History of the Invasion and Capture of Washington, and of the events which preceded and followed

Front matter

Col. Beall's Regiment. 2 Sailors and Marines. 3 Barney's Battery. 4 1st Reg't of Smith's Brigade. 6 2d Reg't of Smith's Brigade. 0 Major Peter's Battery. 7 Major Waring's Battalion. 8 I.t.-col. Scett'sReg't Regulars. 9 Stull's and Dit 10 Stansbury's k; Regiment 11 Stansbury's fc lavidson's Comp's. 12 ftthReg't Baltimore Volunteer?. 10 2Comp's Militia and 1 of RifleF. Srigade— Ragan's 13 Capt. Burch's Artillery. 17 The Baltimore Artillery. [Regiment. 14 The Cavalry. 18 Major Pinkney's Riflemen. Brigade— Shutz's 15 Capt. Doughty'a Company. 13 Ueut.-col. Kramer's Battalion. HISTORY OF THE INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON, AND OF THE EVENTS WHICH PRECEDED AND FOLLOWED. BY JOHN S. WILLIAMS, BRIGADE MAJOR AND INSPECTOR, COLUMBIAN BRIGADE, IN THE WAR OF 1812. NEW YORK: HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS, FRANKLIN SQUARE. 1857.

Entered, according to Act of Oi^JlfœplSaw^y 1857, by Harper & Brothers, In the Clerk's Office of the Southern District of U«w York. TO COL. WILLIAM W. SEATON. My deae Colonel, — The practice of dedication, like many other pleasant customs of the olden time, which tended to check the growth of cold and selfish feelings, has hecome so nearly obsolete that I have had some hesitation in giving way to my impulses on this occasion. I have doubted whether it would be at all agreeable to you to be implicated in any thing that smacked so much of " old-fogyism." But, independently of the dictates of my feelings, there appeared to me so many good and appropriate reasons why this volume should be dedicated to you, that I will run the risk of taking your consent for granted. I know of no one to whom the work is more likely to prove in teresting, or who will be better able to judge of the accuracy of its statements, and at the same time more disposed to view its faults with lenity, knowing that they have not proceeded from any intention to misrep resent facts, or a willingness to asperse the fame of living or dead.

The work, too, relates to the most important event in the history of the city over which you so long presided with so much honor to yourself DEDICATION. and advantage to your fellow-citizens as chief magis trate, and with that event you were personally con nected, both as combatant on the ill-fated field and as a sufferer by the destruction of property in the city. Taking all these reasons into consideration, I think you will at least excuse your old companion in arms for publicly offering you this testimonial of his esteem and friendship. J. S. Williams. Washington, Oct 1, 1856.

Preface

. The primary motive by which the author of this work was actuated in getting together the materials from which it has been composed, was the hope of being able to do something to remove the obloquy which, in his opinion, has been undeservedly cast upon the American troops engaged in the battle of Bladensburg. It is true that this obloquy, being shared among so many, was never very severely felt by any individual among them. This, indeed, is the reason why it was so easily thrown upon them in the first instance, and why it has been suffered so long to continue. It was not the business of any one of the crowd, more than of another, to expose the injustice of the imputation cast upon them ; and as " what is every body's busisess is nobody's business," the duty has never yet been discharged. If the troops, as a body, could have called for a court of inquiry into their conduct, and had counsel of ordinaiy ability to defend them, or if they could have had a voice in the selection of the committee appointed by Congress to investigate the causes of the capture of the City of Washington, there would probably have been no necessity for undertaking a work like the present, or, rather, the neces sity would have been transferred to those high digni taries of the nation whose complacency was not at all

PREFACE.

. VI disturbed, nor intended to be disturbed, by the non committal report made by the committee actually appointed. It may be asked, Why, after the lapse of more than forty years, seek to disturb an arrangement which is admitted to be the most comfortable that could have been made — that is, the one which inflicted the least pain upon individuals ? The troops generally were little inconvenienced by the obloquy, and went about their business as unconcernedly as if nothing had hap pened ; whereas, if public censure had been concen trated upon a few powerful party leaders, thenwrath and that of their partisans might have thrown the country into an uproar. It might seem Pharisaical to profess an abstract love of truth, and not imperatively necessary to con tend for it as an essential ingredient in history.

If works of fiction or parables are written for the purpose of moral instruction, and are found to answer that purpose, why should truth be considered an essential in gredient in history ? or why should any more of such a precious ingredient be used than is necessary to give a flavor of probability ? But moral instruction is not the sole object of his tory, which furnishes, or ought to furnish, valuable lessons in the art of government and art of war, and these lessons can not be so well learned from imao-in ary events as from a faithful statement of real occurrences. National disasters, too, are often more preonant with instruction than national successes, and more may sometimes be learned from a defeat well studied than from half a dozen victories ; and in this

PREFACE.

. VII respect a correct narrative of the battle of Bladens burg, and of the events preceding and attending it, might be considered as highly important and desirable. It fortunately happens that the means of compiling a correct narrative of this battle are unusually abund ant — perhaps more so, owing to fortuitous circum stances, than with respect to any similar event in his tory. The event took place among a reading and in quiring people. It was not only sufficiently extraordinary in itself to arouse the strongest curiosity as to its causes and details, but it was deeply wounding to the pride of the nation. A prompt investigation by Congress was a matter of course, and this inquiry had, at least, the effect of calling forth a mass of evidence, in the shape of statements and official reports from in dividuals prominently connected with the event, which may be considered as having all the solemnity and credibility of testimony before a judicial tribunal, and which, however conflicting on some points, yet furnish the means, upon patient study and comparison, of arriv ing at a correct knowledge of the material facts.

This fund of information has since been increased by various publications, including narratives of British writers. Probably, at this date, little of importance relat ing to the subject remains to be revealed to the public, except what may be contained in the manuscript papers of Mr. Madison, now in possession of Colonel Pe ter Force, of the City of Washington. Having been informed that these papers contained some very inter esting matter in relation to the capture of the seat of government, we applied to Colonel Force for permis sion to consult them, stating to him the deep interest

PREFACE.

. VIII which we took in the subject. With his usual cour tesy he complied with our request, granting us access to the papers as often as we pleased, for the purpose of perusal and study, but declining to allow any por tion of them to be transcribed. We gladly availed ourselves of the privilege, and the information thus obtained will appear in its proper place in the following pages. To the sources of information above-mentioned, and to the author's own personal knowledge of events which he witnessed, he has been enabled to add recent statements from some of those whose position at the time of the capture of the seat of government, and whose high standing in the community at present, give a deep interest to the written communications with which they have favored him. Among these are letters from the Hon. Richard Rush, a member of Mr. Madison's cabinet, and the venerable Major George Peter, of Montgomery County, Maryland, commander of the District Light Corps, which will be found in the Appendix.

Other communications of a similar char acter, which have been useful to us in preparing the work, are omitted, in order that the bulk of the volume might not be unnecessarily increased. We will here take occasion to remark, in justice both to the living and the dead, that in any reflections which we have been tempted to indulge in on the con duct of Mr. Madison's administration, we have had no intention, and certainly not the slightest inclination, to include Mr. Rush, who was Attorney-general at the time, nor Mr. Campbell, then Secretary of the Treas ury. We are well satisfied that neither of them, either

PREFACE.

. IX from his position in the administration or from his personal character, was likely to be connected with any plans or movements which had not for their sole and exclusive object the welfare and honor of their country. It has been our purpose, in compiling a history of the campaign of Washington, to resort as often as practicable to the language of the principal witnesses, and make such use of their testimony that, if the read er is not satisfied with the views which we have taken of the subject, he may substitute other views of his own for them, based upon the facts which we have presented, with an assurance that we have neither de signedly omitted, nor presented in a deceptive manner, any information necessary for the formation of a correct judgment. This will account for the multitude of extracts and quotations in the work.

Different persons will draw a different moral from the same story. The moral which we are disposed to draw from the history of the battle of Bladensburg is, not that Americans were too "pusillanimous" to de fend their seat of government, and that, therefore, it would be safer to hire an army of foreign mercenaries to defend it for us ; nor that militia troops are not to be depended upon, and therefore a large standing army of regular troops is necessary ; but that politicians of the fairest fame require watching, and will not hesitate to sacrifice or jeopard the interests and honor of their country in order to advance themselves or ruin a rival. We present in this book the grounds which we think justify us in deducing this moral ; and, as we believe them sufficient, we have not hesitated to express our A2

PREFACE.

. X opinion in plain terms, without respect to the rank or reputation of the eminent individuals implicated. We do not understand — though the Congressional Com mittee of Investigation did — why truths which may benefit the public, and which the public have a right to know, should be suppressed, or cautiously and fear fully hinted at, rather than boldly spoken, in order to spare any individual reputation or fame, if it were as " sacrosanct" as that of General Washington himself. Nor do we think that men who did not hesitate to ca lumniate others in order to screen themselves have any claim, however exalted their position in history, to be treated with reverence or profound respect by any of those upon whom their unfounded imputations were cast. The reader will observe that we have made a dis tinction between the author and the editor or compiler of this volume.

The person who originated the idea or plan of the work, and who sought out and furnished the materials from which it has been compiled, may properly be termed the author of it. At his request, the literary execution of it was undertaken by a friend, now no more, whose progress in the work was much impeded by other more imperative calls upon his time, and who had not advanced farther than the seventh chapter of the present volume, when his death occa sioned a suspension of the work. One of his sons, however, undertook the completion of the undertaking. This will account for the difference between the style of the first seven chapters of the work and that of the subsequent portion. Some change, also, which took place in the plan of the work, and the fact that the

PREFACE.

. XI first portion of it had not been revised by the writer, rendered it necessary to make alterations, which, it is feared, have rendered the whole production inferior, as a literary composition, to what it would have been had the able pen which commenced it been permitted to continue it to the end. Washington, August, 1856. CONTENTS.

Chapter I

Shadows of forthcoming Events. — Apparent Indifference of Congress and the Administration to the Signs of the Times Page 15

Chapter II

The same subject continued 26 CHAPTER rn. The Administration begins to awake. — Cabinet Meeting of the 1st of July. — Projects of Defence. — Creation of a new Military District 45 CHAPTER TV. Want of Harmony in the Cabinet. — Selection of a Commanding General 6G

CHAPTER V.

Difficulties in the way of the Commanding General 81

CHAPTER VI.

General Armstrong's Letter to the Editors of the Baltimore Patriot. — Comments upon its extraordinary Disclosures 96 CHAPTER VH. Mr. Madison's private Opinion of the Conduct of the Secretary of War 112 CHAPTER VHI. Landing of the British Troops at Benedict. — Uncertainty as to their Destination. — Nature and Amount of the American Force. — Plan of Operations dictated to the Commanding General CONTENTS. XIV •

CHAPTER LX.

Results of the Reconnoitring Expedition under Mr. Monroe. — Advance of the Enemy from Benedict. — General Winder marches to meet him, and retreats to the City Page 157

CHAPTER X.

Cabinet Council at General Winder's Head-quarters at the Eastern Branch Bridge. — The Secretary of War has no Advice or Plan to offer. — The Secretary of State undertakes to arrange the Order of Battle 184

CHAPTER XI.

The Order of Battle 205 CHAPTER XH. The Battle 221 CHAPTER XHI. Remarks on the Battle and Retreat , 239 CHAPTER XTV. Proceedings of the Enemy in the City 254

CHAPTER XV.

The Capitulation of Alexandria 282

Appendix

. No. I. Narrative of General Winder, addressed to the Chairman of the Committee of Investigation 301 No. n. Report of General Stansbury 331 No. HI. Statement of General Walter Smith 343 No. IV. Colonel George Minor's Statement 355 No. V. From Major George Peter to Colonel J. S. Williams.... 357 No. VI. A Volunteer Corps from Virginia

CHAPTER I.

Shadows of forthcoming Events. — Apparent Indifference of Congress and the Administration to the Signs of the Times. More than fifteen months before the actual invasion of the District of Columbia, the enemy had plainly in dicated thendesign to maintain a sufficient force in the Chesapeake Bay to control its commerce. They had repeatedly landed marauding parties on both its shores ; the town of Havre de Grace on the western, and Frenchtown, Georgetown, and Fredericktown on the eastern shore of Maryland, and Hampton and other places in Virginia, had all been attacked, pillaged, and burned ; many of their inhabitants had been killed, and many had been carried off to their ships of war as prisoners. Maryland and Virginia, it is well known, both border on the District of Columbia, and the towns which have been named as the scenes of the enemy's destructive operations may be said to be in the imme diate neighborhood of the seat of government.

These were indications deemed by almost every in telligent and prudent citizen, except those directly connected with the government, sufficiently strong to excite apprehensions that the enemy contemplated an attack also upon the City of Washington.

On the 15th of July, 1813, a few days before the adjourn ment of Congress, and while the House of Represent atives were sitting with closed doors upon a message from the President of the United States, which had been suggested by the presence of the enemy in the Bay, General Philip Stuart, a member from Maryland, a veteran soldier, who bore the scars of numerous honorable wounds received in our Revolutionary battles, a fearless, calm, dispassionate observer of passing events, and one, therefore, not likely to sound the alarm when no cause for it existed, introduced a preamble and resolution in the following words : '■'■Whereas the seat of government, from the unpre pared and defenseless state of the District of Colum bia, is in imminent danger, if an attack should be made thereon ; and whereas the fleet of the enemy is understood to be within a few hours' sail of the capi tal ; and whereas the immense value of public prop erty exposed to destruction, the great value of the public records, and other deeply interesting considerations, render it peculiarly important that any invasion of the metropolis should be met with vigor and successfully repelled, whereupon "Resolved, That, in the opinion of this House, a distribution of such arms as are in the possession of the government within the District of Columbia should be immediately made, to be placed in the hands of aU able-bodied men within the district willing to be em bodied to perform military duty, and also in the hands ACTION IN THE HOUSE. of such members of this House as may be willing to receive them, to act against the enemy in any manner not incompatible with their public duties."* The words of this resolution show that its mover, at least, expected an early invasion, and the preamble discloses the ground of that expectation — "the fleet of the enemy is understood to be within a few hours' sail of the capital."

But it had been so from the previous month of April. Other places in the vicinity of the capital had been invaded, and Washington had been undisturbed. This was the delusive ground of argument : the enemy did not follow up their success ful inroads upon Havre de Grace and the other towns by an immediate attempt against the Federal City, arid therefore it formed no part of their design to invade it at any time. It was admirable logic, it must be con fessed. The first question raised upon the introduction of this preamble and resolution was whether the discussion of the subject required secrecy; and this "passed in the affirmative." The next vote taken was to lay the matter " on the table," and this " was determined in the negative — yeas 64, nays 74." A motion to strike out the preamble was then made and carried, and the naked resolution was committed to the " Com mittee on Military Affairs."

On the following day, before it was possible, in the nature of things, that any personal examination on the part of the committee of the preparations for defence, even within the city itself, could have been accomplished, and much less the whole district and the numerous approaches to it, the * Annals of Congress, 13th Congress, in die. chairman of that committee made the following re port: " The Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred a resolution of yesterday having relation to the present movement of the enemy, report, " That they have examined into the state of prepa ration, naval and military, made to receive the enemy, and are satisfied that the preparations are, in every respect, adequate to the emergence, and that no meas ures are necessary on the part of this House to make it more complete."

That this committee, within the time that intervened between the close of one day's session and the open ing of the next, could have made a personal inspection of the naval and military strength of the city, is alto gether beyond credibility. The report was, therefore, little less than an insult to the common sense of the House. The chairman, it may be, "examined" the secretaries of the two departments of War and the Navy, and received assurances from those officers respectively that every preparation for defence had been made ; but ought this, under the circumstances, to have " satisfied" the committee ? The reader will observe that there are here two opinions expressed, diametrically opposite in their nature, and both advanced with equal confidence and boldness in the face of the world by persons whose means and opportunities of obtaining correct informa tion were alike ample and authoritative.

The one as serts that the seat of government, "from the unpre pared and defenceless state of the District of Colum bia, is in imminent danger, if an attack should be INSUFFICIENT PREPARATION. 19 made thereon ;" the other, that the state of preparation for defence " is, in every respect, adequate to the emergence." It is impossible that any two persons of ordinary capacity should have differed so widely as to the ac tual state of preparations in the district to defend the seat of government ; these discordant opinions, there fore, must have been formed from the different light in which their respective entertainers viewed the proba bility of "an attack." On the supposition that the enemy did not contemplate an invasion of the District of Columbia, it was very natural to believe that no measures were necessary on the part of the House to render the preparations for defence "more complete."

But the question for history is, were the means of de fence, naval and military, such as to give a reasonable assurance that they would prove sufficient to repel the enemy "if an attack should be made?" And history itself answers this question in the negative ; for, even after the lapse of more than a year from this time, during which some additions had been made to what were regarded as preparations for defense, the enemy did make an attack, which, unhappily, was not re pelled. On the 20th of the same month in which the pro ceedings just mentioned took place, in the secret ses sion of the House of Representatives, the President of the United States transmitted to Congress a message which, as it is short, and contains, as we think, a clew to the very extraordinary report of the Military Com mittee, is here presented to the reader without abridg ment.

" Confidential. — To the Senate and House of Rep resentatives of the United States : There being suffi cient ground to infer that it is the purpose of the ene my to combine with the blockade of our ports special license to neutral vessels, or to British vessels in neu tral disguise, whereby they may draw from our country the precise kinds and quantity of exports essential to their wants, whilst its general commerce remains obstructed ; keeping in view also the invidious discrim ination between different ports of the United States ; and as such a system, if not counteracted, will have the effect of diminishing very materially the pressure of the war on the enemy, and encouraging a persever ance in it, at the same time that it will leave the gen eral commerce of the United States under all the press ure the enemy can impose, thus subjecting the whole to British regulation, in subserviency to British mo nopoly; I recommend to the consideration of Congress the expediency of an immediate and effectual prohibi tion of exports, limited to a convenient day in their next session, and removable in the mean time in the event of a cessation of the blockade of our ports.

"James Madison. "Washington, July 20, 1813." A comparison of the tenor of this message with the report of the Committee on Military Affairs, immediately preceding it, would seem to render it manifest that both were the offspring of the same delusion. Both seem to have been dictated by the conviction that the enemy, though at that moment within a few hours' sail of the seat of government, had no intention what- DELUSION OF THE PRESIDENT. ever, either then or at any later period, of attempting an expedition against it. In both cases, indeed, the delusive and unstatesmanlike opinion seemed to have prevailed, that a hostile invasion of the District of Co lumbia, through the instrumentality of the British squadron in Chesapeake Bay, was not within the range of possibility. Otherwise, it is inconceivable on what grounds it could have been asserted, on the one hand, that the defences of the District wanted nothing to their completeness, or why, on the other hand, the at tention of Congress should be called only to the commercial evils which would be likely to result from the continued blockade of our ports.

If it had been an ascertained, indisputable fact, about which there could be no difference of opinion, that the enemy meant to limit their operations in the Chesapeake to the regulation and control of the com merce of which it was the channel, then, indeed, the measure recommended by the President might have been regarded as the most appropriate and suitable one to counteract the design ; but, to say the least, it may be doubted whether the mere assumption of such a fact, and that, too, against strongly-expressed views of a different character, could justify him in his silence as to other than commercial interests in equal want of protection, and which would be in equal jeopardy if assailed. It would certainly have been safer and wiser, and more consonant with a due regard to the general welfare, to have taken into account the possibility, at least, that the enemy might have more extensive de signs than those which were apparent to every body.

"~*»»It can not be considered extraordinary that individuals should differ in opinion as to the probability or im probability of any occurrence yet in the womb of time, but it is passing strange that men of equal discernment, having equal capacity to examine and inquire, and equal authority to draw information from the same sources, should come to opposite conclusions as to a simple question of fact — that is, whether there existed or did not exist in the District of Columbia any evidence of preparation to resist an invading enemy. If the Military Committee of the House of Representatives had said, in so many words, We have reason to believe that the enemy now in the Chesapeake Bay have not the remotest idea or intention of invading the District, and therefore we can not conceive that there exists any necessity for providing means of defence, their report might have been regarded as kindly designed to relieve the House from all apprehension as to their own safe ty ; but when, in speaking of "the state of preparation, naval and military," they make the unqualified assertion "that no measures are necessary on the part of the House to make it more complete," they can be understood in no other way than as meaning to say that they had found it, upon examination, to be al ready complete.

This understanding of it imposes upon us the necessity of inquiring into the correctness or incorrectness of this implied affirmation. At the moment that this report was made, it was a fact notorious to every inhabitant of the District of Columbia, and which ought to have been equally so to Congress, that the only fortification, so called, on the Potomac River, from its embouchure into the Chesa peake Bay up to the seat of government on its banks, ASTONISHING REMISSNESS. had not more than a brace of guns mounted, nor men enough to serve more if they had been mounted. It was a fortification in name only, not prepared to have repulsed even the smallest of the enemy's vessels, had an attempt been made to pass it. At the mouth of the Anacostia, or eastern branch of the Potomac, where there now stands an arsenal, surrounded by a neat embattled wall, there was then nothing but an unpro tected magazine.

From that point to the Navy Yard there was not a gun of any description to present even a show of defence, while at the yard itself a few artifi cers and laborers, and still fewer marines, constituted the sole means of protection. Such was "the state of preparation" on the approaches to the seat of government by water. The defences on the land routes were in no respect "more complete." Throughout the whole boundary-line of the District of Columbia there was not a single point fortified ; not a redoubt, dike, or ditch ; not a solitary piece of artillery ; not a single battalion of regular soldiers ; not one company of militia or volunteers prop erly armed, equipped, and disciplined. The neglect to take advantage of the full opportu nity allowed by the enemy, and, it may be added, of the long warning given by them, to place the seat of government in a condition to have defied the utmost force and skill of attack, is utterly incomprehensible 1 o plain common sense.

There was not an inhabitant of the District, whether farmer, merchant, mechanic, or la borer, who did not know that the city was totally des titute of defences, and who did not believe in the prob ability of an invasion. The President and his ministers, and their friends in Congress, alone entertained a different opinion, and, unfortunately, these were the author ities in whom was vested, by the law and Constitution, the sole power of making the necessary preparations. We dwell upon the treatment which General Stu art's resolutions received longer than it may be thought to deserve, but we do so because we believe that to that treatment may be traced all the misfortunes of the 24th of August, 1814. The necessity of resorting to any measures of preparation was not admitted by Congress or the administration, because, as already intimated, they did not believe that the enemy enter tained the remotest design of attempting an invasion of the District of Columbia.