The Buccaneers in the West Indies in the XVII century

Preface

THE principal facts about the exploits of the English and French buccaneers of the seventeenth century in the West Indies are sufficiently well known to modern readers. The French Jesuit historians of the Antilles have left us many interesting details of their mode of life, and Exquemelin's history of the freebooters has been reprinted numerous times both in France and in England. Based upon these old, contemporary narratives, modern accounts are issued from the press with astonishing regularity, some of them purporting to be serious history, others appearing in the more popular and entertaining guise of romances. All, however, are alike in confining themselves for their information to what may almost be called the traditional sources — Exquemelin, the Jesuits, and perhaps a few narratives like those of Dampier and Wafer. To write another history of these privateers or pirates, for they have, unfortunately, more than once deserved that name, may seem a rather fruitless undertaking. It is justified only by the fact that there exist numerous other documents bearing upon the subject, documents which till now have been entirely neglected. Exquemelin has been reprinted, the story of the buccaneers has been re-told, yet no writer, whether editor or historian, has attempted to estimate the trustworthiness of the old tales by comparing them with these other sources, or to show the connection between the buccaneers and the history of the English colonies in the West Indies. The object of this volume, therefore, is not only to give a narrative, according to the most authentic, available sources, of the more brilliant exploits of these sea-rovers, but, what is of greater interest and importance, to trace the policy pursued toward them by the English and French Governments.

The "Buccaneers in the West Indies" was presented as a thesis to the Board of Modern History of Oxford University in May 1909 to fulfil the requirements for •--4he-<degree of Bachelor of Letters. It was written under the supervision of C. H. Firth, Regius Professor of Modern History in Oxford, and to him the writer owes a lasting debt of gratitude for his unfailing aid and sympathy during the course of preparation.

C. H. H.

i

Oxford, 1910

Contents

Preface

CHAP. PAGB

I. Introductory —

Part II.— The Freebooters of the Sixteenth Century 28

II. The Beginnings of the Buccaneers . . 57

III. The Conquest of Jamaica 85

V. Porto Bello and Panama. . .120

VI. The Government Suppresses the Buccaneers 200

VII. The Buccaneers Turn Pirate .... 232

Appendices 273'74

Bibliography 275

Index 289

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Map of the West Indies .... Frontispiece

From Charlevoix' Histoire de S. Domingue.

FACING PAGE

Spanish Periagua i

From Exquemelin's Histoire des Aventuriers Trevoux, 1744.

Buccaneer Vessels ....... 76

From Exquemelin's Histoire des Aventuriers Trevoitx, 1744.

A Correct Map of Jamaica 85

From the Royal Magazine, 1 760.

Map of San Domingo . . . . . . . 86

From Charlevoix' Histoire de S. Domingue.

Plan of the Bay and Town of Portobelo . . 154

From Prevost d'Exiles' Voyages.

The Isthmus of Darien 164

From Exquemelin's Bucaniers, 1684-5.

' The Battel between the Spaniards and the pyrats or buccaniers before the cltty of Panama ' ........ 1 66

From Exquemelin's Bucaniers of America, 1684-5.

Plan of Vera-Cruz 242

From Charlevoix' Histoire de S. Do?ningue, 1730.

Plan of the Town and Roadstead of Cartagena

and of the Forts 264

From Baron de Pontis' Relation de ce qui c1 est fait la prise de Carthagene, Bruxelles, 1698.

THE BUCCANEERS IN THE

WEST INDIES IN THE

XVII CENTURY

Chapter I Introductory I. — The Spanish Colonial System

AT the time of the discovery of America the Spaniards, as M. Leroy-Beaulieu has remarked, were perhaps less fitted than any other nation of western Europe for the task of American colonization. Whatever may have been the political role thrust upon them in the sixteenth century by the Hapsburg marriages, whatever certain historians may say of the grandeur and nobility of the Spanish national character, Spain was then neither rich nor populous, nor industrious. For centuries she had been called upon to wage a continuous warfare with the Moors, and during this time had not only found little leisure to cultivate the arts of peace, but had acquired a disdain for manual work which helped to mould her colonial administration and influenced all her subsequent history. And when the termination of the last of these wars left her mistress of a united Spain, and the exploitation of her own resources seemed to require all the energies she could muster, an entire new hemisphere was suddenly thrown open to her, and given into her hands by a papal decree to possess and populate. Already weakened by the exile of the most sober and industrious of her population, the Jews ; drawn into a foreign policy for which she had neither the means nor the inclination ; instituting at home an economic policy which was almost epileptic in its consequences, she found her strength dissipated, and gradually sank into a condition of economic and political impotence.

Christopher Columbus, a Genoese sailor in the service of the Castilian Crown, wishing to find a western route by sea to India and especially to Zipangu (Japan), the magic land described by the Venetian traveller, Marco Polo, landed on 12th October 1492, on "Guanahani," one of the Bahama Islands. From "Guanahani" he passed on to other islands of the same group, and thence to Hispaniola,, Tortuga and Cuba. Returning to Spain in March 1493,, he sailed again in September of the same year with seventeen vessels and 1 500 persons, and this time keeping farther to the south, sighted Porto Rico and some of the Lesser Antilles, founded a colony on Hispaniola, and discovered Jamaica in 1494. On a third voyage in 1498 he discovered Trinidad, and coasted along the shores of South America from the Orinoco River to the island of Margarita. After a fourth and last voyage in 1502-04, Columbus died at Valladolid in 1506, in the firm belief that he had discovered a part of the Continent of Asia.

The entire circle of the Antilles having thus been revealed before the end of the fifteenth century, the Spaniards pushed forward to the continent. While Hojida, Vespucci, Pinzon and de Solis were exploring the eastern coast from La Plata to Yucatan, Ponce de Leon in 1 5 12 discovered Florida, and in 15 13 Vasco Nunez de

Balboa descried the Pacific Ocean from the heights of Darien, revealing for the first time the existence of a new continent. In 1520 Magellan entered the Pacific through the strait which bears his name, and a year later was killed in one of the Philippine Islands. Within the next twenty years Cortez had conquered the realm of Montezuma, and Pizarro the empire of Peru ; and thus within the space of two generations all of the West Indies, North America to California and the Carolinas, all of South America except Brazil, which the error of Cabral gave to the Portuguese, and in the east the Philippine Islands and New Guinea passed under the sway of the Crown of Castile.

Ferdinand and Isabella in 1493 had consulted with several persons of eminent learning to find out whether it was necessary to obtain the investiture of the Pope for their newly-discovered possessions, and all were of opinion that this formality was unnecessary.1 Nevertheless, on 3rd May 1493, a bull was granted by Pope Alexander VI. > which divided the sovereignty of those parts of the world not possessed by any Christian prince between Spain and Portugal by a meridian line 100 leagues west of the Azores or of Cape Verde. Later Spanish writers made much of this papal gift; yet, as Georges Scelle points out,2 it is possible that this bull was not so much a deed of conveyance, investing the Spaniards with the proprietorship of America, as it was an act of ecclesiastical jurisdiction according them, on the strength of their acquired right and proven Catholicism, a monopoly as it were in the propagation of the faith. At that time, even Catholic

1 Herrera : Decades II. I, p. 4, cited in Scelle: la Traite Negriere, I. p. 6. Note 2.

2 Scelle, op. cit., I. pp. 6-9.

princes were no longer accustomed to seek the Pope's sanction when making a new conquest, and certainly in the domain of public law the Pope was not considered to have temporal jurisdiction over the entire world. He did, however, intervene in temporal matters when they directly influenced spiritual affairs, and of this the propagation of the faith was an instance. As the compromise between Spain and Portugal was very indecisive, owing to the difference in longitude of the Azores and Cape Verde, a second Act was signed on 7th June 1494, which placed the line of demarcation 270 leagues farther to the west.

The colonization of the Spanish Indies, on its social and administrative side, presents a curious contrast. On the one hand we see the Spanish Crown, with high ideals of order and justice, of religious and political unity, extending to its ultramarine possessions its faith, its language, its laws and its administration ; providing for the welfare of the aborigines with paternal solicitude; endeavouring to restrain and temper the passions of the conquerors ; building churches and founding schools and monasteries ; in a word, trying to make its colonies an integral part of the Spanish monarchy, "une societe vieille dans u* ~ contree neuve." Some Spanish writers, it is true, have exaggerated the virtues of their old colonial system ; yet that system had excellences which we cannot afford to despise. If the Spanish kings had not choked their government with procrastination and routine ; if they had only taken their task a bit less seriously and had not tried to apply too strictly to an empty continent the paternal administration of an older country ; we might have been privileged to witness the development and operation of as complete and benign a system of colonial government as has been devised in modern times. The public initiative of the Spanish government, and the care with which it selected its colonists, compare very favourably with the opportunism of the English and the French, who colonized by chance private activity and sent the worst elements of their population, criminals and vagabonds, to people their new settlements across the sea. However much we may deprecate the treatment of the Indians by the conquistadores, we must not forget that the greater part of the population of Spanish America to-day is still Indian, and that no other colonizing people have succeeded like the Spaniards in assimilating and civilizing the natives. The code of laws which the Spaniards gradually evolved for the rule of their transmarine provinces, was, in spite of defects which are visible only to the larger experience of the present day, one of the wisest, most humane and bestco-ordinated of any to this day published for any colony. Although the Spaniards had to deal with a large population of barbarous natives, the word "conquest" was suppressed in legislation as ill-sounding, " because the peace is to be sealed," they said, " not with the sound of arms, but with charity and good-will." *

The actual results, however, of the social policy of the Spanish kings fell far below the ideals they had set for themselves. The monarchic spirit of the crown was so strong that it crushed every healthy, expansive tendency in the new countries. It burdened the colonies with a numerous, privileged nobility, who congregated mostly in the larger towns and set to the rest of the colonists a pernicious example of idleness and luxury. In its zeal for the propagation of the Faith, the Crown constituted

1 "Por cuanto los pacificaciones no se han de hacer con ruido de armas> sino con caridad y bueo modo." — Recop. de leyes . • de las Indias, lib. vii. tit. i.

a powerfully endowed Church, which, while it did splendid service in converting and civilizing the natives, engrossed much of the land in the form of mainmort, and filled the new world with thousands of idle, unproductive, and often licentious friars. With an innate distrust and fear of individual initiative, it gave virtual omnipotence to royal officials and excluded all Creoles from public employment. In this fashion was transferred to America the crushing political and ecclesiastical absolutism of the mother country. Self-reliance and independence of thought or action on the part of the Creoles was discouraged, divisions and factions among them were encouraged and educational opportunities restricted, and the Americanborn Spaniards gradually sank into idleness and lethargy, indifferent to all but childish honours and distinctions and petty local jealousies. To make matters worse, many of the Spaniards who crossed the seas to the American colonies came not to colonize, not to trade or cultivate the soil, so much as to extract from the natives a tribute of gold and silver. The Indians, instead of being protected and civilized, were only too olwn reduced to serfdom and confined to a laborious routine for which they had neither the aptitude nor the strength ; while the government at home was too distant to interfere effectively in their behalf. Driven by cruel taskmasters they died by thousands from exhaustion and despair, and in some places entirely disappeared.

The Crown of Castile, moreover, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries sought to extend Spanish commerce and monopolize all the treasure of the Indies by means of a rigid and complicated commercial system. Yet in the end it saw the trade of the New World pass into the hands of its rivals, its own marine reduced to a shadow of its former strength, its crews and its vessels supplied by merchants from foreign lands, and its riches diverted at their very source.

This Spanish commercial system was based upon two distinct principles. One was the principle of colonial exclusivism, according to which all the trade of the colonies was to be reserved to the mother country. Spain on her side undertook to furnish the colonies with all they required, shipped upon Spanish vessels ; the colonies in return were to produce nothing but raw materials and articles which did not compete with the home products with which they were to be exchanged. The second principle was the. mercantile doctrine which, considering as wealth itself the precious metals which are but its symbol, laid down that money ought, by every means possible, to be imported and hoarded, never exported.1 This latter theory, the fallacy of which has long been established, resulted in the endeavour of the Spanish Hapsburgs to conserve the wealth of the country, not by the encouragement of industry, but by the increase and complexity of imposts. The former doctrine, adopted by a non-producing country which was in no position to fulfil its part in the colonial compact, led to the most disastrous consequences.

While the Spanish Crown was aiming to concentrate and monopolize its colonial commerce, the prosperity of Spain itself was slowly sapped by reason of these mistaken economic theories. Owing to the lack of workmen, the increase of imposts, and the prejudice against the mechanic arts, industry was being ruined ; while the increased depopulation of the realm, the mainmort of ecclesiastical lands, the majorats of the nobility and

' Scelle. op. cit.y I. p. 35. 7 the privileges of the Mesta, brought agriculture rapidly into decay. The Spaniards, consequently, could not export the products of their manufacture to the colonies, when they did not have enough to supply their own needs. To make up for this deficiency their merchants were driven to have recourse to foreigners, to whom they lent their names in order to elude a law which forbade commerce between the colonies and traders of other nations. In return for the manufactured articles of the English, Dutch and French, and of the great commercial cities like Genoa and Hamburg, they were obliged to give their own raw materials and the products of the Indies — wool, silks, wines and dried fruits, cochineal, dye-woods, indigo and leather, and finally, indeed, ingots of gold and silver. The trade in Spain thus in time became a mere passive machine. Already in 1545 it had been found impossible to furnish in less than six years the goods demanded by the merchants of Spanish America. At the end of the seventeenth century, foreigners were supplying five-sixths of the manufactures consumed in Spain itself, and engrossed nine-tenths of that American trade which the Spaniards had sought so carefully to monopolize.1

1 Weiss : L'Espagne depuis Philippe II. jusqu'aux Bourbons., II. pp. 204. and 215. Not till 1722 was legislative sanction given to this practice.

In the colonies the most striking feature of Spanish economic policy was its wastefulness. After the conquest of the New World, it was to the interest of the Spaniards to gradually wean the native Indians from barbarism by teaching them the arts and sciences of Europe, to encourage such industries as were favoured by the soil, and to furnish the growing colonies with those articles which they could not produce themselves, and of which they stood in need. Only thus could they justify their monopoly of the markets of Spanish America. The same test,

leurs coffres, la pluspart entre pont et sans connoissement." (Margry : Relations et memoires inedits pour servir a l'histcire de la France dans les pays d'outremer, p. 185.)

The importance to the maritime powers of preserving and protecting this clandestine trade is evident, especially as the Spanish government frequently found it a convenient instrument for retaliating upon those nations against which it harboured some grudge. All that was necessary was to sequester the vessels and goods of merchants belonging to the nation at which it wished to strike. This happened frequently in the course of the seventeenth century. Thus Lerma in 1601 arrested the French merchants in Spain to revenge himself on Henry IV. In 1624 Olivares seized 160 Dutch vessels. The goods of Genoese merchants were sequestered by Philip IV. in 1644 ; and in 1684 French merchandize was again seized, and Mexican traders whose storehouses contained such goods were fined 500,000 ecus, although the same storehouses contained English and Dutch goods which were left unnoticed. The fine was later restored upon Admiral d'Estrees' threat to bombard Cadiz. The solicitude of the French government for this trade is expressed in a letter of Colbert to the Marquis de Villars, ambassador at Madrid, dated 5th February 1672 : — " II est tellement necessaire d'avoir soin d'assister les particuliers qui font leur trafic en Espagne, pour maintenir le plus important commerce que nous ayons, que je suis persuade que vous ferez toutes les instances qui pourront dependre de vous ... en sorte que cette protection produira des avantages considerables au commerce des sujets de Sa Majeste " (ibid., p. 188).

Cf. also the instructions of Louis XIV. to the Comte d'Estrees, 1st April 1680. The French admiral was to visit all the ports of the Spaniards in the West Indies, especially Cartagena and San Domingo ; and to be always informed of the situation and advantages of these ports, and of the facilities and difficulties to be met with in case of an attack upon them ; so that the Spaniards might realise that if they failed to do justice to the French merchants on the return of the galleons, his Majesty was always ready to force them to do so, either by attacking these galleons, or by capturing one of their West Indian ports {ibid.).

indeed, may be applied to every other nation which adopted the exclusivist system. Queen Isabella wished to carry out this policy, introduced into the newly-discovered islands wheat, the olive and the vine, and acclimatized many of the European domestic animals.1 Her efforts, unfortunately, were not seconded by her successors, nor by the Spaniards who went to the Indies. In time the government itself, as well as the colonist, came to be concerned, not so much with the agricultural products of the Indies, but with the return of the precious metals. Natives were made to work the mines, while many regions adapted to agriculture, Guiana, Caracas and Buenos Ayres, were neglected, and the peopling of the colonies by Europeans was slow. The emperor, Charles V., did little to stem this tendency, but drifted along with the tide. Immigration was restricted to keep the colonies free from the contamination of heresy and of foreigners. The Spanish population was concentrated in cities, and the country divided into great estates granted by th j crown to the families of the conquistador es or to favourites at court. The immense areas of Peru, Buenos Ayres and Mexico were submitted to the most unjust and arbitrary regulations, with no object but to stifle growing industry and put them in absolute dependence upon the metropolis. It was forbidden to exercise the trades of dyer, fuller, weaver, shoemaker or hatter, and the natives were compelled to buy of the Spaniards even the stuffs they wore on their backs. Another ordinance prohibited the cultivation of the vine and the olive except in Peru and Chili, and even these provinces might not send their oil and wine to Panama, Gautemala or any other place which could be supplied from Spain.2 To maintain the com-

1 Weiss, op. cit., II. p. 205. ' Ibid., II. p. 206.

mercial monopoly, legitimate ports of entry in Spanish America were made few and far apart — for Mexico, Vera Cruz, for New Granada, the town of Cartagena. The islands and most of the other provinces were supplied by uncertain "vaisseaux de registre," while Peru and Chili, finding all direct commerce by the Pacific or South Sea interdicted, were obliged to resort to the fever-ridden town of Porto Bello, where the mortality was enormous and the prices increased tenfold.

In Spain, likewise, the colonial commerce was restricted to one port — Seville. For in the estimation of the crown it was much more important to avoid being defrauded of its dues on import and export, than to permit the natural development of trade by those towns best fitted to acquire it. Another reason, prior in point of time perhaps, why Seville was chosen as the port for American trade, was that the Indies were regarded as the exclusive appanage of the crown of Castile, and of that realm Seville was then the chief mercantile city. It was not a suitable port, however, to be distinguished by so high a privilege. Only ships of less than 200 tons were able to cross the bar of San Lucar, and goods therefore had to be transhipped — a disability which was soon felt when traffic and vessels became heavier.1 The fact, nevertheless, that the official organization called the Casa de Contratacion was seated in Seville, together with the influence of the vested interests of the merchants whose prosperity depended upon the retention of that city as the one port for Indian commerce, were sufficient to bear down all opposition. The maritime towns of Galicia and Asturia, inhabited by better seamen

1 0ppenheim : The Naval Tracts of Sir Wm. Monson. Vol. II. Appendix B., p. 316.

and stronger races, often protested, and sometimes succeeded in obtaining a small share of the lucrative trade.1 » But Seville retained its primacy until 171 7, in which year the Contratacion was transferred to Cadiz.

The administration of the complex rules governing the commerce between Spain and her colonies was entrusted to two institutions located at Seville, — the Casa de Contrataa'on, mentioned above, and the Consulado. The Casa de Contratacion, founded by royal decree as early as 1503, was both a judicial tribunal and a house of commerce. Nothing might be sent to the Indies without its consent ;; nothing might be brought back and landed, either on the account of merchants or of the King himself, without its authorization. It received all the revenues accruing from the Indies, not only the imposts on commerce, but also all the taxes remitted by colonial officers. As a consultative body it had the right to propose directly to the King anything which it deemed necessary to the developmt nt and organization of American commerce ; and as a tribunal it possessed an absolute competence over all crimes under the common law, and over all infractions of the ordinances governing the trade of the Indies, to the exclusion of

1 In 1509, owing to the difficulties experienced by merchants in ascending the Guadalquivir, ships were given permission to load and register at Cadiz under the supervision of an inspector or " visitador," and thereafter commerce and navigation tended more and more to gravitate to that port. After 1529* in order to facilitate emigration to America, vessels were allowed to sail from certain other ports, notably San Sebastian, Bilboa, Coruna, Cartagena and Malaga. The ships might register in these ports, but were obliged always to make their return voyage to Seville. But either the cedilla was revoked, or was never made use of, for, according to Scelle, there are no known instances of vessels sailing to America from those towns. The only other exceptions were in favour of the Company of Guipuzcoa in 1728, to send ships from San Sebastian to Caracas, and of the Company of Galicia in 1734, to send two vessels annually to Campeache and Vera Cruz. (Scelle, op. cit.f I. pp. 48-49 and notes. )

every ordinary court. Its jurisdiction began at the moment the passengers and crews embarked and the goods were put on board, and ended only when the return voyage and disembarkation had been completed.1 The civil jurisdiction of the Casa was much more restricted and disputes purely commercial in character between the merchants were reserved to the Consulado, which was a tribunal of commerce chosen entirely by the merchants themselves. Appeals in certain cases might be carried to the Council of the Indies.2

The first means adopted by the northern maritime nations to appropriate to themselves a share of the riches of the New World was open, semi-piratical attack upon the Spanish argosies returning from those distant El Dorados. The success of the Norman and Breton corsairs, for it was the French, not the English, who started the game, gradually forced upon the Spaniards, as a means of protection, the establishment of great merchant fleets sailing periodically at long intervals and accompanied by powerful convoys. During the first half of the sixteenth century any ship which had fulfilled the conditions required for engaging in American commerce was allowed to depart alone and at any time of the year. From about 1526, however, merchant vessels were ordered to sail together, and by a cedula of July 1561, the system of fleets was made permanent and obligatory. This decree prohibited any ship from sailing alone to America from Cadiz or San Lucar on pain of forfeiture of ship and

2 In Nov. 1530 Charles V., against the opposition of the Contratacion, •ordered the Council of the Indies to appoint a resident judge at Cadiz to replace the officers of the Casa there. This institution, called the "Juzgado de Indias," was, until the removal of the Casa to Cadiz in 1717, the source of constant disputes and irritation.

cargo.1 Two fleets were organized each year, one for Terra Firma going to Cartagena and Porto Bello, the other designed for the port of San Juan d'Ulloa (Vera Cruz) in New Spain. The latter, called the Flota, was commanded by an " almirante," and sailed for Mexico in the early summer so as to avoid the hurricane season and the " northers " of the Mexican Gulf. The former was usually called the galeones {anglice " galleons "), was commanded by a " general," and sailed from Spain earlier in the year,, between January and March. If it departed in March, it usually wintered at Havana and returned with the Flota in the following spring. Sometimes the two fleets sailed together and separated at Guadaloupe, Deseada or another of the Leeward Islands.2

The galleons generally consisted of from five to eight war-vessels carrying from forty to fifty guns, together with, several smaller, faster boats called " pataches," and a fleet of merchantmen varying in number in different years, In the time of Philip II. often as many as forty ships supplied Cartagena and Porto Bello, but in succeeding reigns,, although the population of the Indies was rapidly increasing, American commerce fell off so sadly that eight or ten were sufficient for all the trade of South and Central America. The general of the galleons, on his departure,, received from the Council of the Indies three sealed packets. The first, opened at the Canaries, contained the name of the island in the West Indies at which the fleet was first to call. The second was unsealed after the galleons.

1 Scelle, of. cit., I. p. 52 and note ; Duro : Armada Espanola, I. p. 204.

- The distinction between the Flota or fleet for New Spain and thegalleons intended for Terra Firma only began with the opening of the great silver mines of Potosi, the rich yields of which after 1557 made advisable an especial fleet for Cartagena and Nombre de Dios. (Oppenheim, II. Appendix B., p. 322.)

arrived at Cartagena, and contained instructions for the fleet to return in the same year or to winter in America. In the third, left unopened until the fleet had emerged from the Bahama Channel on the homeward voyage, were orders for the route to the Azores and the islands they should touch in passing, usually Corvo and Flores or Santa Maria.1

The course of the galleons from San Lucar was south-west to Teneriffe on the African coast, and thence to the Grand Canary to call for provisions — considered in all a run of eight days. From the Canaries one of the pataches sailed on alone to Cartagena and Porto Bello, carrying letters and packets from the Court and announcing the coming of the fleet. If the two fleets sailed together, they steered south-west from the Canaries to about the latitude of Deseada, 1 5' 30", and then catching the Trade winds continued due west, rarely changing a sail until Deseada or one of the other West Indian islands was sighted. From Deseada the galleons steered an easy course to Cape de la Vela, and thence to Cartagena. When the galleons sailed from Spain alone, however, they entered the Caribbean Sea by the channel between Tobago and Trinidad, afterwards named the Galleons' Passage. Opposite Margarita a second patache left the fleet to visit the island and collect the royal revenues, although after the exhaustion of the pearl fisheries the island lost most of its importance. As the fleet advanced into regions where more security was felt, merchant ships too, which were intended to unload and trade on the coasts they were passing, detached themselves during the night and made for Caracas, Santa Marta or Maracaibo