The Russian navy in the Russo-Japanese war

Front matter

T

THE GIFT OF

BERNARD A. SINN, '97

Preface

In translating this work I have endeavoured to do justice both to the author and to the British Public.

I have kept to the author's text as much as possible, and though he has said many things about my country, which I as an Englishman do not agree with, I have, nevertheless, translated the bare, unpolished statements in order that my countrymen may know what is being said about them.

In one of his letters to me. Captain Klado frankly acknowledges that his writings may not be agreeable reading for an Englishman, but expresses the opinion that in a free country one ought to hear all the critics.

Putting aside the many disagreeable things he has said about us and giving an unbiased criticism of his book, I think we shall be forced to acknowledge that it is a remarkable work, and that the author has ably exposed the corruptibility of the Russian Government vi PREFACE.

and its inability to cope with the great needs which were demanded of it.

Many things predicted by Captain Klado have happened in quick succession, and this alone is a testimony to his value as a critic ; and had the Russian authorities taken notice of him earlier, they might have spared their country many humiliating defeats.

These defeats will never be wiped out, or the land lost regained, unless Russia wrests the command of the sea from the Japanese ; or, in other words, follows Captain Klado's advice.

L. J. H. DICKINSON.

Paris, March, 1905.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Captain N. L. Klado .... Frontispiece

Vice- Admiral Z. P. Rodjestvensky . . facing page 22

In the North Sea „ ,,3°

The Emperor Nicholas II. . . „ „ 44

On board the armoured cruiser Gromoboi ,, „ 162

THE RUSSIAN NAVY IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

INTRODUCTION.*

A YEAR has passed since that tragic night on which, without a declaration of war, a flotilla of Japanese torpedo-boats attacked and torpedoed three of the strongest units of the Imperial Russian Navy, which were anchored in the outer roadstead of Port Arthur, thus rendering inevitable the terrible struggle between the white and yellow races — the old West and the young East ! A year has passed. . . .

• This introduction appeared in the French edition.

I

France was surprised, and each, day awaited with increasing anxiety the news of a victory which would definitely mark the arrest of the yellow invasion — the annihilation of the little Japanese by the Northern Colossus. This victory has not been achieved and we are astonished. We have not understood the cause of the Russian defeats in Manchuria, which is, however, very simple ; we have even ended — though most unjustly — in accusing General Kuropatkin. If our readers will kindly permit us, we will give here a short r^sum^ of the events which have taken place during the past year, and we shall then be able to see on whom should rest the responsibility of the Russian defeats.

In the first place, for the war to be possible it was necessary that Japan should secure the command of the sea, without which she could not, of course, have landed her troops on the coveted territories. But the Russian fleet in the Far East was apparently equally as powerful as that of the Japanese, and a reinforcing squadron, under the command of Admiral Wirenius, was already sailing down the Red Sea, en route for Port Arthur.

It was necessary to act quickly. It was at this period that the Japanese General Staff entrusted to Admiral Togo the carrying out of the first part of the programme, whilst they actively pushed forward the mobilisation of the troops. During the night of February 8th to 9th, Togo arrived unexpectedly before Port Arthur ; and, as the Russian squadron was not on the look-out, he succeeded in placing hors de combat for several months two of its best warships, the Cesarevitch and the Retvisan, as well as a first-class cruiser, the Pallada.

Some hours after, on February 9th, Admiral Uriu surprised in the little Corean port of Chemulpho a first-class protected cruiser, the Varyag, and a gunboat, the Korieietz, which were sunk by their crews after a brave resistance, so as not to fall into the enemy's hands.

The result attained surpassed the wildest hopes of the Japanese, and their treuisports at once set sail for Corea, having on board the troops which were to form the first army. A grave fault had been committed ; the Russian fleet ought to have prepared for action as soon as the rupture of diplomatic relations was officially confirmed, but did not do so. What should have been the attitude of its commandant, Vice-Admiral Stark, at this moment ?

It was certainly no time for hesitation. Through his negligence he had lost two warships, two cruisers, and a gunboat. And he could no longer expect reinforcements, for, from this moment, it was fully evident that the complementary division of Admiral Wirenius, henceforth in danger of an encounter with the numerically superior Japanese squadrons, could not follow its proposed route. Therefore, Admiral Stark could not hope to see his fleet reinforced later on. In spite of everything, and even at the risk of losing his squadron, it was incumbent on him to have attempted to prevent the landing of the enemy — that is to say, to play the part which had from the first been assigned to the Russian fleet, and upon which Russia continued to count, in spite of the unfortunate afiair of February 8th-gth.

He ought to have moved towards the Corean coeists, but he did not do so, and thus added to his first mistake another and perhaps stiU graver blunder. He remained in Port Arthur, limiting himself to frustrating Admiral Togo's reiterated attempts to close up the channel to the harbour. In this way the first Japanese army was able to concentrate in Corea, and, under General Kuroki's command, was not long in commencing its forward march.

However, at St. Petersburg they soon understood the gravity of the faults which Admiral Stark had committed. And on February 20th a ukase (edict of the Russian Emperor) reUeved him of the command of the Port Arthur squadron, and appointed Admiral Makharof, then in command of the Baltic fleet and ports, commander-in-chief of aU the naval forces of the Pacific. On his arrival at Port Arthur (March 9th), Admiral Makharof immediately assumed the offensive, and resolutely led his squadron out. Togo, whose plan consisted above all in taking as much care as possible of the ships with which he had been entrusted, hesitated to accept a battle, doubtless decisive, and in any case very costly, but upon the issue of which he could not count. He therefore prudently withdrew before an adversary who was numerically weaker. Makharof, to exercise his crews, first advanced towards Dalny, and then towards the Miao-Tao Islands ; he finally reached the archipelago of the Elliot Islands, and continued to advance farther in the direction of the Corean coast. At Tokio there was great uneasiness, and the Japanese at once modified their plans. Kuropatkin rapidly sent the troops he had at hand to the Yalu, to face Kuroki ; whilst General Mischtchenko's Cossacks had already deployed in Corea and commenced to harass the enemy.

This time fortune favoured the Japanese and put an end to their troubles by ridding them of their dangerous adversary.

On April 12th the terrible catastrophe of the Petropavlovsk occurred, which deprived the Russian squadron of another powerful battleship and, above all, of its chief. Admired Makharof. While the command of the squadron was being taken away from the incapable Prince Ouchtomsky, to whom it had at first been given, and was being provisionally put into Admiral Withoeft's hands, Kuroki recommenced his advance. The Cossack detachments retired before him. However, Zassoulitch held out well on the

Yalu, thinking that by means of the support of the torpedo-destroyers and gunboats, which, as he supposed, would certainly come to his assistance, he would be able to prevent Kuroki from crossing the river, a plan which would allow him to await reinforcements and to then definitely destroy the first Japanese army. The terrible battle of Turrentchen took place (May ist). The Russian soldiers fought with prodigious courage, but to what purpose ? No flotilla came to help them ; on the contrary, the Japanese gunboats sailed up the river and commenced to bombard them, finally compelling them to give way before largely superior forces. This was Kuropatkin's first opportunity of proving his metal ; he saved Zassoulitch's small force from irretrievable disaster, and managed to reform it after retreating for a short distance. But while the Russian reinforcements commenced to make their way slowly across the long stretch of the Trans- Siberian railway — alas ! but a single-line track — the Japanese troops, no longer encountering any hindrance, landed in all directions with rapidity and success. A new army, under General Oku's command, landed on the Liao-Tung peninsula and marched towards the south.

However, in Russia there was no anxiety felt. General Stoessel refused to believe that Port Arthur might find itself one day besieged ; his faithful lieutenant. General Fock, kept watch with the pick of the troops over the Kin-Tcheu fortress, which guarded access to the Kuang-Tung peninsula. The position was said to be impregnable, and would, as it was thought, certainly be able to keep back the Japanese.

On May 26th, Oku attacked Kin-Tcheu, and on this occasion Admiral Withoeft hastily sent a light flotilla to support General Fock. Yet it was not a small flotilla, but the whole squadron which was needed ! In spite of the brave action of the gunboat Bobr, which opened a murderous fire on the Japanese left wing, the Russian ships were obliged to retire towards Port Arthur before a strong squadron of the enemy, and from that moment the fall of that impregnable position was only a question of time. After a bloody combat of several hours Fock was forced to retire.

At St. Petersburg the excitement was considerable, and Kuropatkin had to yield to public opinion. He sent General Stackelberg's corps towards the south, in order to drive the Japanese out from Kuang-Tung.

Then Oku marched towards the north, and an action took place at Vafangu (June 14th) ; but here again the Russian troops encountered numerically superior forces, and had to beat a retreat.

However, General Oku did not resume his march towards the south, but marched northwards to effect a junction with Kuroki, whilst the transports landed at Ta-Ku-Chan the nucleus of the present third Japanese army, placed under Nodsu's command, and at Pi-tse-Ouo the army which, under General Nogi's command, was to undertake the siege of Port Arthur. It was then seen that it was hopeless to think any longer of relieving that place, and whilst the indefatigable Kondratenko covered the peninsula with improvised fortresses, in order to delay the final investment as long as possible, General Kuropatkin was forced to take the only course left to him from the moment that he could not count on the co-operation of the flfeet — to retire towards the north, in order to draw the Japanese as far from the sea as possible ; that is to say, from their supply base.

But to carry this out, he had to abandon In-Keou and Niu-Chuang, and, once masters of the Liao, the Japanese were not long in making good use of it. In-Keou became one of their principal bases, and the possession of the Liao enabled them to continue to receive reinforcements much more quickly than Kuropatkin could receive his by the long single-line Trans-Siberian railway. For this new plan to have offered any real advantages, the retreat ought to have been continued far to the north, beyond Mukden and even beyond Kharbin. But then they would have been obliged to have abandoned Vladivostok, the second and last Russian naval base in the Far East, without reckoning that the possession of the maritime region practically brought " the Japanese again near to the sea. That was certainly an impracticable plan, and so General Kuropatkin immediately rejected it, and decided at any cost to try and prevent the enemy from reaching Mukden. If we only think of the superiority in men and

Russo-Japanese "War. ii

guns which has never ceased to be on the side of the Japanese; if we call to mind that at Liao-Yang the Russians were on the brink of victory, we shall find ourselves forced to recognise Kuropatkin's genius, which has up to the present saved Russia from falhng into the gulf into which the incapacity of Stark and Ouchtomsky fatally precipitated it. However, Admiral Withoeft, who had at first shown over-caution, at last decided to revert to the plans of Makharof ; it was Admiral Skrydloff, the latter's successor, who urged him to do so. Unable to reach Port Arthur before the rupture of negotiations, he himself had gone on to Vladivostok. Owing to the efforts of the engineer, Shilof, the damaged ships had been repaired by the end of July, and then Admiral Withoeft resolved, as the squadron had not been able to fulfil the first part of its mission (that is to say, to save Port Arthur, which had just been invested) that it should at least effect the second. This was simply a question of a sortie by the fleet which should allow a part of the squadron, with the cruiser division and fast vessels, to reach Vladivostok. The Japanese were, unfortunately for themselves, obliged to divide their naval forces, and to send a large part of their fleet to defend their coasts and their military transports, which, from this moment, might be at the mercy of the new Vladivostok squadron. As to the battleships and gunboats back at Port Arthur, they could attack the Japanese naval division which remained before that place, and, in raising the blockade, could secure the re-victualling of the fortress.

The battle took place on August loth, and was favourable to the Russians, who were helped by the indecision of Admiral Togo ; but once again fortune betrayed them. Admiral Withoeft was killed, and Prince Ouchtomsky, not only incapable of pursuing the plans made by his chief, but even of understanding their importance, could think of nothing better than to take the squadron back to Port Arthur, where it could only await its destruction. At this period the cruisers under the heroic Admiral Reitzenstein's orders successfully broke through the blockading squadron ; but, as they alone had sustained the whole brunt of the battle, they were obliged, as glorious wrecks, to seek refuge in neutral ports. And thus ended with the history of the first Pacific squadron that of the first part of the war, lost to Russia because her fleet has been unable to perform the heavy task laid upon it. We cannot insist too nauch upon the fact that this war is not one to be carried only on land, and that if Russia desires to be successful, it is essential that she should regain the supremacy of the sea. The Imperial Government has, in fact, realised this, and a second Pacific squadron has been equipped at Libau. But this squadron was notoriously weaker than the Japanese fleet, and in spite of flattering predictions of the Russian Admiralty (by which it was sought to bolster up the " giltedged illusions " of the Russian people), Rodjestvensky sailed to an inevitable defeat. Thus the second part of the war was lost even before it had even really commenced.

It was about this time that one man had the courage to state boldly what the real situation was ; he showed that all which could be reasonably expected from the second Pacific squadron as it was constituted, was a glorious defeat ! He became troublesome and threatened to disturb the tranquility of the high authorities at the Admiralty. They begged him to hold his tongue, but he did nothing of the kind. They then accused him of encouraging a dangerous agitation on the part of the Russian people. He replied that it was not by gilded lies that the tranquility of a people could be maintained, but by reveaUng to it the whole truth — ^by speaking to it in the plain language of figures and logic* They imprisoned him, but he continued to write stirring articles, in which he ceaselessly set out the real truth.

Then public opinion was roused, and this man, who no fear of ruining his career had restrained from trying to serve his country, had at last the satisfaction of seeing the Imperial ukase appear, by which Admiral Birileff, then in command of the Baltic fleet and ports, was required to at once prepare for the dispatch of a third Pacific squadron to the Far East.

It is to Captain Klado that I have referred.

Nicolas Lawrentievitch Klado, captain of frigate, was born November 13th, 1861 — that is to say, in the same year as the emancipa-

* See letter written by Captain Klado to Admiral Birileff and dated 10/23 December, 1904.

tion of the peasants. He comes from a family of gentlefolk in the Government of Tver, and was born at Mlevo (a village in the Vychnievolotz province of the Tver Government) on his mother's estate. His father, who was an officer on the General Staff, died in 1888, whilst holding the command at Vladivostok. As to his mother. Captain Klado still has the happiness of seeing her still alive. Educated at home, Nicolas Klado entered the Naval School at thirteen years of age, and was one of the officers to leave it on April 20th, 1881. He then made two cruises, one on board the battleship Peter the Great, the other on board the sloop Askold, and on both occasions he had the opportunity of visiting France.

In 1884 he entered the Emperor Nicholas' Naval Academy, and left it in 1886, when he was immediately appointed tutor at the Naval School. He made a cruise every summer, and always in the capacity of flag officer, first of all filling this position to Admiral Verkovsky, and then to Admiral Nazimof. At the time of his nomination to the command of the Pacific squadron (Autumn, 1889), Admiral Nazimof made him his direct assistant, the head of his staff, though Klado was then only a lieutenant.

It was thus, that for two years and a half, Nicolas Klado was able quietly to study Japan and China. He, in fact, took part in the voyage undertaken by the present Emperor of Russia, Nicholas II., who was then Heir Apparent to the Crown, and he was with him on board the cruiser Pamiat- Azova. He thus successively visited Saigon, Singapore, Batavia, Hong Kong, Hankow, Nagasaki, Kagosima, Kiobe and Vladivostok. The return voyage was by America, and on his arrival in Russia, Klado resumed his former position as tutor at the Naval School, to which was also added that of Mathematical Professor at this same school. Besides, he was shortly afterwards called upon to discharge the duties of aide-de-camp to Vice- Admiral Arsienieff, the director of the Naval School. Naval history was a subject then much neglected at the school, and the course of naval tactics had no existence. The development of the first was entrusted to the young tutor's care, whilst he was instructed to himself institute the second.

' Nicolas Klado acquitted himself of this double task with a conscientiousness beyond praise, and he recorded his remarkable studies in two books, which are to-day standard works on the subject. On January ist, 1896, there were founded simultaneously, both the School of Naval Warfare in France, and in Russia a section of the Naval Academy, in which the sciences relating to naval warfare (tactics, strategy, history, etc.) were to be studied — sciences of which the naval authorities in all countries then eagerly asked for some fuller knowledge. It was also upon Commandant Klado that devolved the heavy burden of developing in the new section of the Academy the two courses of history and naval tactics.

If we only remember that up to this period no courses of the kind had been given, and that as yet there existed no book in which these subjects had been treated, we can easily form an idea of the immense amount of work which Commandant Klado had to accomplish. However, though these new duties took up most of his time, Klado did not for a moment think of spending the summer months, during which he had his leave, in idleness. On the contrary, this indefatigable worker sought abroad the work which his country temporarily denied him. Thus he embarked on board the French cruiser Latouche-Tr^ville, one of the ships forming part of the War School Division, and then commanded by Rear-Admiral Fournier, before whom (so strange is destiny) Commandant Klado now has to appear. It is, in fact, before Admiral Fournier, president of the International Commission of Inquiry, now assembled at Paris to give judgment on the Hull incident, that Captain Klado was summoned to read his evidence.

During his stay on board the Latouche- Trdville, Commandant Klado continued eagerly with his work and attended all the lectures given, having his share in all the practical work cast upon our officers and finally taking part in the important manoeuvres directed by Admiral Gervais. Thus we see that Commandant Klado is no stranger to us, and, if he still recalls with pleasure the hours passed amongst the brave French sailors who " helped him to found the solid foundations upon which he had afterwards to build his scientific work,"

France has shown her appreciation of his eminent abihties by making him offlcier d' academic and chevalier de la Legion d'honneur, in recognition of the great value of the technical books which he has written.

From the year 1896, Nicolas Klado uninterruptedly carried on his work as a professor, and in 1900 he had to lecture both at the School of War, and also at the Tsarskoe-Selo School, which is set apart for the instruction of those officers who intend to join the marine (fortress) artillery.

During the years 1893-4, Lieutenant Klado gave lessons to the Grand Duke Cyril Vladimirovitch, who, it will be remembered, was on board the Petropavlovsk last March, at the time of the catastrophe in which Admiral Makharof met his death. Finally, during the years of 1902 and 1903, Klado was asked to teach the science of naval warfare to the Emperor's brother, the Grand Duke Michel Alexandrovitch (Heir Apparent to the Crown until the birth of the Tsarevitch Alexis Nicolaievitch). As soon as the war broke out Commandant Klado (he had been Captain of Frigate since 1901) commenced a series of pubUc lectures at St. Petersburg,

Warsaw, Moscow, Helsingfors, etc., in which he showed the great importance of the part which the fleet had to play, and insisted on the absolute necessity on the part of Russia of creating powerful squadrons. As the result of his strenuous efforts and unwearied activity. Commandant Klado was able to collect considerable subscriptions for the Russian fleet — an appropriate reward for his noble conduct. In April, Klado was appointed chief of the strategical section of Admiral Skrydlof's staff. At the time of the latter's nomination as Commander-in- Chief of the Russian naval forces of the Pacific, in place of Admiral Makharof, he left with him for Port Arthur, but communications with the fort having been severed as the result of the landing of the Japanese on the Liao-Tung peninsula, Skrydlof and Klado had to be content with going on to Vladivostok. There, again, Captain Klado did not remain idle, for he took an active part in the elaboration and drawing up of the plans for the sorties, which were so daringly executed by the division of swift cruisers, and as a reward for these services he received the order of

Saint Vladimir with the sword. At the end of August Klado returned to St. Petersburg in order to embark with Admiral Rodjestvensky, to whom he was instructed to communicate the plans and intentions of Admiral Skrydlof. He again left Russia on October 14th, on board the ship Admiral Kniaz- Souvorof, in the capacity of junior flagcaptain to Vice-Admiral Rodjestvensky. But at Vigo Commandant Klado had to leave the squadron, and with several other officers was sent by Admiral Rodjestvensky to Russia, in order to offer before the Commission of Inquiry, which was about to assemble, explanations as to the Hull incident. It was then that he realised the part which this return to St. Petersburg permitted him to play. Temporarily deprived of his sword he seized the pen, and at once commenced to write those sensational articles, in which, endeavouring to stir the inactivity of the High Admiral, Grand Duke Alexis, he ceaselessly and boldly insisted on the dispatch of immediate reinforcements for the second Pacific Squadron, reinforcements unreservedly promised to Admiral Rodjestvensky at the time of his departure from

Libau. In the end, he pleaded the cause so well that the Admiralty had at last to give way, and the vanguard of the third squadron which, under Admiral Nebogatof's orders has just set sail from Libau, was the work — we can say it without being taxed with exaggeration — of Commandant Klado. If this squadron should be unable alone to restore the equilibrium between the Japanese and Russian fleets — to do which it would be necessary to bring out the powerful squadron, alas ! so unfortunately shut up in the Black Sea — it will at least be able, as we must admit, to increase the chances of victory of Admiral Rodjestvensky, in whose hands the fate of Russia has been placed. It is on him far more than on Kuropatkin that depends the result of the second part, now just commenced, of this war. The articles written by Captain Klado, for the most part published last November under the pseudonym of Priboj in the Novoe Vremya, fully revised and rendered complete, have been collected by the author and published in a book entitled, " After the Departure of the Second Pacific Squadron." This work, of which we are pleased to be able to offer a

VICE-ADMIRAL Z. P. RODJESTVENSKY, Commander-in-Chief of the Second Pacific Squadron.

[To face page 22.

translation to the French public, which has always known how to value merit and selfsacrifice, is not merely the r^sumS of Commandant Klado's scathing criticisms ; it is also a true history of the blunders committed by the Russian commanders during the first part of this war, and from which useful lessons must clearly be derived.

But, before submitting to our reader these pages, so terrible in their pitiless accuracy, we wish first to teU him — to reassure him a little, if indeed that be possible — a little about Admiral Rodjestvensky, who, as we have just shown, will decide the fate of Russia.

Z. P. Rodjestvensky was born in 1848, entered the service in 1865, and after leaving the Naval School at once speciaUsed in marine artillery. He passed through the Michel Artillery School, which he left in 1873, and the same year was promoted lieutenant.

He took an active part in the Turko- Russian War of 1877-1878, and particularly distinguished himself in the affair of the Vesta, a small steamer carrying only very few guns, and which, under the brave

Commandant Baranof's command, did not hesitate to attack a powerful Turkish battleship. Rodjestvensky's brilUant conduct earned for him the 4th class cross of Saint George and that of Saint Vladimir, in addition to the war medal.

A short time afterwards his services were placed at the disposal of the Bulgarian Government, and for two years he sat on the special commission charged with the organisation of the navy of that country. Recalled to Russia, he was given the command of various ships, and subsequently went to London as Naval Attach^. From 1894 to 1896 he commanded in the Pacific the cruiser Vladimir Monomakh, flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Alexieff, who, it will be remembered, was at the head of the Far Eastern Russian Squadron at the time of the Chino- Japanese war. Then appointed to the command of the guardship Perv^niets, Captain Rodjestvensky was from 1899 to 1900 at the head of the service division of marine artillery, and then of that of the Baltic fleet during the two following years.

At the conclusion of the extremely brilliant naval manoeuvres, at which the

Emperor of Germany was present, Rear- Admiral Rodjestvensky received from the hands of the Emperor, Nicolas II., his appointment as Rear- Admiral on His Majesty's personal staff.

At the death of Admiral Tyrtof, in 1903, Rear - Admiral Rodjestvensky succeeded Admiral Avellane as head of the general staff of the navy, when the latter was appointed Minister of Marine. And thus promoted Vice-Admiral only a few months before, he was placed at the head of the second Pacific Squadron, then in course of formation at Libau. Therefore this is not Admiral Rodjestvensky 's debut, and we are firmly convinced — for, if we cannot be certain of his victory, we can at least hope for it — that the old hero of the Turko-Russian war, the briUiant tactician of the Baltic, will do for his country all that can be looked for at the hands of a man of great genius and dauntless courage.

Ren£ Marchand.

February, 1905.

THE SECOND PACIFIC OCEAN SQUADRON.

(Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Admiral Rodjestvensky.)

First Division of Warships : — Kniaz-Souvorof (flying the flag of Admiral Rodjestvensky, actually in command of this division), Emperor Alexander III., Borodino and Orel.

Second Division of Warships : — Ossliabia (flying the flag of Rear- Admiral Felkersham, in command of the division), Sisso'i-V Mky , Navarin, and the armoured cruiser Admiral Nakhimof.