The order of nature; an essay

Preface

The study of adaptation, of which Lamarck is the great originator, has not yet won for itself a secure scientific foundation or led to clear and unequivocal interpretations of nature. Although the facts which this study presents are both universal and important, biologists have neither agreed upon their place in the theory of evolution nor discovered any principle by which they may be even unified.

This failure of our modem science is not hard to understand, and may fairly be attributed, in part at least, to the lack of a systematic study of adaptability; which at bottom is a physical and chemical problem, uncomplicated by the riddle of life.

THE ORDER OF NATURE

Introduction

Many of the characteristics of inorganic nature, like the stability of the solar system and the enduring movements of the waters of the earth, are the very condition of existence for life as we know it and the source of diversity in organic evolution. This is perhaps one of the oldest interpretations of nature. But since Darwin's time the fitness of the environment has only occasionally aroused passing comment without ever entering the main current of scientific thought. And yet, whatever may be the final judgment of natural science upon either organic or inorganic harmonies, biological fitness is manifestly a mutual relationship. For, however present order may have developed out of past confusion, the organism and the environment each fits and is fitted by the other.

In a recent book ^ I have tried to recall attention to the many interesting peculiarities of the environment and to state the facts concerning the fitness of the inorganic world for life. This has turned out to be more notable and extensive than biologists had supposed, and more important in

1 The Fitness of the Environment. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1913.

determining the universal characteristics of living organisms. The very nature of the cosmic process and of the physical and chemical phenomena of matter and energy bring about not only stability of the solar system, but very great stability of land and sea. Thus the temperature of the earth is more equable than it could be if the composition of the surface of the earth were other than it is. Thus the alkalinity of the ocean possesses a constancy which is nearly perfect, and this depends upon certain unique properties of carbonic acid. Thus the currents of the atmosphere and of the ocean, the fall of rain and the flow of streams are almost ideally regular, and are so only because water is different from any other substance.

Secondly, the properties of water cause a mobilization all over the earth of most of the chemical elements in very large quantities, and no other substance could so effectively accomplish this result. Once mobilized, these elements penetrate everywhere, borne by water, and the penetrating qualities of water are imique. In this manner the whole earth has become habitable.

Even more significant appear what the chemist calls the properties of the three elements, hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon, from which water and carbonic acid are formed. These are the most active of all elements (if we take account of both intensity and variety of activity), their compounds are the

INTRODUCTION 5

most numerous, the molecular structures which they form are incomparably the most complex and elaborate which have been brought to light. Moreover the energy which they yield in their mutual chemical transformations is more than other elements can provide, yet, because of their manifold reactions, more easy to regulate, to store, and to release.

In short the primary constituents of the environment, water and carbonic acid, the very substances which are placed upon a planet's surface by the' blind forces of cosmic evolution, serve with maximum efficiency to make stable, durable, and complex, both the living thing itself and the world around it. With otherwise unattainable effectiveness they provide both matter and energy in many forms and in great abimdance for growth and for repair, and in the ensemble of characteristics upon which these results depend they are unique. Nothing else could replace them in such respects, for their utiHty depends upon a coincidence of many peculiar and unequaled properties which they alone possess. It is therefore certain that in abstract physical and chemical characteristics the actual environment is the fittest possible abode of life as we know it, so far as the elements of the periodic system are concerned. In truth fitness of the environment is quite as constant a component of a particular case of biological fitness as is fitness of the organism, and fitness is quite as constantly manifest in all the properties of water and carbonic acid as in all the characteristics of living things.

Such a conclusion, however, only touches the surface of the problem. For this relationship, although mutual, is not symmetrical: it is something more than adaptation for it involves great adaptability. In every case the particular characteristics of the organism fit a special environment, while the general physical and chemical properties of water and carbonic acid fit the general characteristics of life. But it may be shown that stability, mobility, durability, complexity, and availability of matter and energy are favorable not merely to life as we know it; they are favorable to any mechanism, to any possible kind of life in this universe. For it is not by chance that life needs to be stable, that it needs food, that it needs to be complex if it is to evolve. Accordingly it is not for any special or peculiar form of life, whether life as we know it or another form, that this environment is the fittest.

Just because life must exist in the universe, just because the living thing must be made of matter in space and actuated by energy in time, it is conditioned. In so far as this is a physical and chemical world, life must manifest itself through more or less complicated, more or less durable physico-chemical systems.

INTRODUCTION 7

Accordingly it is possible to assert and it will presently be demonstrated that the primary constituents of the environment are the fittest for those general characteristics of the organism which are* imposed upon the organism by the general characteristics of the world itself; by the very nature of matter and energy, space and time. I feel sure that this conclusion is but a precise statement of a view that has long been vaguely held by many chemists.

The facts upon which this conclusion rests prove, I believe, that a hitherto unrecognized order exists among the properties of matter. For the peculiarities that make things what they are have been found not evenly distributed among the compoimds of all the elements, nor in such manner as the laws of chance can explain, nor altogether in such manner as the periodic system of the elements describes. If the extreme values and unique properties be considered, very many are seen to belong to the three elements hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon in an arrangement that brings about stabihty of physical and chemical conditions, and diversity of phenomena, and, further, the possibility of the greatest complexity, durability, and activity of physico-chemical systems on the surface of a planet.

This order is masked when the properties of matter are considered statically. It becomes evident only when time is taken into account, for this is the order that determines the later course of cosmic evolution. At present it can be only imperfectly described, but there is reason to hope that a clearer description is attainable, and if an explanation seems to be beyond our grasp, the recognition of the order may yet serve a useful purpose by helping to define a little more clearly one of the riddles of existence.

Proceeding from the results of this earlier inquiry, I have, in the following pages, endeavored in a more rigorous manner to discuss the importance of the three elements for the process of cosmic evolution and by eliminating all biological theories and principles to rest the conclusions exclusively upon the secure foundation of abstract physical science. Such is the principal aim of the present essay.

But it has also seemed desirable at least to raise another question. For the fact cannot be escaped that these considerations have a philosophical as well as a scientific bearing. I have, therefore, after much hesitation, ventured to sketch the development of thought upon the problem of teleology, and at length to confront the scientific conclusions with the results of philosophical thought, in order finally to attempt a reconciliation.

I fear that this task has been accomplished with feeble strokes. It was not undertaken confidently.

INTRODUCTION 9

but in the sincere belief that when such questions are involved men of science can no longer shirk the responsibility of philosophical thought. Only thus can they hope to escape from many errors, like those that weaken both sides of the vitalistic and mechanistic controversy, and that do really retard the advancement of science. But in thus mingling philosophy with science a danger is incurred. I would, therefore, beg the reader still to remember after he has turned this page that, when all has been said, the scientific conclusions are independent of the philosophical problem of teleology. And — I wish to say it as clearly as possible — the present essay professes to demonstrate nothing but the existence of a new order among the properties of matter, and only to examine the teleological character of this order.

II

The teleological appearance of nature and the forms of life is a universal fact of human experience. Hence it has been quite impossible for natural science or philosophy permanently to ignore the problem of teleology. Merely to explain away the order of nature is no more satisfactory than to explain away matter itself. We may argue against such ideas ever so ingeniously, but the experiences of daily life steadily oppose the arguments, and gradually overwhelm them. Thus men must always hiquire into the cause and significance of the teleological appearance of things. Efforts to solve such questions are to be found in every system of thought; they are greatly involved in the earliest of all systems.

The peculiar philosophical standpoint of Aristotle, that position which enabled him to unify his doctrine of the philosophy of nature, can only be understood as the result of many different circumstances. And yet one feels that the teleological parts of his thought were no mere accidents of time and place. Aristotle's historical derivation from Socrates and Plato, and, on the other hdnd, from Greek physicians is important as a determinant of his thought. Not less so are remote influences; for his work is continuous with the evolution of early science and primitive speculation. In short, both the sources of his system in personal experience, and its historical connections are to the point; and we may fairly think that they are often quite decisive in respect of his completed systematic views. But it is, above all other causes, his temperament, his native bent as a philosophical naturalist, to which the general character of his elementary teleological conceptions seems to be due. His system is only intelligible as an historical product, but on this subject his opinions are just his own.

No long reading of Aristotle's works is necessary to reveal in his general attitude toward final causes the very essence of his own mental disposition, the reflection of the world of life and thought as necessarily perceived through his eyes. Thus and not otherwise Aristotle was destined to see nature, if he was ever to see her as a whole, clearly.

Nevertheless, it was an historical accident that the systematic examination of the teleological concepts was first undertaken by Aristotle, and carried through under pecuhar conditions and difficulties. The problem arose, to be sure, from his equal interest in the philosophy of forms and in natural history. Moreover, this conflicting interest in the end prevented a genuine resolution of the difficulties. But it was the accident of his time that compelled him to deal with the ideas of both Democritus and Plato. For the same reason he lacked a clear conception of mechanical or even of " efficient " causation, the one essential foundation of a clear theory of final causes. And, in turn, it was this defect which led to his peculiar idea of development, founded upon metaphysical concepts of matter and form. Hence his most highly elaborated considerations upon this point are least satisfactory.

In this view of development, which occupies the central position in the Metaphysics, one seeks in vain, I believe, for those elementary teleological conclusions which are so important in Aristotle's thought. They have disappeared in a subtle process of synthesis. It is true, contrary to the opinion of Gomperz,* that the modem idea of evolution, hence at least one question of objective science, is not entirely foreign to this analysis of development. The study of the Politics clearly establishes the point. But not in this concept of development, that concerns primarily the logical aspects of the idea of formation, nor in any similar speculations, does the riddle of the teleology of nature reveal itself simply and clearly. This can be grasped only in the scientific investigation of nature itself. Even so admirable a stroke as Aristotle's compari-

' Greek Thinkers, IV, 154. London, 1912.

son of natural formation with the work of the artist, whereby both analogies and differences are revealed, and the curious unimportance of conscious design is made evident, only confuses the real questions.

In the biological works, however, the teleologicalf problems appear in their simplest forms. Even' here there are difficulties and inconsistencies enough, and too many unlucky errors which count' heavily in the later development of science. But] the ideas are established; they arise as they are to recur for all later generations; and they initiate one of the great currents of human thought. Whatever blimders Aristotle may have made, hd has here avoided fallacies that have proved dangerous to his successors, even in our own times The reason for this success is that he adopts as his starting point those ideas which sooner or later must come home to every genuine naturalist. However they may be interpreted, these ideas will forever persist. They are the basis of all later speculations.

Aristotle was not equipped with the philosophical and scientific methods that have been found indispensable for a genuinely critical examination even of this simpler problem, and that are absolutely necessary for a formulation of the ultimate concepts. But his efforts, restricted in method though they had to be, were carried out systematically and with great subtlety of dialectic; they extended throughout the vast field of his scientific knowledge; they especially involved the whole of his favorite science of zoology; and the result, accordingly, was not the least important of his contributions to the understanding of nature.

Aristotle's discussion of causation arises from the consideration that we are obliged to assign to nature several different kinds of causation, two of which are especially important for the philosophy of science. He says himself: (* The causes concerned in the generation of the works of nature are . . . more than one. There is the final cause and there is the motor cause. Now we must decide which of these two causes comes first, which second. Plainly, however, that cause is the first which we call the final one. For this is the Reason, and the Reason forms the starting point, alike in the works of art and in the works of nature." ^ It should be observed that the employment of but two kinds of causation in the explanation of nature, in place of the four which are to be found in his more philosophical works, is characteristic of Aristotle as a naturahst.

The relation between the two forms of causation is not to be judged from the priority of the reason alone for " it is plain . . . that both of these must,

1 De partibus animalium (The Works of Aristotle translated into English), I, 1, 639^ 10-15. Oxford, 1911.

SO far as possible, be taken into account in explaining the works of nature, or that at any rate an attempt must be made to include them both; and that those who fail in this tell us in reality nothing about nature." ^ Democritus, however, neglecting the final cause, reduces to necessity all the operations of nature; but though necessary, they are for a final cause, and for the sake of what is best in each case.

Thus it is also possible to understand, according to Aristotle, the failure of Empedocles, who was content to limit his reflections to mechanical causation. On the other hand, in the time of Socrates, men gave up inquiring into the works of nature, so that mechanical causation did not receive its due regard. The true method to be employed is illustrated by Aristotle as follows^, " In dealing with respiration we must show that it takes place for such or such a final object; and we must also show that this and that part of the process is necessitated by this and that other stage of it." ^

The study of physiology from this point of view is likely to lead to a vitalistic theory, but it hardly involves the general philosophy of nature. For Aristotle, however, the same considerations apply

1 De partibus animalium (The Works of Aristotle translated into English, I, 1, 642», 15. Oxford, 1911. * Ibid., 1, 642s 30.

to the whole of nature. " Absence of haphazard /and conduciveness of everything to an end are to be found in Nature's works in the highest degree, and the resultant end of her generations and combinations is a form of the beautiful." ^

Teleology therefore appears to be a universal principle. In the science of life, however, a more subtle consideration arises, and this leads Aristotle to the concept of organization. " As every instrument and every bodily member subserves some partial end, that is to say, some special action, so the whole body must be destined to minister to some plenary sphere of action." ^

" And the animal organism must be conceived after the similitude of a well-governed commonwealth. When order is once established in it there is no more need of a separate monarch to preside over each several task. The individuals each play their assigned part as it is ordered, and one thing follows another in its accustomed order. So in animals there is the same orderliness — nature taking the place of custom — and each part naturally doing his own work as nature has composed them. There is no need then of a soul in each part, but she resides in a kind of central governing place of the body, and the remaining parts live by

1 De partibus animalium (The Works of Aristotle translated into English), I, 5, 645% 20. Oxford, 1911.

continuity of natural structure, and play the parts Nature would have them play." ^

The idea of organization leads at once to a science of physiology based exclusively upon the ; concept of function. But once more a qualification arises; — this will not do as the complete science, for it deals only with final causes, accordingly " We have ... to inquire whether necess ity may not also have a share in the matter; and it must be admitted that these mutual relations could not from the very beginning have possibly been other than they are." "

Thus Aristotle arrives, no doubt less clearly than we may be inclined to think, at the conception of mechanism and teleology as complementary aspects of nature, which are always associated in its manifestations. And he is therefore led to a further question: " Let us now consider the character of the material nature whose necessary results have been made available by rational nature for a final cause." '

This no doubt is an important quest, which contemplates nothing less than the problem whose solution must put teleology in its proper place, or else eliminate it altogether. But the mquiry not unnaturally leads Aristotle from his general prin-

1 De motu animalium, II, 703^, 30-35. Oxford, 1912. ^ De fartihus animalium, II, 1, 646'', 25-30. ' lUd., Ill, 2, 663^ 20.

ciples to the infinite complexity of phenomena; he loses his clear vision of the principles, and stumbles into pitfalls. For dysteleology is hardly less obvious m nature than teleology, and the search for a final cause of everything is a hopeless task. Thus betrayed he concludes that: "... we must not in all cases expect to find ... a final cause; for granted the existence in the body of this or that constituent, with such and such properties, many results must ensue merely as necessary consequences of these properties." ^ And he even dares to be specific in his statement of this idea, that: *' Whenever things are not the product of Nature working upon the animal kingdom as a whole, nor yet characteristic of each separate kind, then none of these things is such as it is or is so developed for any final cause. The eye for instance exists for a final cause, but it is not blue for a final cause unless this condition be characteristic of the kind of animal." ^

Such ideas are damaging to the logical consistency of Aristotle's views. But they are harmless to his science. Not so the complementary inconsistency. The explanation of natural phenomena by final causes alone is at once incompatible with his principles and destructive of all sound science. Yet it is only too common in his scientific treatises.

1 De partitnts animalium, IV, 2, 677", 15.

^ De generatione animalium, V, 1, 778*, 30. Oxford 1910

We need make no difficulty of understanding Aristotle's perplexities on this point, for they depend upon his ignorance of the true manner in which mechanical processes are to be conceived. Thus for example the phenomena of the heavens were scientifically a complete riddle to him, and/ teleological explanations his only escape from perfect bewilderment.

It is singular that within a hundred years Archimedes and others shovdd have been able to avoid these difficulties and, quite in the modem spirit, investigate the problems of mechanics. But for Aristotle this field of research was closed, and accordingly the use of final causes as a sufficient principle for the explanation of nature became usual in his works and the fatal defect of his natural philosophy.

It is unprofitable to continue the analysis of Aristotle's failures as a physical scientist. In certain departments these are too well known and too apparent to call for comment, but the blame for their perpetuation belongs to his successors. And it should never be forgotten that his great merits as a zoologist more than offset his errors. We need not further consider his remarks upon teleology. For though other examples in great profusion could readily be cited, they add little to the essential considerations.

Accordingly, if the preceding analysis be not at fault, the foundations of Aristotle's teleology may be stated as follows: In the study of the living organism the mechanical cause and the reason of everything must both be sought. This is an absolute rule, although there is ground for the belief that sometimes the one explanation, sometimes the other, cannot be discovered.

The whole of nature is also subject to these two forms of causation. But the diflSculties of the investigator are here multiplied. For on the one hand matter is a refractory medium; it does not lend itself quite perfectly to the working out of the ends of nature. For this reason results may sometimes arise which are due to necessity and not properly to final causes at all. On the other hand the wider our experience and knowledge of nature, the more often do we lose track of the chain of necessary causation and discover only the final causes.

It is only reasonable to proceed one step further in the elimination of the unessential from Aristotle's views. We then reach the heart of his doctrine: Teleology and mechanism are in all phenomena, for they are complementary aspects of all things and all changes. Every qualification of this view is evidently due to Aristotle's perplexities as a naturalist or physicist. Therefore, it is the task of the investigator to " consider the character of the material nature whose necessary results have been made available by rational nature for a final cause." A more pregnant statement was never uttered.

One special view remains to be noted: the conception of the living thing as an autonomous unit in which every part is functionally related to every other and exists as the servant of the whole. No external end or purpose guides this being. Here, as in the state, the teleological principle is within. Every activity is subject to the regulative control of the soul. But, in the biological treatises, the soul is nothing more than a name for the principle of autonomy. Kant and the modern physiologists have expanded this view without improving it. It is the complete formulation of the biological principle of organization.

Ill

During the next two thousand years the history of teleology more than of other things is a record of the stagnation and decay of thought. Although the great achievements of Archimedes and the Alexandrians did almost at once afford an example of how unnecessary is a regard for teleology in the development of physical science, the lesson remained unheeded, and in the course of time the system of Aristotle won the commanding position in all domains of thought.

The followers of Aristotle, Mohammedans and Christians alike, were able in most respects only to degrade his doctrine, for they had lost his spirit of independence; only rarely could they comprehend the precision of his abstractions and generalizations; and above all they were too far from nature. Perhaps, of all his works, the teleological portions suffered most at their hands. The rare independent spirits who from time to time arose — Roger' ^acon, Nicholas of Cusa, Leonardo da Vinci — failed or did not try to shake the authority of the schools, and meanwhile the practice of explaining the phenomena of nature by their supposed final causes, alone increased and developed. Under the influence of logical pedantry or the belief in authority, now arrayed in the service of theology, Aristotle's worst faults were perpetuated, and when the currents of modem thought began to flow, the abuse of ideas which were admirable in their inception had long been complete. i

The actual situation is revealed in the works of Francis Bacon. When only thirteen years old his mind had revolted against the accepted doctrines and the mature philosopher was not slow to detect and define the sources of error. These are first stated in a famous passage of " The Advancement of Learning."

" The second part of Metaphysic is the inquiry of final causes, which I am moved to report not as omitted, but as misplaced. And yet if it were but a fault in order, I would not speak of it; for order is matter of illustration, but pertaineth not to the substance of sciences: but this misplacing hath caused a deficience, or at least a great inproficience in the sciences themselves. For the handling of final causes mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, hath intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and physical causes, and given men the occasion to stay upon these satisfactory and specious causes, to the great arrest and prejudice of further discovery. For this I find done not only by Plato, who ever anchoreth upon that shore, but by Aristotle, Galen, and others, which do usually likewise fall upon these flats of discoursing causes. For to say that the hairs of the eyelids are for a quickset and fence about the sight; or that the firmness of the skins and hides of living creatures is to defend them from the extremities of heat or cold; or that the bones are for the columns or beams, whereupon the frames of the bodies of living creatures are built; or that the leaves of trees are for protecting of the fruit; or that the clouds are for watering of the earth; or that the solidness of the earth is for the station and mansion of living creatures, and the like, is well enquired and collected in Metaphysic; but in Physic they are impertinent. Nay, they are indeed but remoras and hindrances to stay and slug the ship from further sailing, and have brought this to pass, that the search of the Physical Causes hath been neglected and passed in silence.

And therefore the natural philosophy of Democritus and some others, who did not suppose a mind or reason in the frame of things, but attributed the form thereof able to maintain itself to infinite essays or proofs of nature, which they term fortune, seemeth to me (as far as I can judge by the recital and fragments which remain unto us) in particularities of physical causes more real and better enquired than that of Aristotle and Plato; whereof both intermingled final causes, the one as a part of theology, and the other as a part of logic, which were the favourite studies respectively of both those persons. Not because those final causes are not true, and worthy to be enquired, being kept within their own province; but because their excursions into the limits of physical causes hath bred a vastness and solitude in that track. For otherwise keeping their precincts and borders, men are extremely deceived if they think there is an enmity or repugnancy at all between them. For the cause rendered, that the hairs about the eye-lids are for the safeguard of the sight, doth not impugn the cause rendered, that pilosity is incident to orifices of moisture; Muscosi fontes [the mossy springs], etc. Nor the cause rendered, that the firmness of hides is for the armour of the body again against extremities of heat and cold, doth not impugn the cause rendered, that contraction of pores is incident to the outwardest parts, in regard of their adjacence to foreign or unlike bodies; and so of the rest: both causes being true and compatible, the one declaring an intention, the other a consequence only. Neither doth this call in question or derogate from divine providence, but highly confirm and exalt it. For as in civil actions he is the greater and deeper politique, that can make other men the instruments of his will and ends and yet never acquaint them with his purpose, so as they shall do it and yet not know what they do, than he that imparteth his meaning to those he employ eth; so is the wisdom of God more admirable, when nature intendeth one thing and providence draweth forth another, than if he had communicated to particular creatures and motions the characters and impressions of his providence." ^