Cavalry in the Waterloo campaign

Front matter

THE

BY

GENERAL SIR EVELYN WOOD, V.C, &c., &c.

Introduction

When the proposal for a series of republications in book form of some of the more important articles and short stories appearing in the pages of the Pall Mall Magazine was first made to us by Mr. R. B. Marston, we* accepted it without hesitation, perceiving at once that an admirable medium would thus be provided by which much valuable literary matter might be made known to an even wider circle of the public than the readers of the periodical of which we have the conduct. Field-Marshal Viscount Wolseley's graphic and analytical papers on the " Decline and Fall of Napoleon," which constitute this, the first volume of the Pall Mall Magazine Library, achieved, as we are able to say from personal knowledge, a very remarkable success not only in England and America, but on the Continent ; especially in Paris, where they were translated and published in book form. Much the same may be said with regard to General Lord Roberts' valuable and instructive articles on the " Rise of Wellington," which found

INTRODUCTION.

especial favour with military readers in all branches of the Service, and we have reason to think that the collection of these into a single and handy volume will meet with the general approval of military men, and might form a valuable text-book for military students. The articles commenced by Viscount Wolseley and continued by Lord Roberts are now being followed in the pages of the Pall Mall Magazine by Lieut.-General Sir Evelyn Wood's papers on " Cavalry in the Waterloo Campaign," and we hope from time to time to be able to secure other able military writers as contributors to deal with subjects having an equal historical interest. We conclude by saying that the Publishers have our hearty sympathy and will have our lively co-operation in the publication of the FALL Mall MAGAZINE Library, and so far as lies in our power we shall endeavour to assist them in making each successive volume such as to entitle it to a foremost place in the literature of the day.

Frederic Hamilton.

Douglas Straight.

Editors Pall Mall Mazazifie.

^ii'

8, Charing Cross Road.

March, 1895.

Preface

The publication in the Pall Mall Magazine of some papers on the use of Cavalry in the Waterloo Campaign has induced several gentlemen, mostly civilians, to write to me on various points, and from their correspondence it seems that many of my readers who have never served in the Army take deep interest in questions which I had previously thought would only be likely to attract the attention of professional soldiers. It is remarkable that of a party of four with which I revisited Waterloo last year there were two soldiers, one lawyer, and one physician, the two latter being men of admitted reputation in their professions. The knowledge these gentlemen possessed of the campaign was great, and from what I learnt from them and my numerous correspondents I have been induced to enlarge the Pall Mall Magazine articles to a greater length than was permissible in the pages of a monthly magazine.

PREFACE.

While confining my narrative generally to the operations of the Cavalry, and to the work of the Staff of the Army, so far as it affected the Mounted branches, I have endeavoured, by a study of English, French, and German works, to place before my readers a faithful description of cavalry achievements in the shortest but most decisive campaign of this century.

Evelyn Wood,

General.

LIST OF SOME OF THE BOOKS USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS NARRATIVE.

Waterloo. By Erckmann-Chatrian.

Campagne de 1815. Par General Gourgaud.

Observations sur la " Relation de la Campagne de 181 5." Par

le General Grouchy.

F. von Kausler.

History of the King's German Legion. By Beamish. Field Services of Cavalry. By Beamish. Tactics of Cavalry. By Beamish.

The Waterloo Campaign (Arber's). By W. Siborne. Waterloo Letters. By H. T. Siborne. Fifteen decisive Battles of the World. By E. S. Creasy. Histoire de la Campagne de 181 5. Par Lieut.-Colonel Charras. Precis politique et militaire de la Campagne de 181 5. Par

General Baron de Jomini.

A Voice from Waterloo. By E. Cotton. Waterloo : the Downfall of the First Napoleon. By George

Hooper.

Notes on the Battle of Waterloo. By Sir J. S. Kennedy. Waterloo Lectures. By Lieut.-Colonel C. C. Chesney. Fifty Years of my Life. By George Thomas Albemarle. Geschichte des Feldzuges von 181 5. Von General von Ollech. The War in the Peninsula, and Wellington's Campaigns in

France and Belgium. By H. R. Clinton. Quatre Bras, Ligny, and Waterloo. By Dorsey Gardner. Histoire de la Campagne de 181 5. Par Edgar Quinet.

LIST OF BOOKS CONSULTED.

Words on Wellington. Sir William Fraser.

A Sketch of the Battle of Waterloo. By Baron von Miiffling.

Mdmoires (i 799-1 854). Par Marbot.

The Campaign of Waterloo. By J. C. Ropes,

Relation de la Bataille de Mont St. Jean. Par un T^moin

Oculaire.

Home's Precis of Modern Tactics.

An Account of the Battle of Waterloo. By Sir Herbert Taylor. Letters and Journals of Sir W. M. Gomm. Histoire de la Guerre de la Peninsule sous Napoleon. Par

Foy.

Les grands Cavaliers du Premier Empire. Par Thoumas. De I'Esprit des Institutions de Militaires. Par Marmont. Souvenirs de Delafosse.

" 1815." Par Henry Houssaye.

The Life of Lord Hill.

Revue des deux Mondes, Decembre 1894. Histoire des deux Restaurations. Par Vaulabelle. Personal Recollections of Waterloo. By Lieutenant F. H.

Pattison, 33rd Regt.

Revue de Cavalerie.

All the Regimental Histories, Cavalry and Infantry, bearing on

the Subject.

Contents

I.— Organisation of the French Army . . i II.— The French Cavalry Leaders, and how

THEY crossed THE SaMBRE RiVER . . 28

III.— Battle of Ligny, i6th June . r . .51

Chapter 1. Organisation Of The French Army

" And that it was great pity, so it was, That villainous saltpetre should be digg'd Out of the bowels of the harmless earth, Which many a good tall fellow had destroyed So cowardly ; "

King Henry IV., Act I., Scenic Hi.

Until the use of firearms became general, Horsemen had but little to fear from Infantry, but since Hotspur thus related the lament of the "popinjay lord" there have been to the present day progressive improvements in " cowardly " weapons, and we now possess a rifle which, when fired horizontally on level ground, propels a bullet through the air for five hundred yards

B without its rising more than five feet, or the height of a boy's head.

The announcement of each improvement in firearms since the days of *' Brown Bess," has been accompanied with the confident assertion by many infantry soldiers, based mainly on results of rifle-range practices, that the days of cavalry have passed away. It is probable, however, that these Soldier-prophets have either never seen Cavalry properly led, or never studied closely what that Arm of the Service has achieved. We find all the great Continental Powers are increasing the number of their mounted troops, while the most successful "Nation in Arms," believing thoroughly in the use of shock tactics, has adopted the lance, not only for " Medium," but also for " Light " Cavalry, and, as I think unwisely, for Hussars, who are too short to wield a lance effectively. Although three i^ years ago Russia, to the astonishment of military ; students, decided to turn great numbers of its Cavalry into Mounted Infantry, it appears that this decision has already been abandoned. Moreover though the Great Powers have every reason to economise, yet ; \ since the war of 1870-71 they have continued to add|)j cavalry to their armies, and to train it with still; f; greater care. Now, as cavalry takes three times as long to train, and is three times more costly to maintain than infantry, it is obvious that on the Continent, at least, it is not believed that " the age of chivalry has passed away at last."*

My main reasons for believing in the Continental views rather than in those of some of my comrades are: —

Firstly. — Because the conditions under which rifle practice is executed in peace and war differ so materially as to furnish but unreliable data on which to base deductions of any value. On the Rifle ranges, soldiers practise with every advantage that health, good-living, fair weather, and light equipment can give. They never fire when fatigued, since Commanding Oflicers object to their men being marched more than about four miles to a range. And they never shoot in unfavourable weather, for fear of their losing the monetary prizes which are granted for proficiency in these exercises. Nevertheless, on service, Infantry may often be called on to withstand Cavalry, when exhausted by long marches, want of food, and while encumbered by equipment which must militate against good shooting.

Secondly. — Though weapons are improved yearly, the human heart remains the same. Discipline enhances its military value, but then thorough discipline * Old song, by Mrs. Norton.

B 2 cannot be acquired in a few months, and with the immense growth of armies, .the time the infantry soldier is kept under training has been so reduced that it is possible this, or the coming generation, may see a repetition of glorious cavalry achievements such as astonished the world eighty years ago.

Many authors have written on the Waterloo campaign, but no one has, so far as I am aware, brought out fully and consecutively the operations of the Mounted branches of the Army during the four days' fighting. It is to these, and to the Leaders and Staff directing the Mounted branches, that I propose to confine my story, telling sufficient only of the general operations to render my narrative intelligible. I shall endeavour to show when, and under what conditions, cavalry attacks succeeded and failed, in order that my readers may judge how far they are likely to be successful in the future. To form accurate opinions we must however consider the efficiency of the contending forces.

Some French and many English historians of this campaign describe Napoleon's Army as being ''the finest he had ever commanded." This assertion has no foundation in fact, except as regards the stature of the old soldiers ; and to so term them on this ground is as reasonable as to assert that eight old " Dark " or

ORGANISATION OF THE FRENCH ARMY.

"Light Blues," who had formerly rowed in the winning boat of different years, could, when hurriedly brought together for the first time in their lives, form the finest crew ever sent by the Universities to the Thames. Moreover, the old soldiers who had returned in 1814, from captivity in foreign lands, formed only a part of Napoleon's forces, amongst which were many young and immature men. About 50 per centum of the Line were recruits, and of the Imperial Guard, 18,500 strong, between 4000 and 5000 were untrained men.

The formations employed during the first Empire indicate clearly the gradual decline of the French Infantry in military efficiency, as the waste in the ranks was made up by drafts of younger and less trained men. But it was not only the men in the Ranks who were less efficient. The great development of the Army, and its losses in action, had enabled many men to become company and battalion commanders who were unfitted for such posts. Thus battalions could no longer be successfully employed when fighting away from the supervision of superior officers. When the Generals realised that their battalions could not be trusted in extended formations, they gradually increased the depth of columns, losing thereby the advantages of fire action and manoeuvring 'power. Jomini describes how, against insufficiently trained troops, the moral effect of massive columns often caused defenders to abandon a position without awaiting an attack. When, however, such formations were employed against British infantry drawn up in line they failed, for the leading ranks, on being struck by a shower of bullets, invariably faltered, and tried to deploy, as happened both at Quatre Bras, and at Waterloo. The diagrams on the opposite page indicate clearly that the French infantry which fought so bravely at Waterloo was not, in the opinion of its Leaders, the most efficient which Napoleon commanded during his glorious career.

There were, moreover, other reasons militating against efficiency amongst the Rank and File. In the Spring of 1814 there were 180,000 cases of desertion in two months, and during the ensuing summer the following reductions were carried out, to the serious discontent of the many officers placed in retirement : infantry, from 206 to 107 regiments ; cavalry, from 99 to 61 regiments ; artillery, from 339 to 184 batteries. On April ist, 181 5, the paper strength of the army in France was 190,000, it having been increased some 40,000 in the latter part of 18 14. From all these changes it is clear that the Regimental officers could not have had that intimate knowledge of their men's character which is essential for success.

Many Regimental officers also were discontented, and from a variety of causes. During the Restoration bribery was prevalent. Honours and Titles were sold at recognised prices, the Legion of Honour being valued at from 250 to 300 francs, and in the five months from August to December 18 14 more decorations were granted than in the whole of the preceding twelve years of the Empire. In the same period of 18 14 there were more patents of Nobility issued than in the last 200 years of the Monarchy of France ! With Napoleon's return many of these nominations were cancelled, between 2000 and 3000 being recalled ; and whereas the Bonapartists had been at first disgusted at the cheapening of the previously hardly-earned Legion of Honour, those from whom it was now retaken were on their part aggrieved.

It may be easier for my civilian readers to comprehend the strength and weakness of Napoleon's army as a fighting machine if I show briefly the steps taken to reorganise it, and what happened between the 1st March and the opening of the campaign. Napoleon, having disembarked in the Gulf of St. Juan on the ist March, left the coast on the 2nd March, 181 5, with one weak battalion, General Cambronne with forty Grenadiers moving in front of him,

ORGANISATION OF THE FRENCH ARMY.

as an advanced guard. When this advanced guard came face to face with the 5th Regiment near Vizelle, Napoleon ordered his men to " Secure " arms, and dismounted from his horse. It was a critical moment for his fortunes, but he walked up to the Royal battalion, 700 strong, drawn up to oppose him, and having saluted it exclaimed : " If any soldier wants to shoot his General, who is also his Emperor, here I am ! " For a moment there was an intense silence, and then there arose a mighty shout, " Long live the Emperor," and the soldiers on either side fraternised.

There can be no doubt of the enthusiasm felt for him, not only in the army, but in certain sections of the country. At a review held on the i6th April, 181 5, he stood practically alone, although he had received many warnings of officers and others having left La Vendee in order to assassinate him. Disregarding all these threats he had but one unarmed grenadier by his side, whose duty it was to receive petitions, and a woman coming out of the crowd handed the Emperor a paper. Napoleon, imagining it to be a request for help, passed it to the orderly, that he might read it at his leisure, but on reentering his apartments, he found that the unknown woman had given him ^800 ! !

That Napoleop appreciated accurately the feeling lo CAVALRY IN THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN.

in the Army, is clear from the following memoranda dictated at St. Helena : —

" I owed my restoration to the inhabitants of the towns and villages, to the soldiers, and junior company officers. I could rely only on them. All the generals I met on my journey hesitated, or received me badly even if they were not hostile, but they were obliged to give way before the excitement of their soldiers. Marshal Macdonald and General St. Cyr endeavoured to keep their troops loyal to the Government, and the attempt nearly cost them their lives."

Many of the senior officers, though young in years, had become heavy, gross in body, and incapable of i much exertion, and Napoleon realised, though too j late, that he should have put the commands into the | hands of younger men. This slackness on the part j of the senior officers had become apparent during the j later campaigns in Germany, for at Leipsic, Napoleon, j through a field glass, observed one of his Marshals i riding up to join his troops after they had been several hours engaged.

Napoleon entered Paris on the 2ist March, having had, after the first week of his disembarkation, a triumphant march. He at once set to work in reorganising the army, and, as regards the mounted branches especially, the task was stupendous.

ORGANISATION OF THE FRENCH ARMY.

Owing to the second deposition of Napoleon and the entire dissolution of his army, there are very few Regimental details in French accounts of this reorganisation, and of the events of June 15th — 19th, 181 5 ; but my Cavalry readers will appreciate the immense difficulties under which Napoleon's mounted troops laboured, when they reflect that, of 187,600 horses which crossed the Niemen in 18 12, only 1600 came back ! These appalling losses were nearly all due to starvation and unripe food ; and during the retreat, officers who still owned horses were formed into squadrons 150 strong, which were commanded by General officers, Colonels acting as non-commissioned I officers. One of the regiments (4ienie Lanciers) engaged I on June i6th, 18 15, went to Russia 600 strong, but j returned with only one officer and 17 Rank and File ! Students of history will remember how short of cavalry Napoleon was at Liitzen in 1 8 1 3, when most of the regiments had but two squadrons ; and after the losses suffered in the disastrous autumn campaign of that year, the cavalry was freely used in the short but brilliant campaign of 18 14. Thoumas mentions the moral effect produced amongst the squads of boy recruits then enrolled in the ranks by the arrival of trained cavalry soldiers from Spain.

On Napoleon's departure for Elba, in April 18 14,

CAVALRY IN THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN.

the titles of the regiments were changed, as we many officers : the sixty-one regiments remainin after the reduction being each brought down to thre weak squadrons. In December there was a furtht reorganisation — several ex-prisoners of war, and othei called in from furlough, replacing men till then in th ranks.

The decree of the 28th March, recalling to the arm all non-commissioned officers and privates who ha been discharged for whatever reason, was not issue^ till fifteen days after it was signed, Napoleon fearin to alarm the peasantry ; and soon after the 9th Aprii the day on which it was published, the Public fund fell, a feeling of discouragement becoming prevaler throughout the country. The peasantiy, who had bee rejoicing at the abolition by the Emperor of som) vexatious taxes, now began to fear that his returj would cause possibly an invasion, but certainly ] war. This idea was so unpopular, that many of thi soldiers, even including those who had served undei Napoleon, failed to obey the summons to rejoiij Although a great many of those who deserted in i8ij gave as a reason that they would not wear th} Bourbon colours, yet several had quitted the arm! from dislike of war, which it must be remembered ha! been latterly, almost without exception, unfortunatij

J

ORGANISATION OF THE FRENCH ARM\

In spite of this feeling however, during the first week in June, 52,000 old soldiers had actually joined, and 23,000 more had left their homes to report themselves at their respective stations. In calling up the con- Iscripts for the year 181 5, the Emperor got 20,000 who jhad served in 18 14, they having been previously conjScripted one year in anticipation of their time.

The Emperor found that the two mounted Arms of the service consisted of nothing more than depots without horses or guns, and that the arsenals contained no spare muskets. The army numbered in all but 190,000 men of all branches of the service with 35,000 horses.

Napoleon collected men more quickly than he could manufacture arms and equipment, of which there was a great deficiency. In twenty regiments men had no boots or shoes, and in even the Corps d'elite, the supply was inadequate. Up to the 1 2th June, the Imperial Guard, and the five Corps d'Armee which were intended to invade Belgium, with few exceptions, had not a second pair of boots, and the last of the equipment for the mounted troops was not issued till the end of May.

On the 20th March, there were only 28,000 horses in the cavalry, and the artillery and train had but 8000 on paper, of which 5000 had been let out to t4 CAVALJ^y m THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN.

farmers. Half the mounted gendarmery were theiij.

ordered to send in their horses, each man receiving!

6oo' francs in payment, and by this means 4300 horses

were obtained, and distributed among- the Cuirassier! :

I and Dragoon regiments. The General who was put irn \

charge of the Remount depot at Versailles did not) I

understand his business, for he declined to accept!

any horses over age, and even if .they were half an!

inch under the regulated height ; but nevertheless!

Napoleon managed to collect 41,000 horses for the|

cavahy, and some 16,000 for artillery and transport]

purposes. '

That Napoleon could in two months collect 20,000

horsemen for his invasion of Belgium, after providing

for the Army Corps guarding the other frontiers of

France, and having had a nucleus of 8000 horses only

on which to start the mobilisation, is one of the many

proofs of his marvellous genius ; but the inevitable

hurry, and consequent want of training, accounts

in a great measure for the want of success attained

by the French Cavalry, notwithstanding the heroic

conduct displayed by many individuals, who freely

offered their lives to make up for the want of

training of their regiments. Those who have had to

train large drafts of recruits brought suddenly into a

regiment previously in a high state of efficiency must,

ORGANISATION- OP THM FkENCH ARMY. 15 if they know the facts, feel astonished not only at what Napoleon expected of his untrained horsemen, but at what they actually accomplished. The many decrees issued by the Emperor during the " Hundred days," and their nature, indicate his difficulties in raising men. That dated March 28th, brought alongside boyish recruits, old men of sixty years of age, some of whom it is said had served in the Italian campaigns, when Napoleon was Consul.

On the 1st June, 1815, the effectives reached 217,000, of which there were available for the Waterloo campaign, 115,000, composed of 86,000 infantry, 20,000 cavalry, 7000 artillery, and 2000 sappers.

Napoleon left Paris at 3 A.M. on the 12th June, the Guards having set out on the 5th. On the 14th, the French army was concentrated at Maubeuge, Beaumont, and Philippeville. Headquarters were at Beaumont. At these three places the troops were all encamped under cover of low hills within a few miles of the frontier, being so well placed that the enemy remained unaware of the proximity of the large masses of troops.

Cavalry divisions, about 1500 stroilg, were attached to the corps as follows : —

To the 1st Corps (Count D'Erlon's), the division commanded by General Jacquinot.

To the 2nd Corps (Count Reille's), the division commanded by General Pire.

To the 3rd Corps (Count Vandamme's), the division commanded by General Domon.

To the 4th Corps (Count Gerard's), the division commanded by General Maurin.

The Reserve of cavalry under supreme command of General Grouchy was thus divided : —

1st Cavalry Corps, Count Pajol. 2nd „ ,, Count Exelmans.

3rd „ „ Count Kellerman.

4th „ „ Count Milhaud.

Each of these consisted of some 2600 sabres, with two batteries of artillery attached.

The Young Guard was formed of volunteers and the men called back to the colours who had previously served in the Young Guard. For the Middle Guard, the men for the artillery and cavalry were taken from the gendarmery and the line, each regiment of which had to supply fifty selected men, with a minimum of eight years' service, and those drafted into the infantry were required to be of four years' service.

On the evening of the 14th, 115,000 men answered the Roll call, and there were 350 guns present. Napoleon on the morning of the 14th issued a stirring "order of the day" to his army, in the concluding sentences of which he called on every man " to conquer or die irtthe attempt." This spirit animated most of the old soldiers in the ranks, but the same exalted feeling was not shared by the generals, several of whom, though young in years, were prematurely aged, and such had lost that determined audacity which had gained so many battles under the Republic and the Empire.

All of them, Soult, Ney, Grouchy, Grouet, Lobau, Kellerman, Vandamme, Bachelu, Gerard, Druot, Exelmans, and Foy, were between forty and fifty years of age. Unfortunately for Napoleon, most of them no longer believed that the Emperor could succeed ; and possibly his own confidence in his ! Star was no longer what it had been.

Ney, Lobau, and many others felt that they were not only risking their lives in battle, but that unless Napoleon succeeded in maintaining his throne they would probably be tried by Court martial and shot. Gerard, Exelmans, and Vandamme, however, were full of zeal and confidence. The two latter were not on speaking terms with Soult, who had certainly treated Exelmans ungenerously, and though he did not allow the incident to affect his conduct, yet it must have impaired Soult's influence and I therefore will tell the story briefly.

l8 CAVALRY IN THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN.

When Murat was reinstated by the Allied Sovereigns as King of Naples, Exelmans wrote a friendly letter to his former Chief with whom he had served as Aide-de-camp in Italy, and in Germany in 1805. This letter, being intercepted in the post, was put before Louis XVIII., who contented himself wit| desiring the Minister of War to request Exelmans be more guarded in future. This did not satisfl Soult, and although Countess Exelmans was about t be confined, Soult ordered him to leave Paris imm

I

ORGANISATION Oh THE FRENCH ARMY. 19 diately. Exelmans refused, and when a general officer was sent with a picquet of soldiers to take him prisoner, he threatened to kill the first man who laid a hand on him. This threat was successful.

The Countess having appealed to the Chamber of Deputies, the appeal was accepted, and by a Royal decree the General was ordered to be tried before a court-martial at Lille, but was unanimously acquitted.

Soult and Exelmans did not meet again till the i6th June, 181 5, when Grouchy, having sent for Exelmans, began to talk to him in Soult's presence. The Marshal in the first instance bent his eyes down on a map, but seeing it was impossible to ignore his presence, eventually held out his hand, saying, " How are you ? " Exelmans shook his hand, but the quarrel between them was not made up.

Soult's relations with Vandamme were not friendly. I do not wish it to be understood that I imply this was Soult's fault ; for Vandamme, although brave to the last degree, was not only impetuous and hasty, but rough-mannered, and one with whom it was difficult to preserve amicable relations. Count Ferenzac narrates that in Germany he insulted grievously the Prince of Eckmiihl (Davout), who was very much mortified, but bearing in mind a message

C 2 he had just received from Napoleon saying, " Try to manage Vandamme, there are few soldiers like him on service," he put up with his junior officer's insubordination.

On the evening of the 14th June, when an officer was sent with an order for Vandamme to advance with his corps at 3 A.M., the General could not be found. He had gone off to a house at some distance from his corps, and had not left word where he was sleeping. The orderly officer, who wandered abouti during the night endeavouring to find the General, eventually fell from his horse and broke his leg. He lay helpless for some time, and thus the order was never delivered to Vandamme, who started only al seven o'clock instead of three in the morning.

On the afternoon of the 15th, when Napoleoi decided to give Ney and Grouchy the commands 0 the two wings of his forces, Soult omitted to inforn Vandamme that he was to pass under Grouchy' orders, and when later Grouchy ordered him t advance and press the retreat of the Prussian; Vandamme refused to take orders from him.

The late Colonel Home in his admirable 'Preci! of Modern Tactics,' quoting von Hardegg, says thti " If the General may be regarded as representing th head of a human body, the Staff may be justl'

ORGANISATION OF THE FRENCH ARMY. ii compared to the nerves which convey the volition from the head to the different members," and it is obvious that in order to obtain the best results, those conveying the orders of the Chief should work in unison with all the members of the body.