Studies in Hegelian cosmology

Front matter

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Preface

/CHAPTERS V. and VII. of this book appeared, nearly in ^-^ their present form, in the International Journal of Ethics. (July 1896, and July 1897.) The other chapters have not been previously published.

In referring to Hegel's works I have used the Collected Edition, the publication of which began in 1832. For purposes of quotation I have generally availed myself of Wallace's translation of the Encyclopaedia, of Dyde's translation of the Philosophy of Law, and of Spiers' and Sanderson's translation of the Philosophy of Religion.

I am much indebted to Mr G. L. Dickinson, of King's College in Cambridge, and to my wife, for their kindness in reading this book before its publication, and assisting me with many valuable suggestions.

M*T.

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1. Definition of Cosmology . . . . . 1

2. Hegel's attitude to Cosmology . . ... 2

3. The main principles illustrated in these Studies ... 3

Chapter II. Human Immortality

4. The problem of this Chapter . . . . . 4

5. Hegel's own attitude towards Immortality ... 5

6. Apparently best explained by his indifference . . 5

7. The answer must depend on the Absolute Idea . . 7

8. Two questions arise. Are we among the fundamental differen-

tiations of the Absolute ? Is each of these differentiations

B.

9. As to the first of these questions, — firstly, What is the nature

of the fundamental differentiations of the Absolute ? . . 8

10. Let us start from Hegel's category of Life .... 9

11. The unity in this category is in the individuals — but not in

each separately • . . 10

12. Nor in the aggregate of them 10

13. Nor in their mutual determination 11

14. The unity must be for each of its differentiations. Thus we

get the category of Cognition 13

15. This gives us the relation we require . . . 14

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16. We cannot imagine any example of the category of Cognition,

except the concrete state of cognition. Dangers of this . . 15

17. The validity of the transition to Cognition . . 15

18. Summary of the argument up to this point . .17

19. Comparison with Lotze ..... .17

20. Transition to the Absolute Idea . .... 18

21. Nature of the Absolute Idea . . . . . 19

22. But, though the fundamental differentiations of the Absolute

are now proved to resemble selves, it is possible they may

not be selves, or may not include our selves . 19

23. We must now endeavour to prove that our selves have charac-

teristics which they could not have unless they were fundamental differentiations of the Absolute . . .20

24. No line can be drawn to separate the Self and the Not-Self . 21

25. The usual solution that the Self contains images of an external

Not-Self is untenable . . . . 21

26. On the other hand, the Self has no content which is not also

27. The nature of the Self is thus highly paradoxical . 23

28. It need not therefore be false, but, if not, its paradoxes must be

shown to be transcended contradictions . . . 23

29. In a system like Hegel's it cannot be taken as false . . 25 3i 1. And no demonstration that its paradoxes are transcended contradictions can be found, except on the hypothesis that the Self is a fundamental differentiation of the Absolute . . 25

C.

31. We now turn to the second question stated in Section 8. Are

the fundamental differentiations of the Absolute eternal ? . 26

32. Can the selves change ? They are reproductions of the Absolute 27

33. Neither of the two elements of the Absolute can change 27

34. Even if the selves could change, they could not perish . 29

35. For the Absolute does not stand to its manifestations in the

same relation as finite things to their manifestations . . 30

36. Change is only possible when reality is viewed under categories

having something of the nature of Essence in them . . 32

37. To maintain that the Individuals could change while the Abso-

lute remains the same implies that we have not transcended

the category of Matter and Form ... 33

38. Our selves, no doubt, are not given as changeless, or as in

perfect harmony with the universe ... . 34

39. But it is as difficult for Idealism to deny, as to affirm, the per-

fection and changelessness of the Self ... 34

40. Selves can be viewed under the Absolute Idea . . 36

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D.

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41. Personal Identity lies in Identity of Substance ... 36

42. Further explanation of this 37

43. The theory that Personal Identity lies in Memory . . 39

44. The theory that Personal Identity lies in continuity of character 40

45. Mr Bradley's objection that the Self is not a sufficiently adequate

representation of the Absolute to be Immortal ... 40

46. This objection considered 41

47. His objection that our desire for Immortality is no argument

for Immortality . ...... 43

48. His objection that Immortality might not give us that for

which we desire it ....... . 43

49. Lotze's opinion that we have no evidence of Immortality . 45

50. But with Lotze the unity of the Absolute is more fundamental

than its plurality 45

51. And it is this, in which he differs from Hegel, that is decisive

for his view on Immortality ....... 47

52. Lotze's objection to the pre-existeiice of the Self. Pre-existence

is indeed a probable conclusion from Immortality . . 47

53. But why should pre-existence be regarded as unsatisfactory ? 48

54. Lives not connected by memory would be rather fragmentary.

But all life in time is fragmentary . ... 49

55. And the nature of each life would be a free development from

that of the life before . . ..... 50

56. Nor would the change be equivalent to the annihilation of one

self and creation of another 50

57. And, in particular, the personal relations of each life would

spring out of those of the life before ..... 52

58. And may, in many cases, be held to be actually the same relations 53

59. Indeed, nothing is really lost by the loss of memory . . 54

60. Although it is inevitable that it should appear to us that some-

thing is lost .... 54

Chapter III. The Personality Of The Absolute

A.

61. Hegel's definition of God makes God's existence a truism.

The important question is whether God is a person . . 56

62. Hegel's God is more conveniently referred to as the Absolute . 58

63. Hegel regards the Absolute as a spiritual unity. And spirit as

personal. But it does not follow that he thought the Absolute

to be a Person. Nor do I believe that he did think so . .58

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64. It is not necessary that the individuals should be for the unity. 59

65. Indeed it is impossible — in the sense in which the unity is for

the individuals ......... 60

66. This view cannot properly be condemned as atomistic . . 61

B.

67. It does not, however, necessarily follow from this that the

Absolute is not a Self ........ 63

68. Lotze's arguments for the personality of the Absolute 64

69. In his contention that the Ego is independent of the Non-Ego

we may agree in a certain sense .... .66

70. But not in the sense in which it would allow of an Infinite

71. And the possibility that the Absolute should be a Person

becomes trivial .... . .69

72. And it would be a Personality entirely unlike ours . . 69

73. Lotze's asserted immediate certainty that the greatest must exist 70

74. If this be taken as strictly immediate it is only of interest for

Lotze's biography . . 71

75. If it be taken as a conclusion admitting of proof, it has no pro-

bability unless the truth of Idealism has been demonstrated . 72

76. Even in that case, we cannot infer that what men have always

desired is a fundamental demand of spirit . . 72

77. Nor have all men desired the existence of a personal God . . 74

78. And no attempt has been made to prove d priori that a

personal God is a fundamental demand of spirit. . . 74

79. Lotze's theory that the differences between the Infinite and the

Finite are such as to make the Infinite the only real Person . 75

80. This theory considered. Unities of System and Unities of

Centre . 76

81. An Individual is not hindered from being self-determined by the

existence of outside reality to which he is in relation . . 78

83. Nor, if he were, would it follow that the Infinite was a Person . 80

84. We have only dealt with those of Lotze's arguments which

would be applicable to Hegel's Absolute . 81

85. The individual unity in consciousness . . 81

86. Such a unity is not found in the Absolute. And it is this

unity which gives the direct sense of Self which forms the positive essence of Personality ... 82

87. Thus even the valueless possibility of Personality mentioned

in Section 71 can no longer be predicated of the Absolute . 84

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88. The impossibility of this becomes more obvious when we

reflect that the differentiations of the Absolute are themselves Persons 84

89. The Absolute could be called a Person if we extended the

meaning of the term to cover all spiritual unities. But

this would be wasteful and confusing . 85

90. It is unmeaning to enquire whether the Absolute is higher

or lower than a Person ...... 87

D.

91. Would the denial of Personality to the Absolute affect our

morality ? There is no logical justification for its doing so . 88

92. We have not sufficient evidence to determine whether it

would do so in fact . ... 89

93. But what evidence is available seems against the supposition . 90

94. We have even less light on the value of the effect that such »

denial would have upon our emotions . . 91

95. At any rate, the belief in a personal Absolute is nearly as far

removed from the historical belief in God as is the belief in

an impersonal Absolute ... ... 92

96.' It is better not to call an impersonal Absolute by the name

Chapter IV. The Supreme Good And The Moral Criterion

97. The nature of Supreme Reality. This is not, as such, the

Supreme Good 95

98. In point of fact, however, the Supreme Reality, according

to Hegel, is also the Supreme Good 96

99. This Supreme Good is not purely hedonistic . . 96

100. The Moral Criterion need not be identical with the Supreme

Good 96

101. The necessity of a Moral Criterion ... .97

102. We must judge our actions according to their relatively

immediate consequences, as their ultimate consequences

are unknown to us 98

B.

103. The idea of Perfection will not serve as a Moral Criterion 99

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106. Examples of the ambiguity of the idea of Perfection as a

Moral Criterion . . .... 102

107. The attempt to use it as a Moral Criterion leads to sophistry 104

108. Again, the idea of Perfection is useless when the question

is quantitative. Examples of this 104

109. And an Ethical system is bound to provide the principles

upon which such questions can be answered . . . 105

110. Nor would the principle of "my station and its duties" be

available as a Moral Criterion ... . 106

c.

111. On the other hand the calculation of Pleasures and Pains

does seem to give us an applicable criterion, whether it

is a correct one or not . .... 108

112. "We do know the difference between Pleasures and Pains . 108

113. The objection that Pleasure is an abstraction . . . 109

114. The objection that Pleasures vanish in the act of enjoyment . 109

115. The objection that Pleasures are intensive quantities, and

so cannot be added together . . .110

116. But we are continually adding them, in cases where no one

would suppose that the results were completely unmeaning 111

117. And such additions have some place in morality, on any

system of Ethics . . . .112

118. And every system of Ethics, which requires a Criterion at

all, has either Pleasure or Perfection, in some form, as

that Criterion ... . ... 112

119. Now Perfection as a Criterion also requires the addition of

intensive quantities ... 113

120. Examples of this . . 114

121. Thus Ethics of every sort seem to stand or fall with the

possibility of the addition of intensive quantities . . 115

122. And there seems, on consideration, no reason why they

should not be added 116

123. This is not affected by the impossibility of very precise

measurements . . . . . 117

D.

124. How far, then, is Pleasure a correct Criterion ? The Good

may be analyzed into Development and Harmony . . 118

125. Of Harmony the hedonic Criterion is a trustworthy test,

but this is not always the case with Development . . 119

126. Although, in the long run, the greatest Development and

the greatest Happiness are inseparable . . .120

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127. Examples of this . 121

128. When Harmony and Development lead in different direc-

tions, the conflict is not between Pleasure and Perfection,

but between two elements of Perfection . . . .122

129. The solution of the difficulty adopted by Common Sense . 123

130. But neither this nor any other is satisfactory . . 123

131. Summary of results. There are some cases in which we

have no Criterion to trust ... ... 123

132. This does not introduce so much practical uncertainty as

might be supposed 125

133. Some uncertainty, no doubt, it produces. But it does not

deny that there is an objective Right, though we cannot know it . 126

134. And everyone must admit that we do not always know the

Right. The difference is not great 126

135. Nor is the attainment of the Good ultimately dependent

on our action . 127

136. No doubt such a view brings out the fact that Virtue is

not an ultimate conception. But this is an advantage . 127

Chapter V. Punishment

137. Definition of Punishment . . . 129

138. Theories justifying Punishment 130

139. The vindictive theory has fallen out of favour . 131

140. What is Hegel's theory ? It has been supposed to be the

vindictive theory, but this is incorrect . . . 132

141. Hegel's theory is that Punishment, as such, may cause

Repentance ... 133

142. The objection that all Punishment is essentially degrading 134

143. But can Punishment, as such, produce Repentance ? . . 135

144. It can do so, if inflicted by an authority which the culprit

recognizes as embodying the moral law . . 136

145. But is such a recognition compatible with a violation of the

law I Yes. (a) The recognition may not have sufficient strength to enable us to resist temptation . . . 137

146. (b) Or we may fail to see that the law applies to a par-

ticular case .... 138

147. (c) Or we may not know that the authority had forbidden

the act in question ... .... 138

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148. But would Punishment be just in these last two cases ?

There is no reason that it should not be just . . . 139

149. (d) Or our recognition of the authority, previous to the

Punishment, may have been too vague to determine our action ..... .... 141

150. Thus Punishment produces Repentance by emphasising the

element of Disgrace ... ... 142

151. Disgrace must be distinguished from Degradation . . 143

152. It is not advisable to trust exclusively to the Disgrace in-

volved in the fault . . ..... 144

153. It is rarely that the Punishments of a modern State can

produce Repentance. The main object of such Punishment should be deterrent . .... 144

154. And most offences against such a State are either (a) com-

mitted deliberately from a sense of duty . 145

155. Or (6) committed by persons in whom the sense of right

is, in the matter in question, hopelessly dormant . 146

156. And, in the remaining cases, the modern citizen does not

conceive the State as the embodiment of the moral law. 146

157. Hegel's mistake lay in supposing that Punishment could

have the effect he treats of, when inflicted by the Criminal Law of a modern State. This came from his putting the State too high, and the Conscience of the Individual too low . 147

158. He forgets that a State which could be the moral authority

for its citizens could only have existed in antiquity 148

159. And that, before the higher unity of the future can be

attained, the State, as such, will have ceased to exist . 149

160. But although Hegel's theory has no validity in Jurisprudence,

it is of great importance for Education . . 150

Chapter VI. Sin

161. Statement of Hegel's doctrine of Sin ... . 151

162. The proof cannot be a, priori, nor can it amount to demon-

163. Quotations from the Philosophy of Religion .... 153

164. Innocence is good. And yet it implies the absence of

165. The relation of Innocence to Virtue . . . 156

166. They are the Thesis and Synthesis of a triad . . 157

167. Of which Sin is the Antithesis . ... 158

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168. But this explanation of Sin presupposes the existence of Evil 159

169. The subordinate triad of Sin. It may be presumed analo-

gous to the triad of Sin, Punishment, and Kepentance in

the Philosophy of Law . ... 160

170. But Retribution and Amendment will be here more appro-

priate terms . ... ... 160

171. Why Retribution must follow on Sin . . . 161

172. And Amendment on Retribution . ... 162

173. The analogy of Retribution to Punishment .... 164

174. The transition to Virtue from Innocence and Sin . . 165

175. The transition to Virtue from Amendment .... 165

176. The process from Innocence to Virtue may be repeated

more than once in each man . . . .166

177. Virtue can be increased otherwise than by Sin and Amend-

178. But Innocence necessarily leads, through Sin, Retribution,

and Amendment, to Virtue . . 168

179. Yet, in fact, some members of this process are often seen,

in individual cases, without being followed by the later

180. Hegel may have regarded the process as only a tendency

in the individual, though an actual fact in the race . 169

181. Or he may have regarded the process as completed for each

individual in » subsequent life . . . .169

18.3. Comparison with two other theories of Sin .... 171

184. Moral evil and moral good are not so fundamentally opposed

for Hegel as for many philosophers . . .171

185. But his theory affords no logical justification for immoral

186. Nor is it likely, as a matter of fact, to lead to such action . 173

187. The theory certainly does not lend itself to the deification

of Virtue 174

188. An application to the principles of Education . . .174

Chapter VII. The Conception Of Society As An Organism

189. Statement of Hegel's position 177

191. Professor Mackenzie's position 179

192. The intrinsic relations of parts to the whole, as proved by

Professor Mackenzie, only implies mutual determination . 180

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193. And need involve no higher category than Absolute Mecha-

194. Although the end of Society is human well-being, it does

not follow that it lies within Society

195. Illustrations of this

196. A definition of Organic Unity proposed

197. Is Society the end of man? The ideal Society

is, but not our present Society on earth

198. Nor ought our present Society to be our end

199. For, in progressing through it, our relation to

negative . . ...

200. Arguments in support of this statement

202. Statement of results reached ....

203. Earthly Society does not always improve or deteriorate in

proportion as its unity increases or diminishes

204. Philosophy can afford us no guidance in acting on Society

205. Nor is it to be expected that it should do so .

of heaven it is often

184 185

187 188

189 190

192 192

193 195 196

CHAPTER VIII. HECxELIANISM AND CHRISTIANITY

206. Introductory .

207. The definition of Christianity

208. Division of the subject .

197 198 198

209. Statement of Hegel's views on the Trinity and Personality

of God. The Primary and Secondary Triads .

210. He identifies the distinctions of the Secondary Triad with

those of the Trinity . 211.. But the Secondary Triad forms part of a dialectic process

212. And therefore the Synthesis expresses its whole reality

213. This would not lead to the ordinary doctrine of the Trinity

214. The Personality of God. Hegel's statement of the Primary

215. This is again a dialectic process .

216. And, therefore, if God is really Personal, it must be in the

Kingdom of the Spirit . ...

217. God in the Kingdom of the Spirit is a Community .

218. And so can scarcely be a Person — especially as it is bound

together by Love

201 202 204 204

208 209

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219. Hegel's use of the word Love 211

220. Its relation to Friendship 212

221. And to Particularity 212

222. Hegel's views on the Personality of God have been obscured

by his use of the word God 213

223. And by mistakes as to the nature of the Pantheism which

224. And by supposing that Spirit cannot be Personal unless

God is a Person . . 214

B.

225. Hegel's doctrine of Incarnation . . 215

226. Its similarities to the Christian doctrine . . . 216

227. But, for Hegel, God is incarnate in everything finite. 217

228. And all the reality of everything finite is only its Incarnation

229. As to the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation three ques-

tions arise, of which the first has been considered above 218

230. Hegel's demonstration for the necessity of the Incarnation

being typified in a particular man . . . 219

231. "Why the typification in several men would be unsatisfactory . 220

232. For Hegel this typification is a necessity to be regretted . 221

233. Why Jesus should be taken as the type — not because of

his personal perfection ... ... 222

234. Nor of the excellence of his moral teaching : . . 222

235. But because he bears witness to the metaphysical truth of

the Unity of God and Man 223

236. But the Unity is asserted merely immediately . . . 224

237. And the Unity asserted is itself immediate, and therefore

only one side of the truth 225

238. Why the type must be found in a teacher whose assertion

of the Unity was immediate . .... 226

239. And why it must be found in a teacher who asserted an

immediate Unity 226

240. In what sense the position of Jesus was determined by the

choice of the Church . . ... 228

241. Hegel's view of Jesus is, at all events, not the usual Chris-

tian view .... 229

C.

242. Hegel's statement of the doctrine of Original Sin . . 230

243. The consequences of this doctrine, as held by Hegel . 232

244. This doctrine may be true, and may be Christian, but it

is by no means specially Christian . . . 233

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245. And he regards Sin as, at any rate, superior to Innocence . 234

246. As is seen in his treatment of the Fall . . . 234

247. Hegel's statement of the doctrine of Grace . . 236

248. This doctrine, again, is not specially Christian . . . 237

249. Hegel would seem to attribute the doctrine of Grace to

Jesus, and that of Original Sin to his successors . . 238

250. As to morality — its commands and prohibitions are much

the same for Hegel as for Christianity . . 239

251. But he differs from Christianity in the comparatively slight

importance he gives, (a) to Sin . . . 239

252. (b) to Conscience . . 240

253. (c) to Immortality . . 241

254. (d) to Purity of Motive . ... 242

255. (e) And, indeed, to morality as a whole .... 242

256. (/) Moreover, the ideas of humility and contrition for sin

have for Hegel only a relative validity . . 243

D.

257. Summary of results . .... 245

258. Why did Hegel attempt to connect with Christianity a

system so unlike the ordinary doctrines of Christians ? 245

259. It cannot have been from cowardice, or from a regard for

the interests of the non-philosophical public . 245

260. Nor can it be attributed to a sympathy for the life and

character of Jesus .... 246

261. The explanation is to be found in his definition of Religion

as something which cannot give absolute truth . 247

262. His meaning will be that no Religion can ever give a closer

approach to absolute truth than is given by Christianity 248

263. And, if Hegel's philosophy is true, it must be admitted that

no Religion has approximated to the truth as closely as Christianity . . . . 249

264. Historical confirmation of this view 250