Facts and fancies in modern science: studies of the relations of science to prevalent speculations and religious belief

Front matter

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Preface

THE object before the mind of the author in preparing these Lectures was to present a distinct and rational view of the present relation of scientific thought to the religious beliefs of men, and especially to the Christian revelation.

The attempt to make science, or speculations based on science, supersede religion is one of the prevalent fancies of our time, and pervades much of the popular literature of the day. That such attempts can succeed the author does not believe. They have hitherto given birth only to such abortions as Positivism, Nihilism, and Pessimism.

There is, however, a necessary relation and parallelism of all truths, physical and spiritual ; and it is useful to clear away the apparent antagonisms which proceed from partial and imperfect views, and to point out the harmony

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6 PREFACE.

which exists between the natural and the spiritual— between what man can learn from the physical creation, and what has been revealed to him by the Spirit of God. To do this with as much fairness as possible, and with due regard to the present state of knowledge and to the most important difficulties that are likely to be met with by honest inquirers, is the purpose of the following pages.

It is proper to add that, in order to give completeness to the discussion, it has been necessary to introduce, in some of the lectures, topics previously treated of by the author, in a similar manner, in publications bearing his name.

J. W. D.

Contents

LECTURE I.

PAGE

GENERAL RELATIONS OF SCIENCE AND AGNOSTIC

I. General Relations

OF

Science and Agnostic Speculation.

LECTURE I.

GENERAL RELATIONS OF SCIENCE AND AGNOSTIC SPECULATION.

THE infidelity and the contempt for sacred and spiritual things which pervade so much of our modern literature are largely attributable to the prevalence of that form of philosophy which may be designated as Agnostic Evolution, and this in its turn is popularly regarded as a result of the pursuit of physical and natural science. The last conclusion is obviously only in part, if at all, correct, since it is well known that atheistic philosophical speculations were pursued, quite as boldly and ably as now, long before the rise of modern science. Still, it must be admitted that scientific discoveries and principles have been largely employed in our time to give form and consistency to ideas otherwise very dim and shadowy, and thus to rehabilitate for our benefit the philosophical dreams of antiquity in a more substantial shape. In this respect the natural sciences

— or, rather, the facts and laws with which they are conversant — merely share the fate of other things. Nothing, however indifferent in itself, can come into human hands without acquiring thereby an ethical, social, political, or even religious, significance. An ounce of lead or a dynamite cartridge may be in itself a thing altogether destitute of any higher significance than that depending on physical properties ; but let it pass into the power of man, and at once infinite possibilities of good and of evil cluster round it according to the use to which it may be applied. This depends on essential powers and attributes of man himself, of which he can no more be deprived than matter can be denuded of its inherent properties ; and if the evils arising from misuse of these powers trouble us, we may at least console ourselves with the reflection that the possibility of such evils shows man to be a free agent, and not an automaton.

All this is eminently applicable to science in its relation to agnostic speculations. The material of the physical and natural sciences consists of facts ascertained by the evidence of our senses, and for which we depend on the truthfulness of those senses and the stability of external nature. Science proceeds, by comparison of these facts and by inductive reasoning, to arrange them under certain general expressions or laws. So far all is merely physical, and need have no connection with our origin or destiny or relation to higher powers. But we ourselves are a part of the nature which we study ; and we cannot study it without more or less thinking our own thoughts into it. Thus we naturally begin to inquire as to origins and first causes, and as to the source of the energy and order which we perceive ; and to these questions the human mind demands some answer, either actual or speculative. But here we enter into the domain of religious thought, or that which relates to a power or powers beyond and above nature. Whatever forms our thoughts on such subjects may take, these depend, not directly on the facts of science, but on the reaction of our minds on these facts. They are truly anthropomorphic. It has been well said that it is as idle to inquire as to the origin of such religious ideas as to inquire as to the origin of hunger and thirst. Given the man, they must necessarily exist. Now, whatever form these philosophical or religious ideas may take — whether that of Agnosticism or Pantheism or Theism — science, properly so called, has no right to be either praised or blamed. Its material may be used, but the structure is the work of the artificer himself.

It is well, however, to carry with us the truth that this border-land between science and religion is one which men cannot be prevented from entering; but what they may find therein depends very much on themselves. Under wise guidance it may prove to us an Eden, the very gate of heaven, and we may acquire in it larger and more harmonious views of both the seen and the unseen, of science and of religion. But, on the other hand, it may be found to be a battle-field or a bedlam, a place of confused cries and incoherent ravingsv and strewn with the wrecks of human hopes and aspirations.

There can be no question that the more unpleasant aspect of the matter is somewhat prevalent in our time, and that we should, if possible, understand the causes of the conflict and the confusion that prevail, and the way out of them. To do this it will be necessary first to notice some of the incidental or extraneous causes of difficulty and strife, and then to inquire more in detail as to the actual bearing of the scientific knowledge of nature on Agnosticism.

One fruitful cause of difficulty in the relations of science and religion is to be found in the narrowness and incapacity of well-meaning Christians who unnecessarily bring the doctrines of natural and revealed religion into conflict, by misunderstanding the one or the other, or by attaching obsolete scientific ideas to Holy Scripture, and identifying them with it in points where it is quite non-committal. Much mischief is also done by a prevalent habit of speaking of all, or nearly all, the votaries of science as if they were irreligious.

A second cause is to be found in the extravagant speculations indulged in by the adherents of certain philosophical systems. Such speculations often far overpass the limits of actual scientific knowledge, and are yet paraded before the ignorant as if they were legitimate results of science, and so become irretrievably confounded with it in the popular mind.

A third influence, more closely connected with science itself, arises from the rapidity of the progress of discovery and of the - practical applications of scientific facts and principles. This has unsettled the minds of men, and has given them the idea that nothing is beyond their reach. There is thus a vague notion that science has overcome so many difficulties, and explained so many mysteries, that it may ultimately satisfy all the wants of man and leave no scope for religious belief. Those who know the limitations of our knowledge of material things may not share this delusion; but there is reason to fear that many, even of scientific men, are carried away by it, and it widely affects the minds of general readers.

Again, science has in the course of its growth become divided into a great number of small specialties, each pursued ardently by its own votaries. This is beneficial in one respect ; for much more can be gained by men digging downward, each on his own vein of valuable ore, than by all merely scraping the surface. But the specialist, as he descends fathom after fathom into his mine, however rich and rare the gems and metals he may discover, becomes more and more removed from the ordinary ways of men, and more and more regardless of the products of other veins as valuable as his own. The specialist, however profound he may become in the knowledge of his own limited subject, is on that very account less fitted to guide his fellow-men in the pursuit of general truth. When he ventures to the boundaries between his own and other domains of truth, or when he conceives the idea that his own little mine is the sole deposit of all that requires to be known, he sometimes makes grave mistakes ; and these pass current for a time as the dicta of high scientific authority.

Lastly, the lowest influence of all is that which sometimes regulates what may be termed the commercial side of science. Here the demand is very apt to control the supply. New facts and legitimate conclusions cannot be produced with sufficient rapidity to satisfy the popular craving, or they are not sufficiently exciting to compete with other attractions. Science has then to enter the domain of imagination, and the last new generalization — showy and specious, but perhaps baseless as the plot of the last new novel — brings grist to the mill of the " scientist " and his publisher.

Only one permanent and final remedy is possible for these evils, and that is a higher moral tone and more thorough scientific education on the part of the general public. Until this can be secured, true science is sure to be surrounded

with a mental haze of vague hypotheses clothed 2* in ill-defined language, and which is mistaken by the multitude for science itself. Yet true science should not be held responsible for this, except in so far as its material is used to constitute the substance of the pseudo-gnosis which surrounds it. Science is in this relation the honest householder whose goods may be taken by thieves and applied to bad uses, or the careful amasser of wealth which may be dissipated by spendthrifts.

It may be said that if these statements are true, the ordinary reader is helpless. How can he separate the true from the false ? Must he resign himself to the condition of one who either believes on mere authority or refuses to believe anything ? or must he adopt the attitude of the Pyrrhonist who thinks that anything may be either true or false ? But it is true, nevertheless, that common sense may suffice to deliver us from much of the pseudo-science of our time, and to enable us to understand how little reason there is for the conflicts promoted by mere speculation between science and other departments of legitimate thought and inquiry.

In illustrating this, we may in the present lecture consider that form of sceptical philosophy which in our time is the most prevalent, and which has the most specious air of dependence on science. This is the system of Agnosticism combined with evolution of which Mr. Herbert Spencer is the most conspicuous advocate in the English-speaking world. This philosophy deals with two subjects — the cause or origin of the universe and of things therein, and the method of the progress of all from the beginning until now. Spencer sees nothing in the first of these but mere force or energy, nothing in the second but a spontaneous evolution. All beyond these is not only unknown, but unknowable. The theological and philosophical shortcomings of this doctrine have been laid bare by a multitude of critics, and I do not propose to consider it in these relations so much as in relation to science, which has much to say with respect to both force and evolution.

An agnostic is literally one who does not know ; and, were the word used in its true and literal sense, Agnosticism would of necessity be opposed to science, since science is knowledge and quite incompatible with the want of it. But the modern agnostic does not pretend to be ignorant of the facts and principles of science. What he professes not to know is the existence of any power above and beyond material nature. He goes a little farther, however, than mere absence of knowledge. He holds that of God nothing can be known ; or he may put it a little more strongly, in the phrase of his peculiar philosophy, by saying that the existence of a God or of creation by divine power is " unthinkable." It is in this that he differs from the old-fashioned and now extinct atheist, who bluntly denied the existence of a God. The modern agnostic assumes an attitude of greater humility and disclaims the actual denial of God. Yet he practically goes farther, in asserting the impossibility of knowing the existence of a Divine Being ; and in taking this farther step Agnosticism does more to degrade the human reason and to cut it off from all communion with anything beyond mere matter and force, than does any other form of philosophy, ancient or modern.

Yet in this Agnosticism there is in one point an approximation to truth. If there is a God, he cannot be known directly and fully, and his plans and procedure must always be more or less incomprehensible. The writer of the book of Job puts this as plainly as any modern agnostic in the passage beginning " Canst thou by searching find out God?" — literally, " Canst thou sound the depths of God?" — and a still higher authority informs us that " no man hath seen God" — that is, known him as we know material things. In short, absolutely and essentially God is incomprehensible ; but this is no new discovery, and the mistake of the agnostic lies in failing to perceive that the same difficulty stands in the way of our perfectly knowing anything whatever. We say that we know things when we mean that we know them in their properties, relations, or effects. In this sense the knowledge of God is perfectly possible. It is impossible only in that other sense of the word "know" — if it can have such a sense — in which we are required to know things in their absolute essence and thoroughly. Thus the term "agnostic" contains an initial fallacy in itself; and this philosophy, like many others, rests, in the first instance, on a mere jugglery of words. The real question is, " Is there a God who manifests himself to us mediately and practically?" and this is a question which we cannot afford to set aside by a mere play on the meanings of the verb " to know."

If, however, any man takes this position and professes to be incapable of knowing whether or not there is any power above and behind material things, it will be necessary to begin with the very elements of knowledge, and to inquire if there is anything whatever that he really knows and believes.

Let us ask him if he can subscribe to the simple creed expressed in the words " I am, I feel, I think." Should he deny these propositions, then there is no basis left on which to argue. Should he admit this much of belief, he has abandoned somewhat of his agnostic position ; for it would be easy to show that in even uttering the pronoun "I" he has committed himself to the belief in the unknowable. What is the ego which he admits ? Is it the material organism or any one of its organs or parts? or is it something distinct, of which the. organism is merely the garment, or outward manifestation ? or is the organism itself anything more than a bundle of appearances partially known and scarcely understood by that which calls itself "I"? Who knows ? And if our own personality is thus inscrutable, if we. can conceive of it neither as identical with the whole or any part of the organism nor as existing independently of the organism, we should begin our Agnosticism here, and decline to utter the pronoun " I " as implying what we cannot know. Still, as a matter of faith, we must hold fast to the proposition "I exist" as the only standpoint for science, philosophy, or common life. If we are asked for evidence of this faith, we can appeal only to our consciousness of effects which imply the existence of the ego, which we thus have to admit or suppose before we can begin to prove even its existence.

This fact of the mystery of our own existence is full of material for thought. It is in itself startling — even appalling. We feel that it is a solemn, a dreadful, thing to exist, and to exist in that limitless space and that eternal time which we can no more understand than we can our own constitution, though our belief in their -existence is inevitable. Nor can we divest ourselves of anxious thoughts as to the source, tendencies, and end of our own being. Here, in short, we already reach the threshold of that dread unknown future and its possibilities, the realization of which by hope, fear, and imagination constitutes, perhaps, our first introduction to the unseen world as distinguished from the present world of sense. The agnostic may smile if he pleases at religion as a puerile fancy, but he knows, like other men, that the mere consciousness of existence necessarily links itself with a future — nay, unending — existence, and that any being with this consciousness of futurity must have at least a religion of hope and fear. In this we find an intelligible reason for the universality of religious ideas in relation to a future life. Even where this leads to beliefs that may be called superstitious, it is more reasonable than Agnosticism ; for it is surely natural that a being inscrutable by himself should be led to believe in the existence of other things equally inscrutable, but apparently related to himself.

But the thinking " I " dwells in the midst of what we term 'external objects. In a certain sense it treats the parts of its own bodily organism as if they were things external to it, speaking of " my hand," " my head," as if they were its property. But there are things practically infinite beyond the organism itself. We call them objects or things, but they are only appearances ; and we know only their relations to ourselves and to each other. Their essence, if they have any, is inscrutable. We say that th*e appearances indicate matter and energy, but what these are essentially we know not. We reduce matter to atoms, but it is impossible for us to have any conception of an atom or of the supposed ether, whether itself in some sense atomic or not, including such atoms. Our attempts to form rational conceptions of atoms resolve themselves into complex conjectures as to vortices of ethers and the like, of which no one pretends to have any distinct mental picture ; yet on this basis of the incomprehensible rests all our physical science, the first truths in which are really matters of pure faith in the existence of that which we cannot understand. Yet all men would scoff at the agnostic who on this account should express unbelief in physical science.

Let us observe here, further, that since the mysterious and inscrutable "I" is surrounded with an equally mysterious and inscrutable universe, and since the ego and the external world are linked together by indissoluble relations, we are introduced to certain alternatives as to origins. Either the universe or "nature" is a mere phantom conjured up by the ego, or the ego is a product of the universe, or both are the result of some equally mysterious power beyond us and the material world. Neither of these suppositions is absurd or unthinkable ; and, whichever of them we adopt, we are again introduced to what may be termed a religion as well as a philosophy. On one view, man becomes a god to himself ; on another, nature becomes his god ; on the third, a Supreme Being, the Creator of both. All three religions exist in the world in a vast variety of forms, and it is questionable if any human being does not more or less give credence to one or the other. Scientific men, even when they think proper to call themselves idealists, must reject the first of the above alternatives, since they cannot doubt the objective existence of external nature, and they know that its existence dates from a time anterior to our possible existence as human beings. They may hold to either of the others ; and, practically, the minds of students of science are divided between the idea of a spontaneous evolution of all things from self-existent matter and force, and that of the creation of all by a self-existent, omnipotent, and all-wise Creator. From certain points of view, it may be of no consequence whether a scientific man holds one or other of these views. Self-existent force or power, capable of spontaneous inception of change, and of orderly and infallible development according to laws of its own imposition or enactment, which is

IN MODERN SCIENCE. 2J

demanded on the one hypothesis, scarcely differs from the conception of an intelligent Creator demanded on the other, while it is, to say the least, equally incomprehensible. It is/* besides, objectionable to science, on the ground that it requires us to assume properties in matter and energy quite at variance with the results of experience. The remarkable alternative presented by Tyndall in his Belfast Address well expresses this : " Either let us open our doors freely to the conception of creative acts, or, abandoning them, let us radically change our notions of matter." The expression " creative acts " here is a loose and not very accurate one for the operation of creative power. The radical change in " our notions of matter" involves an entire reversal of all that science knows of its essential properties. This being understood, the sentence is a fair expression of the dilemma in which the agnostic and the materialist find themselves.

Between the two hypotheses above stated there is, however, one material and vital difference, depending on the nature of man himself. The universe does not consist merely of insensate matter and force and automatic vitality ; there happens to be in it the rational and consciously responsible being man. To attribute to him an origin from mere matter and force is not merely to attach to them a fictitious power and significance : it is also to reject the rational probability that the original cause must be at least equal to the effects produced, and to deprive ourselves of all communion and sympathy with nature. Further, wherever the " presence and potency " of human reason resides, there seems no reason to prevent our searching for and finding it in the only way in which we can know anything, in its properties and effects. The dogma of Agnosticism, it is true, refuses to permit this search after God, but it does so with as little reason as any of those self-constituted authorities that demand belief without questioning. Nay, it has the offensive peculiarity that in the very terms in which it issues its prohibition it contradicts itself. The same oracle which asserts that " the power which the universe manifests to us is wholly inscrutable " affirms also that " we must inevitably commit ourselves to the hypothesis of a first cause." Thus we are told that a power which is " manifest " is also " inscrutable," and that we must " commit ourselves " to a belief in a " first cause " which on the hypothesis cannot be known to exist. This may be philosophy of a certain sort, but it certainly should not claim kinship with science.

Perhaps it may be well here to place in comparison with each other the doctrine of the agnostic philosophy as expounded by Herbert Spencer, and that of Paul of Tarsus — an older, but certainly a not less acute, thinker — and we may refer to their utterances respecting the origin of the universe.

Spencer says : " The verbally intelligent suppositions respecting the origin of the universe are three: (i) It is self-existent; (2) It is selfcreated ; (3) It is created by an external agency." On these it may be remarked that the second is scarcely even " verbally intelligent ;" it seems to be a contradiction in terms. The third admits of an important modification, which was manifest to . Spinosa if not to Spencer — namely, that the Creator may — nay, must — be not merely " external," but within the universe as well. If there is a God, he must be in the universe as a pervading power, and in every part of it, and must not be shut out from his own work. This mistaken conception of God as building himself out of his own universe and acting on it by external force is both irrational 3* and unscientific, being, for example, quite at variance with the analogy of force and life. Rightly understood, therefore, Spencer's alternatives resolve themselves into two — either the universe is self-existent, or it is the work of a self-existent Creator pervading all things with his power. Of these, Spencer prefers the first. Paul, on the other hand, referring to the mental condition of the civilized heathens of his time, affirms that rationally they could believe only in the hypothesis of creation. He says of God : " His invisible things, even his eternal power and divinity, can be perceived (by the reason), being understood by the things that are made." Let us look at these rival propositions. Is the universe self-existent, or does it show evidence of creative power and divinity ? The doctrine that the universe is self-existent may be understood in different ways. It may mean either an endless succession of such changes as we now see in progress, or an eternity of successive cycles proceeding through the course of geological ages and ever returning into themselves. The first is directly contrary to known facts in the geological history of the earth, and cannot be maintained by any one. The second would imply that the known geological history is merely a part of one great cycle of an endless series, and of which an infinite number have already passed away. It is evident that this infinite succession of cycles is quite as incomprehensible as any other infinite succession of things or events. But, waiving this objection, we have the alternative either that all the successive cycles are exactly alike — which could not be, in accordance with evolution, nor with the analogy of other natural cycles — or there must have been a progression in the successive cycles. But this last supposition would involve an uncaused beginning somewhere, and this of such a character as to determine all the successive cycles and their progress ; which would again be contrary to the hypothesis of self-existence. It is useless, however, to follow such questions farther, since it is evident that this hypothesis accounts for nothing and would involve us in absolute confusion.

Let us turn now to Paul's statement. This has the merit, in the first place, of expressing a known fact — namely, that men do infer power and divinity from nature. But is this a mere superstition, or have they reason for it? If the universe be considered as a vast machine exceeding all our powers of calculation in its magnitude and complexity, it seems in the last degree absurd to deny that it presents evidence of "power." Dr. Carpenter, in a recent lecture, illustrates the position of the agnostic in this respect by supposing him to examine the machinery of a great mill, and, having found that this is all set in motion by a huge iron shaft proceeding from a brick wall, to suppose that this shaft is self-acting, and that there is no cause of motion beyond. But when we consider the variety and the intricacy of nature, the unity and the harmony of its parts, and the adaptation of these to an incalculable number of uses, we find something more than power. There is a fitting" together of things in a manner not only above our imitation, but above our comprehension. To refer this to mere chance or to innate tendencies or potencies of things we feel to be but an empty form of words ; consequently, we are forced to admit superhuman contrivance in nature, or what Paul terms "divinity." Further, since the history of the universe eoes back farther than we can calculate, and as we can know nothing beyond the First Cause, we infer that the Power and Divinity which we have ascertained in nature must be " eternal." Again, since the creative power must at some point in past time have spontaneously begun to act, we regard it as a "living" power, which is the term elsewhere used by Paul in expressing the idea of " personality " as held by theologians. Lastly, if everything that we know thus testifies to an eternal power and divinity, to maintain that we can know nothing of this First Cause must be simply nonsense, unless we are content to fall back on absolute nihilism, and hold that wre know nothing whatever, either relatively or absolutely ; but in this case not only is science dethroned, but reason herself is driven from her seat, and there is nothing left for us to discuss. Paul's idea is thus perfectly clear and consistent, and it is not difficult to see that common sense must accept this doctrine of an Eternal Living Power and Divinity in preference to the hypothesis of Spencer.