The elements of mental and moral philosophy : founded upon experience, reason and the Bible

Front matter

A, f

THE

OVP INA/ fe tee 25

Chapter III

Cenception and Memory, . o Mos eon eee CHAPTER IV.

Attention and Abstraction, aie ings sine is ns CHAPTER V.

Association, “Soa eee CHAPTER VI.

Susceptibilities, A

CHAPTER IX.

Susceptibilities. Emotions of Taste, . : CHAPTER X.

Intuitive Belief, ee er ees CHAPTER XiIil.

Rational Belief, av ag rete ae he tae CHAPTER XIV.

Language. Interpretation of Language, CHAPTER XV.

Language. Classification of Language, CHAPTER XVI.

Sources of Knowledge, . . ..... .

vul CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XVIII.

On the Authority, Integrity and correct Translation of the English

CHAPTER XVII. Page.

Bible, Sune eT ee este ema - 192 CHAPTER XIX.

On Knowledge gained by Revelation, - 210 CHAPTER XxX.

On Knowledge gained by Revelation. (Continued.) . 223 CHAPTER XXI.

Object of the Formation of Mind, . . . . . . 243 CHAPTER XXII.

Mode of Securing the Object of the Formation of Mind, - 249 CHAPTER XXIII.

The Mind of Man disordered, . . . .. . . 255 CHAPTER XXIV.

Mode of Restoring a disordered Mind, wee CHAPTER XXV.

On the Divine Mind, eke eee 5 ree) CHAPTER XXVI.

CHAPTER XXVII.

The Divine Law the directory for Securing the Object of the Formation of Mind,

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Consequences in a Future State of the disordered operation of Mind, CHAPTER XXIX.

Causes why the Remedy for the disordered operation of Mind is not Secured by Mankind, ;

CHAPTER XXX.

On Right and Wrong, Virtue and Vice,

CHAPTER XXXI.

On the Cultivation of the Intellect, Susceptibilities, Will, and Habits, .

; CHAPTER XXXII.

On the operation of the Physical System uponthe Mind, . ... .

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Education according to the Laws of Mind, and the Principles of the Bible, 427

MENTAL .PHILOSOPHY. >

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Chapter I. : Classification Of Mental Phenomena

Au existence of which the mind of man can form any conception, may be divided into two classes, viz. Matter and Mind. These are distinguished from each other by their qualities.

Matter is that which has the qualities of figure, divisibility, extension, inertia, and attraction.

Mind is that which thinks, feels, and wills.

The science which treats of the various phenomena of Matter, is called Natural Philosophy.

The science which treats of the phenomena of Mind is

‘called Mental Philosophy. That part of Mental Philosophy, which treats of the duties of man to his Creator, to himself, and to his fellow beings, is called Moral Philosophy.

In treating of the various phenomena of mind, all mental philosophers have recognized specific operations of mind, such as Memory, Abstraction, &c., and also a generic classification which includes several specific exercises.

The most general classification of mental phenomena is that which in the common language of life, divides the operations of mind into the three general classes, thoughts, feelings, and choice.

The same classification has generally been adopted by most writers on Mental Philosophy ; who have varied from common language, and from each other, chiefly in the names employed, rather than in the principles of classification. °

~ io CLASSIFICATION OF

That class of mental phenomena which is called thoughts, i common language, by mental philosophers has been denominated, the Understanding, the Reason, the Reasoning Powers. the Intellect, and the Intellectual Powers.

That class of mental phenomena called in common language the Feelings, writers on Mental Philosophy denominate the

_Affections, the Susceptibilities, the Heart, and the Active Powers.

The power of choice is commonly called the Will, and by some writers it is placed as a separate faculty of mind, and by some it is classed among the Feelings or Affections.

In this work the names which will be employed in designating the generic classification will be, the Intellectual Powers, the Susceptibilities, and the Will.

There is still another general classification which has been recognized.

It is found that thoughts, feelings, and acts of choice, (or volitions,) arise in the mind in two ways, as produced by material objects acting on the senses, and as originating in fhe mind, without being caused by the senses. ;

Those ideas, that are obtained through the aid of the senses, are, by Locke and others, called edeas of sensation. By Brown and Payne, they are called external affections, because caused by external objects.

Those ideas, which originate without the intervention of the senses, are Called ideas of reflection, by Locke ; and by Brown internal states, because originating in the mind, without the intervention of the senses.

In this work the classification of Locke will be retained, viz. ideas of sensation, and ideas of reflection.

Intellectual Powers.

Under the general class of intellectual powers are arranged the following specific acts of mind. ©

MENTAL PHENOMENA. Ti

1. Sensation. 2. Perception. 3. Conception. 4. Imagmation. 5. Memory. 6. Association. 7. Attention. 8. Judgment. 9. Abstraction. 10. Consciousness.

Sensation, is a state of mind produced by material ehicets acting on the senses.

Thus, when light, which is considered as one kind of matter, affects the eye, the sensation of sight is produced. When the perfume of a rose, which is another species of matter, affects the organ of smell, another kind of sensation is produced. When a bell or some musical instrument causes the air to vibrate on the drum of the ear, it causes the sensation of sound. When any sapid body is applied to the tongue, the sensation of taste is caused.. When the hand, or any part of the body, comes in contact with another body, the sensation of touch is produced.

Thus it appears that the five senses are the organs of sensation, and that through their mstrumentality material things operate upon the mind.

Perception, is a sensation attended by the belief of a cause ; and it is this additional circumstance alone, which distinguishes perception from sensation.

_If a person were asleep, and should suffer from the prick of a pin, or be disturbed by an unpleasant sound, these would be mere sensations, because the mind would not ascribe them to any cause. But if the person should waken, these sensations would immediately become perceptions, because they would be attended by the belief of some cause.

Conception, is a state of mind similar to perception, and differs from it in being less vivid, and in not being produced through the medium of the senses.

When we look at a tree, we have a perception of this object. But the mind can also have an idea of this tree when removed from the sight, though the idea is not so vivid and distinct, nor have the senses any agency in producing it. The perfume of a rose also, occasions another sensation ; but when the rose Is

Pome 2]

CLASSITICATION OF removed so as not to affect the senses, we can still have a conception of its perfume. The conception differs from the perception only in being less vivid, and in not being caused by a material object acting on the senses.

Memory, is either a conception or a perception, which is attended with a fecling of its resemblance to a past state of mind. It is this feeling of resemblance that is the only circumistance which distinguishes memory from conception.

Thus we can conceive of a tree, without recognizing it as the particular idea of any tree we may have seen before ; but if with this conception is a feeling of the resemblance of this idea to the one we always have when we see the tree that shadows the paternal roof, this conception becomes memory. If we conceive the form of a man, without recognizing the resemblance of this idea to the perceptions we have when we see any particular man, this is a simple act of conception ; but if we recognize. in this object of conception, the features of a dear friend, this act then becomes memory. Again, if we conceive of certain events and circumstances attending them, without recognizing this combination as ever having existed in past experience, they are mere conceptions that arise before the mind ; but if we recognize in these conceptions, the events and circumstances of past experience, conception becomes memory.

Imagination, is the power which the mind possesses of arranging our conceptions in new combinations. We can conceive objects as united together, of which we never conceived before, as thus united.

Thus when we read the description of some picturesque scene in nature, the mind immediately groups together mountains, trees, brooks, cottages, and glens, forming a new combination of conceptions different from any scene we ever witnessed or conceived of before. All the objects thus combined are conceptions, the act-of arranging them is an act of the imagination.

MENTAL PHENOMENA. *i3

Judgment, is the power which the mind possesses, of noticing relations. <A relation is an idea obtained by observing one thing in connection with another. Thus when we perceive one thing to be longer than another, one thing to be on another, or one thing to belong to another, in all these cases the mind notices relations, or exercises the faculty of judgment. Thus also, when we compare any action with the rule of duty in order to decide whether it is right or wrong, we exercise the same faculty. This act always is necessarily preceded by the comparison of one thing with another, m order to notice the relations.

Abstraction, is the power of noticing certain parts or qualities of any object, as distinct from other parts or qualities. Thus when we notice the length of a bridge without attending to the breadth or colour, or when we notice the heighth of a aman, without thinking of his character, we exercise the faculty of abstraction.

Attention, is the direction of the mind to any particular object or quality, from the interest which is felt in it, or in something connected with it. The degree of attention is always proportioned to the degree of interest felt in the object.

Association, is the power possessed by the mind of recalling ideas in the connections and relations in which they have existed in past experience. For example, when any two objects of sense, such as a house and a tree, have often been observed together, the idea of one will ordinarily be attended by that of the other. If two events have often been united together in regard to the time of their occurrence, such, for example, as thunder and lightning, the idea of one will usually be attended by the other.

Consciousness, is the knowledge which the mind has of its own states and operations.

Susceptibilities.

The feelings or susceptibilities of the mind may be divided into two general classes : viz. pleasurable and painful.

14 CLASSIFICATION oF

All our emotions are either of one or the other class, and | derive their different names, either from the causes which produce them, the circumstances which attend them, or the effects they produce.

There are several terms which signify simply a pleasurable state of mind, without reference to the causes or effects, such as pleasure, satisfaction, enjoyment, &e.

There are other terms which signify simply a painful state of mind without reference to any other circumstances, such as pain, sorrow, grief, affliction, &c.

The following are pleasurable states of mind, including the idea of some cause, effect or circumstance connected with them.

Hope is a pleasurable state of mind arising from a view of some good, which is desired and expected. Lsteem, love, veneration and reverence are pleasurable emotions in view of certain qualities in intelligent minds. Gratitude is a pleasurable emotion occasioned by receiving some benefit from another. Emotions of taste are caused by exhibitions of beauty, grandeur, novelty, order, and fitness, of design, or of conduct. Surprise, wonder, astonishment, and admiration, are some of the specific names of the emotions of taste. Emotions of the ludicrous, produce laughter. Pleaswrable moral emotions are such as are caused by viewing any action of our own, or of others, as right or virtuous.

The following are names of certain painful states of mind, which include some idea, either of the causes, effects, or circumstances connected with them.

Pity or compassion is a painful state of mind in view of some object which is suffering pain or sorrow. Repentance and remorse are painful states of mind caused by viewing our own conduct as wrong. Fear is a painful state of mind occasioned by foreseeing some future suffering either to ourselves _ or others. Envy is a painful emotion in view of certain happiness possessed by others of which we are destitute. Anger,

MENTAL PHENOMENA. 15 wrath, fury and rage are painful states of mind occasioned by some evil inflicted on ourselves or others, and is attended by a desire of evil to the author. Malice, spite, hatred, and mahgnity are painful states of mind occasioned by a desire of evil to others. Jealousy is a painful state of mind occasioned by seeing the affection we desire withheld from us, and given to another. Desperation and despair are painful states of mind occasioned by the loss of all hope of future good.

Sympathy is the power the mind possesses of experiencing such emotions as are realized to exist in another mind.

Desire is a state of mind which is caused by the view of a certain object which has been the cause of enjoyment, or which it is believed can become so.

Emotions is another name for feelings or susceptibilities.

Other Mental Phenomena, not usually classified.

Instinct, a desire awakened in the mind to do a certain action, without any knowledge from past experience of the good it will secure.

Habit, a tendency of the mind to perform certain acts, or a facility in performing them acquired by the previous repetition of such acts.

Dreams. The conceptions of the mind during sleep.

Excited conceptions. Uncommon modes of conception, erdinarily occasioned by some derangement of the animal system.

Mental alienation, or derangement, the state of mind which is unnatural, and in which the laws of mental phenomena seem destroyed.

Belief is a state of mind caused by evidence.

On the Definitions and Classification of Mental Philosophy.

» Inregard to definitions, Mental Philosophy has this advantage over every other science, that the ideas to be defined i6 CLASSIFICATION OF already exist in the mind, so that nothing is wanting, but such a description as will enable a person to determine, in what circumstances, or at what times, the given state of mind occurs, without making it necessary to express its nature and quality by language. In attempting to define on other subjects new combinations of ideas are to be conveyed, and there is danger of deception in definitions. But in regard to the acts and emotions of the mind, nothing is wanting but to ascertain which specific exercise is intended, and then to apply the name.

‘This consideration obviates the difficulties which many seem to feel, both in regard to the propriety of the names given, and of the terms used in describing the states of the mind intended. For if the person, who seeks to understand the science can receive such a description of any particular state of mind, as to ascertain what one is intended by the writer, it is of little consequence what name is given, or what definition is employed. The mind of the individual is conscious of the nature of the idea intended, and no name or description can deceive him as to its nature. All that should be aimed at in a definition, is such a description as enables the reader to determine what particular state of mind is intended. In regard to this classification of the powers and operations of mind, it may be remarked, that writers on Mental Philosophy have differed, not only in reference to the names employed, but also as to the propriety of the modes of classification.

The most general classification, viz. the Intellectual Powers, the Susceptibilities, and the Will, is one which has been recognized in almost all languages, and by most writers on this subject. Some however have placed the W7ll in the class of the Susceptibilities, considering it the same as Desire.

Some writers have chosen to simplify, and resolve Conception, Memory, and Imagination, into one faculty called Memory. Others choose to subdivide still more and provide different operations of memory with separate names.

MENTAL PHENOMENA. 17

Brown resolves all the intellectual powers except Perception into two, which he calls Simple Suggestion, and Relative

Suggestion ;—which names represent the same states as Conception and Judgment. Conception, he calls Simple Suggestion, and Judgment, he calls Relative Suggestion.

It doubtless is true, that all ideas which are not perceptions, are conceptions, and that conceptions are some of them, attended by feelings of relations, and some are not. But seeing that there really does exist such distinctions between Memory, Conception, Imagination, Abstraction, &c. as has been pointed out, and that names have been given, recognizing these distinctions, and universally incorporated into both written and spoken language, it seems useless and impracticable to attempt, either to destroy these distinctions, or banish the terms which recognize them. It will be as unavailing as attempting to destroy the classification of the animal world, by showing that there was a foundation for reducing a certain portion of animals to two classes, guadrupeds and bipeds, and that therefore all more specific names and classification should be given up.

It seems to be too late to quarrel either with the classification or the names employed in this science. All that is now to be done by the student is, to discover what operations of mind are intended, and the various names used to designate them, and thus learn to attach the right idea to the several terms.

In doing this, it will be found that most writers on this subject, though they differ as to the expediency of names and classification, all agree in attaching the same meaning to the terms employed, when they use them. It is believed the preceding definitions will be found sanctioned by the most approved writers on this subject.