Cetywayo and his White Neighbours; or, remarks on recent events in Zululand, Natal, and the Transvaal. Second edition, with a new introduction

Front matter

■ 4 1 1 ■ ■ ■ 1 ■ f I 1 lÆ ■ ■ I c ■ t. ■ ■ 1 I I M ■ I 1 W t 1 m m CETYWAYO AND HIS WHITE NEIGHBOURS. " I am told that these men (the Boers) are told to keep on agitating in this way, for a change of Government in England may give them again the old order of things. Nothing can show greater ignorance of English politics than such an idea. I tell you there is no Government — Whig or Tory, Liberal, Conser vative, or Radical — who would dare, under any circumstances, to give back this country (the Transvaal). They would not dare, because the English people would not allow them." — (Extract from Speech of Sir Garnet Wolseley, delivered at a Public Banquet in Pretoria, on the lyth December i8jg.) " There was a still stronger reason than that for not receding (from the Transvaal); it was impossible to say what calamities such a step as receding might not cause. . . .

For such a risk he could not make himself responsible. . . . Difficulties with the Zulu and the frontier tribes would again arise, and looking as they must to South Africa as a whole, the Government, after a careful consideration of the question, came to the conclusion that we could not relinquish the Transvaal." — (Extract from Speech of Lord Kimberley in the House of Lords, 24th May 1SS0. H. P. D., vol. cclii., p. 20S.) CETYWAYO AND HIS WHITE NEIGHBOUBS; OK, REMARKS ON RECENT EVENTS IN ZULULAND, NATAL, AND THE TRANSVAAL. BY H. RIDER HAGGARD. SECOND EDITION. Mitb a 1Rcw Jntro&uctton. LONDON: TRUBNER & CO., LUDGATE HILL. iSSS. [AU rights reserved. ] BY THE SAME AUTHOR. — >£3SC&<— DAWN. THE "WITCH'S HEAD. KING SOLOMON'S MINES. SHE. JESS. ALLAN QUATERMAIN. BALLANTYNE PRESS: EDINBURGH AND LONDON, PAGE CONTENTS.

Introduction xi Preface Ixxiii CETYWAYO AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT. Claims of affairs of Zululand to attention — Proposed visit of Cetywayo to England — Chaka — His method of government — His death — Dingaan — Panda — Battle of the Tugela — John Dunn — Nomination of Cetywayo — His coronation — His lady advocates — Their attacks on officials — Was Cetywayo bloodthirsty ? — Cause of the Zulu war — Zulu military system — State of feeling amongst the Zulus previous to the war — Cetywayo's position — H'S enemies — His intentions on the Transvaal — Their frustration by Sir T. Shepstone — Cetywayo's interview with Mr. Fynney — His opinion of the Boers — The annexation in connection with the Zulu war — The Natal colonists and the Zulu war — Sir Bartle Frere — The Zulu war — Cetywayo's half-heartedness — Sir Garnet Wolseley's settlement — Careless selection of chiefs — The Sitimela plot — Chief John Dunn — Appointment of Mr. Osborn as British Resident — His difficult position — Folly and cruelty of our settlement — Disappointment of the Zulus — Object and result of settlement — Slaughter in Zululand — Our responsibilities to the Zulus — Lord Kimberley on Zululand — -Cetywayo's son — Necessity of the proper settlement of Zululand — Should Cetywayo be restored 1 . 1-57 CONTENTS.

Appendix

. I. The Potchefstroom Atrocities, &c. . . . . . . 289 II. Pledges given by Mr. Gladstone'6 Government as to the Retention of the Transvaal ..... 299 III. The Case of Indabezimbi ....... 301 IV. A Boer Advertisement ....... 308 V. " Transvaal's " Letter to the Standard .... INTEODUCTION. A NEW edition of this book having been called for after the lapse of more than five years from the date of its first appearance, I have found myself in some difficulty as to the matter. In the course of five years many things happen in South Africa, and re marks which applied to a certain anterior condition of affairs necessarily lose most of their freshness and some of their weight. It would not be convenient to rewrite the book, for to do so would be to destroy whatever value it may possess as a contemporaneous historical record.

It appears, therefore, that the only suitable course is to add an introduction, or rather a brief summary, of such important events as have occurred between 1882 and the present date. Prophecy is a dangerous thing. Probably there are few writers who could turn after a lapse of years to a political history dealing with interests so various as those with which we are confronted in South Africa, without a secret fear that somewhere in its pages they would find their sage predictions utterly confounded

Introduction

. XII by the development of events. I confess that such a fear was present to my mind. It is therefore with some relief and yet with sorrow that I find it to be in the main unfounded. In some cases, as in that of Zululand, the clouds to which I pointed have burst ; in some, as in that of Natal, they still gather and darken.1 On one point, however, I have fallen into signal error. I predicted, as can be seen by reference, that financial ruin would overtake the Transvaal. This has not happened ; on the contrary, the country is very prosperous. The reason of this prosperity is not far to seek, though I failed to foresee it. The vast gold-fields of the Transvaal have been opened up, and its coffers are being filled to overflowing by the enterprise of the diggers. On the other hand, a chance remark that I made in connection with this country has been signally verified.

I suggested that a close parallel existed between the case of the Transvaal and that of Ireland, and that the state of affairs which was held to justify the surrender of the one country might equally well be advanced in excuse of the sur render of the other. But here also I made a mistake. After driving my parallel — which was, I remember, 1 As I have pointed out in my chapter on " Natal and Responsible Government," there seems to be only one possible solution of the native question in that colony, namely, the removal of the natives to Zulu land. Since that chapter was written, however, a considerable portion of the best and most fertile country in Zululand has been seized by the Boers, and as the Zulu people must live somewhere themselves, there is naturally less room left in which to try the experiment of trans planting the native hordes of Natal.

INTRODUCTION.

. XIII treated with contempt, not to say contumely, in some quarters — as far as I conveniently could, I remarked that it must break down at last, because " it mattered little to England whether or no she let the Transvaal go, but to let Ireland go would be more than even Mr. Gladstone dare attempt." So I thought in 1882, in common with most Englishmen. In 1888 ex perience has shown how gratuitous was any such assumption. In concluding my chapter on Zulu history and affairs, which was written just before Cetywayo's visit to England, I said : " On the whole, I am of opinion that the Government that replaces Cetywayo on the throne of his fathers will undertake a very grave responsibility, and must be prepared to deal with many resulting complications." That the responsibility was grave indeed the following pages will show.

It will be remembered that on the conclusion of the Zulu war, Sir Garnet Wolseley, acting no doubt under instructions, settled Zululand in a fashion that did not commend itself to the common sense or ideas of justice of most people acquainted with the circumstances. In the place of one king he set up thirteen, who, of course, did not altogether agree. No sooner, however, was this settlement announced than a strong, and in some ways a natural agitation sprang up against it. As it became more and more clear to the English mind how ill-judged, I might almost say how unjust, was the Zulu war, this agitation gathered

INTRODUCTION.

. strength, and with singular unreason took the form of a demand for the restoration of Cetywayo. Now, whatever personal sympathy one may have with the late king, there is no doubt that he was in a degree doubly an offender. He was an offender against the Imperial Power in that he had not kept the promises which he solemnly entered into at the time of his coronation, and he was a much deeper offender against his own people, whom he had ruled with considerable cruelty. Therefore the war against him could to some extent be justified ; whereas the war against the Zulu people, who were never other than our friends, admits of no possible justification. Sir Bartle Frere recognised this when he declared that he made war on Cetywayo, not on Zululand. If, then, we could in any way be held to owe reparation to Cetywayo, how much greater was the reparation that we owed to his unfortunate people, which could, of course, have been fully made by extending the blessings of British rule over Zulu land.

But the agitation never took this form, at least not in England. Nobody thought about the Zulus, while everybody's voice was raised on behalf of the dethroned king. A monarch, black or white, is an interesting person, especially when he appears in the streets of London ; but his war-smitten people, mourn ing their dead, seven thousand miles away, do not appeal so actively to the imagination. " The Zulu people," says Sir Henry Bulwer, on 25th August 1882, in his exhaustive and most valuable report on the

INTRODUCTION.

. XV settlement of the Zulu country,1 " there is little doubt, would have gladly come under the direct rule of the British Government. They would have accepted that rule without question and without misgiving. They would have accepted it for all reasons, not only because it was the rule of the Government that had conquered them, but because they knew it to be a just and merciful rule. . . . ' The Government conquered us (they say) ; we belong to the Government.' " And again 2 he says : " Great numbers of the Zulu people have no wish to return under his (Cetywayo's) rule, and would regard any obligation to do so as one of the greatest misfortunes that could befall them." These considerations, however, were not allowed to weigh with Her Majesty's Government. In spite of the Wolseley settlement, to which, such as it was, we had solemnly pledged ourselves ; in spite of the cautious but none the less marked disapproval of Sir Henry Bulwer, and of the outspoken protests of the entire white population of Natal (the ex-king's friends and agents alone excepted), it was determined to restore Cetywayo.

In vain did Sir Garnet Wolseley write to the Colonial office 3 to place on record his " strong conviction that the return of Cetywayo to Zululand would be fraught with considerable danger to Natal, and would give rise to serious trouble and bloodshed in Zululand itself, whilst it would be in direct con- 1 [C. 3466], 18S3, p. 139- " [C- 34*36], p. 199- 3 Ibid. 1883, p. 1.

INTRODUCTION.

. XVI travention of the guarantee that I gave to all the thirteen existing chiefs of Zululand, viz., that under no circumstances should Cetywayo be ever allowed to settle again in the country." In vain did he on a subsequent occasion 1 feel bound to state that Mr. Dunn " would not have accepted the position of Chief had I not, as Her Majesty's High Commissioner, given him a promise in the name of the Government of England that under no circumstances should Cetywayo be ever allowed to return to Zululand, a promise approved of by the Government of the day." It is, by the way, impossible not to sympathise with Sir Garnet Wolseley, for this is the second occasion upon which promises solemnly uttered by him in the name of the Queen and by order of the British Government were within a few years deliberately set aside.

Eor the other instance I refer to his famous proclamation in which he announced, on behalf of the Queen, that the Trans vaal should continue a British possession for ever. It is dangerous to make promises on behalf of a country governed by party. All these protests, together with those of a multitude of smaller folk, went by Lord Kimberley like the wind. Acting on the sacred principle that agitation must be acceded to, he determined to restore Cetywayo. Even the request of the Transvaal Government, made as usual " in the interests of humanity," that the ex-king should be re-established, did not put him on his guard. 1 [C. 3466], 1883, p. 269.

INTRODUCTION.

. XVII But it was found impossible, with the best will in the world, to re-establish Cetywayo in the position of sole Zulu king, which he held before the war. As Sir Henry Bulwer pointed out in various despatches, out of the thirteen chiefs established under the Wolseley settlement only five showed any disposition to welcome their departed king. It therefore became necessary to reserve some territory, where the dis sentients could take refuge. Lord Kimberley did not like this. Indeed he positively refused to allow any part of Zululand to be annexed to the Empire or to Natal,1 but, taking refuge in one of those half measures that have done so much harm in South Africa, stated, characteristically enough, that Her Majesty's Govern ment " would not object to such arrangements for the control of chiefs by a Commissioner as you (Sir Henry Bulwer) might consider indispensable for the peace and security of that part of the country not placed under the rule of Cetywayo."

Sir Henry Bulwer pro posed a boundary to this Eeserved Territory, which finally came under English protection for native pur poses only, though nominally in so vague a fashion that it is not possible to define its status with reference to the Empire. This boundary was, however, rejected as taking too much territory from Cetywayo. A narrower one was then proposed, including the territories of Hlubi and John Dunn, and cutting off about a fourth part of Zululand from its southern side where it " [C. 3466], p. 91. b

INTRODUCTION.

. marches on Natal. This line was ultimately accepted, and the country so cut off became a most successful and self-supporting native state, under the direct rule of Mr. Osborn, who took his orders from the Governor of Natal. Another portion in the north of Zululand, of about half the area of the Eeserved Territory, was set apart for the occupation of the chief, Usibepu, who alone of the kinglets now remained in an independent position. Usibepu is a cousin of Cetywayo's, and the hereditary chief of the Manhlagasi tribe. Of all the Zulu chiefs living at the date of which I write he was recognised to be the best. Sir Henry Bulwer speaks of him as " a man of considerable force of character, moderate in counsels, strong in action, straightforward in his con duct, courageous, self-reliant," nor does his subsequent history belie this report.

He was against the Zulu war, but when it had been undertaken fought loyally for Cetywayo. By his people he was beloved, and it was said of him that in his country " men live to be old." But not unnaturally he did not wish to see Cetywayo back, and on the whole it was thought best to leave him in an independent position. Indeed any other course would have been difficult if not impossible. Cetywayo was thus to be restored to about two thirds of Zululand. Moreover, he was to be restored under conditions — on paper. By these conditions, as assented to by him in his days of captivity, he was made to promise to do many things excellent in them selves and conducive to the good government and

INTRODUCTION.

. XIX prosperity of his country. Amongst others, he solemnly undertook not to make treaties or war with anybody without the consent of the British Govern ment, and to refer all disputes to its arbitration. Of course he never adhered to a single one of these nicely written conditions, and in all probability never intended to adhere to them any more than he did to his corona tion promises. The ignorance of human nature shown by those who imagined that he would is really astonishing. Could they indeed have believed that a savage king, finding himself in his own country, but shorn of a third of his territories and more than half his royal prerogative, would bear upon his heart so vivid an impression of long conditions read to him by a gentleman in a frock coat in Downing Street, to which pressure of circumstances had brought him to assent with an unwilling mind, that he would on their account refrain from doing those things that a Zulu so placed is accustomed to do ?

The notion is ridiculous, how ridiculous the issue shows most clearly. When in Zululand paper alone stands between an assegai and an enemy, woe to th'e enemy — assegais cut paper ! Of course this half restoration did not satisfy Cetywayo's friends, more especially his white friends, any more than it satisfied the king himself. However, it was in January 1883 duly and ably carried out by Sir Theophilus Shepstone, not without some risk to himself and his party. Sir Theophilus's report 1 of » [C. 3616], 1SS3, p. 40.

INTRODUCTION.

. XX his journey and the final ceremony is most interesting reading, and shows two things very conclusively, first, that Cetywayo, even before he was reinstalled, had made up his mind to break the conditions he had promised to obey; and secondly, that the great bulk of the nation was by no means enthusiastic about his return. Thus on the very day of his landing at Port Durnford, for it had not been thought advisable to bring him through Natal, the king sent a message to the Zulu people desiring them to meet and welcome him, and " to disregard the alleged curtailment of his territory . . . that it was only a Natal device, which he would defeat." The Zulus could not at all under stand our conduct in restoring Cetywayo, and were loud in praise of its magnanimity, although they were for the most part more than doubtful as to its results.

They called it " a marvel, a miracle, the raising to life of a man on whose grave for years the grass had grown ; clothing dry bones with living flesh." Cety wayo himself, however, began to grow anxious — his welcome even at the hands of his own Usutu party was not quite all that he had hoped for. A presage of his fate seems to have oppressed him.1 He talked of Sikukuni, who was restored to his people and instantly murdered. Then with singular insight into our ways, he said that " should assassination be his fate, the British Government would do nothing beyond 1 There is little doubt that Cetywayo perished by poison and not by heart disease, as was at first believed.

INTRODUCTION.

. XXI expressing regret and asking for information, and by the time information was forthcoming it would be found inconvenient to do anything in the matter, and so the assassin would go free, and his fate be un avenged." These things indeed came to pass. Some chiefs, as in the case of Umfanawendhlela, Cetywayo's uncle, were bold enough to express their open dislike of the restoration. Usibepu came in, not to greet Cetywayo, of whom it will be remembered he was independent, but to pay his respects to Sir T. Shepstone and Mr. Osborn. As he rode past Cety wayo's camp he was received with taunts and threats, which were soon to be translated into acts. Before he went he told Sir Theophilus that he wanted to interfere with nobody, but that if the Usutu attacked him he should defend himself, and he was as good as his word.

At length the restoration was carried out, and Sir Theophilus and his escort returned to Natal, leaving Mr. Fynn in the thankless position of Eesident and general adviser to Cetywayo. This was done in January 18S3. Hardly had the echoes of Sir T. Shepstone's words died away, when preparations for the destruction of Usibepu began to be made, if not by Cetywayo's direct orders, most certainly with his cognisance. On the 30th March a force of about five thousand Usutus, acting on the orders, of Undabuko, Cetywayo's brother, made an unprovoked attack upon Usibepu's territory, burnt

INTRODUCTION.

. XXII two of his kraals, and finally met with a crushing defeat at the hands of that chief himself, in which great numbers of the assailants perished. This was the beginning of the end. Undeterred by his repulse, Cetywayo set to work to gather a fresh force to operate, it was said, against Uhamu. In May these forces came into action without decisive results. Much bloodshed, however, took place both on the side of Cetywayo and that of Uhamu. These and other distressing incidents were of course duly reported to Lord Derby, who was much grieved at the " continued disregard by Cetywayo of the conditions of his restora tion." Lord Derby seems to have felt some perplexity as to what argument would have most weight with the intractable king. At length, however, he found one.1 " You will add," he says in his despatch to Sir Henry Bulwer of the 12th July 1883, "that if he (Cetywayo) continues to disregard his undertakings and promises, it will become a serious question whether Her Majesty's Government should not take the step of withdrawing the British Besident from him!' No doubt when this dreadful threat reached Cetywayo's ears he was duly impressed.

Unfortu nately, however, the British Eesident had some months before, on the plea of ill health, sent in his resigna tion of a post which had become unendurable.2 1 [C. 3705], iS83,p. nS. 2 Mr. Fynn did not, however, actually leave Zululand till after Cetywayo's death.

INTRODUCTION.

. XXIII Cetywayo meanwhile was daily growing more difficult to deal with. Thus in June we find him repudiating the boundaries assigned to him and claiming the whole of Zululand. Towards the natives in the Eeserve Territory he assumed a threatening atti tude, ordering them to come and fight for him in the various conflicts wherein he was from week to week enframed. Up to this time there were three main factors in Zulu affairs. I. The English Government, as repre sented by Mr. Osborn and the Eeserve Territory ; 2. Cetywayo ; 3. Usibepu. Now, however, a fourth appeared, the Boer freebooters. When natives are engaged in warfare these men gather and sit like vul tures round a sick ox, awaiting the right moment to develop their plan of campaign. Sooner or later one of the contending parties applies to them for assist ance, nor do they turn a deaf ear to its pleading.

Only certain little formalities have first to be attended to. The signature of the chief and a few of his headmen is required to a paper, which, as the signa tories may or may not understand, cedes the greater part of their territory to their kind allies in return for the services they are willing to render " in the name of humanity." These preliminaries arranged, the enemy is attacked, and by the help of the Boer rifles utterly destroyed. So far so good, but then comes the hour of settlement. It always ends in the same way, un less, as in the case of Bechuanaland, the British

INTRODUCTION.

. Government can be induced to interfere. The natives find that they have paid for their folly with their country, and that the price of their triumph over the enemy of an hour is their utter national ruin and destruction. The first appearance of the Boers in the present case is reported by Uhamu to Sir Henry Bulwer on 7th July 1883, when, according to his account,1 an Impi of Umdeta's with ten Boers attacked his people residing out of the Transvaal line and " killed all his people there, as well as their wives and children." Mr. Meek, a resident in the Derby District of the Transvaal, also reports " what appears from the dates to be the same attack, though it is difficult to be sure of this, as no mention is made of the presence of Boers. This attack on the Sicini Mountains, where Uhamu's people had taken refuge, was carried out in the name of Cetywayo, and with every circumstance of barbarity.

The assailants were repulsed five times, on the sixth they effected an entrance. Nearly everybody was slaughtered. " They left several companies," says Mr. Meek, "to destroy all remaining life . . . women are lying there with their infants bound to their backs, stabbed right through both their bodies, some with their heads smashed, and others most brutally mutilated. The caves which they did not enter they rammed grass and rubbish into, and then set it on fire, and by so doing burnt and suffocated 1 [C. 3S64], 1S84, p. 55. ,L * Ibid. p. 85.

INTRODUCTION.

. XXV many to death. At the entrance lay fifty-two dead men, and five brothers lay dead in a heap, making a total of fifty-seven, all within a few paces, and several women not far from them lay behind the stones with their children on their backs, ripped open. ... I can mention the names of no less than twelve women, eleven girls, and five infants which lay close to one cave, all well known, let alone the remaining numbers that lay on the Sicini Mountain. I should say at a rough estimation there are about 350 lying for the vultures, and for only one reason, viz., ' cattle,' ' cattle,' ' cattle.' " In short the restoration policy now began to bear fruit. No wonder that Lord Derby threatened to with draw the British Eesident from Cetywayo ! By way of comment on this heroic scheme it may, however, be mentioned that as Her Majesty's Government very well knew, all slaughter could have been stopped, and Zululand reduced to an almost immediate state of quietude by the simple expedient of extending the authority of the Queen over the country.

This, how ever, would have involved " responsibility." Of course the piled-up slaughters of thousands of unoffending human beings did not do this, at any rate not in a sense that was likely to find expression at the English polling-booths. And yet we have heard of "blood guiltiness." At length, on the 2 1 st July 1883, the war between Cetywayo and the Usutu party against Usibepu, a

INTRODUCTION.

. war entirely unprovoked by the latter, came to an issue. Cetywayo was gathering the Usutu for an attack upon Usibepu, when by a sudden and brilliant move that chief entirely out-generalled him. Avoid ing the main body of the Usutu impi, he made a forced march, and about eight on the morning of the 2 1 st hurled himself upon Cetywayo's camp at Ulundi. Cetywayo had about 5000 men with him, and these moved out to meet the attack. But they could not stand before the fierce charge of the Manhlagazi. They broke, scattered, and fled, and after them streamed the pursuers. Soon Ulundi was in flames, and here perished six of Cetywayo's wives and his little son. Here also, among hundreds of others, fell the two chiefs, Seketwayo and Chingwayo, Haiana, Usibepu's own brother, who was bitterly opposed to him, and the Indunas, Sirayo, Umkosana, and Umwumandaba.

At first it was believed that Cetywayo himself was among the slain, but this was not the case. He was discovered hiding in a bush, and two young men of the attacking party threw assegais at him, wounding him twice in the thigh. He then called out that he was the king, and the young men left him, whereon he made goood his escape, finally reaching the Eeserve Territory, where he took refuge in a kloof near the Inkankla forest. Here, on the 16th August, Mr. Osborn went in search of him, but finding that he 1 was being surrounded by armed men, fell back, and sent a message to him telling him that he had

INTRODUCTION.

. XXVII come to protect him and to escort him to Eshowe. Cetywayo's reply was couched in a very unsatisfactory and overbearing tone. He said that the whole country belonged to him, that it was all given to him in England, and intimated that he meant to go on in his own way. Finally, on the 15 th October, recognising that circumstances were too strong for him, Cetywayo consented to go "into Mr. Osborn's armpit," or in other words, to accept his protection, and was escorted to Eshowe by Mr. Fynn, who, though he had resigned his position as Eesident, had not yet left Zululand. Here, at Eshowe, the king remained till he died, nominally of heart disease. Meanwhile this state of affairs was not unnaturally viewed with great anxiety by Sir Henry Bulwer. On the 1 6th November we find him writing and telegraph ing to Lord Derby,1 submitting various alternative plans for the settlement of Zululand, pointing out Cetywayo's violation of the conditions of his restoration, and stating that he sees "no hope of peace or order being maintained in the country unless Cetywayo is removed."

Among other things he suggests the extension of the Eeserve Territory, to which Lord Derby replies in much haste that it is " impossible." On the 24th November Lord Derby telegraphs again complaining that he has no means of ascertaining " what party was the strongest." Evidently in its despair the Home Government was coming to the conclusion that force was a remedy 1 [C. 3864], 1884, p. 224.