Elements of thought;

Preface To The First Edition

The design of this volume is to impart, in a familiar form, elementary explanations and instructions on subjects connected with the intellectual faculties ; to • afford gradual and easy exercises to the powers of abstraction ; and thus to conduct the young reader, by an accessible path, into that region of thought where the mind acquires force, accuracy, and comprehension.

A writer who invites the attention of young persons to subjects which demand a continued effort of thought, is tempted to win that attention by some promise of amusement; or to profess that he has the art of communicating knowledge without the cost of labor on the part of those who receive it. No such promise or profession can be ofiered in the present instance. The author believes that when the object intended is to give tone and vigor to the understanding by exertion, trivial digressions and gaieties of style should be avoided. Relaxation from efforts of attention is perhaps always better provided for away from books than in thera ; or at least it should be entirely disjoined from serious studies.

The writer, therefore, does not treat his young readers as children, who must be allured by the promise of entertainment to advance in the course of mental improvement, and to whom knowledge must be administered, hke a nauseous drug concealed in a sweetmeat. On the contrary, he boldly claims their undiverted attention ; he invites them to think,

IV PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

and suggests no inducements besides the proper pleasures and advantages of intellectual cultivation. He has indeed endeavored to make this introduction to the study of the mind as familiar and intelligible as possible, and has presumed upon no higher qualifications in his young reader than an ordinary measure of inteUigence — a moderate proficiency in the several branches of education, together with a deliberate and efficient desire for the improvement of the mind.

In explanation of the form into which these elementary instructions are thrown, it may be proper to say, that the writer has been guided by the opinion that comprehensive and systematical books are little adapted to the purpose of initiation in studies of the kind to which this volume relates, A treatise on any branch of intellectual philosophy, if it be complete and systematical, must include many topics which no simplicity or perspicuity of style can render easily comprehensible. One portion of the book may be readily understood, while another portion, though not less lucid in its style, may baffle the efforts of the unexercised faculties ; and thus perhaps may occasion to the youthful reader final discouragement and disgust. The writer, therefore, has not aimed to compose regular elements either of Metaphysics or of Logic, beheving that the first book which is put into the hands of a young person with the view of inviting his attention to objects purely intellectual, should be rather select than comprehensive in its topics.

ADVERTISEMENT

TO THE NINTH EDITION

In sending this little volume again to the press, after the lapse of several years, the author has been induced to rewrite it ; and although he has retained portions of the original work, has superseded more, and has thrown the whole into a new form.

The volume is now offered to the public, first, as

A BOOK OF REFERENCE,

to which recourse may be had by those who are not fully and familiarly conversant with Intellectual Philosophy, when explanation is needed of those abstract and scientific words which occur in the course of reading the best authors, and which find a place, more or less frequently, in the conversation of the educated classes. It is especially with a view to facilitate this use of the book, that the articles have been placed in alphabetic order.

The author has, furthermore, borne in view the advantage of those, who, although neither their tastes nor their opportunities may admit of their engaging in the study of Intellectual Philosophy, or of their perusing larger works, would

ADVERTISEMENT

gladly acquire some general knowledge of these subjects, such as should be at once correct, precise, and easily retained. The author is not aware that any modern work, except his own, is to be met with adapted to the use of the class of readers he is now speaking of; and he has especially endeavored to suit his style to the range of such persons. The method he recommeds them to pursue, in avaihng themselves of his labors, is, after perusing the preliminary synthetical explanation of terms, to read each article of the vocabulary in the order in which it occurs in the synthesis ; by which means the whole will present itself as a connected system (though brief indeed) of the three principal branches of Intellectual Study, and so form a compendious

SUMMARY OF MENTAL SCIENCE.

There is yet another, and a very important purpose to which the author would fain believe his little volume may be Ibund applicable ; he means that of catechetical instruction in schools on these subjects, indispensable as they are to a good education. The book is therefore explicitly oftered to Tutors and Teachers as

A CLASS BOOK OF PHILOSOPHIC THEMES ;

and without presuming to dictate to those whose experience in the arduous business of education quahfies them to select the most efficient and practicable methods of instruction, the author suggests, that each pupil, having first been directed in what way to avail himself of the prefixed synthesis of terms, as a means of bringing together the several articles that are naturally related one to the other, should then (the books being laid aside) express, in writing, his sense of each article, and that, after a short interval, the class should be questioned on the chief points of the three branches of Intellectual

TO THE NINTH EDITION. Vll

Science ; as, for example, the Teacher asks for a definition of MIND, as distinguished from matter ; he next inquires what correspondence mind has with matter, and by what means, namely, the senses for perception, and the nervous muscular system for the exertion of its innate power of resisting and moving matter. He goes on to interrogate on the difference of those several states of the mind which connect it with the external world ; and in doing so will find it easy to render the subject at once intelligible and attractive by illustrations readily drawn from famihar experience, or from the regions of poetry.

A single branch of any of these subjects may be quite enough to fill the portion of time allotted to the exercise ; or the rule might be to assume the words belonging to one paragraph of the synthesis as the materials of each catechetical lecture. Thus, for instance, the terms of physical science (page 12) would be explained on one occasion, those belonging to the proof of historical facts (pages 12 and 13) on another ; and again the phrases of argumentation at a different time.

The author will only subjoin a hint to the Teacher on the importance of imparting to the pupil, and of maintaining in his own mind, a clear conception of the essential independency and dissimilarity of those three branches of study, namely — the science of the mind, or its Physiology — Metaphyics, or the philosophy of abstraction — and Logic, or the science and art of acquiring and communicating knowledge ; since from confounding these subjects, not only does the mind lose itself in endless obscurities, but is liable to practical mistakes, in matters of opinion, which are easily avoided if the distinction be kept in view.

Without attributing a paramount importance to the cultivation of Intellectual Science — physical or abstract — it may

Vm ADVERTISEMENT TO THE NINTH EDITION.

fairly be affirmed, that a well conducted and early initiation in this branch of philosophy secures a mental advantage of great practical value ; and which, if it were generally possessed, would go far in accelerating the universal diffusion of the highest Truths.

November, 1833.

SYNTHESIS,

SYSTEMATIC VIEW OF THE TERMS EXPLAINED IN THIS VOLUME.

The terms employed in the several departments of abstract and mental science are readily separable into Three Classes : —

The First Class, containing those which belong to the Physiology of the human Mind ; and which designate its several faculties, and modes of feeling, and acting ; such, for example, as sensation, emotion, iinagination, 8^c,

The Second Class comprehends those terms which represent purely abstract notions, such as essence, extension, space, power, substance, mode, 8^c., and which belong to Metaphysics.

The Third Class are those that express the operations of the Mind,' its methods, and its artificial processes, in acquiring and in communicating knowledge. These terms belong to Logic.

We have therefore before us — 1st. Mental Philosophy, which treats of the nature of the Mhid ;

2d. Metaphysics, or the science of Abstraction ;

3d. Logic, or the method of gaining knowledge for ourselves, and of conveying it to others.

CLASS L

TERMS BELONGING TO THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE MIND.

The Mind is that which feels, and knows, and thinks ; or which is conscious of existence ; and is distinguished from Matter, which affects the mind through the senses ; and is moved by the voluntary effort of the mind, exerted through the muscles.

That Consciousness of existence wliich belongs to the mind, and which extends without interruption from one period of life to another, imparts the notion and conviction of personal Identity.

The human Mind is distinguished from the brute mind, not only by the greater extent of its faculties, and especially of the faculty of

ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT.

abstraction ; but by its being guided, in almost all its operations, by its knowledge of the connexion of cause and effect : whereas, animals are more often guided bj an unknown influence, called Instinct, than by any calculation of means, as conducing to an end ; or by a knowledge of consequences. The words Reason and Instinct are used to express this important difference between man and animals. Whenever the state of the mind is changed by some cause exterior to itself it is said to be the subject of an Impression.

The Mind is conscious of impressions from the external world through the organs of sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch : changes in its feehngs, so produced, are called Sensations ; and when two or more sensations, coming from the same object, through different senses, lead the Mind to think of that object as an external cause of its feehngs, it is said to perceive, or to have a Perception. The recalling of a former perception, or sensation, is Conception. The mental image, so recalled, is an Idea ; and is distinguished from a Notion, which is a thought, purely mental or abstract.

Independently of any act or effort of the mind, there is incessantly going on within it a Succession of Ideas or emotioDS : and these

ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT.

ideas follow each other in consequence of some circumstance of real connexion, or of accidental relationship. This is called the Association OF Ideas. In other words, there is a something in each thought which brings some other before the mind ; this is Suggestion. When foruier perceptions or emotions recur to the mind, attended bj circumstances of time and placed we are said to remember; and the power of remembering is Memory.

The power which the mind possesses, not only o{ recalling ideas, or of having conceptions, but of separating such conceptions, and of recomposing them in new modes, is Imagination.

Besides impressions from the external world, received through the senses, the mind is Hable to feelings which arise from the several organs and functions of the body, such as its Appetites, and other corporeal sensations. It is moreover subject to states of feeling which, though belonging to the Mind, never take place without, at the same time, affecting the body, either in a gentler or a more violent degree : these feelings are called Emotions; such as love, hatred, fear, ivonder, S^c.

When the Mind acts in bringing together, comparing, or separating its ideas, or notions, it exerts its Intellectual powers. The emotion or desire to know, which is the immediate cause o[' this exertion, produces a continuance of certain ideas or notions in the mind, longer than they would continue in the ordinary course of the succession of ideas. This act, producing continued thought, is Attention.

If two or more objects or ideas are compared, and the relation between them is instantly perceived, the Mind is said to know by Intuition. When, either by such intuition, or by continued attention, the relation between two ideas is perceived, we are said to Apprehend.

Single properties, or sensible qualities of bodies, or the parts of complex notions, are thought of separately and apart from all other properties, by the power of Abstraction. This power is the principal distinction of the human Mind. The power of considering the qualities of things apart, leads to the process of combining them in new forms, called Invention.

Two or more objects or notions are detained before the Mind, and are compared the one with the other, and their agreement, or disagreement, or relative proportion, is ascertained by the faculty of Judgment.

Reasoning, is the bringing together a series of things, or notions, which are found to be

ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT.

successively dependent one upon the other, or between which there exists a real connexion.

The principal states and operations of the human Mind, considered in the simplest form, and apart from all the diversities, and peculiarities, and accidents to which, in individual cases, it is liable, are designated by the above-named terms.

CLASS II.

ABSTRACT OF METAPHYSICAL TERMS.

The notions which are the subject of the science called Metaphysics, all result from the faculty of Abstraction ; as, for example, when various objects are perceived, and compared, . which agree in form, we think of form apart from colour, hardness, S^c, and then think of the several sorts of form, or figure ; as rounds square, &^c. And in the same way the notions of the mind are separated, and compared, and analysed, and combined. These abstract notions, as they are less instantly inteUigible, or less readily compared than sensible images, are often called Abstruse.

From our own consciousness, after separating from it all idea or recollection of particular states, or emotions, we derive the simple abstract notion of Existence ; otherwise called Being.

All the sensible and inseparable properties of anything, thought of together, constitute its Nature, or Essence ; and we think of this nature, as containing a hidden something, called Substance ; which supports or sustains, first, its Primary qualities, or those essential to it ; and then its Secondary qualities, which are imagined to be separable.

These qualities are the Modes, or Affections, or Attributes, or Adjuncts, or Accidents, of the substance in which they are found. The entire collection of properties belonging to a substance forms the Aggregate. 1 he qualities spoken of as so associated are Concrete ; and a being, or a notion, consisting of parts or qualities that may be abstracted (in idea) one from the other, is Complex.

The thinking of two things or notions together, comparing the one with the other, gives the notion of Relation ; which may be the relation of Agree?ne7it, or of Difference, or of Proportion, or of Power.

The thought of a quality as present, or as removed, and absent, suggests the relative notions of Positive and Negative modes.

The acquaintance which the mind gains with matter, by its own sensations, leads it to form a notion from which all particular forms, colors, and other variable qualities, are withdrawn, and which we call Extension. Removing again from this notion all idea of the sensible properties of matter, we acquire the simple abstract notion of Space. By a similar process our general consciousness of continued existence, apart from particular events, suggests the notion of Duration. Extension or duration, without limit, is Infinite.

The consciousness which the Mind has of its ability to control its own states, and to move the body, gives the notion of Power, Whatever possesses, or is supposed to possess Power, is called Active : that which is acted upon is Passive. That which exerts Power, or which by a natural prejudice, is thought to exert power, is a cause ; and the change produced is an Effect. Cause and Effect, thought of as simply connected in time, are called Antecedent, and consequent. Where a similar order of causes is supposed to exist in different classes of beings, the resemblance or sameness is expressed by the word Analogy.

Power, operating without restraint,is Liberty. The existence of restraint ; or, as sometimes, the infallible connexion of causes and effects, is

ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT.

called Necessity, and is opposed to Contingency; which means the absence of any real or settled connexion of causes and effects.

When the established order of causes and effects is calculated upon, and causes are put in operation with an express view to obtain the effects they will produce, this intelligent exercise of power is Design. Supposed connexions of cause and effect, thought of as contradictory, or absurd ; or not so, give the notions of Possibility, and Impossibility. An effect w^iich will not take place, unless a certain cause is assumed as present, is Conditional.

This synthesis of abstract terms might be enlarged, almost without end; but it is here purposely confined to the few which are either of principal importance, or which most frequently occur in metaphysical discussions.

CLASS III.

LOGICAL TERMS.

Truths which are not intuitively perceived, must be ascertained by successive efforts of the mind : or when ascertained, must be communicated to others in successive portions. These methods of thinking and of discoursing, together with the states of the mind in relation to the subjects of its knowledge, are designated by the following terms, which may be arranged under four heads : — 1st. Those which belong to the separation and sorting of ideas or notions. 2d. Those that relate to the discovery of the laws of nature, and belong to physical science. 3d. The terms that are connected with the proof of historical facts. 4th. The terms of reasoning by the statement of successive propositions.

]st. Terms of separation and sorting, and which belong in part to the discovery, but more to the conveyance and preservation of knowledge.

Generally, any placing of multifarious things in sets or in series, for the ease of the mind in thinking, or in learning, is Method; of which Order is either the means, or the end, according to the sense in which that word is understood. The least artificial kind of method is that of mere Division ; which reduces many to a few parcels. But if many things are sorted with some reference (more or less accurate) to their real differences, then the sorting is called an Arrange MEMT (in reference to things) ; or a Disposition (in reference to thoughts). After an arrangement has been planned, the things for which it is intended are assigned to their places by Distribution.

A more exact or philosophical sorting of things or notions, is effected, first by an effort of abstraction which, when completed, in relation to a complex body or notion, is an Analysis. After an analysis has been completed the parts or qualities which have been taken asunder, may be re-composed : this is Synthesis.

When organized bodies (especially) which in some things are alike, and in some unlike, are sorted according: to their resemblances and differences, the process is Classification. The larger sets or sorts are genera; and the smaller species. Words representing many individuals sorted together, are common teRiMs. A question concerning the objects of common terms, gave rise to the distinction of Nominal and Real.

A Definition is the naming of the larger sort, or genus, to which any thing belongs; and then of that Difference which is the Distinction, between it, and others of the same genus. To mention more differences than is essential to a Definition, is to give a Description.

2d. The principal terms employed in relation to the discovery of the laws of nature, or the terms of physical science, fire these : — •

Any natural fact or event, considered as an object of philosophical curiosity, is a Phenomenon ; or facts known, and which are to be explained, are Data. The supposition formed concerning the cause of a phenomenon, is an Hypothesis. A complete set or system of such suppositions, is a Theory. A trial made for the purpose of discovering the cause of an effect, and which is guided by some hypothesis, is an Experiment. The inferring of general facts, or the laws of nature, from many particular facts, is Induction ; and the expressing or sorting of such laws is Generalization. General and well-established truths, in matters of natural philosophy, are Science. Special truths, appUed to human industry, constitute an Art.

3d. The terms belonging to the proof of historical or particular facts, are these : —

The subject of enquiry is — a Fact, or actual event, not known to us by personal observation. In support of the affirmation that such an event has taken place, w^e seek for Evidence, which may be either human Testimony, or other facts, whence an inference may be drawn, bearing upon the matter in question. If this evidence is conclusive, it produces Belief: or if insufficient, Doubt : and then the fact has attached to it, in our minds, the idea of Probability, or the reverse.

If the matter in question be rather an abstract principle, than a matter of historical fact, it is estabhshed by Argument ; or if susceptible of absolute proof, by Demonstration. The conviction produced by good argument is Opinion : or if that conviction be influenced by improper motives, it is Prejudice. A deceptive or unsound argument, is a Fallacy ; and if employed for the purpose of deluding those to whom it is addressed, it is a Sophism.

4th. The terms employed in establishing a truth by the real connexion of a series of propositions, or Reasoning, are these : —

That which is the object of the process is Truth. Truths when so evident as to be incapable of being made more so, are Axioms. Axioms from w^hich many inferences are to be derived, are Principles. All reasoning is carried on by the means of words, or other arbitrary Signs.

One thing affirmed or denied, concerning another, is a Proposition. The words expressing these two things aud their connexion, are the Terms. Terms which may be exchanged, one for another, without destroying the truth of an affirmation, are Convertible. Terms which imply, one the other, are Correlative.

A positive and unconditional proposition is Categorical. A proposition which offers for choice one affirmation of two, is a Dilemma. Propositions are either Affirmative, or Negative ; Indefinite, Disjunctive, or Universal.

The thing concerning whicii an affirmation or negation is made, is the Subject of a proposition. The thing affirmed is the Predicate.

The connecting of propositions, for the purpose of exhibiting the relation which subsists between them, is a Syllogism ; in which the facts granted are called the premises ; the fact inferred — the Conclusion ; or the three connected propositions, are called the Major, Minor, and Middle terms.

VOCABULARY, &c.

ABSTRACTION.

From Ahstraho, to draw ofjf, or to draw apart ; or to separate and take away one thing from among a number.

Things that differ very greatly, one from another, are often found to be aUke in some single quality ; and when this one quality is distinctly taken notice of, we readily learn to think of it apart from the other quahties with which it may have been joined ; and tiius the mind acquires the habit of drawing o^ certain properties of things, and of giving names to them : this habit is called abstraction ; and the words employed on such occasions are called abstract terms.

There are, for instance, placed before us, a cricket-ball, a marble, a glass bubble, an apple, and an orange ; and we are asked if these things are ahke ; we answer, No : for the first is brown, and may be indented ; the second is heavy, and impenetrable ; the third is transparent, and fragile, and light ; the fourth is green and pulpy ; the fifth is yellow and fragrant. But is there then no respect wherein they are alike ? Yes ; they are alike in shape, or form — they are round. Roundness then is the quality or circumstance in which these five objects agree, and which may be thought of, and spoken of, apart from the iveight, hardness^ color, or smell, of these five things. Thus we have obtained two abstract ideas — namely, that of form or figure, and that of roundness ; roundness being a particular sort of form. Examples of this kind are easily multiplied ; we will take another. Water, and glass, and spirits, and diamonds, admit the rays of light to pass through them; so that objects may be discerned almost as clearly when they iatervene, as w^hen they are removed. Some other bodies possess the same quality in a less degree ; such as amber, and the amethyst, and the ruby, &c. We want a name for this property, belonging as it does to things so different as water, glass, and stones; and we call it Transparency.

Each of the five senses has its class of abstractions ; that is to say, each sense separates single qualities from other qualities, discerned by itself, or by other senses. The eye separates redness from yellowness, or whiteness, &c., and brightness from duhiess ; — and again separates colom* from figure, and it separates colour and figure from the notions obtained bj the other senses, such as hardness, or weight, or fragrancj, or fluidity. The sense of taste not only distinguishes sour from sweet and bitter, but separates them from the qualities that are made known to the mind by the sense of touch, as heat and cold, asperity and softness, &c.

Thus it is that likeness, or sameness of quality, in things otherwise unlike, leads the mind to form abstract notions, and to use abstract words. But having acquired this habit, it employs the power of separation in many other instances than those that belong to the five senses : — for example. If a man restores freely the property of another, which he could not have been compelled to relinquish ; or if he speaks the exact truth when it might have been advantageous to him to utter a falsehood ; or if in any way he regards the welfare of other men, when he is tempted to secure his own benefit, w-e form a notion which we separate from the particular circumstances that may have belonged to the man's conduct ; — we feel that there is a pecuHar quality, that belongs to his conduct, on all these several occasions, and we call it — Integritj ; and the so acting is-— -Justice. Justice is not the name of one action, or of one kind of action ; but of the abstract notion which belongs to any action wherein a man pays strict regard to the rights and property of others. Or, if, in his actions, he goes beyond what might have been demanded of him ; — -if he prefers the w^elfare of his neighbour to his own ; then we form the notion of another sort of quahty, and call it — Generosity, or kindness. And in any new instance, even if all the circumstances are diiferent, yet if a friend or stranger confers upon us a benefit which he might properly have withheld, we are reminded of the notion we had before formed, and call the action or the person generous.

Some abstract notions are simple ; that is to say, they cannot be described or made known otherwise than by single words, or by pointing to the objects in which they are to be seen or felt. Such are, redness^ whiteness, heat, cold, siveetness, pleasure, pain, and many others. If the person to whom we would convey our meaning has never himself perceived the quality we are speaking of, we cannot impart to him our idea by words : or if he does not understand the word we first use, we must find some other, of the same meaning; — if he does not know what the word pain means, w^e must try the word dolor, or some other; but if lie have never felt pain, the most ingenious description of it would be utterly useless.

But there are abstract notions that are Complex, or made up of two or more ideas ; and may therefore be described by mentioning those constituent ideas. Thus in the instances already mentioned. Justice may be described as the paying a strict regard to the rights and interests of others ; or the not preferring our own welfare to that of others. Generosity is the conferring of benefits upon others beyond what they could claim. Form or figure is the relation to each other of the several surfaces of a solid body. Distance is extension between two points, divided into parts, and numbered. Place is the relation between one point and some other points on a smface. Perfection is the existence, together, of all the parts or properties that are assigned to some complex body or being. Design is the relation of all the parts of a complex body to the last effect which it is intended to produce. Truth is the relation of sameness between things and our notions of them ; or betw^een notions and thoughts, and our affirmations. Liberty is the absence of restraint upon choice or action. Necessity is the certain connexion between cause and effect. In all such instances there is a notion conveyed by the word we employ which admits of being resolved into two or more ideas.