The works of Thomas Reid : with account of his life and writings

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OB THE THIRD VOLUME.

ESSAYS ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN.

OF ABSTRACTION.

Chap. I. Of General Words

The words we use in language are either general words, or proper names. Proper names are intended to signify one individual only. Such are the names of men, kingdoms, provinces, cities, rivers, and of every other creature of God, or work of man, which we choose to distinguish from all others of the kind, by a name appropriated to it. All the other words of language are general words, not appropriated to signify any one individual thing, but equally related to many.

Under general words, therefore, I comprehend, not only those which logicians call general terms ; that is, such general words as may make the subject or the predicate of a proposition ; but likewise their auxiliaries or accessories, as the learned Mr. Harris calls vol. in. 2

ESSAT T.

them ; such as prepositions, conjunctions, articles, which are all general words, though they cannot properly he called general terms.

In every language, rude or polished, general words make the greatest part, and proper names the least. Grammarians have reduced all words to eight or nine classes, which are called parts of speech. Of these there is only one, to wit, that of nouns, wherein proper names are found. All pronouns, Kerbs, participles, adverbs, articles, prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections, are general words. Of nouns, all adjectives are general words, and the greater part of substantives. Etery substantive that has a plural number, is a general word ; for no proper name can have a plural number, because it signifies only one individual. In all the fifteen books of Euclid's Elements, there is not one word that is not general ; and the same may be said of many large volumes.

At the same time it must be acknowledged, that all the objects we perceive are individuals. Every object of sense, of memory, or of consciousness, is an individual object. All the good things we enjoy or desire, and all the evils we feel or fear, must come from individuals ; and I think we may venture to say, that every creature which God has made, in the heavens above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth, is an individual.

How comes it to pass then, that id all languages, general words make the greatest part of the language, and proper names but a very small and inconsiderable part of it.

This seemingly strange phenomenon may, I think, be easily accounted for by the following observations.

First, Though there be a few individuals that are obvious to the notice of all men, and therefore have proper names in all languages ; such as the sun and moon, the earth and sea; yet the greatest part of the things

OF GENE11A1 WOKDS. 7

to which we think fit to give proper names are local ; known perhaps to a village or to a neighbourhood, but unknown to the greater part, of those who speak the same language, and to all the rest of mankind. The names of such things being confined to a corner, and having no names answering to them in other languages, are not accounted a part of the language, any more than the customs of a particular hamlet are accounted part of the law of the nation.

For this reason, there are but few proper names that belong to a language. It is next to be considered wbj there must be many general words in every language.

Secondly, It may be observed, that every individual object that falls within our view has various attributes j and it is by them that it becomes useful or hurtful to us. We know apt the essence of any individual object; all the knowledge we can attain of it, is the knowledge of its attributes ; its quantity, its various qualities, its various relations to other things, its place, its situ- . ation, and motions. It is by such attributes of things only that we can communicate our knowledge of them to others. By their attributes, our hopes or fears from them are regulated ; and it is only by attention to their attributes that we can make ihem subservient to our ends ; and therefore we give names to such attributes.

Now all attributes must from their nature be expressed by general words, and are so expressed in all languages. In the ancient philosophy, attributes in general were called by two names which express their nature. They were called universale, because they might belong equally t(t many individuals, and are not confined to one; they were also called predicables, because whatever is predicated, that is, affirmed or denied of one subject, may be of more, and therefore is an universal, and expressed by a general word. A predicable therefore signifies the same thing as an attribute, with «hi9 difference only, that the first is Latin, the last English. The attributes we find either in the creatures of God, or in the works of men, are common to many individuals. We either find it to be so, or presume it may be so, and give them the same name in every subject to which they belong.

There are not only attributes belonging to individual subjects, but there are likewise attributes of attributes, which may be called secondary attributes. Most attributes are capable of different degrees, and different modifications, which must be expressed by general Words.

Thus it is an attribute of many bodies to be moved j but motion may be in an endless variety of directions. It may be quick or slow, rectilineal or curvilinealj it m'ay be equable, or accellerated, or retarded.

As all attributes, therefore, whether primary or secondary, are expressed by general words, it follows, that in every proposition we express in language, what is affirmed or denied of the subject of the proposition must be expressed by general words: and that the subject of the proposition may often be a general word» will appear from the next observation.

Thirdly, The same faculties by which we distinguish the different attributes belonging to the same subject, and give names to them, enables us likewise to observe, that many subjects agree in certain attributes, while they differ in others. By this means we are enabled to reduce individuals which are infinite, to a limited number of classes, which are called kinds and sorts ; and in the scholastic language, genera and species.

Observing many individuals to agree in certain attributes, we refer them all to one class, and give a name

OF BENERA1 'WORDS. W

to the class. This name comprehends in its signification not one attribute only, but all the attributes which distinguish that class; and by affirming this name of any individual, we affirm it to have all the attributes which characterize the class. Thus men, dogs, horses elephants, are so many different classes of animals. In like manner we marshal other substances, vegetable and inanimate, into classes.

Nor is it only substances that we thus form into classes. We do the same, with regard to qualities, relations, actions, affections, passions, and all other things.

When a class is very large, it is divided into subordinate classes in the same manner. The higher class is called a genus or kind ; the lower a species or sort of the higher. Sometimes a species is still subdivided into subordinate species ; and this subdivision is carried on as far as is found convenient for the purpose of language, or for the improvement of knowledge.

In this distribution of things into genera and species, it is evident that the name of the species comprehends more attributes than the name of the genus. The species comprehends all that is in the genus, and those attributes likewise which distinguish that species from others belonging to the same genus ; and the more subdivisions we make, the names of the lower become still the more comprehensive in their signification, but the less extensive in their application to individuals.

Hence it is an axiom in logic, that the more extensive any general term is, it is the less comprehensive; and on the contrary, the more comprehensive, the less extensive. Thus, in the following series of subordinate general terms, animal, man, Frenchman, Parisian, every subsequent term comprehends in its singification all that is in the preceding, and sometimes more ; and every antecedent term extends to more individuals than the subsequent.

10 ESSAY T.

Such divisions and subdivisions of things into genera and species with general names, are not confined to the learned and polished languages ; they are found in those of the rudest tribes of mankind : from which we learn, that the invention and the use of general words, both to signify the attributes of things, and to signify the genera and species of things, is not a subtile invention of philosophers, but an operation which all men perform by the light of common sense. Philosophers may speculate about this operation, and reduee it to canons and aphorisms ; but men of common undertsanding, without knowing auy thing of the philosophy of it, can put it in practice ; in like manner as they can see objects, and make use of their eyes, although they know nothing of the structure of the eye, or of the theory of vision.

Every genus, and every species of tilings, may be either the subject or the predicate of a preposition, nay, of innumerable propositions ; for every attribute common to the genus or species may be affirmed of it ; and the genus may be affirmed of every species, and both geuus and species o f every individual to which it extends.

Thus of man it may be affirmed, that he is an animal made up of body and mind ; that he is of few days, and full of trouble ; that he js capable of various improvements in arts, in knowledge, and in virtue. In a word, every thing common to the species may be affirmed of man ; and of all such propositions, which are innumerable, man is the subject.

Again, of every nation and tribe,, and of every individual of the human race that is, or was, or shall he, it may be affirmed that they are men. In all such propositions, which are innumerable, man is the predicate of the proposition.

We observed above an extension and a comprehension in general terms ; and that in any subdivision of

Of GENEBAX WORDS. i£

things the name of the lowest species is most comprehensive, and that of the highest genus most extensive. I would now observe, that, by means of such general terms, there is also an extension and comprehension of propositions, which is one of the noblest powers of language, and fits it for expressing, with great ease and expedition, the highest attainments in knowledge, of which the human understanding is capable.

"When the predicate is a genus or a species, the proposition is more or less comprehensive, according as the predicate is. Thus, when I say that this seal is gold, by this single proposition, I affirm of it all the properties Which that metal is known to have. When I say of any man that he is a mathematician, this appellation comprehends all the attributes that belong to him as an animal, as a man, and as one who has studied mathematics. When I say that the orbit of the planet Mercury is an ellipsis, I thereby affirm of that orbit all the properties which Apollonius and other Geometricians have discovered, or may discover, of that species of figure.

Again, when the subject of a proposition is a genm or a specks, the proposition is more or less extensive, according as the subject is. Thus whetf I am taught, that the three angles of a plane triangle are equal to two right angles, this property extends to every species of plane triangle, and to every individual plane triangle that did, or does, or can exist.

It is by means of such extensive and comprehensive propositions that human knowledge is condensed, as it were, into a size adapted to the capacity of the human mind, with great addition to its beauty, and without any diminution of its distinctness and perspicuity.

General propositions in science may be compared to the seed of a plant, which, according to some phi-

IS ESSAY V.

losophers, has not only the whole future plant enclosed within it, but the seeds of that plant, and the plants that shall spring from them through all future generations.

But the similitude falls short in this respect, that time and accidents, not in our power, must concur to disclose the contents of the seed, and bring them into our view ; whereas the contents of a general proposition uiay be brought forth, ripened, and exposed to view at our pleasure, and in an instant.

Thus the wisdom of ages, and the most sublime theorems of science, may be laid up, like an Iliad in a nut shell, and transmitted to future generations. And this noble purpose of language can only be accomplished, by means of general words annexed to the divisions and subdivisions of things.

What has been said in this chapter, I think, is sufficient to show, that there can be no language, not so much as a single proposition, without general words j that they must make the greatest part of every language, and that it is by them only that language is fitted to express, with wonderful ease and expedition, all the treasures of human wisdom and knowledge.

Or GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. IS

Chap. II. Of General Conceptions

As general words are so necessary in language, it is natural to conclude that there must be general conceptions, of which they are the signs.

Words are empty sounds, when they do not signify the thoughts of the speaker; and.it is only from their signification that they are denominated general. Every word that is spoken, considered merely as a sound, is an individual sound. And it can only be called a general word, because that which it signifies, is general. Now, that which it signifies, is conceived by the mind both of the speaker and hearer, if the word have a distinct meaning, and be distinctly understood. It is therefore impossible that words can have a general signification, unless there be conceptions in the mind of the speaker, and of the hearer, of things that are general. It is to such that I give, the name of general conceptions : and it ought to be observed, that they take this denomination, not from the act of the mind in conceiving, which is an individual act, but from the object, or thing conceived, which is general.

We are therefore here to consider whether we have such general conceptions, and how they are formed.

To begin with the conceptions expressed by general terms, that is, by such general words as may be the subject or the predicate of a proposition. They are either attributes of things, or they are genera or species of things.

It is evident, with respect to all the individuals we

are acquainted with, that we have a more clear and vox. III. 3

1* ESSAY T.

distinct conception of their attributes, than of the subject to which those attributes belong.

Take, for instance, any individual body we have access to know, what conception do we form of it ? Every man may know this from his consciousness. He will find that he conceives it as a thing that has length, breadth, and thickness, such a figure, and such a colour ; that it is hard, or soft, or fluid ; that it has such qualities, and is fit for such purposes. If it is a vegetable, he may know where it grew, what is the form of its leaves, and flower, and seed. If an animal, what are its natural instincts, its manner of life, and of rearing its young. Of these attributes belonging to this individual, and numberless others, he may surely have a distinct conception ; and he will find words in language by which he can clearly and distinctly express each of them.

If we consider, in like manner, the conception we form of any individual person of our acquaintance, we shall find it to be made up of various attributes, which Ave ascribe to him ; such as, that he is the son of such a man, the brother of such another, that he has such an employment or office, has such a fortune, that he is tall or short, well or ill made, comely or ill favoured, young or old, married or unmarried ; to this we may add, his temper, his character, his abilities, and perhaps some anecdotes of his history.

Such is the conception we form of individual persons of our acquaintance. By such attributes we describe them to those who know them not ; and by such attributes historians give us a conception of the personages of former times. Nor is it possible to do it in any other way.

All the distinct knowledge we have or can attain of any individual, is the knowledge of its attributes: for we know not the essence of any indi-

OF GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. 15

vidual. This seems to be beyond the reach of the human faculties.

Now, every attribute is what the ancients called an universal. It is, or may be, common to various individuals. There is no attribute belonging to any creature of God which may not belong to others; and, on this account, attributes, in all languages, are expressed by general words.

It appears likewise, from every man's experience, that he may have as clear and distinct a conception of such attributes as we have named, and of innumerable others, as he can have of any individual to which they belong. ,

Indeed the attributes of individuals is all that we distinctly conceive about them- It is true, we con- ; ceive a subject, to which the attributes belong ; but of this subject, when its attributes are set aside, we have but an obscure and relative conception, whether it be body or mind.

This was before observed with regard to bodies, Essay 2. chap. 19. to which we refer, and it is no less evident with regard to minds. What is it we call a mind? It is a thinking, intelligent,, active being. Granting, that flunking, intelligence, and activity, are attributes of mind, I want to know what the thing or being is, to which these attributes belong ? To this question I can find no satisfying answer. The attributes of mind, and particularly its operatiqns, we know clearly ; but of the thing itself we have only an obscure notion.

Nature teaches us, that thinking and reasoning are attributes, which cannot exist without a subject ; but of that subject I believe the best notion we can form implies little more than that it is the subject of such attributes. t ,

Whether other created brings may have the knowledge of the real essence of created things, so as to b« able to deduce their attributes from their essence and constitution, or whether this be the prerogative of Him who made them, we cannot tell ; but it is a knowledge which seems to be quite beyond the reach of the human faculties.

We know the essence of a triangle, and from that essence can deduce its properties. It is an universal, and might have been conceived by the human mind, though no individual triangle had ever existed. It has only what Mr. Locke calls a nominal essence, which is expressed in its definition. But every thing that exists has a real essence, which is above our comprehension ; and therefore we cannot deduce its properties or attributes from its nature, as we do in the triangle. We must take a contrary road in the knowledge of God's works, and satisfy ourselves with their attributes as facts, and with the general conviction that there is a subject to which those attributes belong.

Enough, I think, has been said, to show, not only that we may have clear and distinct conceptions of attributes, but that they are the only things, with regard to individuals, of which we have a clear and distinct conception.

The other class of general terms are those that signify the genera and species into which we divide and subdivide things. And if we be able to form distinct conceptions of attributes, it cannot surely be denied that we may have distinct conceptions of genera and species; because they are only collections of attributes which we conceive to exist in a subject, and to which we give a general name. If the attributes comprehended under that general name be distinctly conceived, the thing meant by the name must be distinctly conceived. And the name may justly be attributed to every individual which has those attributes.

OF GENERAL CONCEPTIONS. 17

Thus, I eonceive distinctly what it is to have wings, to be covered with feathers, to lay eggs. Suppose then that we give the name of bird to every animal that has these three attributes. Here undoubtedly my conception of a bird is as distinct as my notion of the attributes which are common to this species : and if this be admitted to be the definition of a bird, there is nothing I conceive more distinctly. If I had never seen a bird, and can but be made to understand the definition, I can easily apply it to every individual of the species, without danger of mistake.

When things are divided and subdivided by men of science, and names given to the genera and species, those names are defined. Thus, the genera and species of plants, and of other natural bodies, are accurately defined by the writers in the various branches of natural history; so that, to all future generations, the definition will convey a distinct notion of the genus or species defined.

There are, without doubt, many words signifying genera and species of things, which have a meaning somewhat vague and indistinct; so that those who speak the same language do not always use them in the same sense. But if we attend to the cause of this indistinctness, we shall find, that it is not owing to their being general terms, but to this, that there is no definition of them that has authority. Their, meaning therefore, has not been learned by a definition, but by a kind of induction, by observing to what individuals they are applied by those who understand the language. We learn by habit to use them as we see others do, even when we have not a precise meaning annexed to them. A man may know, that to certain individuals they may be applied with propriety ; but whether they can be applied to certain other individuals, he may be uncertain, either from want of good anthorities, or from having contrary authorities, which leave him in doubt.

Thus, a man may know, that when he applies the name of beast to a lion or a fyger, and the name of bird to an eagle or a turkey, he speaks properly. But whether a bat be a bird or a beast, he may be uncertain. If there was any accurate definition of a beast and of a bird, that was of sufficient authority, he could be at no loss.

It is said to have been sometimes a matter of dispute, with regard to a monstrous birth of a woman, whether it was a man' or not. Although this be in reality a question about the meaning of a word, it may be of importance, on account of the privileges which laws have annexed to the human character. To make such laws perfectly precise, the definition of a man would be necessary, which I believe legislators have seldom or never thought fit to give. It is, indeed, very difficult to fix a definition of so common a word, and the cases wherein it would be of any use so rarely occur, that perhaps it may be better, when they do occur, to leave them to the determination of a judge or of a jury, than to give a definition, which might be attended with unforeseen consequences.

A genus or species, being a collection of attributes, conceived to exist in one subject, a definition is the only way to prevent any addition or diminution, of its ingredients in the conception of different persons $ and when there is no definition that can be appealed to as a standard, the name will hardly retain the most perfect precision in its signification.

From what has been said, I conceive it is evident, that the words which signify genera and species of things have often as precise and definite a signification as any words whatsoever ; and that when it is otherwise, their want of precision is not owing to their being general words, but to other causes.

OP GENERAX, CONCEPTIONS. 19

Having shown that we may have a perfectly clear and distinct conception of the meaning of general terms, we may, I think, take it for granted, that the same may be said of other general words, such as prepositions, conjunctions, articles. My design at present being only to show, that we have general conceptions no less clear and distinct than those of individuals, it is sufficient for this purpose, if this appears with regard , to the conceptions expressed by general terms. To conceive the meaning of a general word, and to conceive that which it signifies, is the same thing. We conceive distinctly the meaning of general terms, therefore we conceive distinctly that which they signify. But such terms do not signify any individual, but what is common to many individuals ; therefore we have a distinct conception of things common to many individuals, that is, we have distinct general conceptions.

"We must here beware of the ambiguity of the word conception, which sometimes signifies the act of the mind in conceiving, sometimes the thing conceived, which is the object of that act. If the word be taken in the first sense, 1 acknowledge that every act of the mind is an individual act ; the universality, therefore, is not in the act of the mind, but in the object, or thing conceived. The. thing conceived is an attribute common to many subjects, or it is a genus or species common to many individuals.

Suppose I conceive a triangle, that is, a plain figure terminated by three right lines. He that understands this definition distinctly has a distinct conception of a triangle. But a triangle is not an individual ; it is a species. The act of my understanding in conceiving it is an individual act, and has a real existence ; but the thing conceived is general, and cannot exist without other attributes, which are not included in the definition.

Every triangle that really exists must have a certain length of sides and measure of angles ; it must have place and time. But the definition of a triangle includes neither existence, nor any of those attributes ; and therefore they are not included in the conception of a triangle, which cannot be accurate if it comprehend more than the definition.

Thus I think it appears to be evident, that we have general conceptions that are clear and distinct, both of attributes of things, and of genera and species of things.

CONCEPTIONS BY ANALYZING OBJECTS. 21

Chap. III. Of General Conceptions Formed Bt Analyzing Ob- Jects

We are next to consider the operations of the understanding, by which we are enabled to form general conceptions.

These appear to me to be three ; first, the resolving or analyzing a subject into its known attributes, and giving a name to each attribute, which name shall signify that attribute, and nothing more.

Secondly, The observing one or more such attributes to be common to many subjects. The first is by philosophers called abstraction; the second maybe called generalizing ; but both are commonly included under the name of abstraction.

It is difficult to say which of them goes first, or whether they are not so closely connected that neither can claim the precedence. For on the one hand, to perceive an agreement between two or more objects in the same attribute, seems to require nothing more than to compare them together. A savage, upon seeing snow and chalk, would find no difficulty in perceiving that they have the same colour. Yet, on the other hand, it seems impossible that he should observe this agreement without abstraction, that is, distinguishing in his conception the colour, wherein those two objects agree, from the other qualities wherein they disagree.

It seems, therefore, that we cannot generalize without some degree of abstraction ; but I apprehend we may abstract without generalizing : for what hinders me from attending to the whiteness of the paper before me, without applying that colour to any

TOL. III. 4

22 ESSAT T.

other object? The whiteness of this individual object is an abstract conception, but not a general one, while applied to one individual only. These two operations, however, are subservient to each other ; for the more attributes we observe and distinguish in any one individual, the more agreements we shall discover between it and other individuals.'

A third operation of the understanding, by which we form abstract conceptions, is the combining into one whole a certain number of those attributes of which we have formed abstract notions, and giving a name to that combination. It is thus we form abstract notions of the genera and species of things. These three operations we shall consider in order.

With regard to abstraction, strictly so called, I can perceive nothing in it that is difficult either to be understood or practised. What can be more easy than to distinguish the different attributes which we know to belong to a subject ? In a man, for instance, to distinguish his size, his complexion, his age, his fortune, his birth, his profession, and twenty other things that belong to him. . To think and speak of these things with understanding, is surely within the reach of every man endowed with the human faculties.