Essays on the powers of the human mind; to which are added, An essay on quantity, and An analysis of Aristotle's Logic

Front matter

A ' JZSSATS 1 iVJ'lELLECTUAL) POWIEIiS * (a;^ -^ Human Mxnb, a" Joaesicr1 on Steel ""^y *"" A""'^c,i„u- „r, ,mdmbl.,ii? tin *<•*" "; "Cmtiiitit. A // V"" / / AAA"y/A//,7 Thomas Tego ywœt 1927. ESSAYS ON THE POWERS OP THE HUMAN MIND; TO WHICH ARE ADDED, AN ESSAY ON QUANTITY, AND AN ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE'S LOGIC. " In the right employment of the active powers of the human mind consists all the honour, dignity, and worth of a man ; and in the abuse and perversion of it, all vice, coription, and depravity." BY THOMAS REID, D.D. F.R.S. Edin. PROFESSOR OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW. LONDON : PRINTED FOR THOMAS T EGG, '73, OHEAPSIDE ; R. GRIFFIN AND CO., GLASGOW; AND J. CUMMING, DUBLIN. 1827. LONDON : rniNTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFB.IAKS. TO MR. DUGALD STEWART, lately professor of mathematics, now professor of moral philosophy; AND DR. JAMES GREGORY, PROFESSOR OF THE THEORY OF PHYSIC, IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH MY DEAR FRIENDS, I know not to whom I can address these Essays with more pro priety than to you ; not only on account of a friendship begun in early life on your part, though in old age on mine, and in one of you I may say hereditary ; nor yet on account of that correspondence in our literary pursuits and amusements, which has always given me so great pleasure ; but because, if these Essays have any merit, you have a considerable share in it, having not only encouraged me to hope that they may be useful, but favoured me with your observations on every part of them, both before they were sent to press, and while they were under it.

I have availed myself of your observations, so as to correct many faults that might otherwise have escaped me ; and I have a very grateful sense of your friendship in giving this aid to one, who stood much in need of it : having no shame, but much pleasure, in being instructed by those who formerly were my pupils, as one of you was. It would be ingratitude to a man whose memory I most highly respect, not to mention my obligations to the late Lord Kames for the concern he was pleased to take in this woj,-k. Having seen a small part of it, he urged me to carry it on ; took account of my progress from time to time ; revised it more than once, as far as it was carried, before his death ; and gave me his observations on it, both with respect to the matter and the expression. On some points we differed in opinion, and debated them keenly, both in conversation and by many letters, without any abatement of his affection, or of his zeal for the work's being carried on and published : For he had too much liberality of mind not to allow to others the same liberty in judging which he claimed to himself.

DEDICATION. IV It is difficult to say whether that worthy man was more eminent in active life or in speculation. Very rare, surely, have been the in stances where the talents for both were united in so eminent a degree. His genius and industry, in many different branches of literature, will, by his works, be known to posterity : his private virtues, and public spirit, his assiduity through a long and laborious life, in many honourable public offices with which he was intrusted, and his zeal to encourage and promote every thing that tended to the improvement of his country in laws, literature, commerce, manufactures, and agriculture, are best known to his friends and cotemporaries. The favourable opinion which he, and you, my friends, • were pleased to express of this work, has been my chief encouragement to lay it before the public ; and perhaps, without that encouragement, it had never seen the light : For, I have always found, that, without social intercourse, even a favourite speculation languishes ; and that we cannot help thinking the better of our own opinions when they are approved by those whom we esteem good judges.

Preface

. Human knowledge may be reduced to two general heads, according as it relates to body, or to mind ; to things material, or to things intellectual. The whole system of bodies in the universe, of which we know but a very small part, may be called the Material World ; the whole system of minds, from the infinite Creator to the meanest creature endowed with thought, may be called the Intellectual World. These are the two great kingdoms of nature that fall within our notice ; and about the one, or the other, or things pertaining to them, every art, every science, and every human thought is employed ; nor can the boldest flight of imagination carry us beyond their limits. Many things there are, indeed, regarding the nature and the structure both of body and of mind, which our faculties cannot reach; many difficulties which the ablest philosopher cannot resolve ; but of other natures, if any other there be, we have no knowledge, no conception at all.

That every thing that exists must be either corporeal or incorporeal, is evident. But it is not so evident, that every thing that exists must cither be corporeal, or endowed with thought. Whether there be in the universe beings, which are neither extended, solid and inert, like body, nor active and intelligent, like mind, seems to be beyond the reach of our knowledge. There appears to be a vast interval between body and mind, and whether there be any intermediate nature that connects them together, we know not. We have no reason to ascribe intelligence, or even sensation, to plants ; yet there appears in them an active force and energy, which cannot be the result of any arrangement or combination of inert matter. The same thing may be said of those powers by which animals are nourished and grow, by which matter gravitates, by which magnetical and electrical bodies attract and repel each other, and by which the parts of solid bodies cohere.

Some have conjectured, that the phenomena of the material world which require active force, are produced by the continual operation of intelligent beings : Others have conjectured, that there may be in the universe, beings that are active without intelligence, which, as a kind of incorporeal ma chinery, contrived by the Supreme Wisdom, perform their destined task without any knowledge or intention. But, laying aside conjecture, and all pretences to determine in things beyond our reach, we must rest in this, that body and mind are the only kinds of being of which we can have any knowledge, or can form any conception. If there be other kinds, they are not discoverable by the faculties which God hath given us ; and with regard to us, are as if they were not. VI PREFACE- As, therefore, all our knowledge is confined to body and mind, or things belonging to them, there are two great branches of philosophy, one relating to body, the other to mind.

The properties of body, and the laws that obtain in the material system, are the objects of Natural Philosophy, as that word is now used. The branch which treats of the nature and operations of mind has by some been called Pneumatology. And to the one or the other of these branches, the principles of all the sciences belong. What variety there may be of minds or thinking beings throughout this vast universe, we cannot pretend to say. We dwell in a little corner of God's dominion, disjoined from the rest of it. The globe which we inhabit is but one of seven planets that encircle our sun. What various orders of beings may inhabit the other six, their secondaries, and the comets, belonging to our system ; and how many other suns may be encircled with like systems, are things altogether hid from us.

Although human reason and industry have discovered with great accuracy the order and distances of the planets, and the laws of their motion, we have no means of corre sponding with them. That they may be the habitation of animated beings is very probable : but of the nature, or powers of their inhabitants, we are perfectly ignorant. Every man is conscious of a thinking principle or mind in himself, and we have sufficient evidence of a like principle in other men. The actions of brute animals show, that they have some thinking principle, though of a nature far inferior to she human mind. And every thing about us may convince us of the existence of a Supreme Blind, the Maker and Governor of the Universe. These are all the minds of which reason can give us any certain knowledge. The mind of man is the noblest work of God which reason discovers to us, and therefore, on account of its dignity, deserves our study.

It must indeed be acknowledged, that although it is of all objects the nearest to us, and seems the most within our reach, it is very difficult to attend to its operations, so as to form a distinct notion of them ; and on that account there is no branch of knowledge in which the ingenious and speculative have fallen into so great errors, and even absurdities. These errors and absurdities have given rise to a general prejudice against all inquiries of this nature ; and because ingenious men have, for many ages, given different and contradictory accounts of the powers of the mind, it is concluded, that all speculations concerning them are chimerical and visionary. But whatever effect this prejudice may have with superficial thinkers, the judicious will not be apt to be carried away with it. About two hun dred years ago, the opinions of men in natural philosophy were as various and as contradictory, as they are now concerning the powers of the mind.

Galileo, Torricelli, Kepler, Bacon, and Newton, had the same discourage ment in their attempts to throw light upon the material system, as we have with regard to the intellectual. If they had been deterred by such prejudices, we should never have reaped the benefit of their discoveries

PREFACE.

. VII which do honour to human nature, and will make their names immortal. The motto which Lord Bacon prefixed to some of his writings was worthy of his genius, Inveniam viam autfaciam. There is a natural order in the progress of the sciences, and good reasons may be assigned why the philosophy of body should be elder sister to that of mind, and of a quicker growth ; but the last hath the principle, of life no less than the first, and will grow up, though slowly, to maturity. The remains of ancient philosophy upon this subject are venerable ruins, carrying the marks of genius and industry, sufficient to inflame, but not to satisfy, our curiosity. In later ages, Des Cartes was the first that pointed out the road we ought to take in those dark regions. Malebranche, Arnauld, Locke, Berkeley, Buffier, Hutcheson, Butler, Hume, Price, Lord Kames, have laboured to make discoveries ; nor have they laboured in vain.

For, however different and contrary their conclusions are, how ever sceptical some of them, they have all given new Ught, and cleared the way to those who shall come after them. We ought never to despair of human genius, but rather to hope, that, in time, it may produce a system of the powers and operations of the human mind, no less certain than those of optics or astronomy. This is the more devoutly to be wished, that a distinct knowledge of the powers of the mind would undoubtedly give great light to many other branches of science. Mr. Hume hath justly observed, that " all the sciences have a relation to human nature ; and, however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. This is the centre and capital of the sciences, which being once masters of, we may easily extend our conquests every where."

The faculties of our minds are the tools and engines we must use in every disquisition ; and the better we understand their nature and force, the more successfully we shall be able to apply them. Mr. Locke gives this account of the occasion of his entering upon his Essay concerning Human Understanding : " Five or six friends (says he) meeting at my chamber and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had for a while puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer to a resolution of those doubts that perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course ; and that, before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were fitted or not fitted to deal with.

This I proposed to the company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed that this should be our first Inquiry." If this be commonly the cause of perplexity in those disquisitions which have least relation to the mind, it must be so much more in those that have an immediate connexion with it. The sciences may be distinguished into two classes, according as they pertain to the material or to the intellectual world. The various parts of

PREFACE.

. Natural Philosophy, the Mechanical Arts, Chemistry, Medicine, and Agri culture, belong to the first ; but, to the last, belong Grammar, Logic, Rhetoric, Natural Theology, Morals, Jurisprudence, Law, Politics, and the Fine Arts. The knowledge of the human mind is the root from which these grow, and draw their nourishment. Whether, therefore, we consider the dignity of this subject, or its subserviency to science in general, and to the noblest branches of science in particular, it highly deserves to be cultivated. A very elegant writer, on the Sublime and Beautiful, concludes his account of the passions thus : " The variety of the passions is great, and worthy, in every branch of that variety, of the most diligent investigation. The more accurately we search into the human mind, the stronger traces we every where find of His wisdom who made it.

If a discourse on the use of the parts of the body may be considered as a hymn to the Creator ; the use of the passions, which are the organs of the mind, cannot be barren of praise to him, nor unproductive to ourselves of that noble and un common union of science and admiration, which a contemplation of the works of Infinite Wisdom alone can afford to a rational mind ; whilst referring to him whatever we find of right, or good, or fair, in ourselves, discovering his strength and wisdom even in our own weakness and imper fection, honouring them where we discover them clearly, and adoring their profundity where we are lost in our search, we may be inquisitive without impertinence, and elevated without pride : we may be admitted, if I may dare to say so, into the counsel of the Almighty, by a consideration of his works.

This elevation of the mind ought to be the principal end of all our studies, which, if they do not in some measure effect, they are of very little service to us." CONTENTS. Page Dedication •".... iii Preface ...... v ESSAYS ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN. ESSAY I. PRELIMINARY. Chap. 1. Explication of words ... .1 II. Principles taken for granted . ... 15 III. Of hypotheses ..... 21 IV. Of analogy . . . . . . 24 V. Of the proper means of knowing the operations of the mind 2fi VI. Of the difficulty of attending to the operations of our own minds 29 VII. Division of the powers of the mind . . 32 VIII. Of social operations of mind .... 34 ESSAY II. OF THE POWERS WE HAVE BY MEANS OF OUR EX- TERNAL SENSES. Chap. I. Of the organs of sense .... 37 II. Of the impressions on the organs, nerves, and brain . . 39 III.

Hypothesis concerning the nerves and brain . . .41 IV. False conclusions drawn from the impressions before mentioned 47 V. Of perception . . ... 53 VI. What it is to account fora phenomenon in nature . . 57 VII. Sentiments of philosophers about the perceptions of external objects ; and first, of the theory of Father Malebranche . 59 VIII. Of the common theory of perception, and of the sentiments of the Peripatetics, and of Des Cartes . 64 IX. The sentiments of Mr. Locke . . . .74 X. The sentiments of Bishop Berkeley . . .81 XI. Bishop Berkeley's sentimeuts of the nature of ideas . . 90 XII. The sentiments of Mr. Hume . ... 96 XIII. The sentiments of Anthony Arnauld . 99 XIV. Reflections on the common theory of ideas . . 102 XV. Account of the system of Leibnitz . . .113 XVI. Of sensation . . . ; . .117 XVII.

Of the objects of perception ; aud, first, of primary and secondary qualities ... . 122 XVIII. Of other objects of perception . . . . 129 XIX. Of matter and of space . . ... 133 XX. Of the evidence of sense, and of belief in general . . 139 XXL Of the improvement of the senses . . . 144 XXII. Of the fallacy of the senses . . ... CONTENTS. X Page ESSAY III. OF MEMORY. 158 Chap. I. Things obvious and certain with regard to memory . • II. Memory an original faculty . • • ' III. Of duration . • ■ • ,..T IV. Of identity . • • . ■ "f V. Mr. Locke's account of the origin of our ideas, and particularly ot the idea of duration • • ■ ._ VI. Mr. Locke's account of our personal identity . ' VII. Theories concerning memory ESSAY IV. OF CONCEPTION. Chap. I. Of conception, or simple apprehension in general .

II. Theories concerning conception ■ • „„ III. Mistakes concerning conception . ■ „.. IV. Of the train of thought in the mind ESSAY V. OF ABSTRACTION. Chap. I. Of general words . , . . • " II. Of general conceptions . . • • J- III. Of general conceptions formed by analysing objects . ■ 23- IV. Of general conceptions formed by combination . .27 V. Observations concerning the names given to our general notions 245 VI. Opinion of philosophers about universals ESSAY VL OF JUDGMENT. Chap. I. Of judgment in geneial .... 259 II. Of common sense . . ... 270 III. Sentiments of philosophers concerning judgment . . 277 IV. Of first principles in general . . . 289 V. The first principles of contingent truths . . . 309 VI. First principles of necessary truths . ... 314 VII. Opinions, ancient and modern, about first principles . 328 VIII.

Of prejudices, the causes of error . . . 337 ESSAY VII. OF REASONING. Chap. I. Of reasoning in general, and of demonstration . . 347 II. Whether morality be capable of demonstration . . ' 351 III. Of probable reasoning . . 356 IV. Of Mr. Hume's scepticism with regard to reason . . 360 ESSAY VIII. OF TASTE. Chap. I. Of taste in general . . . ggg II. Of the objects of taste, and first of novelty . 372 III. Of grandeur . .... 374 IV. Of beauty . ... 3g0 CONTENTS. XI Page AN ESSAY ON QUANTITY . . 3<j6 ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE'S LOGIC . . 402 ESSAYS ON THE ACTIVE POWERS OF THE HUMAN MIND. Introduction . . 440 ESSAY I. OF ACTIVE POWER IN GENERAL. Chap. I- Of the motion of active power . . .441 II. The same subject . . . 445 III. Of Mr. Locke's account of our idea of power . . 450 IV. Of Mr. Hume's opinion of the idea of power . . 451 V. Whether beings that have no will nor understanding may have active power ? ... . 455 VI.

Of the efficient causes of the phenomena of nature . 459 VII. Of the extent of human power . . .462 ESSAY II. OF THE WILL. Chap. I. Observations concerning the will . . . 468 II. Of the influence of incitements and motives upon the will . 471 III. Of operations of mind which may be called voluntary . 477 IV. Corollaries . . 484 ESSAY III. OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ACTION.

Part I

of thf. mechanical principles of action. Chap. I. Of the principles of action in general . . . 486 II. Of instinct . . ... 489 III. Of habit . . .... 495 ESSAY III.

Part II. Of

animal principles of action. Chap. 1. Of appetites . . . 498 II. Of desires . . . .502 III. Of benevolent affection in general . . . 507 IV. Of the particular benevolent affections . . 511 V. Of malevolent affections . • . 519 VI. Of passion . . . ... 525 VII. Of disposition ... ... 531 VIII. Of opinion . • ... 534 ESSAY III.

Part III. Of The Rational Principles Of Action

Chap. I. There are rational principles of action in man . . 538 II. Of regard to our good upon the whole . . .539 III. The tendency of this principle . . • 542 IV. Defects of this principle . ... 545 V. Of the notion of duty, rectitude, moral obligation . . 548 VI. Of the sense of duty . • 552 VII. Of moral approbation and disapprobation . . 556 VIII. Observations concerning conscience . . • CONTENTS. ESSAY IV. OF THE LIBERTY OF MORAL AGENTS. Page Chap. I. The notions of moral liberty and necessity stated . . 567 II. Of the words, cause and effect, action, aud active power . 570 III. Causes of the ambiguity of those words . . 573 IV. Of the influence of motives . ... 578 V. Liberty consistent with government . . . 584 VI. First argument for liberty . ... 588 VII. Second argument . .... 594 VIII.

Third argument . . . 596 IX. Of arguments for necessity . . . . 599 X. The same subject .. .... 605 XI- Of the permission of evil . . ... 609 ESSAY V. OF MORALS. Chap. I. Of the first principles of morals . 61G II. Of systems of morals . . . . . 621 III. Of systems of natural jurisprudence . . . 624 IV. Whether an action deserving moral approbation, must be done with the belief of its being morally good . - . 628 V. Whether justice be a natural or an artificial virtue . 635 VI. Of the nature and obligation of a contract . . 653 VII. That moral approbation implies a real judgment . . ESSAYS ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN. ESSAY I. PRELIMINARY.

Chapter I. Explication Of Words

There is no greater impediment to the advancement of knowledge than the ambiguity of words. To this chiefly it is owing that we find sects and parties in most branches of science ; and disputes, which are carried on from age to age, without being brought to an issue. Sophistry has been more effectually excluded from mathematics and natural philosophy than from other sciences. In mathematics it had no place from the beginning : Mathematicians having had the wisdom to define accurately the terms they use, and to lay down, as axioms, the first principles on which their reasoning is grounded. Accordingly we find no parties among mathematicians, and hardly any disputes. In natural philosophy, there was no less sophistry, no less dispute and uncertainty, than in other sciences, until, about a century and a half ago, this science began to be built upon the foundation of clear definitions and self-evident axioms.

Since that time, the science, as if watered with the dew of Heaven, hath grown apace ; disputes have ceased, truth hath prevailed, and the science hath received greater increase in two centuries than in two thousand years before. It were to be wished, that this method, which hath been so successful in those branches of science, were attempted in others ; for definitions and axioms are the foundations of all science. But that definitions may not be sought, where no definition can be given, nor logical definitions be attempted, where the subject does not admit of them, it may be proper to lay down some general principles concerning definition, for the sake of those who are less conversant in this branch of logic. When one undertakes to explain any art or science, he will have occasion to use many words that are common to all who use the same language, and some that are peculiar to that art or science.

Words of the last kind are called terms of the art, and ought to be distinctly explained, that their meaning may be understood. A definition is nothing else but an explication of the meaning of a word, bv words whose meaning is already known. Hence it is evident, that every [ESSAY I. EXPLICATION OF WORDS. ■2 word cannot be defined; for the definition must consist of words; and there could be no definition, if there were not words previously understood with out definition. Common words, therefore, ought to be used in their com mon acceptation ; and, when they have different acceptations in common language, these, when it is necessary, ought to be distinguished. But they require no definition. It is sufficient to define words that are uncommon, or that are used in an uncommon meaning. It may farther be observed, that there are many words, which, though they may need explication, cannot be logically defined.

A logical definition, that is, a strict and proper definition, must express the kind of the thing defined, and the specific difference by which the species defined is distinguished from every other species belonging to that kind. It is natural to the mind of man to class things under various kinds, and again to subdivide every kind into its various species. A species may often be subdivided into subordinate species, and then it is considered as a kind. From what has been said of logical definition, it is evident, that no word can be logically defined which does not denote a species; because such things only can have a specific difference ; and a specific difference is essen tial to a logical definition. On this account there can be no logical de finition of individual things, such as London or Paris.

Individuals are distinguished either by proper names, or by accidental circumstances of time or place ; but they have no specific difference ; and therefore, though they may be known by proper names, or may be described by circumstances or relations, they cannot be defined. It is no less evident, that the most general words cannot be logically defined, because there is not a more general term, of which they are a species. Nay, we cannot define every species of things, because it happens some times that we have not words to express the specific difference. Thus a scarlet colour is no doubt a species of colour; but how shall we express the specific difference by which scarlet is distinguished from green or blue ? The difference of them is immediately perceived by the eye ; but we have not words to express it.

These things we are taught by logic. Without having recourse to the principles of logic, we may easily be satisfied that words cannot be defined, which signify things perfectly simple, and void of all composition. This observation, I think, was first made by Des Cartes, and afterwards more fully illustrated by Locke. And how ever obvious it appears to be, many instances may be given of great phi losophers who have perplexed and darkened the subjects they have treated, by not knowing, or not attending to it. When men attempt to define things which cannot be defined, their de finitions will always be either obscure or false. It was one of 'the capital defects of Aristotle's philosophy, that he pretended to define the simplest things, which neither can be, nor need to be defined ; such as time and motion.

Among modern philosophers, I know none that has abused de finition so much as Wolfius, the famous German philosopher, who, in a work on the human mind, called Psychohgia Empirica, consisting of many hundred propositions, fortified by demonstrations, with a proportional ac companiment of definitions, corollaries, and scholia, has given so many definitions of things, which cannot be defined, and so many demonstrations of things self-evident, that the greatest part of the work consists of tau tology, and ringing changes upon words. There is no subject in which there is more frequent occasion to use words that cannot be logically defined, than in treating of the powers and operations of the mind. The simplest operations of our minds must all be expressed by words of this kind. No man can explain by a logical definition what it is to think to apprehend, to believe, to will, to desire.

Everv man who understands the language has some notion of the meaning of these words ; and every man, who is capable of reflection, may, by at tending to the operations of his own mind, which are signified by them form a clear and distinct notion of them; but they cannot be logically Since therefore it is often impossible to define words which we must use on this subject, we must as much as possible use common words in their common acceptation, pointing out their various senses where they are ambiguous; and when we are obliged to use words less common, we must endeavour to explain them as well as we can without affecting to give logical definitions, when the nature of the thing does not admit of them. ° The following observations on the meaning of certain words are intended to supply, as far as we can, the want of definitions, by preventing ambiguity or obscurity in the use of them. 1.