Anti-Theistic Theories

Front matter

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

THEISM.

Being the Baird Lecture for 1S76.

Prefatory Note

The present volume is closely connected with the work entitled 'Theism/ which was published in 1877. The two works may be regarded as two parts of a system of Natural Theology which is still very far from complete.

The chief omission in the present volume relates to Agnosticism. The explanation of the omission is that the author was anxious to ayoid, in a semi-popular work, abstruse metaphysical discussion, and has long cherished the hope of being able, at some future time, to publish a historical account and critical examination of the various phases of Modern Agnosticism.

He has again to thank Mr James A. Campbell of Stracathro for kindly assisting him in the work of revision.

Edinburgh, 2.0th May 1879.

Prefatory Note To Third Edition

THE alterations in this edition are chiefly in the literary references. Lecture VII., and the Notes connected with it, have been left unchanged. They may be compared with the very elaborate examina¬ tion of Sir John Lubbock’s views on the atheism of savage peoples in G. RoskofFs * Religionswesen der Rohesten Naturvolker,’ a work published the year after the first edition of the present volume, and in which the results arrived at are precisely those which I had reached. Among the many works which have recently appeared dealing with Theism and Anti-Theism, it is proper to mention at least these three—the ‘ Philosophical Basis of Theism 5 (1883) by Professor Samuel Harris of Yale, the f Philosophy of Theism (1884) by the late Dr Ward, and ‘ Modern Theories in Philosophy and Religion ’ (1885) by Principal Tulloch.

Johnstone Lodge, Craigmillar Park, Edinburgh, 21st Ap-il 1885.

Contents

LECT. PAGE

I. ATHEISM,.I

II. ANCIENT MATERIALISM,. 39

Appendix

NOTE

I. THE TERMS THEISM, DEISM, ATHEISM, AND ANTI¬ THEISM, .44I

II. ABSOLUTE ATHEISM IMPLIES INFINITE KNOWLEDGE, . 446

III. PHYSICUS,. 450

IV. HISTORY, CAUSES, AND CONSEQUENCES OF ATHEISM, . 456

X

Contents.

v. lange’s history of materialism,

VI. CHINESE MATERIALISM, *****

VII. HINDU MATERIALISM, .

VIII. EARLY GREEK MATERIALISM, •

IX. EPICUREAN MATERIALISM, * * * *

X. MATERIALISM IN THE MIDDLE AGES, .

XI. MATERIALISM OF THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGH-

TEENTH CENTURIES,.

XII. LA MKTTRIE,.

XIII. MIRABAUD AND VON HOLBACH, . . * •

XIV. ENGLISH MATERIALISM IN THE FIRST HALF OF

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, .

XV. RECENT MATERIALISM,.

XVI. MATERIALISM AND FORCE,.

XVII. MATERIALISM AND LIFE,.

XVIII. MATERIALISM AND MIND,.

XIX. MATERIALISM AND MORALITY, .

XX. POSITIVISM AND ITS SCHOOLS, ....

XXI. POSITIVIST LAW OF THREE STATES,

XXIL THE POSITIVIST RELIGION, .

XXIII. HISTORY OF SECULARISM, .

XXIV. THE ATHEISM OF SECULARISM, ....

XXV. DARWINISM AND THE UNIVERSALITY OF RELIGION,

XXVI. ALLEGED ATHEISM OF SOUTH AMERICAN TRIBES, XXVII. ALLEGED ATHEISM OF NORTH AMERICAN TRIBES, XXVIII. ALLEGED ATHEISM OF POLYNESIANS AND AUS¬ TRALASIANS, .

XXIX. ALLEGED ATHEISM OF AFRICAN TRIBES,

XXX. ALLEGED ATHEISM OF ESQUIMAUX,

XXXI. SIR J. LUBBOCK’S MISCELLANEOUS INSTANCES OF ATHEISTICAL PEOPLES, .....

XXXII. POLYTHEISM,. .

474 479

5°4

Contents . xi

XXXIII. PESSIMISM,.533

XXXIV. HISTORIES OF PANTHEISM,. 536

XXXV. HINDU PANTHEISM,.539

XXXVI. GREEK PANTHEISM,.54I

XXXVII. JORDANO BRUNO,.544

XXXVIII. SPINOZA,. 546

XXXIX. MODERN GERMAN PANTHEISM, . . . . 551

XL. MODERN FRENCH PANTHEISM, . . . -553

XLI. MODERN ENGLISH PANTHEISM, .... 554

ANTI-THEISTIC THEORIES.

LECTURE I.

ATHEISM.

I

In the course of lectures which I delivered last year I endeavoured to show that theism was true; that there was an overwhelming weight of evidence in favour of the belief that the heavens and the earth and all that they contain owe their existence and continuance in existence to the wis¬ dom and will of a supreme, seif-existent, omnipo¬ tent, omniscient, righteous, and benevolent Being, who is distinct from, and independent of, what He has created. In the course which I have under¬ take n to deliver this year, I wish to subject to examination the theories which are opposed to theism, and I hope to be able to prove that they are essentially irrational and erroneous. When

Anti-Theistic Theories .

engaged in the attempt to establish that theism has a broad and solid foundation both in fact and reason, I contented myself with simply warding off the attacks of those who deny that it has such a foundation. But obviously more than this may and should be done. It is our right and our duty to inquire also if those who reject and assail theism are themselves standing on firm ground, and if the systems which have been raised in hostility to theism are as impregnable as we have found itself to be. It is this right which I intend to exercise; it is this duty which I shall endeavour to perform.

In dealing with theories which have nothing in common except that they are antagonistic to theism, it is necessary to have a general term to designate them. Anti-theism appears to be the appropriate word. It is, of course, much more comprehensive in meaning than the term atheism. It applies to all systems which are opposed to theism. It includes, therefore, atheism. No sys¬ tem is so opposed to theism as atheism ; it is the extreme form of opposition to it. But short of atheism there are anti - theistic theories. Poly¬ theism is not atheism, for it does not deny that there is a Deity; but it is anti-theistic, since it denies that there is only one. Pantheism is not atheism, for it admits that there is a God; but it is anti-theism, for it denies that God is a Being distinct from creation and possessed of such attri-

What Theism is .

butes as wisdom, and holiness, and love. Every theory which refuses to ascribe to God an attribute which is essential to a worthy conception of His character is anti - theistic. Only those theories which refuse to acknowledge that there is evidence even for the existence of a God are atheistic. 1

An examination of anti-theistic theories ought evidently to begin with atheism,—the complete negation of theism. The term atheism, although much less general in signification than anti-theism, includes a multitude of systems. Atheism has a great variety of forms. Its advocates are by no means agreed among themselves. On the con¬ trary, if their comparatively small number be taken into account, they are far more divided into sects than theists. They are at one only in their utter rejection of theism. I am not aware of any positive distinctive principle which atheists hold in common. As soon as they attempt to state a doctrine which may fill the place of theism, dissension breaks out among them at all points. It is an obvious consequence of the fact that atheism is thus indefinite, divided, and varied, that its chief phases must be discussed separately. It cannot be treated fairly by being treated as what it is not,—a single, self-consistent system. It is really a series or aggregation of discordant and conflicting systems. At the same time, some 1 See Appendix I.

A nti~ Theistic Theories.

general remarks regarding it may not be without use.

Atheism is the rejection of belief in God. It teaches either that there is no God, or that it is impossible for man to know that there is a God, or that there is no sufficient reason for believing that there is a God. In other words, it either absolute¬ ly denies that there is a Divine Being, or it denies that the human mind is capable of discovering^ whether or not there is a Divine Being, or it simply maintains that no valid proof of the ex¬ istence of a Divine Being has been produced. Atheism in the form of a denial of the existence of a God has been called dogmatic atheism; atheism in the form of doubt of man’s ability to ascertain whether there is a God or not has been ^ called sceptical atheism; atheism in the form of 1 mere rejection of the evidence which has been / presented for the existence of a God may be \ called critical atheism. There is no individual system of atheism, however, which is exclusively dogmatic, exclusively sceptical, or exclusively critical. These terms express accurately only ideal distinctions which have never been exactly realised. Sceptical atheism and critical atheism are inseparable. A purely dogmatic atheism would be utterly incredible. Sceptical atheism and critical atheism have always been much more prevalent than dogmatic atheism. In

Existence of Atheism.

every form — even in its most modest form_

atheism pronounces all belief in God a delusion, and ail religion a fable. What is called practical atheism is not a kind of thought or opinion, but a mode of life. It may coexist with a belief in the being of a God. It is the living as if there were no God, whether we believe that there is a God or not.

The existence of atheism has often been doubted.

It has been held to be absolutely impossible for a man entirely to throw off belief in God. The ' thought of a universe without a creator, without a presiding mind and sustaining will, without a judge of right and wrong, has seemed to many to be so incredible that they have refused to admitthat it could be sincerely entertained by the human \ mind. And it may be conceded that there is an ^ element of truth underlying this view. The whole nature of man presupposes and demands God, and is an enigma and self-contradiction if there be no \ God. The reason of man can only rest in the ! Divine Reason as the first cause; his affections * tend to a supreme good which can only be found j in God ; his conscience contains a moral law which j implies a moral lawgiver. He can only be con- ! scious of himself as dependent, finite, and imper¬ fect, and consequently as distinguished from that which is absolute, infinite, and perfect. In this sense all theists will probably hold that the soul

A nti- Theistic Theories.

bears within it a latent and implicit testimony against atheism and on behalf of theism; and the opinion is one which cannot be refuted otherwise than by what would amount to a refutation of theism itself. But although man's whole nature cries for God, and can only find its true life in God, there can be little doubt that he may so contradict himself, so violate the most essential principles of his own nature, as to persuade him¬ self that there is no reason in the universe higher than his own, no good which is not earthly and perishable, no righteous judge, no infinite and eternal God. The number of those who have

Sgt

gone this length may not have been so large as it has sometimes been represented. Many have certainly been called atheists unjustly and calumniously. Some may possibly have professed themselves to be atheists who really professed a religious belief which they overlooked. But that there have been atheists—that there are atheists —cannot reasonably be denied. When men teach the most manifest and explicit atheism — when they avow themselves to be atheists—when they glory in the name—we must take them at their word. To say that they do not conscientiously believe what they teach is an assertion which no one has a right to make unless he can conclusive¬ ly prove it, and for which there will be found in many cases no proof whatever. The strangest

Existence of A theism .

and most monstrous beliefs can be conscientiously held by the weak and erring children of men. The absurdities of superstition make easily credible the sincerity of atheism. If one man can honestly believe that there are a thousand fantastic gods, another may honestly believe that there is no god. Without hesitation or reservation, therefore,

I grant that Feuerbach fully meant what he said when he wrote, “ There is no God; it is clear as j the sun and as evident as the day that there is no j God, and still more that there can be none ; ” ; Gustave Flourens when he penned these words, : “ Our enemy is God. Hatred of God is the begin- j ning of wisdom. If mankind would make true / progress, it must be on the basis of atheism; ” and Mr Bradlaugh when he told his audience, My friend Mr Holyoake says, with regard to the ! words infidelity and atheism, that he objects to them because of the opprobrium which has gath¬ ered round them. The people who fight for old nationalities remember the words of opprobrium that have been heaped on their country and their cause, but only to fight to redeem cause and coun¬ try from that opprobrium. They do not admit the opprobrium to be deserved, but they fight to show that the whole is a lie. And I maintain the oppro¬ brium cast upon the word atheism is a lie. I believe \ atheists as a body to be men deserving respect, \ and I do not care what kind of character religious \

Anti-Theistic Theories .

men may put round the word atheist. I would fight until men respect It.” I know no reason for suspecting the sincerity of these men or of these statements, and therefore I do not suspect it.

There are open and avowed atheists whom we are bound to believe to be what they profess them¬ selves to be. There are also some who disclaim atheism, yet who plainly teach it under other names. A large amount of the speculation which is called pantheistic might with equal propriety be called atheistic. Many materialists have repelled the charge of atheism, because they held matter to be endowed with eternal unchanging properties and powers ; many positivists and secularists have fancied that they could not be properly called atheists because they did not undertake to prove that there is no God, but only to show that there is no reason for supposing that there is one; but, of course, belief in the eternity of matter and motion is not belief in the existence of God, and atheism is not only the belief that God’s existence can be disproved, but also the belief that it cannot be proved. We have no desire to attach to any man a name which he dislikes, but a regard to truth forbids us to concede that atheism only exists where it is avowed.

Atheists have seldom undertaken to do more than to refute the reasons adduced in favour of belief in God. They have rarely pretended to

The Denial that there is a God ,’

prove that there is no God ; they have maintained that the existence of God cannot be established, but not that His non-existence can be established; they have tried to justify their unbelief, but they have not sought to lay a foundation for disbelief. And the reason is obvious. It is proverbially difficult to prove a negative, and there can be no negative so difficult to prove as that there is no God, Were a man to be landed on an unknown island, the print of a foot, a shell, a feather, a scratch on the bark of a tree, the perforation or indentation or upheaval of a little earth, would be sufficient to show him that some living creature had been there; but he would require to traverse the whole island, and examine every nook and corner, every object and every inch of space in it, before he was entitled to affirm that no living creature had been there. The larger the territory to be traversed and examined, the more difficult would it necessarily be to show that it had not a single animal inhabitant. So to show that there is a God may be very easy, but to prove that there is certainly none must be extremely difficult, if not impossible. There may be as many witnesses to God’s existence as there are creatures in the whole compass of heaven and earth, but before we can be sure that nothing testifies to His existence, we must know all things. The territory which has in this case to be surveyed and investigated is the

IO

A nti- Theistic Theories .

universe in all its length and breadth; it is eter¬ nal time and boundless space, with all the events which have occurred in time, and all the objects which occupy space. Before a man can be war¬ ranted to affirm that nowhere throughout all this territory is there any trace of God’s existence, he must have seen it all and comprehended it all, which would require omnipresence and om¬ niscience, or, in other words, would imply that he is himself God.

Foster and Chalmers have so admirably pre¬ sented this argument in celebrated passages of their writings that it is unnecessary to dwell upon it further. 1 It has only been attempted to be refuted by an author who has fallen into singular mistakes as to its nature. Mr Holyoake fancies that it turns upon an arbitrary use of the words “ denial ” and f< knowledge.” There is not the slightest foundation for such a notion. The word denial, and even all the sentences which contain it, might be deleted without the argument losing a particle of its force. The word knowledge is employed in its ordinary and most general signifi¬ cation. The knowledge of the eyesight is no more demanded of the atheist for his negation than it is alleged by the theist for his affirmation. The whole argument turns simply on the manifest and indubitable difference between proving an affirma- 1 See Appendix II.

The Denial that there is a God.

II tive and proving a negative. From that difference it follows necessarily that the Inference that there is a God may be warranted by a very limited know¬ ledge of nature, but that the inference that there is no God can only be warranted by a complete knowledge of nature. If the author mentioned had not thoroughly misconceived the character of the argument he would never have imagined that It could be thus refuted by inversion. 41 The wonder/’ he says, 44 turns on the great process by which a man could grow to the immense intelligence which can know that there is a God. What powers, what lights are requisite for this attainment 1 This intelligence involves the very attributes of Divinity, which must therefore be possessed by the theist while they are pretended to be sought For unless this man is omnipresent, unless he is at this moment in every place in the universe, he cannot know but there may be, in some place, manifestations of nature independent of Deity, by which even he would be overpowered. If he does not know absolutely every agent in the universe, the one that he does not know may be the eternal source of all life. If he is not himself the chief agent in the universe, and does not know that God is so—that which is so may be the eternal and independent element which animates nature. If the theist is not in absolute possession of all the propositions which constitute universal truth, the one which he wants may be,

Anti-Theistic Theories .

that nature is the primordial and sole existence. If he cannot with certainty assign the cause of all that he perceives to exist, that cause may be nature. If he does not know everything that has been done in the immeasurable ages that are past, some things may have been done by nature. Thus, unless the theist knows all things — that is, pre¬ cludes all other independent existence by being the infinite existence himself—he does not know that the nature whose supremacy he rejects, does not self-subsist and act on its own eternal essence.” Foster’s argument is here travestied, but certainly not answered. Where is the wonder that men should know that tl^ere is a God ? Such knowledge must indeed be elevated and glorious, but it may well be within the reach of a feeble and limited intelligence. It implies a certain likeness to God, but none of the distinctive attributes of God. A single square foot of earth may contain numerous proofs that there is a God, but only the entire universe can furnish evidence that there is none. He who does not know absolutely every agent in the universe cannot be sure that the one of which he is ignorant may not be the eternal source of all life and thought, while the most familiar manifesta¬ tions of life and thought may reasonably convince him that their eternal source cannot be dead and thoughtless matter. If the theist undertook to prove the non-existence of nature,—that there

The Denial that there is a God. 13

are no natural causes and no effects produced by them,—he would venture on the same kind of task as that of the atheist who attempts to establish that there is no God, and his audacity might then be rebuked and his want of wisdom evinced by the same kind of reasoning. In that case refutation by inversion would be legitimate and conclusive • but it is clearly inapplicable in any other case. Before it can be employed some one must be found to maintain that there is no nature, which is the only proposition corresponding to there is no God. But no theist maintains the non-exist¬ ence of nature. What he maintains is that nature is an effect whose cause is God.

If the argument of Foster and Chalmers be well founded, atheism ought certainly not to be a selfconfident system. It can never be sure that there is no God, and can never have a right to deny that there is a God. It must simply affirm that theism has not been proved true, and must abandon the hope of ever proving it to be false. It must rest in a state of suspense and hesitation from which there is no probability of deliverance, unless by theism being proved true. It must never express itself more strongly than by such phrases as “ there is no knowing whether there be a God or not,”—“there is no saying,”—“it doth not yet appear.” Is this not a very strange and dreary condition for the human mind to be condemned

H

A nti- Theistic Theories .

to abide in ? If such be the natural condition of the human mind, must not the constitution both of the mind and of the universe in relation to the mind be about the worst conceivable ? But is. it not much more likely that atheists have deceived themselves, than that either the mind or the uni¬ verse has been so badly made as atheism im¬ plies? Is it not much more likely that atheism is false, than that the human mind has been made not for truth, but for doubt ?

To deny that God can be known is scarcely less presumptuous than to deny that God is. For, it will be observed, it assumes that we are capable of describing the limits both of human attainment and of Divine power. It assumes that we are not only able to say here is a proposition which the human mind can never ascertain to be true, but also here is a proposition which cannot be re¬ vealed to be true even by an infinite mind, suppos¬ ing such a mind to exist. It assumes, that is to say, in the first place, a kind of knowledge of the human mind such as no man has got. We can discover the conditions and laws to which reason¬ ing and research must be conformed if the human mind would attain truth ; but we cannot ascertain the external limits of intellectual progress. To lay down that this or that proposition, which in¬ volves in itself no contradiction, can never be known, never be proved, is sheer dogmatism. The

The Denial that God can be known . 15

mind has no right to assign fixed limits to its own advancement in knowledge; it has no warrant even for doubting that it may advance for ever, its horizon constantly receding, its range of vision growing always wider and more distinct When the atheist declares, therefore, that God cannot be known, he dogmatises presumptuously as to the limits of human power; he arrogates to him¬ self a superhuman knowledge of the possible at¬ tainments of the human mind. But worse than this, while denying that an infinite mind can never be known, he assumes that he himself knows what an infinite mind would be capable of. He tells us in one breath that we can never know even the existence of an almighty Being, and in the next that he himself knows what such a Being could not do; that he knows that God could not make His existence known to us. Under the apparent humility of the declaration God cannot be known, there lurks the affirmation that a finite mind can trace the limits of infinite power. Therefore, I say, to deny that God can be known is scarcely less presumptuous than to deny that God is. It implies in him who makes the denial the posses¬ sion of a Divine attribute—the possession of infi¬ nite knowledge.

The atheist, then, who would not virtually de¬ clare himself to be a god, must not venture to deny either that God is or that God can be known.

but must be content merely to deny the sufficiency of the evidence for God’s existence. He must be content to be a mere critic; he is bound to confess that atheism is really no theory or explanation of the universe; that no positive or independent or scientific proof of it need be looked for ; and that facts sufficient to overthrow it may be brought to light any instant. Atheists are, however, seldom thus diffident, and we cannot wonder that they are not. There are very few minds which could ac¬ quiesce in a hopeless and inexplicable hesitancy and suspense. Atheism would make no converts unless it showed more confidence than it is ration¬ ally entitled to ’do.

Not unfrequently it displays great confidence. Thus Von Holbach, in the ‘ System of Nature,’ tells his readers that the existence of God is “ not a problem, but simply an impossibility.” But for this strong statement he had only the weak rea¬ son that “we cannot know God truly unless we are God.” We have just seen that to know there is no God, or that God cannot be known, implies such knowledge as only a God can have, but that only a very little knowledge may suffice reason¬ ably to convince us that there is a God. Feuer¬ bach, as I have already mentioned, declares it “ clear as the sun and as evident as the day, not only that there is no God, but that there can be none.” We seek in vain, however, for the demon-

Atheism often Dogmatic . 17

stration of this startling assertion. In its place there is presented to us an unreasoned and superficial hypothesis as to the origin, nature, and history of religion. Religion, in Feuerbachs opinion, is selfdelusion in the form of self-deification. It is his own nature which man projects out of himself, per-' sonifies, and worships. He idealises himself, be- t lieves the ideal real, and adores the imaginary! being whom he has created. Religion is thus a phase of insanity under which the whole human race laboured for thousands of years, until the one wise man appeared who discovered that his fellow-men had been idiotically bowing and cringing before their own shadow. It is this discovery which makes it “ clear as the sun and evident as the day, not only that there is no God, but that there can be none.” Mainlander claims, in a recently pub¬ lished work, to have for the first time founded atheism on a scientific basis. But to accomplish his task he finds it necessary to represent Chris¬ tianity as, like Budhism, a system of atheism. Maintaining the atheism of these two religions, he infers that atheism is the natural goal of human development. The mass of assertions which he accumulates around this ludicrous argument he assures us is a scientific demonstration. Czolbe, Diihring, and some other German atheists, might be referred to as equally audacious in profession and feeble in performance. A zealous English

B

Anti-Theistic Theories .

x8

i advocate of atheism, Mr Bradlaugh, has frequently ! said, “If God is defined to mean an existence other than the existence of which I am a mode, then I deny God, and affirm that it is impossible God can be. That is, I affirm one existence, and deny that there can be more than one.” But the terms “ existence ” and “ mode n are here em¬ ployed in so peculiar and equivocal a manner that the declaration may have either a theistie, pan¬ theistic, or atheistic meaning. It has no proper or definite meaning.

Atheism is essentially irrational when not j merely critical. And even when merely critical ; it is not very rational. This statement is based on the entire argumentation in the previous course of lectures. The chief aim of that course was to exhibit the evidence for the existence of (rod, and the proof of theism is necessarily the refutation of atheism. Further, a secondary aim, kept in view throughout, was directly to repel the objections which atheism has brought against the validity and sufficiency of the fundamental theistie proofs; to show that their weight is scarcely appreciable when fairly poised against the reasons in the op¬ posite scale, and that, almost without exception, the subtlest and most plausible of them indicate only defects or difficulties in the metaphysics of religious speculation, and should have no influence whatever on the practical decision, at which the