Why does man exist ? : the continuation and conclusion of Whence comes man ?

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CI-IAPTEU I.

The Nature of Man and the Conditions of Ihfe . 3

Chapter I. The Natuhe Of Man And The Conditions Of Life

The nature and constitution of man is sncli that he desires some things and dislikes others. Those things which he desires are snch as produce or cause in him ])leasure or happiness or satisfaction ; those things which he dislikes ])roduce or cause in him jiain or misery. He is conse- (|uently inclined to seek tlie one and to avoid the other. To bring about the state of jileasure or hap2)iness, and to avoid, or, if |)resent, to change, the state of jiain or misery to the state of pleasure or hajipiness or satisfaction, may be said to be the cause, direct or indirect, of all conscious action, whether in the amoeba or in man.

Having been compelled to believe that nature and man were created by an Infinite Being, we are also comjielled to believe that nature and man are what they are and as thev are, and that each and everv atom and each and everv life bear to one another the relations we know them to bear, because such was His will. It is conceivable that they might have been otherwise. The powers constituting nature and life might have been more, or fewer, or dilferent — that is, so far as a human creature is able to think of the acts of God. Although our thoughts of the acts of God — or even whether God “ acts ” at all in the way nyd think of as acting — cannot by any 2)Ossibility include

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the whole truth, it seems to me that they must contain .wme truth, must he to some extent correct : for we have seen that tlie Intinite-Ahsolute-God has so created us that relations ’’between Himself and us are ])ossil)le ; not only possible, but the absence of such relations is /;;^possible. \Vc are justihed in believing that, whatever other inconceivable, unimaginable ])Owers are ])resent in God, (xod must be cajiable of consciousness as wc. are ca|)able of consciousness.

We cannot help thinking that God has what we would call a reason for doing what He has done, that He has created nature and man for some purpose. In our thoughts about God wo have no other data than those furnished by analogies drawn from the highest creature He has created — that is, so far as we know— man.

When we ask, ‘‘ Why does man exist ? we mean, What was God’s reason for causing man to exist ?

We have seen that man acts. He seems to have only one cause of action — Desire. That single word seems, either directly or by implication, to cover the whole sum of causes of human action. We desire'' to have pleasure; we ^‘‘desire" to avoid paiu; or, if j)ain is present, we desire" to banish it and to have pleasure instead of it.

That whicli produces ])leasure, or that which tends to produce pleasure, man calls good" ; that which ])roduces pain, or tends to jjroduce pain, he calls evil.

Man was created bv an Inlinite Being. That Being so constituted him that his one desire is pleasure or happiness. If man was always hap]>y, his judgment of the character or nature of the Being who created him would be that He was a good Being ; for in the whole world there would be nothing but happiness.

How far does the ]>ast, the present, and the j)robable future state of the world justify such a judgment ?

Man is the highest of living beings. He is the latest result of a process of evolution, commencing with a minute

AND THE CONDITIONS OF LIFE.

mass of nucleated protoplasm which develo])S in two different directions. The one results in the vegetable, the other in the animal world. There is no perceivable difference in the mode of origin of the two ; but by degrees they separate, never again to be united.

The condition of evolution is “ variation ” and “ heredity.” The offspring of a creature is not always exactly like its l)arents : it is, in many cases, more or less different.

Creatures, whether plants or animals, tend to increase in numbers more ra])idly than the food on which they live tends to increase. There is consequently a continual struggle for i)ossession of the means of existence : in that struggle the strongest and luckiest necessarilv survive. When the “ variation ” or unlikeness of any of the progeny to their parents is of a character advantageous in any way to its ])ossessor in the struggle for life, that particular individual will have a better chance of survival than those which do not possess such advantage ; for the latter will get an insufficient (piantity of food to sustain them, or even be starved altogether. As living creatures by heredity transmit to their descendants their strengths and their weaknesses, the posterities of the stronger will tend to grow stronger and stronger, while those of the weaker will tend to grow weaker and weaker. The stronger, in course of time, may gradually extinguish the weaker, and form what naturalists call new species. By continual rcq)etitions of this evolutionary process the primordial speck of nucleated ])roto])lasm has developed through advantageous variations — the struggle for existence, and the necessary survival of the fittest, the strongest, and the luckiest — to its highest form, that of man.

Thus man has arisen, has been evolved, developed : but at what a cost !

In relation to animals the ])rinci])le of evolution is a principle to be exj)ressed in few words — universal selfishness, universal carnage. The murderous law of animal life

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is, Kill or be killed, or Kill for awhile for your own benefit, then you will yourself be killed by soiiietliing stronger than youi'self. If you s/wuld chanee to esca])e all foes and die of natural decay, you will probably suffer a concentration ol’ tlu' horrors of disease, of hunger and of thirst. Your life will, with the excej)tion of a few brief intervals of satisfied desires, have been one long agony of fear. If you hai)i)en to be one of the lowest of the low — an ainceba, for instance — your consciousness will be so feeble, so dim, that you will suffer but little ; but if your sufferings are small, so will be your enjoyments. The higher you rise in the scale of being, the moi’e ihtiable will be your lot. Higlmess ’’ means increased seiisibilitv, increased desires. Everv new ca2'»ability of “ desiring ” means an increased 2'cssibility of enjoyment, and therefore to be desired: and so it would be if the means of gratification increased at an e(2ual rate with the increase of the desires. But it is not so — nay, would seem to be exactly tlie contrary. The history of animal life seems to be one long Idstory of continually increasing jiain.

Is God, then, cruel — malevolent ?

Man, being the highest of all animals, has the greatest number and variety of desires, conse(2uently the greatest caj)acity — through the gratification of those desires — for [deasure ; the greatest capacity — through the non-gratificatiou of those desires — for ])ain. AVas it good of God to give the desires without providing for their gratification ? Was it because He was nncihle to ])rovide for such gratification ? Su2>2)osing such inability to exist, was it wise or benevolent to create the desires ? So far as we liave been able to judge, God not only created man, by tlie 2)rocess of evolution, hut He aLso created, all the circumstances, all the conditions, in the midst of which he was to live. Could not the man and the circumstances, by some differences in one or both, have I)eeu so adapted to each other that the result should have l)eeu liap})iness ? AVe are sometimes

AND THE CONDITIONS OF LIFE.

happy. The state is possilhe to us. Love, the highest of all human happinesses, is sometimes successful, sometimes almost })erfect, and the human creature gets a glimi)se of the possibilities open to him ; hut, on the other liand, kShakespeare says : —

“ Ah me ! for aught that ever I could read.

Could ever hear by tale or history.

The course of true love never did run smootli ;

But, either it was difterent iu blood.

Or else misgraffed iu respect of years.

Or else it stood upon the choice of friends ;

Or, if there were a symi)athy in choice.

War, death, or sickness did lay siege to it ;

Makino- it momentary as a sound,

Swift as a shadow, short as any dream.

Brief as the lightning in the collied night.

That, in a spleen, unfolds both heaven and earth.

And ere a man hath power to say — Behold !

The jaws of darkness do devour it up :

So (piick bright things come to confusion.”

J. S. MILL. — THE CKUELTV OF NATURE

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