Papers on psycho-analysis

Front matter

tSYG HO- ANALYSIS mST JONES

CORNELL

UNIVERSITY

Preface

The papers here collected have already appeared in print, for the most part in psychological journals that do not circulate widely among the medical profession. They constitute a selection of the author's contributions made during the past few years on the subject of psycho-analysis, and are now issued in a more accessible form in the hope of arousing further interest in this overneglected and important branch of scientific investigation. Being under no illusions as to any intrinsic importance of the papers apart from the subject to which they relate, or, therefore, as to their documentary value, the author has not hesitated to alter considerably their original form, by modifications and additions, wherever this has seemed desirable. They have been grouped under five headings, according to the particular topic with which they deal, but otherwise are printed in the order of their publication. Having regard to the difference in the familiarity with French and German respectively in this country, the author has left the quotations from the former language in the original and has appended translations to those from the latter.

A certain amount of repetition is unavoidable in a book thus constructed, but this presents advantages as well as disadvantages ; a new thought has usually to be expressed more than once before the full import of it is appreciated. A more serious defect, against which those unfamiliar with the subject should especially be warned, is the extensive incompleteness of the book as an exposition of the Freudian theory. Among the more noteworthy omissions is the absence of any description of the way in which the theory has been applied to the viii PEEPACE

various mental sciences ancillary to psychology, an exception being, however, made in the case of education. Of normal psychology itself, only certain aspects are dealt with, particularly that of dream-life. Freud's important theory of sex is only briefly delineated, and even on the clinical side there is no account given of the theory of hysteria, of obsessions, or of paranoia. These deficiencies are in part due to the fact that most of the papers were written by request for special occasions, particularly for society meetings and congresses. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the disjointed expositions here offered of various aspects of psycho-analysis, with the illustrative examples that can in this way be furnished, may serve as a complement to more systematic accounts, such as Hitschmann has, for instance, given in his ' Freud's Theory of the Neuroses.'^

It is well known that Freud's views have met with very considerable opposition. It is not correct to attribute this altogether, as some writers have done, to the mental stereotypy that is so grievous a characteristic of mankind, and which inevitably interposes a resistance to any revolution in thought.^ In the present case a greater measure of it is inherent in the situation, in a way that it may be well to explain at the outset. Freud holds that a great part of mental life can, either partially or entirely, be summarised under two principles, which he terms the ' pleasure-principle ' and the ' reality-principle ' respectively. The former represents the primary, original form of mental activity, and is characteristic of the earliest stages of human development, both in the individual and in the race ; it is therefore typically found in the mental

1 This book has just been translated by Dr. 0. E. Payne. An American translation of Freud's works by Dr. A. A. BrUl is also in the course of publication, two volumes having already appeared.

2 Davenport's remarks in this connection remain just as true now as when they were written seventy years ago : ' It is the fate of all useful discoveries and improvements to meet with bigoted or interested opposition from those who would willingly remain in the beaten path of habit rather than acknowledge any change to be profitable. That most important discovery of the circulation of the blood by Harvey was at first furiously opposed, and was ^proved, according to the laws of dynamics to be both impossible and absurd ; yet when it was vain to dispute the fact it was undervalued, as one almost known long before.' '

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life of the infant, and, to a less extent, in that of the savage. Its main attribute is a never-ceasing demand for immediate gratification of various desires of a distinctly lowly order, and at literally any cost. It is thus exquisitely egocentric, selfish, personal, and anti-social. The thought processes corresponding to it proceed by the use of analogies and superficial associations, treat resemblances as equivalent to identities, ignore all the laws of logic, and make no distinction between a phantasy and an actual situation of life. Soon, however, this tendency comes into conflict with the reality-principle, which genetically is derived from it. The function of the latter is to adapt the organism to the exigencies of reality, to subordinate the imperious demand for immediate gratification, and to replace this by a more distant but more satisfactory and permanent one. It is thus influenced by social, ethical, and other external considerations that are ignored by the earlier principle. It can, however, only guide and control the pleasure-principle, adapting this to the environment; it can never abrogate its activity. The fate of the primary pleasure-principle, and the modifications it has to undergo before it can manifest itself, is one of the central objects of psycho-analytic study, which is thus the study of the fundamental driving force behind the majority of human activities and interests. The fate of the pleasure-principle may shortly be described as follows : The primary tendencies comprising it are inhibited, and even ' repressed ' (verdrdngt) , so that they can neither reach their immediate aim nor even continue as conscious processes ; henceforth they lead an underground life, their very existence unknown to the individual, and ever striving towards an unattainable goal. Being in discord with environmental and educational influences, and repugnant to the moral or aesthetic feelings of the individual, they are subjected to a strong repressing force, and any attempt to uncover them, to make him realise their existence by bringing them to the surface of consciousness, instinctively leads to a lively opposition and resentment on his part. A solution of the conflict between the repressing and the repressed forces is arrived at, however, whereby the energy of the latter is

X PEEFACE

diverted to other aims, in much the same way that a conservation and transformation of energy occur in the physical world. Upon the manner in which this is accomplished greatly depends the future development and mental harmony of the individual. When the transformation is in accord with the demands of external reality, a process known as ' sublimation,' it represents an important win for the progress of civilisation and culture, an amount of energy being set free that is devoted to carrying out the work and fulfilling the needs of society. A limited part of the original tendencies undergoes a relatively slight modification, and appears in the adult as the sexual instinct (in the narrow sense of the word) ; the purely mental processes that shew most markedly the characteristics of the primary type are those of the phantasy, such as reveries and dreams. Between these two extremes lie all possible gradations in the extent to which the transformation is effected, neurotic symptoms being an instance of imperfect sublimation. There is also a considerable variation from one time to another ; when, for instance, the demands of reality are excessive, when life is hard to bear, there is a tendency for the person's mental activities to revert to the primary type, with all the serious consequences of this.

Now, not only does the individual immediately concerned exhibit a resistance against the tracing out of the roots of various transformed activities, but any of the conclusions reached by so doing necessarily offend both the aesthetic and the rational senses in general ; the aesthetic because the discovery of the hidden root can only refer to one that is hidden on account of its unpleasantness, the rational because the inhibiting forces have erected barriers against the illogical and symbolic mode of thinking that characterises unconscious mental processes. When, therefore, critics decry Freud's conclusions as unaesthetic and illogical, they are displaying a perfectly intelligible reaction, although they defensively ascribe to his ratiocination the presence of attributes that properly belong to those phenomena the existence of which they are striving not to recognise. On both grounds an instinctive repulsion is necessarily felt against the translation of any

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surface activity into more primary terms, and this expresses itself in a whole series of denials, incredulities, pretexts, rationalisations, and so on. Against this current of prejudice it is the duty of the sceptical investigator to maintain a purely critical attitude, and to endeavour to overcome the influence of both internal and external bias in his effort to reach objective conclusions. On the medical profession the responsibility in this question is especially weighty, because of the immediate practical importance that the new knowledge has for the field of curative psychological medicine ; to the race it is a small matter whether a series of new discoveries is made in one century or the next ; to the suffering individual it is often of vital importance.

The strongest opposition to Freud's views undoubtedly centres around the significance he attaches to the sexual instinct. It should be remembered, however, that Freud combats the narrow conception of this that generally prevails, and apprehends the expression in a much wider sense. Prom this point of view it will be seen that the importance he attaches to the instinct does not greatly difi'er from that of Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's WiUe zur Macht, Bergson's 4lan vital, Shaw's 'life force,' and the 'vital impulse ' of so many writers, all of which are equivalent to what Freud terms the Ubido. He replaces these metaphysical or poetical phrases by a scientific and biological one — one that is also in harmony with the sound intuition of the people manifested, among other ways, through language, an example being the etymological unity of the words ' love ' and ' life.'

To those who have studied the various aspects of the psycho-analytic theory, the relation it bears to the theory of organic evolution becomes very striking. Freud's recent demonstration of the truth — long suspected, but now proved in a far deeper sense than had been anticipated — that ontogeny repeats phylogeny in the mental sphere just as definitely as in the physical, would alone be of remarkable interest in this connection. He has shewn that the conflict between the primary and secondary systems of mental activity — a conflict on which not merely the growth, but the very existence of xii PEEFACE

civilisation depends — recapitulates on a modified scale in the individual the history of its course in the race, producing strikingly similar manifestations in the two cases. In general, Freud's thoroughgoing application of the principle of determinism, his shifting of the emphasis in psychology away from the intellectual to the instinctive, and his derivation of the higher and more complex mental activities from lowlier forms more nearly akin to those characteristic of animals, represent a momentous progress in scientific thought ; for the reduction of the mental to biological terms — instead of the ignoring of it, which the materialistic doctrine is tantamount to — seems the only satisfactory way of bringing psychology into line with the organic sciences, and of establishing a harmonious relationship between it and physiology. Hardly any serious endeavour has hitherto been made to fertilise psychology with the ideas of organic evolution, and half a century had to pass before the advent of a Darwin of the mind ; now, thanks to Freud, we have, for the first time, a purely biological theory of mental evolution, one free of any admixture of supernatural, metaphysical, or ethical mysticism.

The great criterion of the importance of a scientific generalisation is its fertility. The true significance of the theory of organic evolution was appreciated only when its fructifying power became apparent in the fields of embryology, palaeontology, and comparative morphology, as well as in that of biology proper. In like manner the psycho-analytic theory has at the same time received extensive confirmation from, and supplied fruitful stimuli to, the mental sciences cognate to psychology, to philology, mythology, folk-lore, criminology, jurisprudence, anthropology, and sociology. With both, the sap of new thought penetrating along the parent stem, in the one case of biology, in the other of psychology, has flowed through to all the branches that arise from it.

London,

September, 1912.

PAas vii

Contents

Pebfacb

GENEEAL PAPEES

CHAPTEE I Kationalisation in Everyday Lite

CHAPTER II Fbbud's Psychology . . . . . - 10 CHAPTEE III The Psychopathology of Everyday Life - - - - 35

CLINICAL PAPEES

CHAPTEE IV Eemarks on a Case of Complete Autopsychic Amnesia - - 103

CHAPTEE V A Modern Conception of the Psychonbdrosbs - - . 122

CHAPTEE VI The Belation between Organic and Functional Diseases - 134

CHAPTER VII

SiiunLATED Foolishness in Hysteria ... 141

xiii xiv CONTENTS

CHAPTER VIII

PAGE

The Pathology of Morbid Anxiety - - - 154

PAPBES ON TEEATMENT

CHAPTEE IX Psycho-analysis in Psychotherapy - - 182

CHAPTEB X The Psycho-Analytic Method of Tbbatmbnt ... 193

CHAPTEB XI

The Wobd-Association Method in the Treatment of Psychoneuroses - - 206

CHAPTER XII The Action of Suggestion in Psychotherapy - - - 241

CHAPTEB XIII

Reflections on Some Criticisms op the Psycho-Analytic

Method of Treatment - - - . . 283

CHAPTER XIV The Therapeutic Action of Psycho- Analysis - - 298

papees on dee am s

CHAPTER XV Freud's Theory of Dreams 312

CHAPTER XVI

The Influence of Dreams on "Waking Life

CONTENTS XV

CHAPTER XVII

PAGE

The Belations between Debams and Psychoneurotic Symptoms 355

CHAPTER XVIII A Forgotten Dream : Note on the (Edipus Saving Phantasy - 881

PAPERS ON EDUCATION

CHAPTER XIX Psycho-Analysis and Education - . . - 393

CHAPTER XX

The Value of Sublimating Processes for Education and

Re-education - - 416

CHAPTER I

^ EATIONALISATION IN EVEEYDAY LIPEi

One of the most brilliant results of Professor Freud's researches, and one of the cardinal points of his psychological theory, has been the demonstration that a number of mental processes owe their origin to causes unknown to and unsuspected by the individual. This applies equally to the mentally normal and abnormal, between whom, here as elsewhere, it is so arbitrary to draw a distinction. In my opinion this apparently simple idea is one of the most far-reaching significance both to psychology and to the sciences, such as sociology, that must be founded on psychology. This conclusion is based on the view that enquiry, pursued with adequate scepticism, shews the number of such mental processes to be exceedingly great; in fact, I would maintain that the large majority of mental processes in a normal person arise from sources unsuspected by him. We are as yet only on the threshold of important discoveries that will surely be made as soon as this principle finds a rigorous application ; and the subject opened up is so vast that in these remarks I can do no more than sketch out a few of the directions along which it would seem that fruitful conclusions are readily to be attained.

Although the importance of feeling in the moulding of our judgements, beliefs, and conduct, has for centuries been recognised by poets and writers, academic psychology has usually

1 Bead at the First International Psycho-Analytic Congress, April 27, 1908. Published in the Jov/rnal of Abnormal Psychology, vol. iii., No. 2.

allotted to it a very subordinate position in relation to what may be called the ' intellectual processes.' Of late years, however, more and more recognition has been given to the importance of feeKng ; until now one may fairly question whether there exist any mental processes in the formation and direction of which feeling does not play a part of the first rank, and the science of feeling psychology, to which Professor Freud has devoted himself, shews every sign of becoming the only scientific psychology of the future. He has shewn with convincing precision thai a number of previously incomprehensible mental processes, such as dream formation and certain apparently meaningless and accidental happenings of daily life, are throughout to be explained by regarding them as problems of feeling. He has further shewn that the causes of these mental processes are usually not only unsuspected by the individual concerned, but are repudiated and denied by him when the very existence of them is suggested. In other words, there exist elaborate psychological mechanisms, the effect of which is to conceal from the individual certain feeling processes, which are often of the highest significance to his whole mind. The complexity and subtlety of these mechanisms vary with what may be called the extent of the necessity for concealment, so that the greater the resistance the individual shews to the acceptance of the given feeling, the more elaborate is the mechanism whereby it is concealed from his consciousness. Consideration of this fact from a sceptical point of view should make one entertain the possibility that, even among practical psychologists, a number of mental processes may take their origin from sources widely different from those commonly given as explanatory of them.

The concealment mechanisms may be studied in two ways. The known feeling processes may be traced from their origin to the changed form in which they appear in consciousness, and their effect on associated mental processes thus observed ; or a given mental process may be analysed, and its causes traced back to their elementary sources. Study along these lines shews that, although the mechanisms in question are both numerous and complex, they may from one point of

RATIONALISATION IN EVEEYDAY LIFE 3

view be grouped into two classes, according to whether the individual will offer an explanation as to the origin of the terminal mental process or not. In both classes enquiry into the source of the mental process is stopped and the individual regards any such enquiry as superfluous — in the one case because he already has an explanation, in the other case because he thinks one does not exist. As will presently be seen, there is no sharp line between the two classes, and in both of them instances may be found of all kinds of mental processes, actions, judgements, memories, beliefs, etc.

The prominent characteristic of the second class is the fact that the individual considers the given mental process to be self-explanatory, and regards any further enquiry into its origin as being absurd, irrelevant, meaningless, unnecessary, and, above all, fruitless. This, broadly speaking, is the mechanism that prevents the individual from becoming conscious of the source of the mental process. His precise attitude towards the enquiry varies somewhat according to the kind of mental process concerned, and this enables us further to subdivide the class into two.

When a person is asked what was the cause of a given mental process belonging to this class, he may in the first place categorically assert that it was causeless. Such is the usual attitude adopted towards any of the large group of unconscious and accidental occurrences described by Professor Freud in his ' Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens,' under the different sections of Versprechen, Verschreiben, Vergreifen, Zufallshandlungen, etc. If pressed, the individual may assert vaguely that they are due to ' chance ' or ' inattention ' ; but it is plain that what he means is that they have no effective cause, and that there is no reason whatever why that particular mistake should have been made rather than any other. Yet, as is well known, psycho-analysis always reveals a precise cause for the occurrence, shewing that only it and no other could have arisen, as, indeed, might have been anticipated from the general principles of scientific determinism ; and this cause is often associated with some of the most intimate of the individual's feeling processes.

The person may in the second place not so much solemnly deny that the occurrence had a cause as regard the question as being foolish or meaningless. The key to the interpretation of this attitude lies in recollecting the popular illusion that a volitional process is a self-caused one— i.e., has no cause — for it is doubtful whether anyone is entirely free from the taint of voluntarism in feeling, although the heretical nature of the fallacy itself is, from an intellectual standpoint, plain enough. The mental processes now under discussion are thus always volitional ones, though the volitional element may not always be evident at the time, but may be imported as an afterthought. A beautiful example of this class, in which the volitional element was prominent at the moment of occurrence, is the one given by Adler, in which an individual deliberately selected a number under the full impression that there was no mental process at work other than his free unfettered choice ; psycho-analysis, however, revealed a complex series of causes which had determined precisely the number chosen, causes reaching into the most intimate part of his mind.^ Careful consideration of this example shews further that there were two groups of mental processes concerned — first, a conscious determination to select a number, and, secondly, the actual selection itself. The former was a volitional process, caused by the reading of Professor Freud's book ; the second an automatic process, caused by the subconscious feeling processes revealed in the psycho-analysis. Yet both groups appeared equally volitional to the individual, the feeling of volition having been extended from the conscious mental process to the automatic one that was associated with it. The same mechanism may be seen in the other cases in which the volitional element is imported as an afterthought. If, for example, a persor% decides to take a stroll, the actual direction of his stroll may well be determined by various minor influences that pass unnoticed. If later he is asked why he walked down such-and-such a street, the probability is that he will simply answer, ' Because I decided to.' Here also the slightest trace of volitional feeling is utilised to cover ^ A similar instance is detailed in Chapter III.

EATIONALISATION IN EVEEYDAY LIFE 5

other associated mental processes. In a large number of routine acts, performed automatically, the individual adopts the same attitude when questioned as to their cause. Many acts, the cause of which is a reflex obedience to the custom prevailing in his circle, he will regard when questioned as being volitional, the true cause being thus concealed from him. If, for instance, he is asked why he wears a stiff collar or a tie, he will certainly regard the question as being extremely foolish, though if he is in an indulgent mood he may humour one to the extent of- giving some imaginary explanation, such as * to keep warm,' ' to look respectable,' etc. It is quite plain that he does so only to please the enquirer, and to his mind the real and final explanation of the act lies in its obviousness. The fact that he regards the question as to the origin of the mental process as essentially absurd is evidently because he considers there is no need to search for a cause in an action that he likes to think is volitional — i.e., self-caused.

We thus soon come to a full stop in the case of the ordinary man, but in the case of an observer who has trained himself to introspective analysis we can get this further clue. Such an observer may quite well recognise that there is something behind the volitional process, though he cannot directly detect what it is. If, for instance, he essays spontaneously to choose a number, he discovers that he is not free to choose any number; one number alone comes, and not as one of many alternatives ; it comes with a certain impulsive force, and he has no option but to ' choose ' this one number. In other words, he can recognise that it comes to him apparently from without, and it is clear to him that it must have been determined by some hidden influence to which he has no direct access. A striking illustration of this mechanism, together with an analysis of the source of the mental process, is described by Professor Freud in relation to his 'choice' of the name 'Dora' to designate the heroine of his ' Br uchstiick- Analyse.'

Summing up this class of mental processes, therefore, we may say that whenever an individual considers a given process as being too obvious to permit of any investigation into its origin, and shews resistance to such an investigation, we are right in suspecting that the actual origin is concealed from him — almost certainly on account of its unacceptable nature. Reflection shews that this criterion applies to an enormous number of our fixed beliefs — religious, ethical, political, and hygienic, as well as to a great part of our daily conduct ; in other words, the principle above quoted refers to a large sphere of mental processes where we least suspect it. Yet if such beliefs and conduct are to be brought into scientific harmony, it is of the highest importance that the mechanisms controlling them should be made the subject of precise study in a way that is as yet only just begun.

We return now to the first great class of mental processes, in regard to which the individual proffers indeed an explanation, but a false one. It is not sharply divided from the other class we have considered, for there we saw examples in which the individual casually gave an obviously inadequate explanation for an act which to his mind really needed none. Indeed, all possible grades may be observed in what may be called the feeling of a necessity to provide an explanation. On enquiring into the source of this necessity, we see that it is only another aspect of the necessity everyone feels to have what may be called a theory of life, and particularly a theory of himself. Everyone feels that, as a rational creature, he must be able to give a connected, logical, and continuous account of himself, his conduct, and opinions, and all his mental processes are unconsciously manipulated and revised to that end. No one will admit that he ever deliberately performed an irrational act, and any act that might appear bo is immediately justified by distorting the mental processes concerned and providing a false explanation that has a plausible ring of rationality. This justification bears a special relation to the prevailing opinion of the circle of people who are most significant to the individual concerned, and two different groups of false explanations can be distinguished, according as they are formed essentially for the individual himself or for him in special reference to the opinions of his circle, or, roughly speaking, according as they are formed

EATIONALISATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE 7

mainly for private or mainly for public consumption. The former of these I would term ' evasions,' the latter ' rationalisations ' ; there is, however, no sharp line dividing the two, and perhaps it would be better to employ the latter term for both processes.

We may now consider a couple of examples of these. One of the best instances of evasion is the form of religious belief chosen by an individual. Eeligious belief itself rests of course on psychological principles very different from those now under discussion, but the form of doctrine accepted is another matter. There are a number of arguments used by each sect to support its special view of religion, and as a rule these are as convincing to the members of the given sect as they are unconvincing to the members of other sects. Let us take the case of a man brought up in a close circle, family and otherwise, of Baptists. At the age of puberty he may become a Baptist without thinking twice about the matter, but it often occurs to such a man that it is an irrational and therefore distasteful thing to hold a belief merely because all his friends do so. He therefore embarks with a great shew of reason upon what seems to him to be a critical and dispassionate examination of the evidence for and against Baptism. It need hardly be said that in most cases such an individual is strongly prejudiced in favour of Baptism, and is so deeply persuaded in his subconsciousness of its truth that he is only seeking for the slightest pretext to become an open convert. The matter once settled, he then maintains that he has become convinced of the truth of his doctrine by the overwhelming force of the evidence in its favour, is highly offended if one bluntly says that he believes in Baptism simply because his father did, and passionately denies this true but unacceptable explanation. The origin of his belief is thus concealed from him by the mechanism of evasion. How different with an individual brought up in a Catholic environment ! The same arguments that with the one man proved so efficacious may here be repeated with the most persuasive eloquence, and are rejected with scorn as being obviously fallacious. We see here that environmental influence may inculcate a given belief by the indirect way of raising the standard of acceptability of the arguments used in its favour; in other words, by making them appear more obviously sensible and reasonable to the individual. It will be an interesting question for the future to determine how many of our most firmly held opinions in the value of universal suffrage, of representative government, of marriage institutions, etc., are not similar examples of blind acceptance of the suggestive influence of our environment, fortified by the most elaborate evasions and rationalisations.