom they are named, as though they made them their rule; in the same manner as the followers of Christ are called Christians, after his name, whom they regard and depend upon as their great head and rule. Whereas, this is an unjust and groundless imputation on those that go under the fore-mentioned denominations. Thus (say they) there is not the

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least ground to suppose, that the chief divines who embrace the scheme of doctrine which is, by many, called Arminianism, believe it the more, because Arminius believed it: and that there is no reason to think any other, than that they sincerely and impartially study the holy Scriptures, and inquire after the mind of Christ, with as much judgment and sincerity as any of those that call them by these names; that they seek after truth, and are not careful whether they think exactly as Arminius did; yea, that in some things they actually differ from him. This practice is also esteemed actually injurious on this account, that it is supposed naturally to lead the multitude to imagine the difference between persons thus named and others to be greater than it is; yea, as though it were so great, that they must be, as it were, another species of beings. And they object against it as arising from an uncharitable, narrow, contracted spirit, which, they say, commonly inclines persons to confine all that is good to themselves and their own party, and to make a wide distinction between themselves and others, and stigmatise those that differ from them with odious names. ‘They Say, moreover, that the keeping up such a distinction of names has a direct tendency to uphold distance and disaffection, and keep alive

PREFACE, Vv mutual hatred among Christians, who ought all to be united in friendship and charity, however they cannot in all things think alike.

I confess, these things are very plausible. And I will not deny, that there are some unhappy consequences of this distinction of names, and that men’s infirmities and evil dispositions often make an ill improvement of it. But yet I humbly conceive these objections are carried far beyond reason. ‘The generality of mankind are disposed enough, and a great deal too much, to uncharitableness, and to be censorious and bitter towards those that differ from them in religious opinions; which evil temper of mind will take occasion to exert itself from many things in themselves innocent, useful, and necessary. But yet there is no necessity to suppose, that the thus distinguishing persons of different opinions by different names, arises mainly from an uncharitable spirit. It may arise from the disposition there is In mankind (whom God has distinguished with an ability and inclination for speech) to improve the benefit of language, in the proper use and design of names, given to things which they have often occasion to speak of, or signify their minds about; which is to enable them to express their ideas with ease and expedition, without

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being encumbered with an obscure and difficult circumlocution. And the thus distinguishing persons of different opinions in religious matters may not imply, nor infer, any more than that there is a difference, and that the difference is such as we find we have often occasion to take notice of, and make mention of. ‘That which we have frequent occasion to speak of (whatever it be that gives the occasion), this wants a name: and it is always a defect in language, in such cases, to be obliged to make use of a description instead of a name. Thus we have often occasion to speak of those who are the descendants of the ancient inhabitants of France, who were subjects or heads of the government of that land, and spake the language peculiar to it; in distinction from the descendants of the inhabitants of Spain, who belonged to that community, and spake the language of that country. And therefore we find the great need of distinct names to signify these different sorts of people, and the great convenience of those distinguishing words, French and Spaniards ; by which the signification of our minds is quick and easy, and our speech is delivered from the burden of a continual reiteration of diffuse descriptions, with which it must otherwise be - embarrassed.

PREFACE. Vi

That the difference of the opinions of those who, in their general scheme of divinity, agree with these two noted men, . Calvin and Arminius, is a thing there is often occasion to speak of, is what the practice of the latter itself confesses; who are often, in their discourses and writings, taking notice of the supposed absurd and pernicious opinions of the former sort. And therefore the making use of different names in this case cannot reasonably be objected against, or condemned, as a thing which must come from so bad a cause as they assign. It is easy to be accounted for, without supposing it to arise from any other source than the exigence and natural tendency of the state of things; considering the faculty and disposition God has given to mankind, to express things which they have frequent occasion to mention, by certain distinguishing names. It is an effect that is similar to what we see arise, in innumerable cases which are parallel, where the cause is not at all blameworthy.

Nevertheless, at first, I had thoughts of carefully avoiding the use of the appellation Arminian in this treatise. But I soon found I should be put to great difficulty by it; and that my discourse would be so encumbered with an oftenrepeated circumlocution, instead of a name,

Vill PREFACE.

which would express the thing intended as well and better, that I altered my purpose. And therefore I must ask the excuse of such as are apt to be offended with things of this nature, that I have so freely used the term <Arminian in the following discourse. I profess it to be without any design to stigmatise persons of any sort with a name of reproach, or at all to make them appear more odious. If, when I had occasion to speak of those divines who are commonly called by this name, I had, instead of styling them Arminians, called them these men, as Dr. Whitby does Calvinistic divines; it probably would not have been taken any better, or thought to shew a better temper or more good manners. I have done as I would be done by in this matter. However, the term Calvinistic is, in these days, among most, a term of greater reproach than the term Arminian; yet I should not take it at all amiss to be called a Calvinist, for distinction’s sake: though I utterly disclaim a dependence on Calvin, or believing the doctrines which I hold, because he believed and taught them ; and cannot justly be charged with be- _lieving in every thing just as he taught. But, lest I should really be an occasion of injury to some persons, I would here give notice, that though I generally speak

PREFACE. | 1X of that doctrine, concerning free will and moral agency, which I oppose, as an Arminian doctrine; yet I would not be understood as asserting, that every divine or author whom I have occasion to mention as maintaining that doctrine, was properly an Arminian, or one of that sort which is commonly called by that name. Some of them went far beyond the Arminians; and I would by no means charge Arminians in general with all the corrupt doctrine which these maintained. ‘Thus, for instance, it would be very injurious, if I should rank Arminian divines in general, with such authors as Mr. Chubb. I doubt not, many of them have some of his doctrines in abhorrence; though he agrees, for the most part, with Arminians in his notion of the freedom of the will. And, on the other hand, though I suppose this notion to be a leading article in the Arminian scheme, that which, if pursued in its consequences, will truly infer, or naturally lead to all the rest; yet I do not charge all that have held: this doctrine with being Arminians. Tor whatever may be the consequences of the doctrine really, yet some that hold this doctrine may not own nor see these consequences ; and it would be unjust, in many instances, to charge every author with believing and maintaining all the real consequences of his avowed doctrines. And I x PREFACE.

“desire it may be particularly noted, that though I have occasion, in the following discourse, often to mention the author of the book, entitled “An Essay on the I reedom of the Will in God and the Creature,” as holding that notion of freedom of will which I oppose; yet I do not mean to call him an Arminian: however, in that doctrine he agrees with Arminians, and departs from the current and general opinion of Calvinists. If the author of that Essay be the same as it is commonly ascribed to, he, doubtless, was not one that ought to bear that name. But however good a divine he was in many respects, yet that particular Arminian doctrine which he maintained is never the better for being held by such an one, nor is there less need of opposing it on that account; but rather is there the more need of it ; as it will be likely to have the more pernicious influence, for being taught by a divine of his name and character; supposing the doctrine to be wrong, and in itself to be of an ill tendency.

I have nothing further to say by way of preface, but only to bespeak the reader’s candour, and calm attention to what I have written. The subject is of such import-

_-~ance as to demand attention, and the most ‘, thorough consideration. Of all kinds of / tknowledge that we can ever obtain, the ~ 'knowledge of God, and the knowledge of

PREFACE. XI ourselves, are the most important. As religion is the great business, for which we are created, and on which our happiness depends; and as religion consists In an intercourse between ourselves and our Maker, and so has its foundation in God’s nature and ours, and in the relation that God and we stand in to each other; therefore a true knowledge of both must be needful, in order, to true religion. But the knowledge of ourselves consists chiefly in right apprehensions concerning those two chief faculties of our nature, the understanding and will. Both are very important; yet the science of the latter must be confessed to be of greatest moment; inasmuch as all virtue and religion have their seat more immediately in the will, consisting more especially in right acts and habits of this faculty. And the grand question about the freedom of the will, is the main point that belongs to the science of the will. Therefore, I say, the importance of this subject ereatly demands the attention of Christians, and especially of divines. But as to my manner of handling the subject, I will be far from presuming to say, that it is such as demands the attention of the reader to what I have written. I am ready to own that in this matter I depend on the reader’s courtesy. But only thus far I may have some colour for putting in a claim; that if

Xl PREFACE.

the reader be disposed to pass his censure on what I have written, I may be fully and patiently heard, and well attended to, before I am condemned. However, this is what I would humbly ask of my readers ; together with the prayers of all sincere lovers of truth, that I may have much of that Spirit which Christ promised his disciples, which guides into all truth: and that the blessed and powerful influences of this Spirit would make truth victorious in the world.

Part I

WHEREIN ARE EXPLAINED VARIOUS TERMS AND THINGS BELONGING TO THE SUBJECT OF THE ENSUING DIS- COURSE.

Secr. I.—Concerning the Nature of the Will .....Page 1 Secr. II.—Concerning the Determination of the Will... 6

Secr. I1].—Concerning the Meaning of the Terms Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, &c. and of Contingence..... 19

Secr. I1V.—Of the Distinction of Natural and Moral Neces-

Srevesiicie Ma Dilit voge.o bis wal. ais vert ort ht Sesels. die av, aei= 30 Secr. V.—Concerning the Notion of Liberty and of Moral BOCREY oc eee ees os ERP PE Bee, Ae ea eae 40

i cats Weed hand 4 i

WHEREIN IT IS CONSIDERED, WHETHER THERE IS OR CAN BE ANY SUCH SORT OF FREEDOM OF WILL AS THAT WHEREIN ARMINIANS PLACE THE ESSENCE OF THE LIBERTY OF ALL MORAL AGENTS; AND WHETHER ANY SUCH THING EVER WAS OR CAN BE CONCEIVED OF.

Sect. I.—Shewing the manifest Inconsistence of the Arminian Notion of Liberty of Will consisting in the Will’s self-

UCR TIT SR TOWOE Scie) s ss le. gcc cree e's ote eels 6 alae» <3 46 Sect. IJ.—Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing Reasoning considered. 0-055. oe et se ee eee eee 52

Secr. I1].—Whether any Event whatsoever, and Volition in particular, can come to pass without a Cause of its Ex- PM als oes jak 1's s = 2 7oils + pn ss oleh oie A: Aeon tei 59

Secr. 1V.—Whether Volition can arise without a Cause, through the Activity of the Nature of the Soul ...... 68

XIV CONTENTS.

Secr. V.—Shewing that if the Things asserted in these Evasions should be supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and cannot help the Cause of Arminian Liberty ; and how, this being the state of the case, Arminian Writers are obliged to talk inconsistently...... Page 74

Sect. VI.—Concerning the Will’s determining in things which are perfectly indifferent in the view of the Mind. . 80

Sect. VII.—Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will con- Sistine inIndifference +is, 2's ko. goles oe Oe ie ee 91

Secr. VIII.—Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will, Peso ppOsite Oral lA NECESSILY. ats wes siete ces eel setae a 105

Secr. [X.—Of the Connexion of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the Understanding...............- 110

Srecr. X.—Volition necessarily connected with the Influence of Motives. With particular Observation of the great Inconsistence of Mr. Chubb’s Assertions and Reasonings about the Freedom ofthe Will) Sy) 032. Aces 121 Secr. XI.—The Evidence of God’s certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions of Moral Agents. ................ 142

Sect. XII.—-God’s certain Foreknowledge of the future Volitions of Moral Agents inconsistent with such a Contingence of those Volitions as is without all Necessity; and infers a Necessity of Volition, as much as an absolute WDECTER. piniog oe wine pipse eo Pie a's «Wis Hen Wen ee 170

Sect. XII1].—Whether we suppose the Volitions of moral Agents to be connected with any thing antecedent or not, yet they must be necessary, in such’a sense as to overthrow Hirmimaan Liberty, gps ate iaasy ernest ens Rae ee 189

PART ITI.

WHEREIN IS INQUIRED WHETHER ANY SUCH LIBERTY OF WILL AS ARMINIANS HOLD BE NECESSARY TO MORAL AGENCY, VIRTUE AND VICE, PRAISE AND DISPRAISE, &C.

Secr. I.—God’s moral Excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthy? wei \e ws bie Jf ileee 8 hs eae ee oe 195 Srecr. I1.—The Acts of the Will of the human Soul of Jesus Christ necessarily holy, yet virtuous, praiseworthy, re- Warde Diana. Weis. Goa dehy k's. flsies ere eee 200

CONTENTS.

Sec. I11.—The Case of such as are given up of God to and of fallen Man in general, proves moral Necessity 4. Inability to be consistent with Blameworthiness.. Page 221

Sect. [V.—Command and Obligation to Obedience consistent with moral Inability to obey .............. 231

Sect. V.—That Sincerity of Desires and Endeavours, which is supposed to excuse in the Non-performance of Things in themselves good, particularly considered .......... 246

Sect. VI.—Liberty of Indifference, not only not necessary to Virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it; and all, either virtuous or vicious Habits or Inclinations, inconsistent with Arminian Notions of Liberty and moral Agency. . 257

Sect. VII.—Arminian Notions of moral Agency inconsistent with all Influence of Motive and Inducement, in either WITLUOMSTOL VICIOUS ACUIONS 2% (iim « 030 oars oa Gea . 269

PART IV.

WHEREIN THE CHIEF GROUNDS OF THE REASONINGS OF ARMINIANS, IN SUPPORT AND DEFENCE OF THEIR NOTIONS OF LIBERTY, MORAL AGENCY, &c. AND © AGAINST THE OPPOSITE DOCTRINE, ARE CONSIDERED.

Secr. I.—The Essence of the Virtue and Vice of the Dispositions of the Heart, and Acts of the Will, lies not in their Causes, but their’ Nature «50 02 i ee oa es 278

Sect. I].—The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphysical Notion of Action and Agency which seems to be generally entertained by the Defenders of the fore-mentioned Notions of Liberty, moral Agency, &c....... 287

Secr. III.—The Reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense, to suppose Things which are necessary, to be worthy of either Praise or Blame .............. 298

Secr. IV.—It is agreeable to common Sense, and the natural Notions of Mankind, to suppose moral Necessity to be consistent with Praise and Blame, Reward and Punish- We MERI Mii eae 8h, Gy toe Ce hs ele wwe cy) 307

Sect. V.—-Concerning those Objections, that this Scheme of Necessity renders all Means and Endeavours for the avoiding of Sin, or the obtaining Virtue and Holiness, vain and to no purpose; and that it makes Men no more than mere Machines in affairs of Morality and Religion ...... 319

XV1 CONTENTS.

Sect. VI.—Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine which has been maintained, that it agrees with the Stoical Doctrine of Fate, and the Opinion of Mr. Hobbes. . Page 329

Sect. VII.—Concerning the Necessity of the Divine

WV as] ernest oete ie soisiey. Ish An Ula wee eee to hts eet tate 333 Sect. VIIJ.—Some further Objections against the moral Necessity of God’s Volitions considered............ 346

Sect. [X.—Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine which has been maintained, that it makes God the Author

OUEST Pee AT Swat Pola le ae ee SABE el clo ae eee 365 Sect. X.—Concerning Sin’s first Entrance into the World 389

Sect. XJ.—Of a supposed Inconsistence of these Principles with God's moral Character’... .... 2.30. Sete nie 392 Sect. XII.—Of a supposed Tendency of these Panel to Athetsm sind *licentiousness. 1: [226.05 - te eee 399

Secr. XIII.—Concerning that Objection against the Reasoning by which the Calvinistic Doctrine is supported, that it is metaphysical and abstruse... 2. 5 <eu 20 seu eee 40

Conclusion

What Treatment this Discourse may probably meet with from some Persons «,..1:..% %. 4). ~ shomce.+ cue oar 414 Consequences concerning several Calvinistic Doctrines ; such as a universal, decisive Providence ..........-+0- 416 The total Depravity and Corruption of Man’s Nature.. 417 eiicacious Grace: Wass sit ap Seats hi 3] Saris eens eee 418 A universal and absolute Decree; and absolute, eternal, personal “Election 72 FS. 2 0 iol. ct. ects she cece mein: ete 420 Particular Redemption 5. 2405 AU a Oa ee ee 422 Perseverance Of Saints 20. i... tees es ee 423 Concerning the Treatment which Calvinistic Writers and Divyines have met with 2. 4.03. ss ee eee 425 The unhappiness of the Change lately in many Protestant SOUDIUTIER «Soe ad «vials n'a ota 0d « oe ieee Ce ee 426 The Boldness of some, Writers. .../.:44'<% cas siete 427

The excellent Wisdom appearing in the holy Scriptures 428

INTRODUCTORY ESSAY.

Section I

Ir it be the prerogative of philosophical writings to command a more grave attention, and to challenge a higher rank in literature than is accorded to works of imagination, it is also their fate more often to fall into oblivion; or even if remembered and preserved, to be superseded, and to forfeit the honours they once and long enjoyed as canons of science. The reason of this difference is obvious; for in the one class of compositions, an end is proposed which may be attained in a thousand ways, and in the pursuit of which genius ensures its own success. But in the other class, where the discovery of truth is the single object, success depends not merely upon zeal and ability, but upon the good fortune also which may lead the inquirer upon the one only track amid MES phos: devious paths.

The mass of ancient literature that has reached modern times, consists in great part of those products of mind, the immortality of which has not at all resulted from their value as vehicles of truth: yet are they still perused with delight—are handed down as inestimable treasures from age to age—pass in the course of civilisation from clime to clime—and (go

b

XVill INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. SECT. I.

where they. may) awaken always, in every cultured mind, the liveliest emotions of pleasure. Along with the poetry, the oratory, and the histories of a bright and distant time, we have received also, in no small quantity, the philosophy of the same era. Yet is it a fact, that of this prodigious assemblage, a single small treatise* alone retains its place and office as a source of knowledge, or is actually extant as an efficient instrument of instruction. Nevertheless, it is far from being true that Pindar, Hesiod, and Homer, or that Anacreon, Sophocles, and Aristophanes, were men of a higher order of intellect than those philosophers, their contemporaries, not a sentence of whose writings has been conserved; or than Plato and Aristotle, whose works, though handed down to us, exist in our libraries much rather as literature than as philosophy.

The arrogant chiefs of the Grecian philosophical sects looked probably with scorn upon the versifiers, and dramatists, and orators of their day, and deemed them triflers. And yet it is these who still command the admiration of mankind; while ¢hose, for the most part, do but hover in the recollections of the learned, as phantoms of an obsolete intellectual domination. But the one strove for a prize which is always attainable by genius;—the other reared their fame on the proud pretension that they were teachers of truth: their claim was disputed and disproved; and their ambition has long ago been trampled in the dust.

Works of science lose their credit as such,

* Euclid’s Elements,

SECT. I. INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. XIX either in consequence of the refutation and entire rejection of the principles they maintain ; or they are gradually superseded, in the natural course of improvement, by better digested systems, founded on the same general doctrines. In instances of this latter sort, the discoverers of certain great truths which have become the property of the intellectual commonwealth, though they still hold their titles of honour, retain little real influence, and are more often spoken of than read; or are read only by the few who make the history of science their peculiar study.

As examples of the former class, we might mention the pseudo-scientific doctrines of Plato —those splendid errors which extinguished the then existing light of true philosophy; and the greater portion of the physical disquisitions of Aristotle; and the astronomy of Ptolemy ; and then, in long array, and immeasurable bulk, the alchymy, and the astrology, and the physics, and the metaphysics, of the sixteen centuries during which the human mind dreamed ingeniously, rather than employed itself waking upon the affairs of the real world.

Instances of the second sort (beside the single one above mentioned) are hardly to be produced from the extant remains of ancient literature ; unless indeed we were to consider as works of science the writings of the Grecian and Roman geographers, which, though superseded by the more exact information of modern times, still exist, not simply as classical remains, but as sources of knowledge.* Passing them, the

* We should perhaps say topographers : topography being more remote from the fields of speculation than any other

XX INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. SECT. I.

writings of the fathers of the modern astronomy may be named as examples completely in point ; for these (the modern astronomy being assumed as in truth the system of nature) have possessed themselves ofan immortality which must be coeval with the existence of science. Nevertheless, it has happened, and indeed it is a distinction belonging to genuine discoveries in science, that the writings which opened the path of truth have ceased to be read, except by the curious, even while still regarded as the spring-heads of real knowledge. It was the glory of Copernicus, of Tycho, of Kepler, and of Galileo, to say to their successors, ‘‘ Leave us, and go on.’ *

Yet is it true of the few works that take rank in the fighest class of philosophical literature, that, though they may have become obsolete, either because essentially erroneous, or because superseded, they still challenge attention and respect as products of mind; and though no longer valuable as guides in the pursuit of knowledge, are precious as works of genius, and as exhibitions of an athletic force of intellect. It is in this sense that the unmatched writings of Aristotle must be immortal; and thus that the best of his expounders may continue to be read: and it is on this ground also that Hobbes, and Des Cartes, and Malebranche, and Berkeley, and Hume, and Hutcheson, and branch of learning, was less vitiated than any other branch among the ancients; and their writings of this class retain their value to the present day.

* Ts the ‘‘ Principia” now taking its place in this class of superseded philosophy ? Though this were the fact, Newton would lose none of his fame.

SECT. I. INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. XX]

Hartley, retain, and will, perhaps, long retain, their place in the literature of Europe, and be perused by a future and more enlightened generation, to whom the absurdities and whimsical sophisms with which they abound, shall seem even more frivolous than they do to ourselves.

Whatever may in the next age be the fate of the ‘‘ Inquiry concerning Freedom of Will,” (in the present age it holds all its honours and authority), it may safely be predicted that, at least as an instance of exact analysis, of profound or perfect abstraction, of conclusive logic, and of calm discussion, this celebrated essay will long support its reputation, and will continue to be used as a classic material in the business of intellectual education. If literary ambition had been, which certainly it was not, the active element of the author’s mind (as it was the single motive in the mind of his contemporary and admirer Hume), and if he could have foreseen the reputation of his ‘‘ Essay on Free Will,” he need have envied very few aspirants to philosophic fame. What higher praise could a scientific writer wish for, than that of having, by a small and single dissertation, reduced a numerous, a learned, and a powerful party, in his own * and other countries (and from his own day to the present time) to the sad necessity of making a blank protest against the argument and inference of the book, and of saying, ‘“‘The reasoning of Edwards must be a sophism ; for it overthrows our doctrine.”

* We claim Edwards as an Englishman: he was such in | every respect but the accident of birth in a distant province | of the empire.

XXll INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. SECT. I.

And then, if we turn from theology to science -—from divines to philosophers, we see the modest pastor of the Calvinists of Northampton assigned to a seat of honour among sages, and allowed (if he will lay aside his faith and his Bible) to speak and to utter decisions as a master of science. |

It might indeed have been well if the devout Edwards* could have foreseen the consequences that have actually resulted from the mode in which he conducted his argument; for in that case, assuredly, he would not have allowed to sceptics the opportunity of triumphing by his means over faith as well as reason. He would, then, instead of abandoning the ground of abstract reasoning as soonas he had achieved the overthrow of the metaphysical error of his opponents, have carried it (and he was able to do so) to its utmost extent, and have so estab- | lished the responsibility of man, as should have compelled infidels either not to avail themselves at. all of his proof of universal causation, or to yield to his proof of the reality of religion.

The diffidence and the Christian humility, or the retired habits of the American divine, prevented, perhaps, his entertaining the thought that he might be listened to by philosophers, as well as by his brethren, the ministers of religion. Supposing himself to write only for those who acknowledged, as cordially as he did, the authority of Scripture, he scrupled not to make out his chain of reasoning, indifferently, of abstractions and of texts; and especially in the latter portion of his treatise, readily took the

* See note A at the end of the Essay,

SECT. I. INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. XXlll short Scriptural road to a conclusion, which must have been circuitously reached in any other way. Just and peremptory as these conclusions may be, they commanded no respect out of the pale of the church; nay, they rather excited the scorn of those who naturally said—If these principles could have been established by abstract argument, a thinker so profound as Edwards, and so fond of metaphysics, would not have proved them by the Bible.