The battle of Chancellorsville

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Preface

E PEYSTER, in his " Critical Review of the Battle of Chancellorsville," says, "Of all the battles of the rebellion, the writer has found Chancellorsville the most difficult to comprehend in all its turns and phases.

Even yet, some of its movements continue to be enigmas to him." And so able a soldier and keen a strategist as General Humphreys, who was himself a prominent actor on the field, says, in his testimony, " Probably I know less in regard to the battle of Chancellorsville than any other battle I ever took part in." It should be added that there has been doubtless more misapprehension, and, in consequence, downright misleading of the public mind respecting this battle than any in the long catalogue of the four years of the late

war.

4 PREFACE.

As a military study, no battle presents so many broad questions, that require, for their correct solution, the best talent of the student, and the most profitable employment of his faculties. Many of the great principles of the military science — tactics, strategy, and logistics — are exemplified in a remarkable manner, in this campaign.

To understand well a campaign it is necessary to know at every moment of time where the two opposing armies are. They must be known etnd watched, as the dispatcher, on a line of railway where innumerable trains are moving, follows his trains. Unless one can answer for the position of all the troops, who are parties to the contest at every conceivable epoch in its progress, he is constantly liable to be imposed upon by false testimony and false opinions, and to be perpetually led astray in his own judgments. But with this knowledge in mind, he is prepared to detect error, and misrepresentation, and easily trace the real phases of the fight. The erroneous testimony given respecting this battle, which has' formed the basis and framework of the accounts of it that have, from time to time, been published, was the result of not knowing where the rebel army was, at the times which the testimony touched, and not of any intentional deceit.

The writer has attempted to give what he conceives to be a truthful outline and coloring to his narrative. K he has failed in any respect to compass this result, none will

PREFACE. 5

feel more sorrow than he, and none will be more ready than he to repair a wrong. Trusting that he has, in some good degree, made plain an extremely intricate subject, he

submits it to the public.

S. P. B.

Fountain Side, Meadyillb,

June Qth, 1882.

CONTENTS:

Chapter Page

I. — Preliminaries to the Campaign, 9

II. — Peepa rations of the Two Armies for the Onset, 25 III. — Plan of the Campaign. Movements op the

Cavalry, 36

IV. — ^The Army of the Potomac Unleashed, . . 45 V. — The Contending Hosts Brought Face to Face, 60

VI. — A Day of Manceuvres, 81

VII. — A Crisis in the Battle, lOC

VIII. — A Morning op Bloody Conflict, 116

IX. — Retirement of 'ihe Union Forces to the Final

Line of Battle, 130

X. — Sedgwick at Fredericksburg and Salem

XI. — Conduct op the Battle, 160

XII. — Numbers Engaged, Losses, the "Wounded, the

Dead, 197

XIII. — The Injuries op Hooker, the Wounds of Jackson, THE Charge of Keenan, 211

Appendix. Official Orders, Telegrams, and Testimony, 237

ILLUSTRATIONS.

Page Map of the Chancellorsville Field, 57

Map of the Feedekicksbukg and Salem Chukch Field, 195

Geound Sketch of the Charge of Keenan, . . . 233

PORTRAITS.

Joseph Hooker, Frontispiece.

Thomas Jonathan (Stonewall) Jackson, , to face page 110 (8) V

HISTORY

OF THE iATTLE OF aiHANCELLORSVILLE.

Chapter I. Pbeliminabies To The Campaign

N the rigbt bank of the Potomac, a few miles above its confluence with the Rappahannock, stretching along the shore for a considerable distance, is the estate of Mount Vernon, once the home of Washington, and where repose his mortal remains. In his lifetime, all this section of country, diversified by hill and dale, skirtings of forest and far-stretching meads, was familiar ground. At Fredericksburg, a few miles away, he attended church on the Sabbath, whither he often rode on horseback, where Mary, his mother, lived, and where she lies buried. In moving up and down the river, which is here a lordly stream, the mansion and the tomb of the chief are plainly visible, and in passing, it is the invariable custom to dip the ensign of the craft, and strike the bell in measured note, the pilgrim standing with uncovered head. It is a mark of veneration bred of those exalted qualities displayed in cabinet and field, for the founding and unification of a country, of which he is aptly termed its Father. As his eye rested in his later days upon the repose and quiet of this beautiful landscape, the river rolling at his feet, orchards and green meadows sweeping up on every side, the blue hills of Virginia in the back-ground) and he contemplated, with just satisfaction, his life-work successfully accomplished, is it possible that a shade of sadness was ever brought to that serene brow, by visions of a broken and disrupted country, the fragments warring over these fields to destroy what he gave his life to build up and cement ?

The perpetual murmur which falls upon his ear, as he rests in his tomb by the stream gliding onward to the sea, was often broken during the years of fratricidal conflict, by the crash of arms, as venomous strife appealed to the red hand of battle. By a singular fatality, the line which bounds the horjzon of Mount Vernon encircles fields on which were some of the most desperate and deadly conflicts of the war.

The Potomac river, which forms the northern boundary of Virginia, was the limit of the seceding States, east of the Appalachian range of mountains, and was the line which the Confederate armies sought, in the early stages of the war, to defend. The next stream south, of sufficient size to be capable of being made a line of defense, is the Rappahannock. When, therefore, their armies were pushed back from the former stream, they entrenched themselves upon this, and here, consequently, was the ground where grand campaigns had their initial, and where the finest armies, on both sides of the contest, struggled for the mastery.

Shortly after the close of the summer campaigns of^ 1862, which had raged upon the Peninsula, at Bull Run before Washington, and at South Mountain and Antietam in Maryland, McClellan, Pope, and McDowell, who had been holdiug command of the Army of the Potomac, either in whole or in part, ware superseded by Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside. It was on the 8th of November that he assumed command of the consolidated Potomac army. In the first battle of Bull Run he had proved himself a brave and skillful ofiicer, and in a subsequent campaign, undertaken by sea, into North Carolina, upon a dangerous and tempestuous coast, he had displayed remarkable enterprise, and the disposition to press forward unceasingly — qualities which the government and the country, on account of the ill success and seeming dilatoriness of former commanders, were eager to see displayed.

The autumnal rains had already set in, and, under ordinary con-

PRELIMINARIES TO THE CAMPAIGN. H

ditions, the time of campaigning would have been considered past, and preparations made to go into winter-quarters, to await, during the inclement season, the settled weather of the spring. But he well knew the impatience which was oppressing every heart, and being constituted of that stern stufF, which never cowers before obstacles and hardships, he had no sooner assumed command than he opened an active campaign. Feigning a movement towards Gordonsville,* he made a real march towards Fredericksburg, where he hoped to cross the Rappahannock, and occupy the heights beyond before the opposing army should divine his motive. But General Robert E. Lee, who was pitted against him in command of the Army of Northern Virginia, was possessed of enterprise akin to his own, and had placed himself in position to oppose the passage at that point, long before Burnside was ready to cross, the latter having been unaccountably delayed by the failure of the proper officers to bring up the bridge-train.

It was the 13th of December, 1862, before his preparations were completed for offering battle. The passage of the stream was resolutely effected, and the necessary bridges having been laid, the grand army moved over. But, at a distance of a mile to two miles back from the river, on a line of rugged, wooded blufife, lay the opposing legions in impregnable fastnesses, awaiting the advance. It was boldly made. But, though wave after wave of living valor dashed madly against those rocky heights, guarded in front by walls of stone, little impression was produced, and when all hope of success by direct advance was gone, on the night of the 15th, Burnside withdrew his entire array without molestation.

Inspired with a resolution which knew no impediment nor delay, and stung with mortification at his previous misfortune, he was scarcely settled in his camp before he commenced preparations for another attempt. His infantry was to cross some six or seven miles below Fredericksburg,t at a point opposite the Sedden house, near Hayfield, while a demonstration was being made above the town ; and, in case he was discovered and prevented from crossing below, then the demonstration above was to be converted into a real progress.

* " Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 643-650. t" Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 717.

12 THE BATTLE OF CHANOELLOBSVILLE.

A cavalry force, consisting of 2,500 men, the best in the service, he divided into two columns, and while one made demonstrations upon the upper Kappahaunock, the other, consisting of a thousand picked men, with four pieces of artillery, was to cross the Rappahannock at Kelly's ford, and the Rapidan at Raccoon ford, and, sweeping around, fall upon Lee's communications, blow up the locks on the James river canal, destroy the iron bridge on the Richmond and Lynchburg railroad at the place of crossing, and the bridge over the Nottaway, on the Richmond and Weldon railroad. When this was well accomplished, Burnside, with the main body, was to cross the river, as indicated, and complete the severance of Lee'o main line of supply, or defeat him in battle. The cavalry expedition was well on the way, and all the dispositions had been made for crossing, positions for the artillery to cover the movement having been Selected, and logs cut for corduroying the roads, when, on the 30th of December, General Burnside received the following telegram from President Lincoln : " I have good reason for saying that you must not make a general movement without letting me know of it." A messenger was immediately dispatched to arrest the cavalry, and all movements were at once suspended.

So numerous were the sympathizers with the seceding States, in and about the army, and in all the departments of the government, that it was impossible for a plan of campaigns to be divulged beyond the breast of him who formed it, without being immediately communicated to the enemy. So disastrous was this evil found to be that the General-in-Chief of the Army, Henry W. Halleck, had directed General Burnside not to telegraph any of his plans to Washington.* What the objection to a movement was, Burnside was at a loss to conceive, as the President had always manifested impatience

* Question. Did the President know at the time he sent you the telegraphic dispatch suspending your movement, what movement you contemplated ?

Answer. No, sir; nothing except that I had ordered a movement. I take it, he knew that. General Halleck knew it. None of them knew my plans. In fact, General Halleck telegraphed me distinctly and positively to send nothing at all over the wires in regard to my plans.

Question. Did those who communicated with the President know your plans ?

Answer. No, sir; not a. General in my command knew my plans. They knew they were to cross, that was all. — Testimony of General Burnside, " Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 722.

at delay. Oii visiting Mr. Lincoln, he learned that two of his general officers, when they found that a movement was about to be undertaken, had been to Washington, and, in a roundabout way,* had told the President, with whom they sought an interview, that there was dissatisfaction in the army, and that their belief was that another movement across the river would end disastrously, that the men would not fight f with that enthusiasm necessary to success.

Before leaving. General Burnside desired to have an order from the President or General Halleck, explicitly directing a forward movement. This General Halleck refused to give, but gave some general principles which should govern in the management of campaigns, J and took care to assert that he had always favored a forward movement. The President indorsed this paper, and, understanding from its purport that a movement was desired by the government without explicitly directing it, General Burnside de-

* " I also found myself in a very delicate position in this oonversfition. I did not wish to tell the President, and I did not tell him at any one time, that the troops had no confidence in General Burnside. I could not tell him that, although, so far as I was concerned, that was my firm belief. But that was a most delicate thing for me to say, and therefore I had to go, as it were, around it Indirectly. ... If I could have gone to the President and said to him, ' Mr. President, the army has no confidence in General Burnside, that is the whole trouble down there,' my conversation would not have lasted five minutes ; but that was manifestly improper. I could not say it, although I did believe it firmly."

.... "Qaestinn. Do I understand you to say that this lack of confidence in the army arose from a want of confidence in General Burnside's military ability ?

"Answer. That is my firm belief.

"Question. And do I understand you to say that that opinion was pretty universal in the army ?

"Answer. That is the misfortune — that it was almost universal. That was my firm belief from all I could hear.

" Question. Did you communicate that fact to the President in any manner ?

"Answer. As I have already remarked, I thought it would be highly improper for me to come square out and say that. I say, as I have before stated, that I tried to convey to the President, indirectly, this idea — that the troops had no confidence in General Burnside."-^Testimony of Geneeal John Newton, " Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 731-2-7.

■f- My meaning was this, that they would fight to a certain extent, but they would not fight with that rush and impetuosity which the situation of affairs on the Bappahannock absolutely demanded as the first element of success. — Testimony of General John Newton, " Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 733.

t Testimony of General Burnside, " Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 719.

termined to again put his army in motion. On returning to camp, however, he found that all the details of the cavalry movement which he had formed were known to the enemy,* as well as his entire plan of campaign. This determined him to give up entirely the campaign in this particular form, and to cast about for other dispositions.

On examining the ground above Falmouth, he believed that a crossing could be effected at Banks' and United States fords. He, accordingly, made all the necessary surveys and preparations as before, only reversing his tactics, and making the feint to cross a few miles below. On the 20th of January the command had been given to move, and the camps were astir, when there came on one of those wintry rains so common to the Virginia climate. It seemed as if the windows of heaven had been opened, and were pouring out all their torrents. The earth soon became like a saturated sponge, and the roads impassable, a full team scarcely sufficing to draw an empty wagon. Teams were doubled and quadrupled to move the heavy guns which soon sank in the yielding mud, blocking the way, and creating inextricable confusion. Single horsemen , were unable to advance, and were obliged to dismount. The delay thijs occasioned robbed the movement of whatever of secrecy and surprise had been intended, and enabled the ever watchful enemy to divine its purpose and prepare to meet it.

Satisiied that all attempts to assail the enemy in this direction would be fatal, he reluctantly on the 22d of January, for the third time, ordered his army to return to camp. But the return proved even more difficult than the advance, and in the midst of the sorest labors to extricate the artillery and trains, the hostile soldiers, who stood guard on the opposite side of the river, commiserating their opponents in these troubles, in mockery offered to come over and lend a helping hand. Thus ended what in common parlance was known as, the "Mud March."

In the meantime it had come to the knowledge of General Burnside who the officers were that had made the gratuitous representations to Mr. Lincoln, and what ones in the army shared in their views. He had learned, moreover, that these soldiers believed it

*" Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 718.

impracticable* to cross the river in the face of an active foe. General Burnside distinctly saw that he could never prosecute successful campaigns, with a portion of his officers so little in sympathy with his plans and purposes, and accordingly went to his tent and drew up, what is known as, order No. 8 of his series, dismissing certain officers from service, and relieving others from duty with the Army of the Potomac. This he ordered his Adjutant-General to issue ; f but was prevailed upon, by a cool-headed adviser, to first lay it before the President, whose approval it required to give it validity. He accordingly went to Washington, and placed in the hands of Mr. Lincoln this order, together with his own resignation as a Major-Genera], with the explanation, that if the President would approve the order and see it executed, he would withdraw the resignation ; otherwise its acceptance was desired.

After due consultation with his jmilitary advisers, th^ President decided to relieve General Burnside but not to accept his resignation, deeming him to be an energetic and faithful officer. Impressed with the lofty sense of duty and responsibility of each individual , to serve his country entertained by the President, the General generously oflFered to waive every motive of pride or ambition, and to return to the command of his old corps, or any other service required of him.J But who should succeed to this fearfully responsible position — the command of the Army of the

*It was my belief, my military belief, that with the best troops in the world we would have failed at that time. ... It is laid down by the very best military writers — not merely theoretical, but practical military writers — that the passage of a river in face of an opposing force never succeeds, except by mere chance ; that the instances of success are so rare that the rule is proved by the exceptions ; that it is impossible to pass a river except what is called by surprise ; that is, at a point so far removed from the main body of the enemy, or do it so suddenly that you have time to get your troops over, and not only get them over but also in order of battle so as to be ready to meet an attack ; for, if the enemy charge upon you before you get in order of battle, the more troops you have over the worse for you. — Testimony of Geneeal Newton, " Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 738.

t " Conduct of the "War," Part I., p. 720, 721.

X General Burnside always distrusted his ability to command the Army of the Potomac, as will be seen from the following testimony : " I told them what my views were with reference to my ability to exercise such a command, which viaws were those I had always unreservedly expressed — that I was not competent to command such a large army as this. I had said the same over and over again to the President and Secretary of War."— "Conduct of the War," Part I., p. 650.

Potomac, the largest of the national forces, and upon which was the chief reliance of the government for the safety of the Capital and its own integrity. To this time it had had a peculiarly unfortunate history. In its varied encounters at Bull Eun, upon the Peninsula, and now before Fredericksburg,

" Unmerciful disaster Followed fast and followed faster, till its songs one burden bore, Till the dirges of its hope the melancholy burden bore."

This army was not wanting in able soldiers. But who, Ia the midst of its countless complications, could harmonize conflicting wills, and successfully wield its hundred thousand men? Who should prove the disenchanter ?

" Who should snatch the wand ?

Who, with the rod reversed, And backward mutters of dissevering power,"

could break the spell, and so reorganize and inspire that army with confidence in itself and in its leader, as to make it invincible? Who could dissipate the gloom, and bring sunshine and the unclouded sky ?

President Lincoln, upon whom the decision finally rested, determined unhesitatingly to confer this grave responsibility upon Major-General Joseph Hooker, who had been with the Army of the Potomac from its origin, and by his heroism in the hour of battle had won the familiar title of "Fighting Joe Hooker." At Williamsburg and at Charles City Cross Roads, in the Peninsula campaign, he had rendered signal service, holding his division with great gallantry at the latter point, when opposed by superior numbers, where, had he yielded, the disaster would have been irreparable. But it was on the field of Antietam that he had given brilliant proof of his exalted qualities as a soldier, having opened the battle and borne the brunt of the heavy fighting, successfully assaulting the enemy in his chosen position and driving him back, leaving that memorable " cornfield," * in front of the little church,

* Mr. Lincoln visited the Antietam field immediately after the close of the battle, and, when conducted over the ground where General Hooker fought, and the " cornfield" into which the corps of Stonewall Jackson had poured until the bayonets of hia men were as the corn-blades for number, and upon which Hooker had opened with his artillery at the opportune moment and cut them down in ranks as they stood the literally strewn with the dead and the dying, and never staying in his course until he was himself borne from the field with a painful wound.*

At the time of the retirement of General McClellan from the command of the Potomac army, General Hooker had been urged as his successor, and the President is understood to have favored it; but General Halleuk, who was then General-in-Chief of all the armies, made objection, and General Burnside was chosen. But the President was now decided, and though Halleck still opposed, his voice was impotent. The President himself saw faults in the character of General Hooker, or conceived he did, and took occasion to point them out, freely and unreservedly, in his letter notifying the General of his appointment. As au example of the President's simplicity and frankness, and his exalted sense of justice £.nd of right, it is here cited, and though he was entirely at fault in the opinion he entertained of General Hooker's lack of ready obedience to his superior's orders, it proved the shortest and best way to its rectification, and convinced the object of his reproof that Mr. Lincoln was at heart his best and truest friend.

President had conceived a strong liking for General Hooker, and from that moment appears to have been impressed with the belief that here was Ihe general who ought to be at the head of the army.

[From the original autograph letter of General McClellan to General Hooker.]

Headquabtbes Akmy Of the Potomac, Sharpsburg, Sept. 206h, 1862.

My dear Hookbe : — I have been very sick the last few days and just able to go where my presence was absolutely necessary, so I could not come to see you, and thank you for what yon did the other day, and express my intense regret and sympathy for your unfortunate wound. Had you not been wounded when you were, I believe the result of the battle would have been the entire destruction of the Eebel army — for I know, with you at its head, your corps would have kept on until it gained the main road.

As a slight expression of what I think you merit, I have requested that the brigadier-general's commission, rendered vacant by Mansfield's death, may be given to you. I will this evening write a private note to the President on th6 subject, and am glad to assure you that so far as I can learn it is the universal feeling of the arpy, that you are the most deserving of it.

With the sincere hope that your health may soon be restored, so that you may again be with us in the field, I am,^ my dear General,

To Majok-GeneeaL Hookeb, Your sincere friend,

Commanding corps. Geo. B. McClellan, Major-General.

'2 '

18 T^E BATTLE OF CHANCELLOBSVILLE.

Majoe-Geneeal Hookee: — I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appear to me to be sufficient reasons. And yet I think it best for you to knowthat there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and a skilful soldier, which, of course, I like. I also believe you do not mix politicswith your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, yhich is a valuable, if not an indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm. But I think that during; General Burnside's command of the army, you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country, and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army and the Government needed a Dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those Generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander, and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you, as far as I can, to put it down. Neither you, nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army, while such a spirit prevails in it.

And now, beware of rashness — Beware of rashness, but with energy, and sleepless vigilance, go forward, and give us victories.

General Hooker immediately repaired to Washington, and in a personal interview disabused the President's mind of the erroneous impression under which he was laboring, and satisfied him that he had given prompt and ready support to every order and requirement of General Burnside, even though his judgment might not have approved of their wisdom.* General Halleck and Secretary

* In the few paragraphs that can be devoted to the operations of the army under General Burnside, wp have simply stated the leading facts in the case without attempting to argue the justness of the one view or the other. But the subject cannot be fairly dismissed without a few words of explanation. General Burnside in his order dismissing some of his officers and relieving others, seemed to be laboring under the impression that these ofScers were purposely trying to thwart his plans. Indeed the opinion prevailed at the North, that these Generals saw in the disaster of Burnside their own advancement, and the tone and temper of Mr. Lincoln's letter would seem to imply that he was tinctured with such an idea. In the battle of Fredericksburg Burnside had made strong front attacks on commanding, impregnable positions fortified after the best military art. Four separate attacks were made on the right, upon Marye's Heights, by powerful columns, led respectively by French, Hancock, Howard,

PBELIMINAItlES TO THE CAMPAIGN. 19

Stanton were present at the interview. To the question whether, in addition to the command of the Army of the Potomac, he desired that of the Department of Washington, and of the upper Potomac, as his predecessor had had, he answered in the negative — not much in the spirit of dictatorship — assigning as a reason, that in the then condition of the Army of the Potomac, all his time would be required to bring that army up to the full state of efficiency necessary to win battles. He was aware that General Halleck was inimical to himself, and had opposed his appointment ; hence, in this interview, he stated to the President, that he had but one request to make of him, that he would stand between himself and the commanding general of the army.* That he should have been under the necessity of making such a request, upon his entrance to duty, was by no means a propitious circumstance. On the 31st of January, the Ninth corps, of which General Burnside had resumed command, was withdrawn from the Army of the Potomac, and transferred to the Department of the Ohio.