Individual project in the liberal college

Front matter

Col le_9

INDIVIDUAL PROJECT IN THE LIBERAL COLLEGE

RUFUS CLARENCE BENTLEY

Chapter I Statement Op The Problem

The claims of the academic college to separate existence, p.l. •General method1 of collegiate teaching, p. 3. Thinking the essential activity of learning, p. 4. A philosophy of education td substantiate aims, p. 7. The psychology of problem-thinking, p. 8.

PARI I

PHILOSOPHY OP HIGHER EDUCATION CHAPTER II

Introduction To A Philosophy Op Collegiate Pedagogy

A philosophy of practice chosen: applied in higher education, p. 9. The individual character of collegiate learning, p. 10. Tentative definition of higher education, p. IE. Importance of the learner, p. 15. The demand for 'elders1 as teachers, p. 19. Definition of education strictly applied in collegiate practice. Summary, p. 22.

Chapter III The College- Student

Nearly adult: deserves corresponding treatment, p.27$ Initiative of individuals ^principle to prevail, p. 29. The pertinence to college of "education as growtu," p. 31. The collegiate -oeriod as an intermediate period, p. 35.. The relation of the college to •science1, p.36.

CHAPTER 17

THE COLLEGE- TEACHER

Aim in collegiate teaching, p. 38. The lesson from student -activities, p. 40. Suggestion of the value of 'project', p. 43. "Actor and spectatoi ," p. 43. Experience. Routine and capricious behavior, p. 44. Impartial thinking, p.45. The foundation of the doctrine of project1, p. 46. The relation of subject-matter and method, p.46. Subject matter in college, p. 51. 'Science' and learning method, p. 52.

Chapter V The Institution

Historic defects of the college, p.55. "Reconstruction of experience" in college, p.57. "Diffusion of intelligence" and the college, p. 58. Adolesoence wants extension, p. 61, Prepare persons to hold the ideals, p. 62. Democracy implies this, p.63. The dualismojfsubject matter and method particularly unfortunate in the college, p. 64. The college is chief sufferer from special pleading, p. 66. Improvement of the college must be voluntary, p.68. It must he cooperative, p. 69. Thinking is practical, individual, and free, p#69. Thinking and knowledge, p. 70. Thinking must he specialized, p. 71, The relation of the college to specialism, p. 72. To freedom, p. 74. To originality, p. 75. To initiative, p. 76. To independence, p.77. The choice of collegians, p.77.

Part II Project As Method Op Collegiate Learning Chapter VI

INDIVIDUAL PROJECT: THE METHOD OP THE COLLEGIATE STUDENT'S WORK

Definition of 'project': Three types, p. 80. The high-school social project, p. 80. The university1 s individual, but specializing, project, p. 81. The liberal college's individual, but cultural, project, p. 82. Train, as well as recruit, researchers, p. 83. Appeal to psychology as foundation for the pedagogy of project, p. 84. Its meaning for collegiate teacher and student, p. 86.

Chapter VII The Psychology Op Purpose Or Problem

The distinction between random and purposeful thinking, p«88. The "intent to express," p. 89. 'Problem1 necessary to thinking, p. 90. j Difficulty, doubt, p.92. Reasoning and imagination, p. 93. The psychology of purpose, p.98. Reasoning follows a tensional situation, p. 100. The doctrine of 'conflict', p. 101. Desire is an element of problem, p»102. 'Compensation' and 'anxiety', p.103. Professor Warren on Purpose, p.104. Learning by 'wholes', the organization of learning into systems, (Washburn), p. 109. An 'interest', p. 110. 'Systems' as test of normality - the learnerteacher attitude, p. 111. 'Activity attitude' foreshadowed, p. 112.

Chapter VIII The Pedagogy Op Problem

'Understanding' ( inf ormation-getting) versus 'thinking'. "Problems" and problem-solving, p. 113. Instruction as didactic, p. 114. 'Exercises' in the form of problems, p. 115. impressions in didactic pedagogy, p. 115. Instruction subordinated to problem -solving in college, p. 118, Comparison of Information-getting and Thinking p. 118. Actual experiences as teaching 'situations' in college,* p. 120. The term 'application', p. 121. Recognizing the general principle, p. 123. "General habit," p. 124, The principle of "finding principles," p. 125. The fallacy of mastering a principle before applying it, p. 127. Text books' misinterpretation of 'problem; p«129. Learning as "discovering problems," p. 135. Little thinking done: teachers rather than text books the agencies for securing some thinking, p. 134,

CHAPTER IX A MOTOR THEORY OP PROBLEM Context

The meaning of 'context', p#135. To the psychologist, p. 135. To the pedagogist, p. 139. Belief and thinking, p. 139. Conviction, p.141.

Affective Aspects of Purpose

The use of terms by psychologist and pedagogist, p. 141. The affective character of the pedagogist' s 'context', p. 143. Collegiate student-work to capitalize adolescent enthusaism, p*143. Attach to strains of emotive tension, p. 144. Must get more than conventional assent, p. 144. The literature of pedagogy of purpose wanting, p. 145. 'Ideas' and 'ideals' p. 145. Motive and the emotive element, p»147. Ho pedagogy of thinking apart from pedagogy of the feelings, p. 148. The claim of 'scientific methods' upon the interest of the student, p. 149. The need of personal 'continuity', p.149. The pedagogy of avocation, a "hobby," p. 150. Its extreme form in the obsession, p. 151. A 'persistent idea" necessary to real thinking, p. 152. Blocked desire and emotion, p*152. Expressed in motor theory, p. 154. A 'static' system needed to carry the problem-idea, p. 156. Identify a purpose with a large, prepotent, static movement system to secure "activity attitude', p. 157.

Activity Attitude

Collegiate work belongs to 'secondary passive attention', p. 158. A new doctrine of effort (Washburn), p. 159. Persistence of a problem-idea, p. 161. Muscular tension. 'Tentative movements', p.161. A determining tendency, p. 162. Persistent tentative movements, p. 163. Effort as cause of problem-persistency, p.163. Transforming 'associative tendency' into1 determining tendency', p. 164. 'Phasic' and 'static' 'movement systems', p. 164. Attachment of the idea to an int ernal st atio movement sy st em gives the persistence required, p. 165. Eesire and persistency, p. 166.

Activity attitude1, p. 166. Definition of 'determining tendency', p. 168. Continuity as 'proprium' , p.169. Conspectus of types of apperception of the individual-project period, p. 169. Cognitive aspects, p. 170. Affective aspects, p. 171. Active aspects, p. 171.

Part III

PRINCIPLES OP COLLEGIATE EDUCATION CHAPTER X SCRUTINY OP THE PRINCIPLES Gener al Survey

The aim is principles of a cultural college, p. 174. To "be followed by 'precepts1, p. 175. Attitude of science and philosophy, p. 175. A theory for regulation of practice, p. 176. Meaning, p*177. Use of a motor theory, p. 179. Logic and thinking, p. 182. "How We Think," p. 184. Inevitability of problem, p. 184. Pive steps, p. 185. The trained mind, p. 186. Problem of the student, and of the teacher, p. 188.

The Educative Coherency of Project

The individual's world of knowledge, p. 188, ve rsus the world of science, p. 189. The collegiate student's individual project and other kinds of project, p. 189. Project depends upon teaching power for success, p. 190.

Project as an Assimilative Measure

Specialism in teaching, p. 190. Project to adapt the course, p. 190. Project the student's "way through," p. 191. Project and the laboratory, p. 191. "The student will forget," p. 192. Example of a simple project, p.192.

Students' Projects the Test and Proof of a Course

The collegiate student's work a unique pursuit, p. 193. The teacher's purpose in a course, p. 194. Purpose, aim, and project, p. 194.

Chapter XI The Precepts Op Project

Summary of Principles

Forty-two principles of collegiate project-teaching stated, pp»196- 204.

Precepts of Project

Twenty-nine precepts of collegiate project-teaching tentatively formulated, pp. 204-216.

...

Chapter XII The Integration Op The College

An Example of Project

A type of college to satisfy the claims of project, p. 217. Integration, p. 217. Summary of the doctrine of project proposed, p. 218. In terms of a teaching problem, p. 218. List of problems from which to choose, p. 219. The precepts to be applied in this case, p. 219. Their application, p. 221.

Collegi ate Pro ject-Thinkinff

Review of study, p#225. Student-seriousness will follow improvement of teacner-procedure, p. 226. A student, a teacher, a" purpose and a pedagogy imply an institution, p. 226. Fifteen years of study of the proposal that the cultural college deserved a pedagogy, p. 227.

The Type of College Implied

Not a college of the large university, p. 227. Must devote cooperative effort of teachers to making students, p. 228. I.Iust increase students1 self-expression and responsibility, p. 228. Advisory systems palliatives, p. 229. A small college necessary, u.229. Not only project to improve courses, p#229, but project might well be the scheme of organization of the work of students, p. 230* Must give intellectual as well as physical autonomy, p. 230. Tbe 1 undergraduate thesis1, p. 231. The organization which forces the cooperation of teachers upon the issue of the individual student's project shows the collegiate type demanded, p. 231.

INDIVIDUAL PROJECT IN THE LIBERAL COLLEGE

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

This study lies within the general field of higher education, but within the junior-college, as distinguished from the graduate and professional schools. Its purpose requires that tne distinction be kept clear also between this field of "the college/ which for our purposes is the historical "academic" college, and the technical college, or any vocational school. The study proposes to test the claims of such a college to a right to separate institutional existence. As a good reason for such separate institutional character, it is proposed to sound the claims of the college to a pedagogy of its own. By proposing a "pedagogy" for the academic college, the implication is intended that the teaching art and its explicit cultivation present a sufficient reason for higher institutional organization, as they have long done in lower schools. The perfection of the teaching of the high school presents as strong an institutional claim as does any other stated purpose of secondary schools, not excluding the vocational. No such demand for the college has yet been acknowledged in practice.

An ultimate purpose of the study is to reach actual precepts of collegiate pedagogy. Its hypothesis is to affirm the expectation that the liberal college has a reason for institutional existence and an obligation to acquire and maintain an institutional integrity, which shall be expressed in organic features. This expectation may be set forth as follows.

We simplify the problem by waiving all appeal directly to vocation. By hypothesis the institution to be studied is a finishing school. The place and value of all vocational and professional schools are intended to be enhanced, in no sense questioned, by this specialization. A liberal college, evidently, is shorn of reason for existence unless it can justify itself by an improved human output, which must be expressed in results of what we have called an improved pedagogy. If in this sense it affords no improvement of what is called the person's preparation for profession al studies, we must grant at the outset that we have begged the question of personal culture.

This quest of a justification for such an institution may not be made, however, chiefly in the region of such abstract practical determinations. The ends of material production, put in terms of the types of service we call vocation, are not guaranteed to have consulted the facts of human development for their warrant. It is for the purpose of establishing an answer to developmental demands that we resort first, in Part I., to an effort to lay a philosophical basis for collegiate education. The philosophy adopt ed, at least as a point of departure, and applied, seems fully to justify the belief in the existence of a "liberal period" in human individual development. This period is, of course, shortened more or less for all by the technical demands of preparation for, or pursuit of, life-work. Depending upon the personal culture and skill of teachers in all grades, and even especially of teachers of the arts of vocation, all periods have a right to be liberalizing, xjut the question we propose to lace is of the devotion of a stated period -to distinctively liberal pursuits. Such a period, if allowed, lies between the elementary period of necessary education and the higher period of actual vocational and professional preparation. Why not call it the secondary period? It must, to be sure, lie within the period called secondary, which period has a right to be one of strenuously extending privilege 01 personal development; but we are just now made conscious, even to defend an element ary period from the greed of exploitation, of the fact that vocational education is at least distinctly secondary, as contrasted with elementary. The fight is the same in principle, whatever period we try to protect, a struggle for the education of the individual person against the exploitation of his powers to render services, in the elementary period it is humanitarian. In the secondary period it becomes a question of important individual development.

in the inclusive field called the principles of education,"1" this essay is within that of principles of collegiate teaching. It can only be, however, rather preliminary in that narrowed field than mrnisning actual precepts of practice for collegiate teaching. It offers itself in terms of what, in elementary pedagogy, was called "general method." The "special method" of collegiate teaching must be provided by teachers of such subjects or study as offer themselves for the collegiate curriculums. It remains, then, but to state the place these chapters might fill in a general collegiate scheme, which must be outlined to show the exact intent of this monograph.

A theoretically complete system of collegiate practice v^ould

embrace principles (axiomatic, empirical and theoretical j , which

would be a platform tor such practice. Such practice implies an

institution. A collegiate institution implies teachers as the

1. nuediger , .an.C. , Principles of Education, ^ch. monographs Ho. 2, pp. 88-118 agencies tor conceiving the meaning of subject matter and applying the principles of method. Supplemental to thie is all the 'instrumentality1 which 'agency' uses. (ij'or the sake of completeness) this may be stated to include teaching organization and administrative organization. The purpose of administrative organization is to facilitate maximal efficiency of teaching organization. I'e aching organization exists to produce maximal learning efficiency, which is the institutional end. A complete scheme would include housing and equipment and their hygiene.

She work in nand turns out to be a study of thinking as the essential activity of learning. It must endeavor to find all the implicit precepts it can apprehend. It must, in the nature of its own peculiar task, render explicit all principles of thinking and learning that come into view. "A person in pursuing a consecutive train of thoughts takes some system of ideas for granted... borne context, some situation, some controlling purpose dominates his explicit ideas so thoroughly that it does not need to be consciously formulated and expounded. ... let the xact that reflection originates in problem makes it necessary at some points consciously to inspect and examine this familiar background, we have to turn on some unconscious assumption ana make it explicit."^" If the matter of a certain few books were in the reader's mind, such a context would be carried, but the task of the study would still be distinct, though abbreviated to a mere application of an adopted psychology and pedagogy to collegiate education. Instead it must "consciously formulate and expound" so much of these fundamental doctrines as immediately underlies the pedagogy of the

"1. Dewey, J., How We Think, p. 215. More particularly, Dewey' s Philosophy of Education is chosen as background of this discussion.

I college. We make whatever apology is due these authors for applications they might not approve. In extenuation v/e can only plead the demand of the times lor applications.

This study of collegiate pedagogy is not addressed to students hut to collegiate teachers. It would be proper to address the collegiate student with suggestions for the rational improvement of his student-work. There is much evidence that he realizes its need of improvement. Aids for the improvement of study as an art are already beginning to appear.2 Their acceptance and active use will follow tne arousal of interest twhich in turn will follow the serious interest of teachers in their part of the enterprise. The interest of teachers may be expected to be only moderate until the ideal of trained service for a prolessional art gets vogue. The conjecture here made is that such interest will be subject to mere exhortation until the work of students has acknowledged character. Critics fear little challenge hitherto in placing a very low rating upon the current supposition of student -industry. It will be easy to err on the side of premature and cock-sure formulation of methods. It will be still easier to fill the student's atmosphere too full of our own over-sanguine suggestions of untried methods, doubly out of place: first, as being ours ratiier than his, and second, as being in a state of development, not yet ready for formulation. Collegiate education may not be in so much danger of sophisticating its students to a condition of self-consciousness of method

1. See Dewey , Phil . of jgd_. ,Ch«XIlI, The hature of luethod. "Learning demands unconsciousness of processes. Teaching demands consciousness ^

2. See the various books on "How to Study."

as the elementary school has been, but the rule that metj od comes before its formulation1 is universal, and here as elsewhere the college should profit by mistakes already made.

Still this caution does not forbid giving first attention to the methods of learning as tnose taking precedence in every way. But it implies a limitation of first effort to those things which may well soon be made objects of the attention of students themselves*

This limitation ought to serve the purpose also of concentrating iirst attention upon elementary needs. We wish to find the first principles. They should be the conscious possession of the collegiate teacher, Their application will be by precepts addressed to both teachers and students. ''Jkethod-consciousness" is a teacher's professional privilege and duty, nis business is to teach, that is, to help make the student successful in his business. The student's business is not the sane, nor does it involve the same kind of "method-consciousness." One may be conscious of the other's art and thinking. She other's consciousness is ideally, not of processes but of objects, not even of his own processes as such, to say nothing of the mental activity of another, The first objects of students' consciousness, at le&.st, are expressed in precepts of ideal and end, simple and definite, something which presents itself in such form as to guarantee it as worth while — something to do and think-out. Ho one can be his teacher who cannot do somewhat more and something different in its nature from this. This differentiates completely the platform of method oi student and teacher. Student-method ought to evince itself first. Teacher-consciousness of student-method is the beginning of the development of teachermethod. They may safely be kept in this order. The student is to 1. T>ewey, How We Think, p. 113.

be conscious, of an end worth working toward, ihis i& objective. Means and methods of attaining this end may be themselves so rationally attached to the end that the methods are themselves objective, ihe teacher's path is parallel, but as distinct as if divergent. One does his work in absorbed, objective, unself consciousness. The other parallels him throughout with increasing capacity, if the thing succeeds, to intensify his appreciation of what it means to do things so, and what shall be tne way to improve and perfect the performance observed.

wow to substantiate aims, ultimate or mediate, requires a philosophy of education. What things are worth the doing and thinking which are to constitute the student's endeavor, and why they are worth it, are questions that are answered only by a philosophy of education, it is conceivable that such a philosophy might separate this question of subject matter from method, buch a possibil ity helps to show the importance of a choice of philosophy. Our choice, in this case, has everything to do with both, because it seeks their complete amalgamation, ouch a philosophy is bound to be equally interested in 'what' and 'how'. It will not altogether differentiate its appeal to its estimate of values from its appeal to psychology and logic for an account of how we think, it is a matter of more than incidental importance that the author of this philosophy was the pioneer in formulating a dynamic psychology, to Lch we may incidentally appeal, .but finally the question of how we think deserves tne fullest possible consideration, without disallowing the iusepsrableness (in importance, at least, if not in every aspect) of subject matter and method, it remains a matter

of the utmost importance to collegiate pedagogy to know what the exponent of a complete system of psychology may be able to teach. It may be admitted, as frankly as we made the free choice of a philosophy of education, that Aashburn's Movement and kental Imagery has been chosen as a further guide to thinking, because it is a dynamic theory and because it deals subtly and with convincing satisfactoriness with the psychology of 'determining tendency' or •problem-idea'. For our purposes, no more than for the psychologist's, is it a matter of ultimate importance whether the scheme of movements used to characterize psychological process is absolutely true. Perhaps it is of less importance to us, because our purpose is so utterly practical. Uot that it is not of importance to pedagogy to base itself upon a true psychology, but that it may nevertheless have its practical purposes well served by a plausible scheme of movements which might have to be revised in minute particulars for psychological truth's sake, without being in the least vitiated as adequate basis of pedagogical precept. At any rate we use the one thoroughgoing theory which consistently gives a dynamic account of thinking. The practical advantage for our purposes is that which inheres in the objectiveness of treating psychological phenomena in a languege constituted of the physiological movements posited as their correlates. Movements are very tangible objects of our thinking, even if they must be conceived of as microscopic or less than microscopic in their amplitude.

Part I Philosophy Of Higher Education Chapter II

INTRODUCTION TO A PHILOSOPHY OP COLLEGIATE PEDAGOGY

Behind any essay a philosophy expressed or implied doubtless lies. It is here assumed that this study of a particular field of pedagogy will profit by a statement of its philosophy at the outset. It is "believed to be an element of sat isf actoriness in the philosophy we ohoose,^ first that it is not metaphysically ambitious about 'ultimates' , but is sincerely a philosophy for practice, and, second, that its own field of application, elementary education, is not the one we wish to treat. If we do violence to the author's beliefs as to the way in which it should be applied in higher education, we do so in ignorance of what application he would make in that field, A philosophy which declares itself moreover, as by definition a "generalized theory of education" challenges an effort to accommodate any ideas on education one may want to live by, to test both the ideas and the philosophy. I am not sure that one must be a pragmatist in philosophy, or be assured that a biological philosophy is a complete universal scheme, to profit nevertheless, for f such a purpose as ours, by accepting the expressions of evolutional biology as the terms which are pertinent to education. Evolution, growth, progress, achievement, seem inevitable as expressions of education's purposes.

We might proceed with only so much of apology for the adoption of this philosophy, but it is incumbent to forecast a little

1. Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education.

further what seems necessary to apply it to higher education. In applying this philosophy to the elementary grades of school, its author has become famous in advocacy of the claims of 'the social1. Perhaps it is fairer to say that the philosophy has been made to appeal through illustrations from elementary school-practice, than to say that it has been applied in elementary schools. At any rate we propose no severer test of it than will be incidental to testing higher educational theory and practice by its main tenets. The genetic difference between elementary and higher education may be expected to draw contrasts without doing violence to the great principle of adjustment. The difference we are inclined to find most pronounced is in this fundamental contest between sociality and individuality.

To dissolve this dualism by interpreting the individual in terms of the social is certainly much less pertinent in higher ranges of the individual's life. Where elementary education faces the problem of adaptation through socialization, it is equally true that higher education faces the problem of adaptation by individuation. Much of elementary education has been undertaken by primitive man as unconscious adaptation in wi .ich !Iends"^rather than "aims" operate as they do in lower stages of evolution. Higher education supplants these primitive, racial, adaptations of childhood by mediate adaptations, different iational in the interest of perfecting individuals, though this individuation may be, in turn, tending toward higher social ideal. It must be the individuating process of higher education that makes education something more than a successful unconscious factor of racial adaptation. Even a 1. See Howerth, Educational Review, January, 1917.

vigorous exploitation of individualism (as a developmental, not an ethical, term) is wholesome as a defensible reaction for higher education against a pervasive doctrine of adaptation for the race's sake, iiducation has no way to express itself biologically more significantly than in this compensating doctrine of individuation. Above childhood it is the prevailing factor. Education must finally express itself best in individualism.

It is only in the individual activity we call learning, thinking, coming to know, accumulating character through experience, that we secure a principle for higher education. It must be that such standards of value as we have, educational as well as ethical, are much less the vague, averaged, high, low, and median, than the actual achievements of individuals. The achievement of individuals leads on to the expectation of individual achievement, and this is platform for the expectation that individual help can be given to individual achievement. Higher education is nothing less than the stamp of approval on this expectation, the way in which society deliberately tries to supplement the very service to the race of individuals by increasing their individual value.

One thing for which we are indebted at the outset is a definition of education which we make free to apply within our field. Whatever else education may be, its institutional aspects always present two parties to the undertaking. If it is a vital process, those two parties are distinct and both subject to modifications by the processes of teaching and learning. Apply it strictly: nothing could be more wholesome for the collegiate teacher to contemplate than the fact that he ceases to be a teacher when he ceases to be modified as one of the agencies, or when he fails to

IEimprove the quality of human material in "both parties. That the learner's is the point of view of first importance, to which the teacher's function is subordinated is part of this insight. The learner's is, of course, what it must be considering who he is and what the problem of learning in his particular case must be. The teacher's point of view is, in one sense, determined also by who he is, but if it is not adjustable to the particular mechanism of the situation represented by this learner and this problem, he is only by courtesy of convention "the teacher." His real superiority as a teacher abides only partially in the fact that he has traversed the roads to the goal, has discovered the pitfalls and short cuts and finally perhaps the best route; only partly in the fact that the learner's attitude is that of problem, while the teacher's knowledge has both the advantage of organized finality and the pedagogical embarrassments of the same. But the teacher's real superiority, if it exists, lies chiefly in the fact that he is adequately sympathetic with the learner's state of mind, and appreciation of the terms and processes of problem, as problems must lie before the learner. Hot the least important distinction of collegiate learner and teacher, but one that is all too largely overlooked, is the requirement that the collegiate teacher snould be older than his student in every important sense. This fact will bear repeated attention.

Preliminary to a philosophy of higher education, is a tentative definition of higher education, to be constructed in part as hypothesis for the criticism of Dewey's philosophy of education

so far as it is to serve for higher as well as elementary, and in part by differentiation of higher from elementary education.

It is in the nature of life to continue in being. Does the process of adaptation by which the social continuity of life is effected, that is education as a means of this continuity, suffer diminution in degree or kind as adulthood is approached? In the sense of the necessary transmission of that minimum of nurture which successfully adopts the individual into his tribe even at a high stage of civilization, the span of elementary education is even now being criticized as too long. The introduction of the junior high school is chiefly advocated upon the ground of a need to improve individuation rather than mere social transmission. However, such distinctions are not to be too nicely made and the question as to whether there is need of a long continuance of conscious socialization may safely be answered in the affirmative, whether for mere adaptation or for individuation, processes which fortunately cannot be wholly separated.

It must be noted that when the question of "transmission of culture by communication" is involved, the history of primitive education shows that conscious efforts to educate took place rather in those activities which we now call "secondary" than in those most primitively connected with adaptation to the tribe. Mere living with children, ir other words, is a safer assurance of elementary education than of the stage where more specialized tribal customs must be inculcated, to say nothing of any education which can attain to a type called "human, " Especially as "the gap between the capacities of the young and the concerns of adults widens" and formal education has to begin, does the significance of the upper ranges of that increasing gap increase in larger ratio; until in time, as now, the limitations are not in the space and the matter, but if any, are in the individual and his limitations, whether of social opportunity, of capacity, or of interest.