Buffon's Natural history, containing a theory of the earth, a general history of man, of the brute creation, and of vegetables, minerals, &c. &c

Contents

OF

THE FIFTH VOLUME

History of the Brute Creation.

Chap. II. Of Domestic Animals. - 8S

The Horse 93

The Ass - - - 179

The Sheep - - - 2*3

The Goat - - - 264

The Souine, the Hog of Siam^

and the Wild Boar - 278

The Dog - - - 302

wo

Directions for placing the Plates,

BUFFON'S NATURAL HISTORY.

HISTORY OF THE BRUTE CREATION.

Chapter I. ©j* The Natuke Of Animals

AS all our knowledge turns upon the relations by which one object differs from another, if there existed no brute animals, the nature of the human being would be still more incomprehensible. Having considered man in himself, ought we not to derive every assistance, by comparing him with the other pads of the animal creation? We will proceed vol v. B then then to examine the nature of animals, to compare their organization, to study their general economy, thereby to make particular applications, to mark resemblances, to reconcile the differences; and from the assemblage of those combinations, to distinguish the principal effects of the living mechanism, and fo make a further progress in that important knowledge of which man is the object.

We will begin by reducing within its proper limits a subject which, at first view, appears to be immense. The properties of matter which animals possess in common with inanimate beings come not within our present consideration, and which we have already fully treated upon. For the same reason we shall reject such qualities as are found equally to belong to the vegetable and to the animal. As in the class of animals we comprehend a number of animated beings, whose organization is highly different from that of man, as well as from more perfect animals, so we shall wave the consideration of them, and confine ourselves to those animals which have evidently the greatest affinity to us.

But as the nature of man is superior to that of animals, so of that superiority we shall studyto demonstrate the cause, in order that we may

distinguish

NATURAL HISTORY. ?

distinguish what is peculiar to man, from -what belongs to him in common with other animals.

Previous to an examination of the minute parts of the animal machine, and their peculiar /unctions, let us view the general result of this mechanism, and, without at first reasoning upon causes, confine ourselves to an elucidation and description of effects.

An animal has two modes of existence; that of motion, or awake, and rest, or asleep; and which, while life lasts, succeed each other alternately. In the former, all the springs of the machine are in action ; in the latter, there is only a part of them so, and this part acts as well while the animal is asleep as while it is awake, and is therefore absolutely necessary since the animal cannot exist without it. It is also independent of the other, as it acts of itself ; \ he former, on the contrary, depends on the tatter, as it cannot exercise itself alone. The one is a fundamental part of the animal economy, since it acts continually and without interruption; the other is less essential, since it acts but by intervals.

The first division of the animal economy appears general and well founded. An animal when asleep is more easy to be examined than

B 2 when when awake and in motion. This difference is essential, and not a simple changeof situation as in an inanimate body, which may be equally and indifferently at rest or in motion ; for in either of these states it would perpetually remain, unless constrained to quit it by some external power or resistance. By its own powers the animal changes its condition ; and naturally, and without constraint, it passes from repose to action, and from action to repose. The period for awaking returns as necessarily as that for sleep, and both arrive independent of any foreign cause ; since in either state the animal cannot exist but for a certain time, and an uninterrupted continuity of either would be equally fata! to life.

In the animal economy, therefore, we may distinguish two parts ; the one acts perpetually without interruption, and the other acts only by intervals. The action of the heart and lungs in animals that breathe, and of the heart in the foetus, seem to constitute the former as does the action of the senses, and the movements of the members of the latter.

If we imagine beings endowed by nature with only the first part of this animal economy, though deprived of sense and progressive

motion.

NATURAL HISTORY. D

motion, would yet be animated, and differ in nothing from animals asleep. An oyster which appears to have no external sense or progressive motion, is a being formed to sleep forever. In this sense a vegetable is merely a sleeping animal, and in general every organized being destitute of sense and motion may be compared to an animal doomed by Nature to a perpetual sleep.

In animals, then, sleep is not an accidental state, occasioned by the exertions of their functions while awake. It is, on the contrary, unessential mode of existence, which serves as a basis to an animal economy. By sleep our existence begins; the foetus sleeps continually, and the infant is more often asleep than awake. Sleeip, therefore, which seems to be a state purely passive, resembling that of death, is, on the contrary, that which a living animal first experiences, and is the very foundation of life.

Confined solely to that part which acts continually, the most perfect animal will not appear to differ from those beings to which we can scarcely give the appellation of animal. As to external functions, it would be nearly upon a level with a vegetable ; for however different the internal organization of animals and vegetables tables may be, the inferences will be (lie same. They each receive nourishment, grow, expand , have external motions, and a vegetating life. But of progressive motion, action, and sentiment, they will be equally destitute ; nor be endowed with any interior or apparent character by which animal life may be distinguished. Investing, however, this internal part with senses and members, animal life will presently manifest itself; and the more this cover shall contain of sense and members, the more will the animal life be perfect. It is by this investment that animals differ from each other. The internal part belongs, withoutexception, to all animals; and is nearly the same in all which have flesh and blood. The external cover, however, is widely different; and it is at its extremities that the greatest differences subsist.

In order to elucidate this, argument, let us compare the body of a man with that of a h< or a ox. In each the heart and luna^s, or the organs of circulation, and of respiration, are nearly the same; but the external cover is highly different. The materials of the animal body, though the parts are similar to those of the human, vary greatly as to number, size, ind position; and thereby the dissimilitudes

in'

NATURAL HISTORY.

in their respective forms are rendered very wide. Besides, we shall find that the greatest differences are at the extremities ; for in dividing the body into three principal parts, the trunk, the head, and the members, we find, that in the head and members, which are the extremities of the body, consist, the most material difference between man and other animals. We discover that the greatest difference in the trunk is at the two extremities ; since in men there are clavicles at the upper extremity, which in animals are wanting; and the under extremity of animals is terminated by a tail, consisting of a certain number of exterior vertebra?, which the human body is without. The inferior extremity of the head also, as the jawbones, and the upper extremity, as the bones ©f the forehead, differ prodigiously In man and beast. Finally, by comparing the members of a man with those of other animals, we plainly perceive it is at the extremities they differ most, as no two things bear less resemblance to each other, than the human hand with the1 foot of a horse or an ox.

Taking the heart then for the centre of the animal machine, we find in that and other adjacent parts, there is a perfect resemblance between inun and other animal.-: but the more'

we we remove from this centre, the more they become different ; and when in the centre itself there is found any difference, then the animal is infinitely more distant from man, and possesses nothing in common with those animals we are now considering. In most insects, for example, there is a peculiar organization of this principal j art of the animal eco-iomy. Instead of heart and lungs, they have parts which, being subservient to the vital functions, have been considered as analogous to those vis* cera, but which in reality widely differ from them, both in structure and result of action, and therefore arc insects to the last degree different from man and other animals. A minute difference in the centrical parts is al ays accompanied with an infinitely greater in the exterior parts. The tortoise, whose heart is of a peculiar structure, is a very extraordinary animal, and has not the smallest resemblance to any other animated being.

In considering men, quadrupeds, birds, cetaceous animals, fishes, reptiles, &c. what prodigious variety do we find in 'he figure and proportion of their bodies, in the number and position of their members, in the substance of their flesh and bones ? Quadrupeds have generally tails and horns; cetaceous animals

live live in another element, and though their mode of generation is similar to that of quadrupeds, yet they differ greatly from them in form, having no inferior extremities ; birds differ still more by their beaks, feathers, wings, and their propagation by eggs ; fishes and amphibious animals are yet father removed from the human form, and reptiles have no members. In the whole exterior covering there is the greatest diversity, the interior conformation being nearly the same ; they have all a heart, a liver, a stomach, intestines, and organs for generation ; these ought to be considered as parts the most essential to the animal economy, since they are the most fixed, and least subjected to variation.

But it is to be observed that, even in the cover, there are some parts more fixed than others. Of all the senses none of these animals are divested . We have already explained what may be their sensation of feeling. What may be the nature of their smelling and taste we know not, but we are assured they all enjoy the sense of seeing, and perhaps that of hearing also. The senses may be considered, then, as another essential part of the animal economy, as well as the brain, from which sensation derives its origin. Even insects, which differ so much in tol. v. C the the centre of the animal economy, have a part analogous to the brain, and its functions resemble those of other animals ; and such as the oyster, which seems to be deprived of a brain, ought to be considered as only half-animated, and as filling up an intermediate space between the animal and the vegetable kingdoms.

As the heart is the centre of the interior part of the animal, so is the brain the centre of the cover. In like manner as the heart, and all the interior parts, communicate with the brain and exterior cover, by means of the bloodvessels, the brain communicates with the heart, and with all the interior parts, by means of the nerves. This union appears to be intimate and reciprocal/and though of these two organs the functions are absolutely different, yet they can never be separated without the instant death of the animal.

The heart and the whole interior part acts continually without interruption, and independent of any exterior cause ; but the senses and exterior part act only by alternate intervals, when affected by external causes. Objects act upon the senses, the senses modify this action, and carry the impression modified into the brain, where it becomes what we term sensation. In consequence of this impression

the.

the brain acts on the nerves, and communicates the vibration it has received ; and this vibration it is which produces progression, and all the other exterior actions of the body. Whenever a cause acts upon a body, we know that the body also acts upon the cause. Thus objects act upon animals by means of the senses, and animals act upon the object by its exterior movements. In general action is the cause, and re-action the effect.

It may be said, that in solid bodies, which follow the laws of mechanism, the re-action is always equal to the action ; but that in the animal body it appears that the re-action is greater than the action, and that the other exterior movements ought not to be considered as sira* pie effects of the impression of objects upon the senses. To this objection I reply, that though in certain cases effects appear proportioned to their causes, there is in Nature an infinite number of cases were the effects bear no kind of proportion to their apparent causes. By a single spark of fire a magazine of powder may be set in flame, and a citadel be blown up. By electricity a slight friction produces a violent shock, which is communicated to great distances, and if a thousand persons touch each other, they would all be almost as much af-

C 2 fected fected by it as if the shock had been confined to each of them individually. It is not, then, extraordinary that a slight impression on the senses should produce in the animal body a violent re-action, and should manifest itself by exterior movements.

The causes we are qualified to ascertain, and the quantity of whose effects we can precisely estimate, are less numerous than those whose mode of action is unknown, and of whose proportional relation with their effects, we are entirely ignorant. Now most effects in Nature depend on a number of causes differently combined, whose actions vary, and seem to be determined by no established law, consequently we can only form a conjectural estimate by endeavouring to approximate the truth by the means of probabilities.

I pretend not, then, to assert as a demonstrative fact, that progressive and other exterior movements of animals, are caused solely by the impression of objects upon the senses. I mention it merely as likely, and founded on principles of analogy, since all organized beings, which are destitute of sense, are likewise destitute of progressive motion, and that all those which possess the one have also the other.

To

To illustrate these observations let us briefly analyze the physical principles of our actions. When an object strikes any of our senses, and the sensation it produces is agreeable, it creates a desire, which desire must have a relation to some of our qualities or modes of enjoyment. The object we cannot desire but either to see, taste, hear, smell, or to touch. We desire it merely that we may render the first sensation still more agreeable, or to excite another which is a new manner of enjoying the object ; for if in the moment that we perceive an object we could enjoy it fully, through all the senses at once, we should have nothing to desire. The source of desire, then, is our being badly situated with respect to the object perceived, our being either too far from, or too near to it. This being the case we naturally change our situation, because at the same time that we perceive the object, we likewise perceive the cause which prevents our obtaining a full enjoyment of it. From the impression which the object produces upon our senses, then, the motion we make in consequence of that desire, and the desire itself, solely proceeds.

An object we perceive by the eye, and which we desire to touch, if within our reach, we stretch forth our hands, and if at a distance we

put put ourselves in motion to approach it. A man deeply immersed in thought, if he is hungry, and there is a piece of bread before him, he will seize it, and even carry it to his mouth and eat it, without being conscious that he has done so. These movements are a necessary consequence of the first impressions of objects, and would never fail to succeed this impression if other intervening impressions did not often oppose this natural effect, either by weakening or by destroying the action of the first.

An organized being void of sensation, as an oyster, whose sense of feeling is probably very imperfect, is deprived not only of progressive motion, but even of sentiment and intelligence, as either of these would produce desire, which would manifest itself by exterior movement. That such beings are divested of a sense of their own existence I will not assert, but at least that sense must be very imperfect, since they have no perception of the existence of others.

It is the action of objects upon the senses which creates desire, and desire progressive motion. In order to render this truth still moresensible, let us suppose a man, at the instant his will incites himto approach an object, suddenly deprived of all his members, his body reduced

to to a physical point, to a globular atom, and, provided the desire still subsists, he will exert his whole strength in order to change his situation. The exterior and progressive movement depends not, then, upon the organization and figure of the body and members, since whatever be the conformation any of being it will not fail to move, provided it has senses, and a desire to gt^tify them.

On this exterior organization, indeed, depends the facility, quickness, direction, and continuity of motion, but the cause, principle, action, and determination, originate solely from desire occasioned by the impression of objects upon the senses ; and if a man was deprived of them he would no longer have desire, and consequently remain constantly at rest, notwithstanding he might possess the faculties for motion.

The natural wants, as that of taking nourishment, are interior movements, which necessarily create desire or appetite. By these movements exterior motions may be produced in animals, and, provided they are not deprived of exterior senses relative to these wants, they will act to satisfy them. Want is not desire; it differs from it as the cause differs from the effect. Every time the animal perceives an

object, id buffon's

object, relative to its wants, desire begins, and action follows.

The action of external objects must produce some effect ; and this effect we readily conceive to be animal motion, as every time its senses are struck in the same manner, the same movements always follow. But how shall we comprehend the action of objects creating desire or aversion ? How shall we obtain knowledge of that which operates beyond the senses, those being the intermediate between the action of objects, and the action of the animal ; a power in which consists the principle of the determination of motion, since it modifies the action of the animal, and renders it sometimes nullj notwithstanding the impression of objects ?

This question, as it relates to man, is difficult to be resolved, being by nature so different from other animals. The soul has a share in all our movements, and to distinguish the effects of this spiritual substance, from those produced by the powers of our material being alone, is an object of very great difficulty, and of which we can form no judgment but by analogy, and by comparing our actions with the natural operations of other animals. But as man alone is possessed of this spiritual substance, which enables him to think and reflect, fleet, and as the brute is a being altogether material, which neither thinks nor reflects, nevertheless acts, and seems to determine, we cannot doubt but that the principle of the determination of motion is in the animals an effect altogether mechanical, and absolutely dependant upon its organization.

I conceive, therefore, that in the animal the action on objects on the senses produces another on the brain, which I consider as an interior and a general sense, which receives every impression that the exterior senses transmit to it. This internal sense is not only capable of being agitated by the action of the senses, but also of retaining for a length of time the agitations thus produced; and in the continuity of the agitation consists the impression, which is more or less deep in porportion as the agitation is more or less durable.

In the first place, then, the interior sense differs from the exterior senses, in the property which it has of receiving all impressions, while the exterior senses receive them merely as they relate to their conformation; the eye, for example, being no more affected by sound than the ear is by light. Secondly, the interior differs from the exterior senses, by the duration of the agitations produced by exterior causes; vol. v. D but

IS Brn-atf's

but in every 6thef respect they are of the same nature. The interior sense of the brute, as its exterior, is entirely material, and the effect of mechanical organization. We have, like the animal, this material sertse ; and we possess, moreover, a sense of a nature highly superior, which resides in the spiritual substance, and which animates and guides us.

The brain of the animal is, therefore, a general sense, which receives all impressions the external senses transmit to it, and these impressions continue much longer in the internal than in the external senses : for instance, the agitations which light produces in the eye, continues longer than that which sound produces on the ear.

It is on this account that the impressions, which the former transmits to the interior sense, are more strong than those transmitted by the latter ; and that we represent to ourselves the things which we have seen much more forcibly than those which we have heard. It is even found, that of all the senses, the eye is that in which the agitations arethe most durable, and in which, of consequence, though seemingly they are more explicit, the strongest impressions are formed.

The

The eye may therefore be considered as a continuation of the interior sense. It is, indeed, nothing more than one large nerve expanded, and a prolongation of the orgau, in which the interior sense resides. That in its nature there should be a greater affinity to this internal sense is not then surprising; and in effect not only its impressions are more durable, but its properties more eminent than those of the pther senses.

The eye represents outwardly the inward impressions. Like the internal sense, it is active, and expresses desire or aversion, while all the other senses are wholly passive ; they are merely organs formed for the reception of exterior impressions, but incapable of retaining or reflecting them.

When with violence, however, and for* length of time any sense is acted upon, the agitation subsists much longer than the action of the exterior objects. This is, however, felt most powerfully in the eye, which will retain the dazzling impression made by looking for a moment on the sun, for hours and even days.

The brain also eminently enjoys this property, and not only retains the impressions it receives tut propagates their actions, by communicating

D 2 the the vibrations to the nerves. The organs of the exterior senses, the brain, the spinal marrow, and the nerves, which are diffused over every part of the body, ought to be considered as one continued substance, as an organic machine, in which the senses are the parts acted upon by the external objects. But what renders this machine so different from all others is its fulcrum not only being capable of resistance and re-action, but is itself active, because it long retains impressions it has received ; and the brain and its membranes being of great capacity and sensibility, it may receive a number of successive agitations, and retain them in the order in which they were received, because each impression agitates one part of the brain only, and the successive impressions agitate the same or contiguous parts, in a different manner.

Should we suppose an animal which had no brain, but possessing an exterior of great sensibility and extension ; an eye, for example, of which the retina was as extensive as that of the brain, and had the property of retaining, for a long space, the impressions it might receive: it is certain, that the animal so endowed would see at the same time not only the present objects, but also those it had seen before ; and

seeing

NATUHAT, HISTORY. 21

seeing thus (he past and the prccnt with one glance, it would be determined mechanically to act according to the number or force of the agitations produced by the images which accorded with, or were contrary to this determination. If the number of images calculated to create an appetite surpassed those that would produce disgust or loathing, the animal would necessarily be determined to move, in order to latisfy that appetite : but if their number and force were equal; having no particular caus* for motion, it would remain perfectly at rest ; and if the number or the force of the images of the former are equal to the number or the force of the images of the latter, the animal will remain undetermined, and in an equilibrium between these two equal powers, nor will he make any movement either to obtain or to avoid. This I say it would do mechanically, and without the intervention of memory ; for as the animal sees at the same time all the images, they consequently act, and those which have an affinity to appetite and desire, counteract those which have an affinity to antipathy and disgust ; and it is by the preponderance of either, that determines it to act in this or in that manner.

It

It is evident, therefore, that in brutes the interior sense differs in nothing from the exterior but in the property of retaining the impressions it has received, a property by which alone all the actions of animals may be explained, and some idea obtained of what passes within them ; a property which likewise demonstrates the essential and infinite difference which subsists between them and us, and from which may be distinguished in what respects they are similar.

The degrees of excellence in the senses do not follow the same order in the brute as in the human species. The sense which has the strongest affinity to thought, is the touch . This is enjoyed by man in greater perfection than by animals. That which has the strongest affinity to instinct and appetite, is that of smelling ; a sense in which man must acknowledge an in* finite inferiority. Man, then, has the greatest tendency to knowledge, and the brute to ap* petite. In the former, the sense first in point of excellence, is the touch, and smelling the last; and this difference corresponds with the nature of each. The sense of seeing is at best ncertain, without the aid of the touch, and therefore less capable of perfection in the brutfc than in man. The ear, though prehaps as perfect in the former as in the latter, is of much

less less use to the animal, from the want of speech, which in man is an appendage to the sense of hearing, an organ of communication which renders it an active sense ; whereas in the other hearing is a sense almost entirely passive. Man, then, enjoys the senses of feeling, seeing, and hearing, more perfect, and the sense of smelling more imperfectly than other animals ; and as the taste is an inferior smell, and has also a stronger relation to appetite than any of the other senses, there is a sufficient probability to suppose that animals enjoy it in a more exquisite degree than man. Of this a proof might beadduced from the repugnance which animals have to certain kinds of food, and from their natural appetite for such as are proper for them; while man, unless informed of the difference, would eat the fruit of one tree for that of another, and even hemlock for parsley.

The excellence of the senses proceeds from Nature ; but art and habit may render them still more perfect. A painter sees, at the first glance, numbers of shades and differences, which another person will pass over unnoticed. A musician, always habituated to harmony, receives a lively sensation of pain from discord. In like manner are the senses, and even appetites of auimals rendered more perfect. Birds may

be be taught to repeat words, and imitate tunes; and (he ardour of a dog for the chace may be increased by acccustoming him to a certain reward.

In proportion as these senses are acute and perfect docs the animal shew itself active and intelligent. In man the improvement is not so conspicuous, because he exercises his ear and bis eye by means more rational and ingenious. Those persons who see, hear, or smell, imperfectly, are of no less intellectual capacity than others; an evident proof than in man there is something more than an internal animal sense. This is the soul of man, which is a superior sense, a spiritual substance, entirely different in its essence and action from the nature of the external senses.

From this, however, we are not to deny that there is in man an internal material sense cor* responding with the external senses. But what I maintain is, that the latter is infinitely subordinate to the other; that the spiritual substance governs it, and cither destroys or creates its operations. In the animal this sense is the determinating principle of motion, but in man only the means, or the secondary cause.