The German empire, 1867-1914, and the unity movement

Front matter

CfarncU IntDcraitg SItbcatg

BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME OF THE

JACOB H. SCHIFF

Preface

It has been my desire to make this survey of the modern political history of Germany something more than a compendium of facts or a work of reference, and the public which I have had in mind in writing it is less the limited circle of scholars and students than those " general readers," the number of whom, one may believe, is steadily increasing, who wish to form their opinions on foreign politics independently, intelligently, and therefore on adequate information.

Inasmuch as my chief concern is with the German Empire as established in 1867-1871, only so much attention has been given to the earlier phases of the national unity movement as seemed needful in order to make the later developments intelligible. Hence in dealing with the first half of last century I have concentrated attention upon capital events and tendencies, and in referring to the actors in these have refrained from dragging out of obscurity and oblivion personalities and reputations which, tried by the test of time, have proved to have had significance only for their own day, or even for their own narrow political circles.

Rightly or wrongly, I have not written this History impersonally, nor have I tried so to write it. Had I adhered more faithfully to conventional forms, the work of writing it would have lost half its interest for me, and it may be that the result for the reader would have been less helpful. I shall be satisfied if it should be held that I have succeeded in preserving the mean between a colourless formalism and excessive subjectivity. It has also seemed to me natural to give special prominence to points of contact with my own country, yet without writing from the British standpoint, and this inclination I have not unduly restrained.

In discharging my task, an old reflection has repeatedly returned to me : How comes it that in normal conditions German politics make so slight an appeal to the outside world.? Why does German political life at any time so little interest observers in this country in particular ? The reason lies, I think.

vi PREFACE

in the fact that the German political system encourages in almost one might say, imposes upon — the nation in general an attitude of quiescence and inertia. In German parliamentary life there is no serious struggle; such struggles as do occur are histrionic and unreal, since the combatants engaged in them know in advance that they can seldom lead to practical results. This would appear to be an inevitable consequence of constitutions under which the work of government is the business and the rightful prerogative of a small handful of men, set above and apart from the rest of the nation. The effect of this arrangement is that parliamentary politicians are as a rule little more than supernumeraries, performing more or less mutely their unimportant parts in the background of the stage, while to the people at large is assigned merely the right to look on. It is a fact of profound significance that during nearly the whole of the thirty years from 1860 to 1890 a single figure dominated German political life. How many of Bismarck's political contemporaries seriously count in the history of their country.? How many have left any lasting impression, or any impression at all, upon the political thought and movements of their time .''

Although it has necessarily been treated very summarily, I confess that the first half of the period covered by my survey has attracted me more than the second. For Germany the years following 1860, marking the maturity of the unity movement, are naturally the palmy era — the Glanzzeit — of their country's modem annals. An outsider may be forgiven the avowal that to him the most sympathetic part of the history of that movement is that dating from Prussia's fall at Jena to the middle of the century. The immediate results of the unity struggle during that epoch were small ; the efforts of the nationalists and constitutionalists alike were requited by manifold disappointments, reverses, and disillusionments. None the less, it was a time of intense moral earnestness and persistent upward striving ; in it the political idealism of the German nation reached its zenith; never before or since did that nation in general reach a higher elevation of spirit. It is customary to judge the episode of the ill-fated Frankfort National Assembly in particular as amongst the most humiliating in the history of national unity: I prefer to regard it as one of the few epical incidents of that history. The story is an epic of

PREFACE vii

failure, it is true, yet of a failure more heroic and honourable than many brilliant successes.

Naturally a large part of this History is occupied with events in which Germany's most distinguished statesman and son played a leading and determining part. In recording these events, and later in estimating Bismarck's character, I have not hesitated to speak the whole truth as I know it. It were doing an ill-service to the fame of that great man to pretend that all the motives and acts of his public life were above reproach. The comfortable doctrine of the literary panegyrist, that history and biography should be written politely, and that of the dead no harsh word should be spoken, is responsible for much misrepresentation of fact and perversion of opinion, not least in Germany, as those best know wl)o have had occasion to study German sources. Some of the most pretentious German histories of the new Empire are not histories at all, but political tracts written for the greater glorification of the Empire's rulers and its chief builder. In their pages one looks in vain for healthy, independent criticism, or even for a straightforward, unvarnished statement of facts. Nowhere is there so much talk of the " historical sense " as in Germany, yet no writers exhibit less trace of this admirable gift than the authors of these euphonic productions.

Let the doctrine that Sovereigns, Governments, and popular statesmen cannot err be left to the historians of the country in which it has originated. There were times when Bismarck, who was no moral 6oward, was utterly straightforward and unsparingly candid with himself. There is no justification whatever for falling behind him in the honesty that looks facts fairly in the face and calls wrong things by their right names. The only condition is that nothing in his deflections from strict rectitude should be exaggerated, and that nothing should be set down against him in malice. " I leave it all to history," were the words which he once addressed to myself, at the close of a long conversation in which he had discussed not a few episodes of his political career. " And history," I rejoined, " will tell the truth." Still I see the grave face which was turned to me as he repeated the words • — " Yes, history will tell the truth." And when the truth has all been told, with no attempt to hide his shortcoi'^ings, the magnitude of his achievements will remain undiminished and the lustre of his reputation undimmed. Greatviii PREFACE

ness was the mark of the man, and it was inevitable that this attribute should be conspicuous in his faults as in his virtues, though it is but just to remember that even the faults were those of a passionate and unselfish patriotism, of which the worst that can be said is that it was insufficiently discriminating in its choice of means.

None the less, Bismarck's career offers a fascinating study for the casuist. In judging the policies and acts by which great national movements and events have been consummated, how far is it true, or is it true at all, that the end sanctifies the means and that success is its own justification? Is the consoling thought permissible that History is merely a secular name for Providence, or is it only, in Lord Acton's words, " the conscience of mankind" — conscience, that broken light of the human soul, that unstable guide of human action, so capricious in its judgments, so variable in its perceptions of right and wrong.? Such questions almost inevitably force themselves upon the mind which has occupied itself closely with the part played by Bismarck in the story of German unity. Little more than half a century ago the German races were still disunited ; they neither formed a nation nor had they any immediate hope of becoming such. The age-long aspirations after unity had hitherto been frustrated by particularist jealousies, the factions of parties, the short-sightedness of Sovereigns; above all, by obscurity of purpose and uncertainty as to the means by which unity might be attained. Different lines of advance had been followed, but always without success. Were the ways already tried wrong, was it necessary to discard them altogether, because they had hitherto failed to lead to the desired goal? In the making of States and nations need the builders work to a time-limit?

But now a statesman comes forward who is at least perfectly clear as to his aims. With an iron resolution and a matchless concentration of purpose he overbears opposition, moulds to his own ends the plastic wills of weaker men, and marches forward with undeviating steps to his objective. In so doing he arrogantly defies the accepted norms of public probity, and, extolling force as the master-key to State policy, makes wars with cold deliberation and glories in the act. Unity is achi- the the nation finds itself ; and the world applauds. Is / of the then, the seal that ratifies and closes the transactioan epic of

PREFACE

IX plause the last word? If not, how many issues in the lives of nations remain open, still awaiting the judge's summing up and the jury's verdict!

It is true that not a few of the violent convulsions recorded by history have been due to procrastinating statesmanship. Golden opportunities of accommodation and conciliation have been allowed to pass unimproved, and hence the solution of problems apparently amenable, in some at least of their stages, to peaceful adjustment has passed from the decision of reason to that of will. Was the consummation of German iinity by " blood and iron " similarly inevitable, and if it was not inevitableTwhat IS the verdict that shouldlSFpassed upon the state-

'''"^iE^I^^-^'^^^^^^^^^i-^iJiLL^^^^^y implements .-'""TTis' a "question which has been discussed for Half a ceiitury, and it may well be that it will excite far more controversy in the future than in the past. Never was it so pregnant with gravity as now, when fate holds in suspense the decision of the question whether the German nation stands before the climax or the debacle of its political aspirations. That even for Germany herself unity gained in Bismarck's way has not proved an unmixed blessing cannot for a moment be doubted. Granting that the hope of attaining unity by political liberty seemed unrealizable when Bismarck appeared upon the scene, it is not less true that the price of a unity attained by force was that political liberty receded more and more from the nation's view. The whole of these chapters have been written during the time of war, though some of them are based on materials which had accumulated during a period of twenty-five years. When a further twenty-five years have passed away — perhaps long before — those who look back upon the present troublous times will view the events incidental to them in a very diff^erent perspective from that in which they appear to-day. Some events which now occupy a large place in the minds and judgments of most of us will then take a minor place. On the other hand, it may well happen that events to which now a small significance is aLtached, or which are ignored altogether, will receive an unanticipated prominence. Writing of the aff^airs of a i^fl^ion with which we are in conflict, there is a danger lest, j^jjfjthe influence of honourable feelings, facts should be unshortcoiZ perverted, acts of policy be interpreted unfairly diminished"^ later knowledge, sinister motives be attributed

X PREFACE

or suspected where they did not exist, and that in this way history should be falsified in the name of patriotism, just as the pious scriveners of the monastery were wont to falsify history in the name of religion.

Compelled by the conditions of my task to record, and in some measure to pronounce upon, events which are in a certain sense sub judice, I have honestly tried to preserve a dispassionate judgment, and to estimate known facts at their rightful value and significance. I frankly own to having written with more of the critic's freedom and less of the indulgence of the friend than might have been the case in other circumstances. It is doubtful, indeed, whether for a very long time, if ever, the history of German unity will be written again out of Germany with enthusiasm. Yet the only bias of which I am conscious has been a bias towards scrupulous investigation and candour of utterance, for history that is not entirely honest is entirely contemptible, degrading to the writer and fraudulent and pernicious in its influence upon public opinion. None the less, without design on my part, it will be seen that many passages in the earlier part of my story have a vital bearing upon recent developments of German politics, and that to some of these they seem to offer a direct clue.

Several points of literary technique may be noted in conclusion. My sources — for the most part German and French, and only in a minor degree, and chiefly when dealing with questions immediately aff'ecting this country, English — have been far too numerous to justify the addition of a bibliography, but I may fairly claim that no essential authority has been overlooked. The reader who wishes to carry his studies further may be referred for guidance to the excellent bibliographies appended to the volumes of Sir Adolphus Ward's Germany. To that scholarly work — published after this History was completed — I cannot deny myself the pleasure of paying a tribute of sincere respect. Where in footnote references to foreign books the titles are given in the original, quotations from these books have been made at first hand. M^y of the quotations from translations, however, have been compared with the originals.

The close student of Bismarck's career will not be surprised if I own to having used his monumental Gedank en und Erinnerungen with a certain discrimination. It is needful to remember that in writing that book Bismar ?k had in mind an inter-

PREFACE xi

national public — the universal republic of letters — and was conscious that he was addressing himself to the tribunal of history, that Weltgericht of which Schiller spoke as the final arbiter of events and reputations. While, therefore, the opinions and dicta recorded in his Memoirs — not a few of which revise earlier utterances — are those by which he would wish to be judged, it does not follow that they can be accepted in all cases as faithful clues to his attitude at the time towards the events to which they relate. It is needful to receive these last words and confessions subject to this important reservation.

The treatment of foreign Christian names is a standing difficulty, and the choice between the original forms and the English equivalents would appear to be regarded as a matter of taste. While admitting that " Frederick Schiller " or " Henry Treitschke " would read no less quaintly in English than " Wilhelm Shakespeare " or " Johann Milton " in German, I have nevertheless followed the rule of translating the names of German Sovereigns ; it is an arbitrary compromise, and, like most compromises, it cannot be altogether defended.

It seems desirable to add for the benefit of critics who judge books, not by what their authors say, but by what they do not say, that as this History is in substance a political essay I have deliberately refrained from dealing with such phases of German national life — e.g. letters, art, and science — as are comprised in the term KulturgescJiichte, or History of Civilization. For the same reason, and upon the further and conclusive ground of want of technical knowledge, in what I have said about the three wars which preceded German unity I have not attempted to invade the special province of the military writer.

My cordial thanks are due to Mr. G. P. Gooch, the historian, who has kindly read these volumes in proof-sheet form, thereby performing the most valuable service that one author can render to another: of his criticisms and suggestions I have not failed to make profitable use. Dr. K. Breul, Schroeder Professor of German in the University of Cambridge, has likewise placed me under a similar obligation, to acknowledge which is no less a pleasure than a duty.

W. H. D.

Beckknham, Kent, August, 1918.

CONTENTS OF CHAPTERS

Chapter I (1806-1848)

The Peace of Westphalia and the German Sovereigns, 1 — Decline of Prussia after the Death of Frederick the Great, 3 — Dissolution of the Holy- Roman Empire by Napoleon, 3 — Formation of the Confederation of the Rhine, 4 — Decay of Public Spirit in the German States, o — Fall of Napoleon, 7 — The Congress of Vienna and Waterloo, 9 — Formation of the Germanic Federation (Deutscher Bund), 11 — The Federal Act of June 8, 1815, 16 — The National Unity Movement and the Victory of Reaction, 19 — The Burschenschaft and the Wartburg Festival, 24 — Murder of Kotzebue, 25 — The Carlsbad Decrees, 27 — Refusal of a Constitution to Prussia, 33 — Character of Frederick William IV of Prussia, 33 — The Revolutionary Movements of 1848, 35 — Frederick William IV and National Unity, 38 — A Constitution granted to Prussia, 40 — Intellectual and Material Progress of Prussia, 42^;— Origin of the Customs Union, 44.

The Interrelation of Liberalism and National Unity, 4;9 — Democratic Movements in South Germany, 50 — Election of the Frankfort National Assembly, 52 — German Professors and the Nationalist Cause, s3.=— Drafting of an Imperial Constitution, 55 — Frederick William IV and the Imperial Title, 56 — Appointment of an Imperial Administrator (Archduke John of Austria), 58 — The Fundamental Rights of the German Nation, 60 — Decline of National Enthusiasm, 6Q„ — Obstructive Policy of Austria, 64 — The Designs of %hwarzenbprg, 66 — Offer of the Imperial Office to Frederick William IV and his refusal of the same, 68 — Dissolution of the Frankfort National Assembly, 73 — The "Union" Project of Prussia, 75 — Austrian Resistance and Counter-measures, 77 — The Erfurt Parliament, 78 — Austria revives the Federal Diet, 78 — The Constitutional Struggle in Hesse, 80 — The Conventions of Warsaw and Olmiitzi, 83 — Success of Schwarzenberg's Policy of Waiting, 84 — Prussia disowns the Union and reenters the Federation, 87 — Austria and the Customs Union, 87 — Further Victory of the Reaction, 88 — The ^migr^s of 1848, 89.

xiv CONTENTS OF CHAPTERS

Chapter III (1851-1861)

The Fundamental Issue between Austria and Prussia one of Power, 91 — Appearance of Otto von Bismarck in Public Life, ^^-z/^r'„ Diplomacy at Frankfort, 94. — The Crimean War, 95 — Louis N apoleon and the Coup d'etat of December, 1853, 97 — Policy of Prussia in the War, 99 — Division amongst Prussian Parties, 101 — Attituae of the Prince of Prussia, 103 — The Treaty of Pans, 105 — Ihe Italian Campaign of 1859, 106 — Obstinate Attitude of Count Buol, 109 — Prussia's Neglect to go to Austria's Assistance, 110 — Ihe Peace of Villafranca, 110 — Cession of Nice and Savoy to France, 111 — Napoleon's Conspiracy against the Territorial Settlement of 1815, 113 — Regency of the Prince of Prussia, 117 — Duke Ernest of Coburg and the "Moral Conquest" of Germany, 119 — The Prussian "Ministry of the New Era," 130 — Lord Clarendon on Prussia's Position in Germany, 131 — Napoleon's Overtures to Prussia and his Meetings with the Prince Regent, 121 — Prince Albert of Coburg and the German Question, 135.

Chapter IV (1858-1863) \

The Prussian Military System in 1858, 139 — Army Reorganization Scheme, 130 — Opposition of the Lower House of the Diet, 132 — Beginning of the Constitutional Conflict, 133 — Fqrmation^pLthe Party— of Progress, (Fortschritt), 134 — Change of Ministry, 135 — Appointment of Bismarclf as Minister-President and Foreign Minister, 137 — The Doctrine of "Blood and Iron," 138 — Issue and subsequent Repeal of Ordinance against the Press, 141 — Government without a Budget, 143 — Conflicting Constitutional Theories, 143 — Bismarck and the Question of Federal Reform, 147 — The Kationalverein and the Unity Movement, 150 — Rival Schemes of Federal Reform»_L53-^ — Bismarck's Ultimatum to Count Karolyi, 153 — The Emperor of Austria Convenes a Congress of Princes at Frankfort, 154 — Refusal of the King of Prussia to Attend, 155 — Renewed Constitutional Struggle in Hesse, 157 — Austria and the Customs Union, 159 — Prussia and the Polish Rebellion of 1863, 161 — Diplomatic Action by the Powers, 162 — Bismarck's Visit to London in June, 1863, 165.

Chapter V (1846-1865)

THE ELBE DUCHIES AND THE DANISH AVAR

Relation of Denmark to Schleswig and Holstein, 170 — The Eider Dane Movement, 171 — Infraction of the Ancient Rights of the Duchies by Denmark, 171 — Insurrection in the Duchies, 173^ — Military Int--^ vention by Prussia, 173 — The Treaty of Malmo, 174 — Restoration !^

CONTENTS OP CHAPTER.

XV tiie Status Quo in the Duchies, 175 — The Protocol (1850) and Treaty (1852) of London, 1T6 — Renunciation by the Duke of Augustenburg of his Claim to Succession in the Duchies, 176 — Settlement of the Neuchatel Question, 177 — The Schleswig-Holstein Question Reopened by Frederick VII of Denmark, 178 — Joint Protest by Prussia and Austria, followed by Joint Intervention, 179 — Declarations of the British Government, 179 — Death of the Danish King and Accession of Christian IX, who claims full Succession in Schleswig and Holstein, 182- Prince Frederick of Augustenburg's Rival Claims to the Duchies, 183- Powerful Support of the Pretender in Germany, 183 — Intervention by Prussia and Austria, 183 — Bismarck's Ulterior Motives, 184 — Obstructive Attitude of the Prussian tower House, 185 — Prussian and Austrian Armies Enter the Duchies and War Begins, 187 — Peace Negotiations in London, and Conclusion of an Armistice, 188 — Hostilities are Renewed: the Peace of Vienna, 189 — The British Government's Attitude of "Meddle and Muddle," 190 — The Prusso- Austrian Condominium in the Duchies and Bismarck's Schemes for their Annexation, 193 — Anti- Prussian Tendencies in Vienna, 195 — Schemes for the Settlement of the Duchy Dispute, 196 — The Prussian " February Programmc'tj 197 — A Prussian Council of State discusses the Question of War with Austria, 200 — Austrian Concessions to Prussia in the Duchies, 201 — Report of the Prussian Crown Syndicate, 201 — Count Blome's Compromise Proposals, 202 — Their Embodiment in the Convention of Gastein, 204.

Chapter VI (1865-1866)

Failure of the Convention of Gastein, 205 — Protests against the Convention by Great Britain and France, 206 — Dual Government in the Duchies, 207 — The Dispute with Austria renewed, 208 — The Augustenburg Agitation in Holstein, 209 — A Council of Prussian Ministers decides on War, 211 — Military Preparations by the Rival Powers, 212 — Bismarck makes sure of Napoleon's Neutrality, 213 — Conversations on French Claims to Territorial Compensations, 213 — Conclusion of a Prussian Alliance with Italy, 214 — Attitude of the Minor German States, 216 — Count Mensdorff's Last Attempt to Conciliate Prussia, 218 — Prussian Appeals to Bismarck and Roon to keep the Peace, 218 — The Prussian Nation opposed to War, 219 — Austria declines Napoleon's Proposal of a Congress, 221 — Bismarck lays before the Diet in Frankfort a Scheme of Federal Reform, 224 — Priissia Ejects Austria from Holstein, 226 — Voting of the Federal Diet upon Austria's Proposal to Mobilize the Federal Army against Prussia, 227 — Prussia secedes from the Diet and declares it dissolved, 228 — Napoleon's Secret Treaty with Austria, 228 — Prussia's Overtures to Saxony, Hanover, and Electoral Hesse Rejected, 231 — Commencement of Hostilities, 231 — Revelations of Austria's Unreadi less for War, 233 — The Bohemian Campaign, 236 — Battle of Koni^gratz, 237 — Bismarck's Unsuccessful Attempt to Raise an Insurrection in Hungary, 239 — Napoleon Intervenes between the Be'ligerents, 241 — The Land-hunger of William I, 243 — Peace Negotiations with Napoleon, 243 — Renewed French Claims to Terrixvi CONTENTS OF CHAPTERS

torial Compensation, 245 — The Peace Preliminaries of Nikolsburg, 348 _ Conclusion and Terms of the Treaty of Prague, 250 — Annexations by Prussia in Germany, 253 — Fate of the King of Hanover, 255; End of the Prussian Constitutional Conflict, 257.

Chapter VII

Federation of the North German States, 263 — Organization and Scope of Government, 265 — The Office of Federal Chancellor, 266 — Bismarck on Manhood Suffrage, 267 — The Constituent North German Diet, 268 — Debates on the Draft Constitution, 269 — The First North German Diet, 276 — An Era of Liberal Legislation, 276 — Relations between North and South Germany, 278 — Napoleon's Overtures to Austria, 282 — Renewal of the Customs Union, 284 — Austro-Prussian Outburst in WUrtemberg, 285 — Meeting of the Customs Parliaffient, 286 — Attitude of the Great Powers towards Prussia in the Middle of last Century, 289 — Attitude of English Statesmen, 291 — Lord John Russell's Awakening to the Importance of the German Question (1860), 293 — Want of Sympathy with the German Unity Movement in England, 296.

Chapter VIII (1867-1870)

Relations between Prussia and France, 298 — French Statesmen and German Unity, MM. Thiers and OUivier quoted, 301 — Napoleon's Disappointment at Prussia's Success, 302 — His Negotiations with Bismarck on the Question of Compensations, 304 — His Designs on German Territory and on Belgium, 306 — The Luxemburg Question, 311 — Napoleon Abandons the Hope of Annexations, 315 — Foresight of Count Benedetti, 316 — Napoleon seeks an Alliance with Austria and Italy, 317 — First Movement towards Austro-Prussian Reconciliation, 320 — French Proposals of Disarmament, 321 — The Liberal Empire in France and Result of the PUbiscite of May 8, 1870, 323 — Changes in the Ministry, and Appointment of the Due de Gramont to the Foreign Ministry, 324 — Peace Portents in France and Germany, 326 — The Hohenzollern Candidature for tbe Spanish Throne, 328 — Bismarck's Clandestine Negotiations in Madrid, 332 — Effect of the Candidature in France, ^^ — Bismarck's Motives in promoting it, 336 — Declaration of Protest by the French Ministry, 337 — Aggravation of Public Opinion in Paris, 338 — Count Benedetti has an Audience of William I at Ems, 340 — Renunciation of the Candidature

by Prince Anthony of Hohenzollern on behalf of his Son, 342

The Due de Gramont requires Guarantees for the future' 343

Refusal of the same by the King of Prussia, 344 — Conference of Bismarck, Roon, and Moltke leading to the Perversion o.f the Ems Telegram, 345 — The French Government Declares for War (§S0>— Bismarck's Share in Precipitating the Issue, 352. , ' ^^

CONTENTS OF CHAPTERS xvii

Chapter IX (1870-1871)

Reception of the Declaration of War in Paris and Berlin, 355 — Napoleon looks in vain for Allies, 356 — Attitude of Count Beust and Austria, 357 — Public Opinion in England, 358 — Disclosure of Napoleon's Proposal to Annex Belgium, 359 — Conclusion by Great Britain of Treaties with the Belligerent Powers guaranteeing the Integrity of Belgium and Luxemburg, 361 — Unreadiness of the French Army and Military Arrangements, 362 — Prussia's Plan of Campaign, 364

— Principal Engagements of the War, 365 — Revolution in Paris, the third Republic Proclaimed, and the Imperial Dynasty Deposed, 367

— German Annexation Designs, 368 — M. Thiers visits the Neutral European Courts, 372 — Investment and Bombardment of Paris, 372 — • Armistice and Election of a, French National Assembly, 374 — Peace Negotiations at Versailles, 375 — The Terms of Peace, 376 — Bismarck's Attitude on the Annexation Question, 378 — Excesses and Suppression of the Paris Commune, 379 — The Treaty of Frankfort, 380 — French and German Losses in the War, 381 — Recuperative Power of France, 381 — Denunciation by Russia of the Treaty of Paris and resulting Conference of the Powers in London, 383.

/chapter X

Completion of^German Unity, 383 — The DiflBculties raised by and the Concessions made to Bavaria, 386 — The Reserve Rights secured to the States of the South, 388 — The Imperial Title, 389 — Attitude of Roon on the Unity Question, 391 — Ratification of the Treaties of Union by the Diets, 393 — Proclamation 'of the Empire at Versailles, 394 — German Unity Consummated by Bismarck, -395 — Constitution and Meeting of the First Diet of the Empire, 396 — Principal Provisions of the Imperial Constitution, 398 — The Fate of the Annexed Provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, 406 — Early Legislation of the Diet, 407 — The Peace Strength of the Federal Army fixed, 409 — Parties in the Diet, 410 — Valuable Service rendered to the Cause of Unity by the National Liberals, 41i,

VcHAPTER XI

(1868-1883)

R^*tions of Church and State in Prussia, 416 V Privileged Position of the Roman Catholic Church under Frederick William III and Frederick WiUiam IV, 417 — The Position of the Papacy after 1866, 418 — Convocation of the CEcumenical Council of December 8, 1869, 418 — Premonitions of the Dogma of Infallibility, 419 — Alarm of the German Governments, 419 — Bismarck Declines to Begin a Quarrel with the Papacy, 420 — The German Bishops pronounce against the Infalxviii CONTENTS OF CHAPTERS