Atonement ; soteriology : the sacrificial, in contrast with the penal, substitutionary, and merely moral or exemplary theories of propitiation

Front matter

is 4 iS z eS : KS Se SS 3 ‘ 3 8 by: Se YO Lol Fe Na RE

INE

We

Contents

INTRODUCTION. e . . ° e e . e e e . e e e e ° e e . PART IL—REVIEW OF CHRISTIAN SOTERIOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.—Preliminary Statement. ... Cie Wie joe iG II.—Soteriology of the Apostolic Father Ap iuiis III.—Soteriology of the Patrists ... . Altes

IV.—SxEc. 1. Conflicting Theories of Soterology 2. Dissensions Arise. . 4

Preface

In the following pages is presented a scheme of Soteriology different in many respects from any theory known to me. Yet it may be true that there is not a new idea in the whole work. New ideas are rare things. the facts with which

Be this as it may, the ideas I build—are so combined and adjusted, as to form a theory materially different from any I have seen. Yet, it is on its practical side what anti-Calvinists generally preach.

The work is divided into three parts; the first comprising a very brief statement of all the principal theories of Soteriology from the origin of Christianity to the preseut time. The more radical defects of these theories have been briefly indicated.

The second part comprises what I conceive to be the ¢rue nature of the plan of salvation through Christ, the great Sin-bearer and Propitiator. In the discussion of this part of the subject, the respective characteristics of the substitutionary and non-substitutionary theory are often set in con-

(vii)

trast.

Vill PREFACE.

The third part comprises a brief argument in favor of an atonement for all men.

The matter was originally prepared for the theological classes, and was delivered to them in lecture form. For convenience this form is retained in the book.

At one time I thought of publishing the whole in three volumes, each part forming one volume. But, for reasons deemed sufficient, an abridgement of the whole is published in one volume. All the parts, especially the first and third, have been very much abridged. The third part, as originally prepared for the classes, comprises a full examination of the arguments for and agaznst a limited atonement.

The arguments against substitution, as presented in these pages, were prepared before ‘‘ Atonement | and Law’’ became known to the theological classes. The author of this vigorous book rejected the old - arguments as quite insufficient, and attempted the defense of substitution by a new line of argument.

Of course my refutation of the old arguments was no refutation of the new. ‘This fact furnished the occasion for my little book, ‘‘Atonement and Law Reviewed.’’? ‘That book and this furnishes a complete refutation of the doctrine of substitution in every hitherto attempted mode of defense.

PREFACE, ax

My arguments are directed chiefly against substitution in its rigid Calvinistic form, which is its only real form. For to substitute is to put one thing or person in the place of another. Hence, if one does not take the place of another, then there is no substitution. Hence, if my arguments are conclusive against Calvinistic substitution, they are conclusive against all substitution. For double imputation is the fundamental idea of substitution, or the putting of one thing in the place of another.

Consequently, if there is no change or double imputation, then there is no substitution; or to deny double imputation is to deny substitution itself. It is to affirm and deny the same thing at the same time.

A conditional substitution or change is an inherent impossibility. It confounds the actual and the possible. It affirms that what zs, zs zot, but only may be. ‘To say that Christ is our substitute if we believe on him, otherwise he is not, distinguishes between those in whose place he died, and those for whom he is a substitute. This is manifestly a distinction without a difference; is, in fact a verbal contradiction.

This conditional substitution assumes that the sinner can come to Christ independently of Christ. But the Bible teaches that it is the sufferings and xX PREFACE.

resurrection of Christ that render repentance, etc., possible. (Luke xxiv. 47.)

On Christ as risen all divine influence depends. We come to God only by him. (John xiv. 6.) Conditional substitution is impossible because it conditions a past event upon a future event. A past event may condition a future event, but manifestly a future event can not condition a past event.

Christ’s death is a past event, an accomplished fact. His death was substitutionary, or it was not. If it was, then he does not become our substitute by our believing on him; for every body knows that a subsequent act can not change the character of a prior act. But, if Christ did not die as our substitute, then no act of ours can make his death substitutionary; and if he saves us at all he saves us as our benefactor, and not as our substi-. tute.

In view of these facts, I have addressed my arguments chiefly against substitution, as held by Calvinists, rather than the various modified theories proposed by anti-Calvinists.

From 1834 to 1852 I literally had no distinctly defined theory of the nature of the atonement. Perhaps no period of my ministry was more productive of apparent good.

PREFACR. X1

I taught then, as now, that men are saved not by the suffering of Christ, but by Christ himself.

In 1852 I had occasion to study the subject. ‘The consequence was the adoption of a modified form of the Grotian or governmental theory. ‘This I thought preferable to the Anselmic, or satisfaction theory. With this, however, I was never satisfied, as I indicated twenty years after in my only published statement on the subject prior to the publication of ‘‘ Atonement and Law Reviewed.”’

One among many reasons for this dissatisfaction is that it assumes'a real difference between administrative and retributive law, while, in fact, these are not two laws, but only two aspects of one and the same law.

The great moral law is in respect to God the rule of his administration, and, hence, is conceived of as administrative law. But the same law in respect to men is the rule of obedience, which being a concreation of the human mind is appropriately called retributive law.

All human law is administrative; all divine law is both administrative and retributive. God governs the physical world as well as the moral by law, and all the subjects of law, in the realm of matter and mind, are in some way affected by the administration of their appropriate laws.

xii PREFACE.

Hence, the retributions of moral law are simply God’s acts administering his own law. Consequently, these are not two laws but one, which we may consider under two phases, viz.: administra tive and retributive. But, as there is but one law, so there is but one penalty.

While holding this theory, I often tried to discriminate between administrative and retributive penalty. I labored to conceive how Christ could suffer the penalty of the former without enduring the penalty of the latter. Of course I failed. Even an archangel might be very well excused for inability to discriminate between a thing and itself. In the last analysis this governmental ‘theory or administrative theory resolves itself into the satisfaction theory, or into nothing. If Christ suffered retributive penalty in our place, then the satisfac-— tion theory is, of course, true. If he did not suffer this retributive penalty, then he suffered no penalty at all, and the administrative theory vanishes into chu

Seeing these facts, I was shut up to the necessity either of adopting Anselmic penal substitution, or of rejecting substitution zz ¢ofo. This I would have done over thirty years ago if I could have seen how any atonement is possible without substitution.

PREFACE. Xiil

But I now thank the Giver of all good that 7 do see how real atonement is made without substitution; also, how no real atonement can be made by penal substitution; because salvation by the deeds of the law, whether performed by principal or substitute, is not salvation by atonement or by gtace.

In ‘‘Atonement and Law Reviewed,’’ it is believed by nearly all those whose opinions I have learned, the new arguments in favor of substitution are hopelessly overthrown. In the present work, if ° I am not mistaken, the old arguments are as thoroughly answered. Of course an answer to the new is not necessarily an answer to. the old, nor conversely, except so far as these arguments rest on principles common to both lines of defense. It will, therefore, contribute much to a thorough understanding of the subject to study both books.

In working out the exceedingly difficult question of atonement, I followed no human authority— not even my ‘‘Confession of Faith ’’—for, highly as I esteem this authority, I have ever recognized it as subordinate to the word of God. |

The Bible was my standard of supreme authority. If it had led me into conflict with my Confession of Faith on any points, I should have rejected it on such points without hesitation. Happily, however, the Bible and Confession are in full accord.

xiv PREFACE

Being, as I verily believe, in full accord with the Bible, I have a conscience void of offense toward God; and being in full accord with our Confession of Faith, I have a conscience void of offense toward my brethren. I have not discussed atonement as an isolated question, but in its relations to other vital questions. It is not merely a treatise on atonement, but is rather a full scheme of soteriology—a somewhat detailed statement of the plan - of salvation. While this fact will give critics a wider field for the exercise of their astuteness, it will be more satisfactory to those who desire to gain rather than give light. |

Among anti-Calvinistic substitutionists, there never has been a consensus as to the exact sense of substitution. Hence, we have about as many theories as writers. These theories not only contradict one another, but each one involves the principle of self-contradiction, viz.: that in some sense Christ’s death does and does not save us. 'To construct a non-suicidal scheme of anti-Calvinistic substitution is an inherent impossibility. We might as successfully attempt to construct a triangular circle.

In fact, what some mean by substitution is propetly benefaction. ‘T'radition and habit have bound them with the fetters of a false terminology which

PREFACE. XV involves them in a false theory, requiring the help of legal fictions and realistic assumptions.

The plan presented in this work rejects substitution and all legal fictions and realistic conceits, and deals with law, sin, its penalties, and salvation in a practical common sense way, as the scientist deals with the facts of nature, taking his theories from his ascertained facts, and not his facts from his theories, as substitutionists are wont to do. If I have presented the plan of salvation in a form more honoring to God, more in accord with his justice and benevolence, more intelligible to the human mind, and more in accord with our noblest instincts and the demands of reason; more in accord with all that is known of God and law in the realms of matter and mind, and especially in better accord with the Bible, than any possible scheme of substitution can be, then the reader, I think, can not reject it without injustice to himself.

Of the ultimate general acceptance of the theory, I have not the shadow of a doubt.

I, of course, am sensible of no defects in the argument. I am, however, sensible of defects in other respects.

The order of the discussion is not as perfect as it might be. Some repetitions also occur. These, though considered a blemish in authorship, may xvi PREFACE.

prove of some advantage to the reader by familiarizing him with ideas and forms of statement with which he is not familiar.

I invite thorough investigation—do not deprecate legitimate criticism; what is erroneous ought to be exposed and corrected. But I do deprecate captiousness, caricature, and misrepresentation — the cheapest and the meanest of polemic vices, and the chief stock in trade of “‘small critics.”

If ‘‘this work be of man it will come to naught; but if it be of God, ye can not overthrow it.”? ‘‘O my Father... not as I will, but as thou wilt.”

Introduction

The Infinite and the Unconditioned alone is incapable of mistakes. God cannoterr. But the infinite and unconditioned can not create the infinite and the unconditioned. ‘This would be to create beings equal to himself, which is on many accounts absurd. ‘The very idea of a created unconditioned, self-existent being is a contradiction in terms. The limitation is not in the dzvinme power, but in the incongruity of the thing itself; for what is created can not be unconditioned or self-existent.

The Infinite, therefore, can produce only the finite. But finiteness in a rational creature necessarily gives the possibility of mistake or sin, but does not necessitate or cause it. It gives the possibility of sin; else neither man nor any of the angels had fallen. It does not create the necessity of sin; else a/Z the angels had fallen. Hence, we conclude that all rational creatures are created with the Jossibility of sinning, but not with the necessity of sinning.

The old conceit that God could create a moral world, absolutely incapable of sin, is contradicted by all that we know of God and of the nature of moral government. Such a world would require the utter negation of all creature freedom and a necessitated virtue or obedience, which is a contradiction in the adjective.

Certainly God is free, but his freedom does not consist in a choice between the possible and the impossible—between a world capadle of sinning and a world zzcapadle of sinning, but in choosing between creating and not creating. ‘This conclusion is supported by the fact that sin does exist among all orders of rational creatures known to us.

How can the creation of rational creatures under such liabilities be reconciled with the wisdom and goodness of God? Certainly we can not know God to perfection. His thoughts are not as our thoughts nor his ways as our ways. We may know more as to what he does than as to why or how he does things. Still it is perhaps not impossible to vindicate to human reason his goodness in the creation of the angel world. ‘This I shall not here attempt.

As far as we know there is a marked difference between the conditions in which angels and men. were created. ‘The former without an animal nature and without the capacity of progeny, but the latter with an animal nature and with progenitory capacity.

These two facts constitute an immense difference between the primitive states of angels and men, and in this difference, perhaps, we should find the reason for the great difference in the divine economies toward them. The first human pair brought evil upon themselves by voluntary disobedience, just as did the fallen angels. Why, then, were they favored with a different economy and one more favorable than was given to the angels? ‘The reasons may be, first, that they were, because of their dual nature, subject to greater temptations.

‘The sensuous organism, the seat of carnal appetites, is distinctly recognized as a fruitful source of evil. The animal desire for food is named as a prominent ingredient of the temptation in Eden, and the first temptation with which the sinless Christ was assailed after his forty days’ fast was an appeal to his sensuous appetite.

The angels, it is suppposed, were by their nature free from this fruitful source of seduction. They were capable of assault only through the aspirations and susceptibilities peculiar to mind or spirit. But the first human pair were subject to all the temptations common to both the animal and spiritual nature. This may be one reason why they were favored with a different and better economy than were the angels. Secondly, the fact that the first human pair were intended as the progenitors of a numerous race, any one, or all, of whom might be involved in moral evil by the disobedience of an ancestor constitutes, perhaps, the chief reason why God deals with angels and men by different methods.

We know so little of these matters, particularly of the angels, that it is not very safe to dogmatize. The case of the descendants of Adam is immensely different from that of Adam himself. His evils came through his own voluntary action. His children are born into a state of evil. ‘They, of course, were in no sense the originators of this evil state. They are involved in the evil consequences of a sin over which they have no more control than they have over their own creation, and that, too, by an order of things which God has established. But exactly what that order is, or how Adam’s sin involved his posterity in moral evil is a question that has been much discussed, but never very satisfactorily settled. ‘The most popular solutions proposed are the following:

1. It is maintained that the first human pair, when they sinned, comprised all human nature; consequently that their act was the sin of human nature and the sin was as really the sin of every human being as it was of the first pair. Hence, all are alike justly condemned to eternal death.

This seems to be the theory asserted in the Westminster Catechism. It assumes that realism is true. Its fallacy I have sufficiently exposed in my work on anthropology.

2. Others, rejecting realism, teach that Adam — was divinely constituted the federal representative of his race, and, having sinned, his sin became by imputation the sin of all his posterity and justly subjects them ‘‘to all the miseries of this life, to death itself, and the pains of hell forever.’’

This seems to be what is taught in the Westminster Confession of Faith. This view assumes that guilt is transportable from one person to another. It rests on legal fictions—that is, on airy xothings.

3. Another solution is that Adam was in some _ way the representative of his race which would have been involved in his sin had he not repented and been brought into a saved state prior to the birth of Cain. Hence, his fallen nature is not imputed nor imparted to his progeny, who are consequently born in the same state in which Adam was created.

Numerous objections le against this theory, not the least of which is that in the last analysis it saves the sinner, or rather human beings, by works, just as Adam would have been saved by works if he had never sinned at all.

This seems to be the theory held by Arminius and some—not all—of his followers.

4. A fourth view bearing on the question is that Adam’s sin had no evil effect upon his children; that they are born in the same state in which Adam was created, and become sinners by force of the example of others.

This scheme is hard to reconcile with the Bible, and, if possible, still harder to reconcile with itself. According to the scheme, a man can not become an exemplar without previously sinning; but he can not sin without a previous example. This brings the matter to a dead lock—renders the inception of sin impossible. Whose example led Eve into sin? or whose example caused tite first sin? It is too plain to require elaboration that if there can be no sin without prior example, and no example without prior sin, then the possibility of sin is quite excluded.

5. The most satisfactory solution of the perplexing question,:I think, is this: Adam by disobedience corrupted his moral nature, and by natural generation transmitted that moral corruption or spiritual death to his children, just as he transmitted his physical, intellectual, and cesthetical nature to them by heredity; like produces like.

This view simplifies the whole subject, makes it intelligible to the common mind, supersedes the necessity of all scholastic and realistic conceits, such as federal representation and judicial imputation, and sufficiently accounts for the depravity of children, without committing us to the vegressus involved in the assumption that sin is the result of example, and is, above all, in strict accord with the Bible. |

But a question paramount in importance to that just considered is, How can the divine goodness and honor be harmonized with any method of administration that makes Adam’s sin a source of moral evil to his posterity ?

I reply, I should not know how to answer this question, if it was so, that no remedy is provided for this fearful evil—an evil which, unless it is set aside, or in some way compensated, must result in. endless death—the death of the immortal soul; and for what? Well, for a sinful nature—the source of actual personal sin—over which we have no more control than over our own creation. I repeat, if no remedy was provided, no means by which escape from such evils is possible, then I do not know how to answer the question.

That an ample remedy has been provided in the gracious mediation of Christ is universally allowed by all Christian communions, except those that hold to unconditional election and reprobation. By some it is maintained that the evils brought geen, SN upon us by our connection with the first Adam are exactly counteracted or done away by our relation to the second Adam.

This, I think, is an inadequate and an unscriptural view of the subject. If the mediation does this much and no more, it certainly does something for us, but possibly too little to save many; for on this hypothesis I do not see how we can escape the necessity of ‘saving ourselves by works. But salvation zs all of grace, and in no sense by works. I prefer to say that as our relation to the first Adam insures our depravity, and death in sin, so our union with the second Adam insures our salvation. Good works are the normal fruits of this union, and not its cause. Fruit has no power to change the quality of the tree that bears it.

Hence, I rejoice in the conviction that we gain immensely more by union with the second Adam than we lose by our relation to the first Adam. For Adam’s obedience could have saved no one but himself, the Confessions of Faith to the contrary notwithstanding. Under the law each must obey for himself. But it is much easier for sinners to believe in Christ than it was for Adam to keep the law.

The mediation of Christ in the interest of humanity not only vindicates the divine justice and wisdom, but is a most marvelous display of the divine goodness and mercy, such as could not be conceived by finite minds but for its gracious revelation in God’s word. For, rightly understood, it is the supreme object of adoration in heaven and earth. It is the ineffable God in Christ, reconciling a sinful and lost world unto himself.

The question is often pertinently put as to whether inediatorship—a days’ man between God and his rational creatures—is an essential, or only an zctdental characteristic of a moral government ?

In reply, I suggest that in relation to beings created, as we suppose the angels are, without progenital relationship, a mediator is probably not an essential provision. Atleast I see no reason why it should be so, nor have we any intimation from the Bible that any has been provided.

But in regard to beings created and related as are human kind, the case is quite different. So much so, that a mediator seems to be a prime necessity, or what is necessary both to vindicate the divine honor and to make it possible for men to escape the consequences of inherited evil. The divine fatherhood seems to require some such provision for those created in his own image but subjected to unavoidable moral evil. |

It is generally represented that the act of God in providing a mediator was the result of his knowing that the first man would sin and involve his posterity in ruin, and that compassion moved him to provide the requisite means of salvation for some or all.

This view of the subject seems to make the mediation of Christ a sort of afterthought; also implies that Adam’s acts, as foreseen by the Creator, had much to do in determining, modifying, or changing God’s plan of administration in relation

, to human beings. Such a procedure might not be unworthy of finite beings, but seems to me to be derogatory to the wisdom of the infinite Creator.

The mediation of Christ, I prefer to believe, is no afterthought, no mere expedient devised to meet an unexpected emergency, no adventitious adjunct to a previously formed but defective plan. ‘The mediatorship of Christ is rather a fundamental part of the divine purpose in relation to humanity, so that the functions of the first and the second Adam are reciprocally complementary. Our relations to the two Adams mutually imply each other, and should be regarded as the product not of two but of one and the same divine act; so that the purpose to create humanity was the purpose to provide mediatorship for them.

This view of the subject releases us from the necessity of disparaging the divine excellence by assuming that his plan of administration was determined, or in any way modified, by the conduct of Adam, as it was foreknown to the Creator.

Hence it is that the mediation of Christ is as old as the creation. He was ‘‘a lamb slain from the foundation of the world.’’ His mediation, too, was just as real and as efficacious before his incarnation as it: is'now. He was always the ‘“‘light of the world,’’ “‘the way and the truth and the life,’ “‘ the resurrection and the life.’’ His incarnation, death, and resurrection add nothing to his life-giving, soul-saving power. ‘They rather are the means by which he reveals himself to the world and manifests his love to humanity, demonstrates his power over

IO INTRODUCTION.

sin and death, and shows himself an all-sufficient Savior, able to save to the uttermost all that trust in him. ‘This manifestation is of immense moral significance, an inestimable boon to humanity, and constitutes the essential difference between the Old and the New Testament dispensation.

But how does Christ, as mediator, save man? This question is variously answered. Some propose one thing and some another. The Bible method I think is presented (imperfectly, however) in the following pages. To this the reader is respectfully referred.

beac ale a

REVIEW OF CHRISTIAN SOTERIOLOGY.

——_——_—_

CAPERS, Te PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.

The mediatorship of Christ is the great central mectrine Or, the, Bible). ) Christ is declared’:to’ be *‘the Savior of all men, especially of them that believe.’? But how he saves men—whether by his precept and example, or by relaxing the rigor of his law in the interest of the guilty and helpless, or by obeying the law as a substitute of the guilty, both in its preceptive and penal requirements, or by imparting his own spiritual life to those who are dead in trespasses aud sins—is a question about which good and great men very widely differ.

The doctrine that Christ saves men by becoming their substitute in law and suffering in their place has obtained large currency in both papal and Protestant countries. Anselm (1109), Archbishop of Canterbury, a scholastic theologian of eminent piety and wonderful intellectual acumen, it is generally allowed, was the first to formulate this view of the subject.

The leading positions of Anselim’s theory, as

“ Beoinning with the idea of sin, Anselm defines 5 5 ;

this as the withholding from God what is due to him from man. Sin is debt. But man owes to God the absolute and entire subjection of his will to the divine law and will.

This is not given, and hence the guilt, or dedz, of man to Deity. The extinction of this guilt does not consist in simply beginning again to subject the will entirely to its rightful sovereign, but in giving satisfaction for the previous cessation in so doing. .

God had been robbed of his honor in the past, and it must be restored to him in some way, while at the same time the present and future honor due him is being given. But how is man, who is still a sinner, and constantly sinning, to render this double satisfaction, viz., satisfy the law in the future by perfectly obeying it, and in the past by enduring its whole penalty ?

It is impossible for him to render it; and yet this impossibility, argues Anselm, does not release him from his indebtedness or guilt, because this impos- | sibility is the effect of a free act, and a free act must be held responsible for all its consequences, in conformity with the ethical maxim that the cause is answerable for the effect.

But now the question arises: Can not the love — and compassion of God abstracted from his justice come in at this point and remit the sin of man without any satisfaction ?

This is impossible, because it would be irregularity (aliquid inordinatum) and injustice. If unrighteousness is punished neither in the person of the transgressor, nor in that of a proper substitute, then unrighteousness is not subject to any law or regulation of any sort; it enjoys more liberty than

—y righteousness itself, which would be a contradiction and a wrong.

Furthermore, it would contradict the divine justice itself, if the creature could defraud the Creator of that which is his due, without giving any satis- ' faction for the robbery. Since there is nothing greater and better than God, there is no attribute more just or necessary than that punitive righteousness innate to deity, which maintains the honor of