The elementary forms of the religious life, a study in religious sociology

Introduction

Subject of our Study : Religious Sociology and the Theory of

Knowledge

I. — Principal subject of the book : analysis of the simplest religion known to determine the elementary forms of the religious life — Why they are more easily found and explained in the primitive religions

II. — Secondary subject of research : the genesis of the fundamental notions of thought or the categories — Reasons for believing that their origin is religious and consequently social — How a way of restating the theory of knowledge is thus seen .....

CHAPTER I Definition of Religious Phenomena and of Religion

Usefulness of a preliminary definition of religion ; method to be followed in seeking this definition — Why the usual definitions should be examined first .......... 23

I. — Religion defined by the supernatural and mysterious — Criticism : the

notion of mystery is not primitive . . . . . . .24

II. — Religion defined in connection with the idea of God or a spiritual being. — Religions without gods — Rites in deistic religions which imply no idea of divinity .......... 29

III. — Search for a positive definition — Distinction between beliefs and rites — Definition of beliefs — First characteristic : division of things between sacred and profane — Distinctive characteristics of this definition — Definition of rites in relation to beliefs — Definition of religion ........... 36

IV. — Necessity of another characteristic to distinguish magic from religion — The idea of the Church — Do individualistic religions exclude the idea of a Church ?......,.. 42

I. — Animism

Distinction of animism and naturism ....... 48

I. — The three theses of animism : Genesis of the idea of the soul ; Formation of the idea of spirits ; Transformation of the cult of spirits into the cult of nature .......... 49

A 2 V vi Contents

PAGE

II. — Criticism of the first thesis — Distinction of the idea of the soul from

that of a double — Dreams do not account for the idea of the soul , 55

III. — Criticism of the second thesis — Death does not explain the transformation of a soul into a spirit — The cult of the souls of the dead is not primitive .......... 60

IV. — Criticism of the third thesis — The anthromoporphic instinct — Spencer's criticism of it ; reservations on this point — Examination of the facts by which this instinct is said to be proved — Difference between a soul and the spirits of nature — Religious anthropomorphism is not primitive .......... 65

V. — Conclusion : animism reduces religion to nothing more than a system

of hallucinations .......... 68

Leading Conceptions of the Elementary Religion — {continued)

II. — Naturism

History of the theory .......... 71

I. — Exposition of Max Miiller's naturism ...... 73

II. — If the object of religion is to express natural forces, it is hard to see how it has maintained itself, for it expresses them in an erroneous manner — Pretended distinction between religion and mythology . 78

III. — Naturism does not explain the division of things into sacred and

I. — Brief history of the question of totemism ...... 88

II. — Reasons of method for which our study will be given specially to the totemism of Australia — The place which will be given to facts from America . . . . . . . . . . .93

Book II The Elementary Beliefs

CHAPTER I ToTEMic Beliefs The Totem as Name and as Emblem I. — Definition of the clan — The totem as name of the clan — Nature of the things which serve as totems — Ways in which the totem is acquired — The totems of phratries ; of matrimonial classes . . . .102

II. — The totem as emblem — Totemic designs engraved or carved upon

objects; tatooings or designs upon the body . . . . .113

III. — ^Sacred character of the totemic emblem — The churinga — The

nurtunja — The waninga — Conventional character of totemic emblems 119

Totemic Beliefs — {continued) The Totemic Animal and Man I. — Sacred character of the totemic animals — Prohibition to eat them, kill them or pick the totemic plants — Different moderations given these prohibitions — Prohibition of contact — The sacred character of the animal is less marked than that of the emblem . . . .128

Contents vii

PAGE

IL — The man — His relationship with the totemic animal or plant — Different myths explaining this relationship — The sacred character of the man is more apparent in certain parts of the organism : the blood, hair, etc. — How this character varies with sex and age — Totemism is not plant or animal worship . , . . .134

Totemic Beliefs — {continued) The Cosmological System of Totemism and the Idea of Class I. — The classification of things into clans, phratries and classes . . 141

II. — Genesis of the notion of class : the first classifications of things take their forms from society — Difi^erences between the sentiment of the difierences of things and the idea of class — Why this is of social origin 144 III. — Religious significance of these classifications : all of the things classified into a clan partake of the nature of the totem and its sacred character — The cosmological system of totemism — Totemism as the tribal religion . . . . . . . . . .148

Toxemic Beliefs — {end) The Individual Totem, and the Sexual Totem

I. — Individual totem as a forename ; its sacred character — Individual totem as personal emblem — Bonds between the man and his individual totem — Relations with the collective totem . . . .157

II. — The totems of sexual groups — Resemblances and differences with the

collective and individual totems — Their tribal nature . . .165

CHAPTER V

Origins of these Beliefs Critical Examination of Preceding Theories

I. — Theories which derive totemism from a previous religion : from the ancestor cult (Wilken and Tylor) ; from the nature cult (Jevons) — Criticism of these theories . . . . . . . .168

II. — Theories which derive collective totemism from individual totemism — Origins attributed by these theories to the individual totem (Frazer, Boas, Hill Tout) — Improbability of these hypotheses — Reasons showing the priority of the collective totem . . . . .172

III. — Recent theory of Frazer : conceptional and local totemism— The begging of the question upon which it rests — The religious character of the totem is denied — Local totemism is not primitive . . .180

IV. — Theory of Lang : that the totem is only a name — Difiiculties in explaining the religious character of totemic practices from this point of view . . . . . . . . . . .184

V. — All these theories explain totemism only by postulating other religious

notions anterior to it . . . . . . . . .186

CHAPTER VI

Origins of these Beliefs — {continued)

The Notion of the Totemic Principle, or Mana, and the Idea of Force

I. — The notion of the totemic force or principle — Its ubiquity — Its

character at once physical and moral • . . . . .188 viii Contents

PAGB

II. — x\nalogous conceptions in other inferior societies — The gods in Samoa, the wakan of the Sioux, the orenda of the Iroquios, the mana of Melanesia — Connection of these notions with totemism — The Arunkulta of the Arunta ......... 191

III. — Logical priority of impersonal force over the different mythical

personalities — Recent theories which tend to admit this priority . 198

IV. — The notion of religious force is the prototype of that of force in

CHAPTER VII

Origins of these Beliefs — [end) Origin of the Idea of the Toiemic Principle or Mana

I. — The totemic principle is the clan, but thought of under a more empirical

II. — General reasons for which society is apt to awaken the sensation of the sacred and the divine — Society as an imperative moral force ; the notion of moral authority — Society as a force which raises the individual outside of himself — Facts which prove that society creates the sacred ........... 206

III. — Reasons peculiar to Australian societies — The two phases through which the life of these societies alternatively passes : dispersion, concentration— Great collective effervescence during the periods of concentration — Examples — How the religious idea is bom out of this effervescence .......... 214

Why collective force has been thought of under totemic forms : it is the totem that is the emblem of the clan — Explanation of the principal totemic beliefs .......... 219

IV. — Religion is not the product of fear — It expresses something real — Its essential idealism — This idealism is a general characteristic of collective mentality — Explanation of the external character of religious forces in relation to their subjects — The principle that the part is equal to the whole ........... 223

V. — Origin of the notion of emblem : emblems a necessary condition of collective representations — Why the clan has taken its emblems from the animal and vegetable kingdoms ...... 230

VI. — The proneness of the primitive to confound the kingdoms and classes which we distinguish — Origins of these confusions — How they have blazed the way for scientific explanations — They do not exclude the tendency towards distinction and opposition . . . 234

CHAPTER VIII The Idea of the Soul

I. — Analysis of the idea of the soul in the Australian societies . . . 240

II. — Genesis of this idea — The doctrine of reincarnation according to Spencer and Gillen : it implies that the soul is a part of the totemic principle — Examination of the facts collected by Strehlow ; they confirm the totemic nature of the soul ...... 246

III. — Generality of the doctrine of reincarnation — Diverse facts in support

of the proposed genesis ........ 256

IV. — Antithesis of the soul and the body : what there is objective in this — Relations of the individual soul with the collective soul — The idea of the soul is not chronologically after that of mana .... 262

V. — Hypothesis to explain the belief in its survival .... 267

VI. — The idea of a soul and the idea of a person ; impersonal elements in

the personality .......... 269

Contents ix

CHAPTER IX The Idea of Spirits and Gods

PAGE

I. — Difference between a soul and a spirit — The souls of the mythical ancestors are spirits, having determined functions — Relations between the ancestral spirit, the individual soul and the individual totem — Explanation of this latter — Its sociological significance . . . 273

II. — Spirits and magic ......... «8i

III. — The civilizing heroes ......... «83

IV. — The great gods — Their origin — Their relations with the totemic

system — Their tribal and international character . . . .285

V. — Unity of the totemic system ........ 295

Book III The Principal Ritual Attitudes Chapter I

The Negative Cult and its Functions The Ascetic Rites

I. — The system of interdictions — Magic and religious interdictions — Interdictions between sacred things of different sorts — Interdictions between sacred and profane — These latter are the basis of the negative cult — Leading types of these interdictions ; their reduction to two essential types .......... «99

II. — The observance of interdictions modifies the religious state of indivividuals — Cases where this efficacy is especially apparent : ascetic practices — The religious ef&cacy of sorrow — Social function of asceticism ........... 309

III. — Explanation of the system of interdictions : antagonism of the

sacred and the profane, contagiousness of the sacred . . .317

IV. — Causes of this contagiousness — It cannot be explained by the laws of the association of ideas — It is because religious forces are outside of their subjects — Logical interest in this property of religious forces 321

The Positive Cult

I. — The Elements of Sacrifice

The Intichiuma ceremony in the tribes of Central Australia — Different

forms which it presents . . . . . . . .326

I. — The Arunta Form — ^The two phases — Analysis of the first : visit to sacred places, scattering of sacred dust, shedding of blood, etc., to assure the reproduction of the totemic species . . . -327

II. — Second phase : ritual consumption of the totemic plant or animal . 333

III. — Interpretation of the complete ceremony — The second rite consists

in a communion meal — Reason for this communion . . -33^

IV. — The rites of the first phase consists in oblations — Analogies with sacrificial oblations — The Intichiuma thus contains the two elements of sacrifice — Interest of these facts for the theory of sacrifice . . 340

V. — On the pretended absurdity of sacrificial oblations — How they are explained : dependence of sacred beings upon their worshippers — Explanation of the circle in which sacrifice seems to move — Origin of the periodicity of positive rites ....... 344

X Contents

CHAPTER III The Positive Cult — (continued) II. — Imitative Rites and the Principle of Causality ^^^^

I. — Nature of the imitative rites- — Examples of ceremonies where they

are employed to assure the fertility of the species , . . .351

II. — They rest upon the principle : like produces like — Examination of the explanation of this given by the anthropological school — -Reasons why they imitate the animal or plant — Reasons for attributing a physical efficacy to these gestures — Faith — In what sense it is founded upon experience — The principles of magic are born in religion . . . 355

III. — The preceding principle considered as one of the first statements of the principle of causality — Social conditions upon which this latter depends — The idea of impersonal force or power is of social origin — The necessity for the conception of causality explained by the authority inherent in social imperatives ...... 362

The Positive Cult — [continued) III. — Representative or Commemorative Rites

I. — Representative rites with physical efScacy — Their relations with the

ceremonies already described — Their action is wholly moral . . 371

II. — Representative rites without physical efficacy — They confirm the preceding results — The element of recreation in religion : its importance ; its reason for existence — The idea of a feast . . . 376

III. — Ambiguity of function in the various ceremonies studied ; they substitute themselves for each other — How this ambiguity confirms the theory proposed . . . . . . . . . 383

CHAPTER V PiAcuLAR Rites and the Ambiguity of the Notion of Sacredness Definition of the piacular rite ........ 389

I. — Positive rites of mourning — Description of these rites . . . 390

II. — How they are explained — They are not a manifestation of private sentiments — The malice attributed to the souls of the dead cannot account for them either — They correspond to the state of mind in which the group happens to be — Analysis of this state — How it ends by mourning — Corresponding changes in the way in which the souls of the dead are conceived ........ 396

III. — Other piacular rites ; after a public mourning, a poor harvest, a drought, the southern lights — Rarity of these rites in Australia — How they are explained ........ 403

IV. — The two forms of the sacred : the pure and the impure — Their antagonism — Their relationship — Ambiguity of the idea of the sacred — All rites present the same character ..... 409

Conclusion

To what extent the results obtained may be generalized . . . .415

I. — Religion rests upon an experience that is well founded but not privileged — Necessity of a science to reach the reality at the bottom of this experience — "What is this reality ? — The human groups — Human meaning of religion — Concerning the objection which opposes the ideal society to the real society . . . . . .416

How religious individualism and cosmopolitanism are explained in this

Contents xi

PAGE

II. — The eternal element in religion — Concerning the conflict between science and religion ; it has to do solely with the speculative side of religion — What this side seems destined to become . . . .427

III. — How has society been able to be the source of logical, that is to say conceptual, thought ? Definition of the concept : not to be confounded with the general idea ; characterized by its impersonality and communicability — It has a collective origin — The analysis of its contents bears witness in the same sense — Collective representations as types of ideas which individuals accept — In regard to the objection that they are impersonal only on condition of being true — Conceptual thought is coeval with humanity . . . . .431

IV. — How the categories express social things — The chief category is the concept of totality which could be suggested only by society — Why the relations expressed by the categories could become conscious only in society — Society is not an a logical being — How the categories tend to detach themselves from geographically determined groups . . 439

The unity of science on the one hand, and of morals and religion on the other — How the society accounts for this unity — Explanation of the rôle attributed to society : its creative power — Reactions of sociology upon the science of man ........ 445

THE

ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE

INTRODUCTION

SUBJECT OF OUR STUDY: RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

IN this book we propose to study the most primitive and simple rehgion which is actually known, to make an analysis of it, and to attempt an explanation of it. A religious system may be said to be the most primitive which we can observe when it fulfils the two following conditions : in the first place, when it is found in a society whose organization is surpassed by no others in i simplicity ; ^ and secondly, when it is possible to explain it '' without making use of any element borrowed from a previous religion.

We shall set ourselves to describe the organization of this system with all the exactness and fidelity that an ethnographer or an historian could give it. But our task will not be limited to that : sociology raises other problems than history or ethnography. It does not seek to know the passed forms of civilization j * _^ ^ with the sole end of knowing them and reconstructing them. But | ' '""^ rather, like every positive science, it has as its object the ex- '-"' ' '-^*-^, planation of some actual reality which is near to us, and which • consequently is capable of affecting our ideas and our acts : this | |v** reality is man, and more precisely, the man of to-day, for there is nothing which we are more interested in knowing. Then we are cw«a^* ' not going to study a very archaic religion simply for the pleasure /^::;;r^; of telling its peculiarities and its singularities. If we have taken

^ In the same way, we shall say of these societies that they are primitive, and we shall call the men of these societies primitives. Undoubtedly the expression lacks precision, but that is hardly evitable, and besides, when we have taken pains to fix the meaning, it is not inconveniéfeij^»||uu|^ it as the subject of our research, it is because it has seemed to us better adapted than any other to lead to an understanding of the rehgious nature of man, that is to say, to show us an essential and permanent aspect of humanity.

But this proposition is not accepted before the raising of strong objections. It seems very strange that one must turn back, and be transported to the very beginnings of history, in order to arrive at an understanding of humanity as it is at present. This manner of procedure seems particularly paradoxical in the question which concerns us. In fact, the various religions generally pass as being quite unequal in value and dignity ; it is said that they do not all contain the same quota of truth. Then it seems as though one could not compare the highest forms of religious thought with the lowest, without reducing the first to the level of the second. If we admit that the crude cults of the Australian tribes can help us to understand Christianity, for example, is that not supposing that this latter religion proceeds from the same mentality as the former, that it is made up of the same superstitions and rests upon the same errors ? This is how the theoretical importance which has sometimes been attributed to primitive religions has come to pass as a sign of a systematic hostility to all religion, which, by prejudging the results of the study, vitiates them in advance.

There is no occasion for asking here whether or not there are scholars who have merited this reproach, and who have made religious history and ethnology a weapon against religion. In any case, a sociologist cannot hold such a point of view. In fact, it is an essential postulate of sociology that a human institution cannot rest upon an error and a lie, without which it could not exist. If it were not founded in the nature of things, it would have encountered in the facts a resistance over which it could never have triumphed. So when we commence the study of primitive religions, it is with the assurance that they hold to reality and express it ; this principle will be seen to re-enter again and again in the course of the analyses and discussions which follow, and the reproach which we make against the schools from which we have separated ourselves is that they have ignored it. When only the letter of the formulae is considered, these religious beliefs and practices undoubtedly seem disconcerting at times, and one is tempted to attribute them to some sort of a deeprooted error. But one must know how to go underneath the symbol to the reality which it represents and which gives it its meaning. The most barbarous and the most fantastic rites and the strangest myths translate some human need, some aspect of life, either individual or social. The reasons with which the faithful justify them may be, and generally are, erroneous ; but the true reasons do not cease to exist, and it is the duty of science to discover them.

In reality, then, there are no religions which are false. All are true in their own fashion ; all answer, though in different ways, to the given conditions of human existence. It is undeniably possible to arrange them in a hierarchy. Some can be called superior to others, in the sense that they call into play higher mental functions, that they are richer in ideas and sentiments, that they contain more concepts with fewer sensations and images, and that their arrangement is wiser. But howsoever real this greater complexity and this higher ideality may be, they are not sufficient to place the corresponding religions in different classes. All are religions equally, just as all living beings are equally alive, from the most humble plastids up to man. So when we turn to primitive religions it is not with the idea of depreciating religion in general, for these religions are no less respectable than the others. They respond to the same needs, they play the same rôle, they depend upon the same causes ; they can also well serve to show the nature of the religious life, and consequently to resolve the problem which we wish to study.

But why give them a sort of prerogative ? Why choose them in preference to all others as the subject of our study ?— It is merely for reasons of method.

In the first place, we cannot arrive at an understanding of the most recent religions except by following the manner in which they have been progressively composed in history. In fact, historical analysis is the only means of explanation which it is possible to apply to them. It alone enables us to resolve an institution into its constituent elements, for it shows them to us as they are born in time, one after another. On the other hand, by placing every one of them in the condition where it was born, it puts into our hands the only means we have of determining the causes which gave rise to it. Every time that we undertake to explain something human, taken at a given moment in history — be it a religious belief, a moral precept, a legal principle, an sesthetic style or an economic system — it is necessary to commence by going back to its most primitive and simple form, to try to account for the characteristics by which it was marked at that time, and then to show how it developed and became complicated little by little, and how it became that which it is at the moment in question. One readily understands the importance which the determination of the point of departure has for this series of progressive explanations, for all the others are attached to it. It was one of Descartes's principles that the first ring has a predominating place in the chain of scientific truths. But there is no question of placing at the foundation of the science of religions an idea elaborated after the cartesian manner, that is to say, a logical concept, a pure possibility, constructed simply by force of thought. What we must find is a concrete reality, and historical and ethnological observation alone can reveal that to us. But even if this cardinal conception-is obtained by a dift'erent process than that of Descartes, it remains true that it is destined to have a considerable influence on the whole series of propositions which the science establishes. Biological evolution has been conceived quite differently ever since it has been known that monocellular beings do exist. In the same way, the arrangement of religious facts is explained quite differently, according as we put naturism, animism or some other religious form at the beginning of the evolution. Even the most specialized scholars, if they are unwilling to confine themselves to a task of pure erudition, and if they desire to interpret the facts which they analyse, are obliged to choose one of these hypotheses, and make it their startingpoint. Whether they desire it or not, the questions which they raise necessarily take the following form : how has naturism or animism been led to take this particular form, here or there, or to enrich itself or impoverish itself in such and such a fashion ? Since it is impossible to avoid taking sides on this initial problem, and since the solution given is destined to affect the whole science, it must be attacked at the outset : that is what we propose to do.

Besides this, outside of these indirect reactions, the study of primitive religions has of itself an immediate interest which is of primary importance.

If it is useful to know what a certain particular religion consists in, it is still more important to know what religion in general is. This is the problem which has aroused the interest of philosophers in all times ; and not without reason, for it is of interest to all humanity. Unfortunately, the method which they generally employ is purely dialectic : they confine themselves to analysing the idea which they make for themselves of religion, except as they illustrate the results of this mental analysis by examples borrowed fro i the religions which best realize their ideal. But even if this method ought to be abandoned, the problem remains intact, and the great service of philosophy is to have prevented its being suppressed by the disdain of scholars. Now it is possible to attack it in a different way. Since all religions can be compared to each other, and since all are species of the same class, there are necessarily many elements which are common to all. We do not mean to speak simply of the outward and visible characteristics which they all have equally, and which make it possible to give them a provisional definition from the very outset of our researches ; the discovery of these apparent signs is relatively easy, for the observation which it demands does not go beneath the surface of things. But these external resemblances suppose others which are profound. At the foundation of all systems of beliefs and of all cults there ought necessarily to be a certain number of fundamental representations or conceptions and of ritual attitudes which, in spite of the diversity of forms which they have taken, have the same objective significance and fulfil the same functions everywhere. These are the permanent elements which constitute that which is permanent and human in religion ; they form all the objective contents of the idea which is expressed when one speaks of religion in general. How is it possible to pick them out ?

Surely it is not by observing the complex religions which appear in the course of history. Every one of these is made up of such a variety of elements that it is very difficult to distinguish what is secondary from what is principal, the essential from the accessory. Suppose that the religion considered is like that of Egypt, India or the classical antiquity. It is a confused mass of many cults, varying according to the locality, the temples, the generations, the dynasties, the invasions, etc. Popular superstitions are there confused with the purest dogmas. Neither the thought nor the activity of the religion is evenly distributed among the believers ; according to the men, the environment and the circumstances, the beliefs as well as the rites are thought of in different ways. Here they are priests, there they are monks, elsewhere they are laymen ; there are mystics and rationalists, theologians and prophets, etc. In these conditions it is difficult to see what is common to all. In one or another of these systems it is quite possible to find the means of making a profitable study of some particular fact which is specially developed there, such as sacrifice or prophecy, monasticism or the mysteries ; but how is it possible to find the common foundation of the religious life underneath the luxuriant vegetation which covers it ? How is it possible to find, underneath the disputes of theology, the variations of ritual, the .multiplicity of groups and the diversity of individuals, the fundamental states characteristic of religious mentality in general ?