Travels in the south of Spain, in letters written A.D. 1809 and 1810

Front matter

CORNELL

UNIVERSITY

LIBRARY

Preface

«rft

Xhe following pages contain the substance of Letters written to my family and friends during six months which I passed in Spain ; they have, however, undergone such alterations as were necessary to render what was originally intended for private amusement, not totally unfit for pubHc perusal ; and those which relate to the Mahomedan dominion, have been entirely composed since my return. In addition to what I have borrowed from Ocampo, Masdeu, and Mariana, I am also indebted to a very accurate abstract of the state of the Moors in Granada, written by Simon de Argote.

It will be perceived, that I have only paid that attention to political subjects which the interesting events, daily passing before me, naturally demanded. I believe, it will be found, that my opinions of public vi PREFACE.

characters, of the nature of the government, and of the disposition of the great mass of the people, are corroborated by all who have visited the Peninsula; and I feel additional confidence in the sanction they receive from the able letter of the Marquis WeUesley to Mr. Canning-, which is printed in the Appendix.

The traces of national character are so strongly marked on the inhabitants of Spdri, that few Englishmen who have visited that country, would find much difficulty in delineating its prominent features. Whatever opinions we may entertain with respect to doniestic politics, we all unite in admiring the efforts of the Spanish people, in their attempt to liberate themselves from oppression. We all join in respecting the manly firmness with which, after repeated reverses, they continue to resist their invaders; in execrating the government which has so grossly abused their confidence ; and in ftervetitly mshing their ultimate freedom and happiness.

I am desirous to rectify an error into which I have fallen, respecting the conspiracy formed in Seville, to overthrow the central Junta. I have learnt since

PREFACE. vii the following sheets were printed, that Lord Wellesley did not name the individual regiments implicated in that plot, nor did he find it expedient to communicate ^ to the government so much of the detail of that project as I had reason to believe he did, from the information I acquired in Seville. While I pay this tribute to accuracy, it is a satisfaction to know, that the respectable authority which has enabled me to correct this error, has, at the same time, confirmed the truth of the other circumstances I have related respecting that conspiracy.

In preparing this work for the press, it has been my object to select such materials only, as I conceived would interest and amuse, while they might convey some information. To myself, amidst many anxieties, it has been a pleasing resource to retrace the scenes I had viewed, and to travel over again the roads I had passed.

London, March 1^ 1811.

Contents

Letter. Page.

I. Departure from England — Storm — Sm-geon's accident — Sight of Cape St. Vincent —

View off Lagos — St. Lucar — Fleet bound for England 1

Appendix

Copy of a Letter from Sir A. Wellesley to the Marquis Wellesley, dated Merida, August 24,

1809 , 1

From the same to the same, dated Merida, August 3 1, 1809 6

From the same to the same, dated Merida, September 1, 1809 8

Copy of a Dispatch from the Marquis Wellesley to the Right Honourable George Canning,

dated Seville, September 15, 1809 15

Population and Extent of Spain, 1803 31

Itinerary of Antoninus in the South of Spain 33

DIRECTIONS TO THE BINDER.

I. Map of Cadiz -- to face the Title-page.

III. Etching of the Inquisition --. ..... .. ....95

IV. Cathedral of Seville ... ... ....... . ^gg

V. AlcaKi de los Panaderos ........ .-...,_. 135

"VI. Carthusian Convent ... ...... ........ jgj^

VIII. Custom-house at Malaga -.--.....,........ 22S

Xm. Gibraltar , 352

ERRATA.

Page II. I. 81. /or "a broad street," read " Broad Street." 91. 1. 18. fin- " Va ja" read " vaja." 95. 1. 1. /or " in this city," read " in Spain." 152. 1. 1. /or " fanega." read " fanegada." 195. 1. 19. for *' Zuarzo," read " Suaco." 195. I. 24. for " Zuar^o," read " Suaeo."^

APPENDIX.

Copy of a Letter fvoijx Sir A. Wellesley to the Marquis Wellesley.

My Lord, Merida, August 2Ath, 1809.

I HAD the honour of receiving last night, at MedelUn, your Excellency's dispatch dated the 22d instant.

From all that I have heard of the state of the Government at Seville, I am not surprised that they should have been astonished and alarmed when they heard that I had at last determined to adopt the measure which I had, so frequently informed them I should adopt.

Although I was desirous to avoid as long as possible to withdraw into Portugal, and certainly remained in the position upon the Tagus as long as it was practicable, and longer probably than was consistent with the anxiety which I have always felt for the welfare and comfort of the troops placed under riiy command, I am of opinion that, having been compelled to withdraw, it becomes a question for serious consideration, whether any circumstances should now induce me to remain in Spain, and to hold out hopes of further co-operation with the Spanish troops, to be decided on grounds very different from those which were to lead to a decision whether, being joined in co-operation with the Spanish Army, I ought or ought not to separate from them. I beg tot lay my ideas upon this point before your Excellency, and to request the j^id of your superior judgment, to enable me to decide upon it in the manner which will be most beneficial to the national interests.

When the two Armies were joined, this implied engagement existed between them, that as long as the operations were conducted by mutual consent they were to continue in co-operation.

a

I should not have considered myself justified in separating from the Spanish Army unless Portugal should evidently have required the protection of the British Army, or unless the Spanish Army should have been under the necessity of adopting a line of operation, to follow which would separate me from Portugal, or unless driven as I was to separate by necessity, or unless the Spanish Army had again behaved so ill as a military body, as it did in its shameful flight from the bridge" of Arzobispo.

I conceived this last case would have made it so notorious that it was necessary for me to separate ; that I had determined that it should induce a separation equally with the occurrence of any of the other three ; and I should have stated it broadly and fairly as my reason for withdrawing the British Army from all communication with a body endowed with qualities as soldiers in a degree so far inferior to themselves.

Your Excellency will observe that my conduct in continuing with the Spanish Army would have been guided by a fair view of our reciprocal situation, and by a consideration of what they might consider an engagement to act with them, as long as it was consistent with the orders I had^ received, to consider my Army applicable to the defence of Portugal ; with which orders the Spanish Government are fully acquainted.

At the present moment however I have been compelled to separate from the Spanish Army ; and the question now is, whether I shall place myself in co-operation with them 'again.

The first point which I should, wish your Excellency to consider is the difference of reasoning by which the decision of this question must be guided, from that which I have above stated would have guided, and did in fact guide me in the decision on the other ; in that case I considered the Armies to be under an implied engagement to each other, not to separate except on certain defined or easily definable grounds: but in this case there is positively no engagement of any description ; there is none in the treaty between His Majesty and the Spanish Government : there is none implied or expressed by me ; indeed the argument would lead the other way, for. His Majesty having offered the Spanish Government the services of his Army upon certain conditions, the conditions were refused, and it must have been understood that His Majesty would not give the aid of his Army ; and accordingly His Ma-

Jesty has never ordered, but has only permitted me to carry on such operations in Spain as 7 might think proper upon my own responsibiUty, and as were consistent with the safety of Portugal.

The question then comes before me to be decided as a near one, whether I shall join in co-operation with the Spanish Army again.

I must here take into consideration, as I did upon the first occasion, the objects of such co-operation, the means which exist of attaining those objects, and the risks which I shall incur of loss to my Army, and of losing sight of Portugal, for the defence of which country the British Army has been sent to the Peninsula.

The object held out in your Excellency's dispatch, and which I consider as only the first and immediate object (for I am convinced your Excellency must look to offensive operations as soon as the means will be prepared for them) is the defence of the Guadiana.

Upon this point I must inform your Excellency, that in my opinion the Guadiana is not to be defended by a weaker Army against a stronger. It is fordable in very many places, and it affords no position that I know of; and the result of withdrawing the Spanish Army from its present position to that which has been proposed to your Excellency for them, would be to expose them to be defeated before I could assist them.

The Spanish Army is at this moment in the best position in this part of the country, which they ought to hold against any force which can be brought against them, if they can hold any thing ; as long as they continue in it they cover effectually the passages of the Guadiana, which they would not cover by the adoption of any other position ; and their retreat from it in case of accidents must always be secure, there is no chance of their being attacked by superior numbers ; I have reason to believe that Soult, as well as Ney, has passed through the mountains into Castille, and there remains only Mortier's corps and two divisions of Victor's in Estremadura, the total of which force cannot amount to 25,000 men.

The subsistence of the Spanish Army in their present position, particularly now that we have withdrawn, cannot be very difficult.

Upon the whole then I recommend that they should remain in their present position as long as possible, sending away to Badajoz the bridge of boats which is still opposite to Almaraz.

According to this reasoning, it does not appear to be necessary, and it is not very desirable, that the British Army should be involved in the defence of the Guadiana. But it may be asked, is there no chance of resuming the offensive ? In answer, I have to obsei*ve, that at present I see none, and hereafter certainly none.

Your Excellency is informed of the history of the causes which led to the late change in our operations ; from the offensive, after a victory, to the defensive. The same causes would certainly exist if we were to recommence our operations. The French have as many troops as we have ; indeed I am not certain that they are not now superior to us in numbers, as they are certainly, at least to the Spanish Army, in discipline and every military quality. Unless we could depend upon the troops employed to keep the passes of the mountains. We could not prevent the French corps in Castitle from coming upon our rear, while those in Estremadura and La Mancha would bein our front; but I certainly can never place any reliance upon the Spanish troops to defend a pass, and I could not venture to detach from the British Army, British troops in sufficient numbers to defend'the passes of Banos and -Perales. Even if we could, however, by the defence of those passes, prevent the Enemy from attacking us in the rear. We could not prevent him from penetrating by the passes of Guadiana or Arila, and adding to the numbers in out front.

To this add, that there are no troops in the north of Spain which could be eniployed to make a diversion. Blake has lost his Aimy, the Marquis de Bomana's is still in Gallicia, and he cannot venture to quit the mountains, having neither cavalry nor artillery.

The Duque del Parque has very few troops, and, as he has shewn lately, he does not like to risk them at a distance from Ciudad Rodrigo. But I come now to another topic, which is one of scriOus Consideration, and has considerable weight in my judgtaent upon this whdle subject, and that is, the frequent, I ought to say Constant, andshameful misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the Enemy. We, in England, never hear of their defeats and flights; but I have heard of Spatiish Officers telling' df nineteen or twenty actions of the description of that at the bridge df Arzobispo, an account of which I believe has never been published.

In the battle at Talavera, in which the Spislnish Army, with very trifling

APPENDIX. s

exceptions, was not engaged, whole corps threw away their arms, and ran off in my presence, when they were neither attacked nor threatened with an attack, but frightened I believe by their own fire. I refer your Excellency, for evidence upon this subject, to General Lueria's orders, in which, after extolling ■the gallantry of his Army in general, he declares his intention to decimate the runaways ; an intention which he afterwards carried into execution. When these dastardly soldiers run away, they plunder every thing they meet ; and in their flight from Talavera, they plundered the baggage of the British Army, which was at the moment btravely engaged in their cause.

1 have found, upon enquiry and from experience, the instances of the misbehaviour of the Spanish troops to be so numerous, and those of their good behaviour so few, that I must conclude that they are troops by no means to be depended upon ; and then the question arises again, whether, being at liberty to join in co-operation with those troops or not, I ought again to risk the King's Army. There is no doubt whatever that every thing that is to be done, must be done by us ; and certainly the British Army cannot be deemed sufficiently strong to be the only acting efficient military body to be opposed to a French Army, not consisting of less than 70,000 men.

Upon every ground, therefore, of objects, means, and risks, it is my opinion that I ought to avoid to enter into any further co-operation with the Spanish Armies, and that at all events your Excellency should avoid to hold out to the Governmentany hope that I would consent to remain within the Spanish frontier with any intention of co-operating with the Spanish troops in future. At the same time I see the difficulty in which the Government may be placed. Their Army may be seized with one of those panic terrors to which they are so liable, and may run off and leave every thing exposed to instant loss. To which I answer, that I am in no hurry to withdraw from Spain. I want to igive my troops food and refreshment ; and I shall not withdraw into Portugal, at all events, till I shall have received your Excellency's sentiments upon what I have submitted to your judgment.

If I should withdraw into Portugal, I shall go no farther than the frontier (but for this I should not wish to engage) and I shall be so near that -the Enemy will not like, to venture across the Guadiana, unless he comes in very large force indeed, leaving me upon his flank and his rear ; I shall therefore.

in effect, be as useful to the Spanish Government within the Portuguese frontier as I should be in the position which has been proposed to your Excellency, and indeed more useful, as I expect that the nearer I shall move to Portugal, the more efficient I shall become: at the same time, that by going within the Portuguese frontier, I clear myself entirely from the Spanish Army, and should have an opportunity hereafter of deciding whether I will co-operate with them at all, in what manner, and to what extent, and under what conditions, according to the circumstances at the moment.

I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) Arthur Wellesley.

H. E. Marquis tVellesley, 4rc, 8^0. 8gc.

Copy of a Letter from Sir A. Wellesley to the Marquis Wellesley.

My Lord, Merida, August ^\st, 1809.

The Spanish Government have lately sent forward a large number of shirts and of sheets, for which I had applied through Mr. Frere, for the use of the hospitals ; I shall be very much obliged to your Excellency if you will give directions that I may be furnished with an account of the expence of these articles, stating to whom I shall order payment to be made for them.

The persons who brought them have run away, with their mules, and I am apprehensive that I shall be obliged to leave here the shirts and the sheets. But that is no reason why the Spanish Government should not be paid for them.

After I had written to your Excellency on the 28th instant, nine carts arrived here from Seville loaded with biscuit for the use of the British Army; and the carts are marked as intended for our service. It is very desirable that I should be informed by the Government on what terms these carts are to be received into the service, whether to be purchased or hired, and at what rates. I propose now to employ them in the removal of the men, who have lately been taken ill, to the hospital at Elvas ; but if the Spanish Government should be of opinion that when the British Army will be in Portugal, it ought not to enjoy the advantage of the means of transport which have been procured for it in Spain, these carts shall be sent back ; notwithstanding that, if the Government and the people of Portugal had acted upon the same principle when the British Army entered Spain, the Army could not have made one march within the Spanish territory.

I am very anxious to receive your Excellency's sentiments upon the pointswhich I submitted to you in my letter of the 24th ; that part of the British Army (the cavalry particularly) which had moved by the road of Caceres, having been pressed for provisions, and not having received, by some accident, the notification of my intention to halt here for some days, had marched on, and had actually arrived within the Portuguese frontier. In the mean time the Spanish Army has, I understand, marched to take up its position behind the Guadiana, and it will probably arrive at La Serena this day. This being the case, it is necessary that I should get the British army in a more collected state, either in Portugal or within the Spanish frontier ; and as the opinions entertained in my Dispatch of the 24th instant, are strengthened by reflections since I addressed you, I propose to commence to move to Badajoz on the day after to-morrow, unless I should in the immediate time receive from your Excellency a communication of your sentiments which shall occasion an alteration of my opinion.

The bridge which had been on the Tagus near Almaraz arrived here last night, on its way to Badajoz. I cannot avoid to take this opportunity of drawing your Excellency's attention to the ease with which all the services of this description required for the Span,ish Army, have been performed ; at the same time that nothing of the kind could be done, on the most urgent requisitions of service as well as of humanity, for the British Army.

When the guns taken from the Enemy at the battle of Talavera were given up, there was no difficulty about drawing them off; when the British Army laid down its ammunition for want of means of conveying it, there was no.

difficulty about transporting it, and there has been none in providing the means to remove the bridge from the neighbourhood of the Tagus at Almaraz to Badajoz. Yet the application of these means at any period of the service of the British Army, would have relieved many of the difficulties under which we laboured, and would certainly have prevented its separation from the Spanish Army at the moment at which it was made. But I beg your Excellency to observe, that among all the ofFers which are pressed upon me to divide the contents of the magazine of provisions at Truxillo, to take what I pleased from it, nay, to take the whole even at the risk of starving the Spanish Army ; offers, of which I knew, and explained, and have since been able to prove the fallacy of, not one was even made to assist the British Army with a cart, or mule, or any means of transport, which gbounded in the Spanish Army.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) Arthur Welleslev.

His Excellency The Marquis IVellesley, ^c. ^c. ^c.

Copy of a Letter from Sir Arthur Wellesley to the Marquis Wellesley.

My Lord, Merida, September 1st, 1809.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your. Excellency's private letter of the 29th of August, containing a copy of Mons. de Garay's note of the 25th August and of your Excellency's answer of the 28th, and of your dispatches of the 30th.

I am happy to find that your Excellency concurs with me in the opinions which I laid before you on the 24th, and I propose to-morrow to commence nay movement from this place.

I intend that the greatest part of the Army shall remain within the Spanish frontier, if I should be able to maintain it in that position, and I will

APPENDIX. <J

apprize your Excellency of the exact positions which I shall occupy, and hereafter of any change which I may think it necessary to make.

My reason for wishing not to engage to remain on the Portuguese frontier i^s, that the principal magazines of the British Army are at Abrantes, Santarem, and Lisbon ; and notwithstanding the good will of the Portuguese Government, and the inclination of the people to give us every assistance in their power ; Alentego being a poor country, I might find it impossible to maintain the whole Army at such a distance from the magazines as the positions which they will occupy upon the frontier. I besides think that it is desirable that the Spanish Government should be induced to look into and acquire an accurate knowledge of their real situation compared with that of the Enemy, and that they should be induced to make such an exertion as will at least provide for their defence by their own means.

On this account, and as I think I ought not to involve His Majesty's Army in any system of co-operation with the Spanish troops for the reasons stated in my:dispatch of the 24th, I beg to decline to accept the honour which the Government have offered to confer upon me, of the command of the corps of 1 2,000 men to be left in this part of the country.

I could not have accepted this command under any circumstances without His Majesty's permission, excepting for the time that I should have considered myself authorized by the instructions of his Majesty's Ministers ; or should have been enabled by circumstances to continue in co-operation with the , Spanish Army ; but, having been obliged to separate from them, and considering it advisable that the British Army should not at present enter upon any system of co-operation with them again, I cannot take upon mysejf the command of any Spanish corps whatever. In respect to offensive operati&ns in future, it is desirable, that the means actually existing in Spain, of the French and of the Allies, should be reviewed ; and the advantages which each Party possesses in the use of these means should be weighed.

I estimate the French foj-ce in Spain, disposable for service in the field, to amount to 125,000 men, well provided with cavalry and artillery ; in which number I do not include the garrisons of Pampeluna, Barcelona, &c. &c. I include however the corps commanded by St. Cyr and Sjichet, which

b i eakttlatg^to amount to 32,000 men, which are employed in Arragonand Catalonia : and the remainder, being gOjOOO men, are in Castile and Estremad»ra. Of fhi& number 70,000 men are actually in the field in the corps of Victofp, Sotflt, Ney, Sebastiani, and Mortier; and the remainder arg employed in garrisons, as at Madrid, EscUrial, Avila, Valladolid, &c. &c. m keeping up the communication with those places ; every man of whom might be brought into the field if occasion required.

In these numbers I do not include sick and woTir^ded, but found my calculatioBs upon what I know were the numbers of the French Army before the battle of Talavera, deducting a loss of 10,000 men in that battle.

Your ExcelleHcy will observe, that there are seven French corps in Spain ; I believe there were originally eight, for Suchet's is the 8th corps, and each corps composing in itself a complete Army, ought to consist of from 30 to 40,000 men. Against this force, the Spanish Government have about 50,000 men in the two corps of Eguia and Venegas. Blake may have collected again about 6,000 men, and the Marquis de Romana has 15,000 men, of which number 1,500 have no arms. The Duque del Parque has 9,000 men in the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, but he is unwilling to detach them. Besides these numbers the British Army may be reckoned from 20 to 25,000 men.

I am aware that there are troops in Spain besides those which I have emunerated; but they are not in any manner, and cannot be considered disposable for the field.

The plan of operations must be founded upon the relative numbers above stated.

But, besides considering the numbers, it is necessary to advert to the . composition, and to the state of efficiency of these different Armies.

The French corps are, as I have already stated, each a complete Army having probably a greater proportion of cavalry, and certainly of artillery, than they ought to have for the existing numbers of their infantry; and they are well disciplined excellent troops.

The Spanish corps of Venegas a;nd Eguia have probably between them not less than 10,000 cavalry, which is more than their proportion ; and they are well provided with artillery. But the corps of Romana has neither cavalry nor artillery, and for want of these arms is unable to quit the mountains of GaUicia. The Duque del Parque is jinable, if he were willing, to assist him with what he wants.

Blake's corps, I believe, consists only of infantry. Both infantry and cavalry are comparatively undisciplined; the cavalry are tolerably well clothed, well armed, accoutred and mounted; but the infantry are not clothed nor accoutred as they ought to be, notwithstanding the large supplies of clothing and accoutrements sent out from England.

With these relative numbers, and adveiling to the state of discipline and eflSciency of the different Armies, it would appear impossible to undertake any offensive operations with any hope of success ; more particularly adverting to the local difficulties with which the Allies would have to contend, and of the advantages of the Enemy.

The Enemy has it in his power to collect his whole force in Castile and Estremadura at any point north of the Tagus ; and can dispose of the parts of it in the front or rear of the Armies of the Allies as he may think proper.

The Allies must move upon the Enemy in two distinct corps at least ; there can be no military communication between the corps assembled in this part of Estremadura and that which would advance from La Carolina through La Mancha ; ori account of the chain of mountains on the whole of the left bank of the Tagus, from the Puente de Miravete to the bridge of Toledo, the onlycommunication which those two corps can have, is by the right bank of the river from Almaraz, and by the bridge of Toledo ; and it is obvious that a battle must be fought with the Enemy's wliole force, and won by one of the two corps, before that communication can be established.

This consideration was the reason that in the late operations the mardh of Venegas was directed upon Viiina and Fuente Duenas and Arganda. It was impossible to join with Venegas, before a battle sihorald be fought with the Enemy's whole force by one of the Armies; and it was tbouglvt best to order Venegas to adopt such a line of march as should ,be most distant from -the combined Armies; in relation to which and the combined Armies the Enemy could not have taken up a centrical position, from which he could have had the choice of attacking either. The Enemy would thus have been forced either to detach to oppose Venegas : or if he had kept his whole force collected to fight the combined corps advancing from this side, he would have lost Madrid ; and his retreat would have been cut off.