A History of Greece, from the earliest times to the present ... With maps and illustrations

Front matter

BY THE SAME AUTHOR. THE LANGUAGE OF THE GREEKS $1.50 ÆSOP'S FABLES, with Vocabulary, Notes, and References to Goodwin's and Hadley's Grammars - 1.50 FOUR BOOKS of XENOPHON'S ANABASIS, with Vocabulary, Notes, and References to Goodwin's and Hadley's Grammars - - - 1.50 A HISTORY OF GREECE Jrom % fattest vDimes 10 % present. BT T. T. TIMAYENIS. WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS. IN TWO VOLUMES. VOL. II. NEW YORK: D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, 1, 3, AND 5 BOND STEEET. LONDON: 16 LITTLE BRITAIN. 1881. COPYRIGHT BV T. T. TIMAYENIS, 1880. PAQE 1 19 28 33 01 73 CONTENTS OF VOLUME II. PART SEVENTH. THEBAN SUPREMACY.

Chapter I

— Eise of Theban Power . Character of the Thebans, 1. Epaminondas and Pelopidas, 2. Humiliation of the Spartans — Battle of Tegyra, 6. Congress at Sparta, 10. Battle of Leuktra, 13. II. — Operations in South and North Hellas Invasion of the Peloponnesus, 19. Pelopidas in Thessaly, 23. The Tearless Battle, 26. III. — Culmination of Theban Power . The Persian Rescript, 23. Death of Pelopidas, SO. Battle of Mantineia — Death of Epaminondas, 31. IV. — Rise of Macedonia Death of Agesilaus, 33. Decline of the Naval Power of Athens, 40. Anarchy, 41. Second Sacred War, 42. Philip, King of Macedonia, 45. Demosthenes, 47. End of the Second Sacred "War — Growth of Philip's Power, 54. New Sacred War— Battle of Chæroneia, 56. Character of the First Hellenism, 53. PART EIGHTH. MACEDONIAN HELLENISM. I. — Extension and Reorganization .

Historical Account of Macedonia, 61. Philip, 64. Reorganization of tho Macedonian Army, 69. II. — The Phokian and Olynthian Wars Conquests in Thessaly, Thrace, etc., 73. Olynthian War, 77. Athenian Proposals of Peace, 81. End of the Phokian War, 85. CONTENTS. IV

Chapter III

— Last Days of Philip . . . • • .86 Preparations for the Asiatic Expedition, 83. Assassination of Fhilip, 87. Philip's Position in History, 88. TV. — Alexander the Great . . . . ■ .91 Consolidation ofhis Power, 91. Destruction of Thebes, 94. Visit to Corinth and Delphi, 95. Entry into Asia, 96. V. — Battles of Granikus and Issus . . . .97 The Opposing Armies, 97. The Battle at the Granikus, 100. Conquests in Asia Minor, 105. The Gordian Knot, 106. Death of Memnon, 107. Battle of Issus, 108. VI. — Further Victories of Alexander . . . .115 Darius submits Propositions of Peace, 115. Tyre and Gaza, 117. Alexander's Visit to Egypt, 110. Battle of Gaugamela or Arbela, 121. VII. — Alexander's Progress to India . . . .129 Revolution of King Agis, 129. New Victories and Projects of Alexander, 131. Death of Philotas and Parmenio, 132.

Death of Kleitus, 134. Conquests on the Indus, 136. VIII. — Last Days of Alexander ..... 139 The Return from India, 139. Alexander's Innovations— Height of his Power, 140. Death of Alexander, 143. Conclusion, 147. PART NINTH. THE SUCCESSORS. L— Regency of Perdikkas ...... 149 Settlement of tho Empire, 149. The Lamian War, 155. Death of Demosthenes, 161. II- — The Struggle for Supremacy . . . . .103 Proceedings of Perdikkas, 103. Combination against Eumenes, 165. Death of Perdikkas, 169. HI- — Antipater and Polysperchon . . . . .170 Affairs in Europe and Asia, 170. Death of Antipater and Demades, 172. Polysperchon— Death of Phokion, 173. IV. — Antigonus and Eumenes. ..... 182 The Struggle for Supremacy, 1S2. V. — Antigonus and nis Son Demetrius .... 190 The War against Antigonus. 190. Condition of Hellas, 193.

Athens freed by Demetrius Poliorketes, 195. VI. — The Exploits of Demetrius ..... 200 Defeat of Ptolemy— Capture of Kyprus, 200. Antigonu9 in Egypt, 206. Siege of Rhodes, 203. Demetrius in Hellas, 214. Battle of" Ipsus— Death of Antigonus, 217. VII.— Last Days of Alexander's Generals .... 220 Proceedings of Demetrius — Death of Kassander, 220. Death of Demetrius, 224. Death of Ptolemy and Lysimachus, 226. Death of Seleukus, 229. CONTENTS. V CHAPTER pA0B VIII. — The Invasion of the Gauls ..... 229 Death os Ptolemy Keraunua, 229. Anarchy in Macedonia— Antigonus Gonatas King, 231. IX. — State of the Hellenic World ..... 233 Expedition of Fyrrhus of Epirus, 233. Hellenism in the West, 236. Hellenism in the East, 237. Macedonia aud Ilellas, 241. X. — The Roman Conquest . . . ... . 242 The Æotian and Achæan Leagues, 242.

Agis and Kleomenes, Kings of Sparta, 244. Eoman Successes, 247. Polybius, 202. Permanence of Hellenic Influence, 253. PAET TENTH. THE ROMAN SUPREMACY. I. — Affairs in Hellas ...... 258 The Mithridatic War, 25S. The Pirates— Krete, 261. The Eoman Civil Wars, 262. The Emperors, 265. The Sophists, 267. Trajan, 270.. Hadrian, 271. Antoninus Pius — Marcus Aurelius, 273. II. — Barbarians and Christians ..... 276 Early Decline of the Empire, 275. Hellenism the First Herald of Christianity, 280. III. CONSTANTINE THE GREAT ...... 288 Division of Imperial Power, 2S6. Conversion of Constantine, 2S8. Constantino Sole Emperor, 291. Arms, 293. Foundation of Constantinople, 297. The Last Seven Tears of tho Reign of Constantine, 299. Remarks on the Life of Constantine, 301. IV. CONSTANTIUS AND JULIAN . ..... 302 Constantius, 302.

Julian the Apostate, 303. The Reign of Julian, 308. V. — Jovian to Theodosius I. . . . . .311 Peace with the Persians, 311. Basil and Gregory, 312. New Invasions of the Barbarians, 314. Theodosius I, 315. VI. — Arcadius and Honorius. ..... 317 Barbarian Incursions, 317. John Chrysostom, 319. VII.— Theodosius II . . . . . . .323 Pulcheria and Eudokia, 323. Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople, 326. Attila, 327. VIII.— End of the Roman Rule . . . .328 Leo the Thracian, 32S. Zeno — Anastasius— Justin I, 829. Justinian I, 330. The Temple of St. Sophia, 839. PAET ELEVENTH. BYZANTINE HELLENISM. I. — FIeraklius ....... 342 Overthrow of Pbokas, 342. Eise of Mohammedanism, 343. Conflict between Islamism and Christianity, 347. VI CONTENTS. CnAPTER PAGE II. — Constantine IV to Leo III .... . 348 Siege os Constantinople, 848.

The Greek Fire, 350. Justinian II, Ehinotmetus, 302. Leontius — Tiberius Absimarus, 353. Second Period of the Reign of Justinian II, 354. Philippikus — Anastatius II, 856. Leo III, the Isaurian, 357. III.— Leo III to Leo V . . . . . . 359 State of the Eastern Empire, 359. Constantino V, 864. Constantine VI, 364. Nikephorus I, 365. Michael I— Leo V, 3£6. TV.— The Dynasty of Michael II . . . . .368 Michael II— Theophilus, 868. The Successors of Theophilus, 370. V. — The Macedonian Dynasty — The Comneni . . . 372 The Reign of Basil I, 872. Leo VI, 873. Alexius I, 374. Robert Guiscard's Invasion, 375. The Crusades, 377. IV. — The Latin and Turkish Conquests .... 3S1 The Second Crusade, 361. The Crusaders in Constantinople, 363. Organization of the Latin Empire, 3S6. Recovery of Constantinople, 888.

Fall of Constantinople, S90. PAET TWELFTH. MODERN HELLENISM. I. — Turkish Rule ....... 392 II. — The Greek Revolution ...... 393 General Survey, 393. The Fall of Mesolonghi, 400. Naval Triumphs, 404. III. — The Kingdom of Greece ..... 407 Index PAET SEVENTH. THEBAN S ITPREMA C Y.

Chapter I. Rise Op Theban Power

Character of the Thebans. We have already alluded to the character and life of the Bœotians and Thebans. The Thebans were certainly not among the noblest tribes in Hella3. They possessed neither the advantages which the Athenians derived from their matchless intelligence, nor those which the Spartans obtained through their wonderful political and military organization. The very sentiment of Hellenic autonomy was for a long time weak among the Thebans. They had openly united with Xerxes and Mardonius during the invasion of the Persians. But the Thebans were brave soldiers, and pos sessed souls, if not always noble, yet ever resolute ; bodies, if not prepossessing, yet athletic and well prepared, by exercise and thorough drill from early childhood, for every military duty. The Thebans in the fifth century b. c. repeatedly ob tained the honor of having defeated the Athenian hoplites, then in their glory.

At Koroneia they showed the Spartans themselves that they were not unworthy opponents. This warlike spirit and dexterity only had need of some power ful motive to accomplish great deeds. The dastardly plot through which Sparta sought to humble Thebes by the peace of Antalkidas provided this necessity. The violent act of Phœbidas and the tyranny of Leontiades made it more imperative. The indignation which the ruinous policy of Sparta produced at Thebes was exemplified by a few men — first by Ismenias, then by Pelopidas, Mellon, Charon, Gor gias, Theopompus, and others ; but it was poured into the veins of all the Thebans, and like some sacred fire kindled and incited them to the contest, and to every sacrifice for the preservation of their restored independence. Thus may be explained to some extent the sudden promi nence of the city of Thebes.

The life and government of the Athenians recall to our mind the countries which Nature has made fertile by many and great rivers. The life and constitution of Sparta recall the lands in which art and indus try, by an economical use of the few streams running through them, and by the construction of various canals, have suc ceeded in making fertile even the most arid plains. But the life and constitution of the Thebans were for a long time almost unproductive ; until, from a powerful sentiment of liberty and ambition stirring the lowest and apparently in sensible depths, there suddenly burst forth a living spring which changed the desert into a garden. Epaminondas and Pelopidas. "Was the man also a product of that moral revolution, who, by his military genius, his political fitness, and his pow er of speech, made immortal that period of Hellenic history ?

Unfortunately, while we can to some extent ascertain the causes of the rise and decline of nations, the growth and power of great men have heretofore remained unexplained. We certainly can not say that the political growth and re generation of the city of Thebes entirely recreated that man, because only in 371— i. e., seven years after the restoration of independence— does he seem to have held the first rank ; yet on the recovery of freedom, in which he certainly was less engaged than Pelopidas and many other citizens, he was already forty years old, and in the very prime of his bodily and intellectual forces. It can not, therefore, be affirmed that the advancement of the city produced Epaminondas, nor that he caused the growth of the city. Each seems to have grown independently of the other, though they united, and acted the one with the other.

Without the growth of Thebes, the genius of Epaminondas would not have received stimulus; and without the genius of Epaminondas, the growth of Thebes would have been limited to the small hegemony of Bœotia. The family of Epaminondas, son of Polymnis, traced its lineage to the race called Sparti, whose heroic progenitors were said to have sprung from the dragon's teeth sown by Kadmus ; * but it was in such reduced circumstances that not even the name of his mother was ever known. Epami nondas was trained from early youth in all the branches of gymnastics and military duty, such as were imposed upon every Thef>an citizen. In this respect he had need of no better school than that of his own country, because bod ily exercise received great attention at Thebes. But he was also distinguished by the diligent care he took of his intellectual education.

He eagerly sought the society of philosophers within his reach, among whom were the Theban Simmias and the Tarentine Spintharus, both of them once companions of Sokrates ; so that Epaminondas may be regarded in some measure as the pupil of that great Athenian. As the relations between Athens and Thebes, ever since the close of the Peloponnesian war, had become more and more friendly, we may reasonably presume, with Grote, that he profited by teachers of the latter city as well as of the former. But we are told that the man to whom he especially devoted himself, and whom he not only revered as a pupil, but tended * Pausanias. ■i almost as a son toward the close of his long life, was a Tarentine exile named Lysis, a member of the Pythagorean brotherhood. With him and many other such men did Epaminondas associate for several years, and engage in all the branches of study and research.

But, while possessed of so lofty a genius, and so much addicted to the improvement of the mind, he was at the same time modest and wholly devoid of a boasting spirit. This is especially to be admired, since the Hellenes were noted for their self-love and selfsufficiency. He was indifferent to money, and remained poor throughout his life, leaving not even the means necessary for his burial ; while strangers often submitted to him propositions of bribery, and friends offered to relieve his pressing needs. He was distinguished for the mildness of his political sentiments, his repugnance to harsh treatment of conquered enemies, and his refusal to mingle in intestine bloodshed. These virtues are especially worthy of admiration, since they were rare among the Hellenes. If there were men whose conduct justified the severest punishment, they were Leontiades and the traitors with him.

Thty not only opened the gates of the Kadmeia to the Spartans, but also killed Ismenias. Epaminondas, however, disapproved of the scheme of Pelopidas and the other exiles to assassinate them, partly on prudential grounds, but in part from conscientious scruples.* Epaminondas does not appear in the career of political action before 371 b. c. Let it not be supposed, however, that he had remained idle in the interim. He took an active part in the success of the daring plan, and provided also the means for the defense of Thebes. He was among the first to urge the Thebans to intrench and fence off the fertile plain on the north of the city, from which they derived their prin cipal means of sustenance. At the same time he organized with Pelopidas the famous sacred lochos or band, composed * Plutarch. of three hundred picked men, bound together by the closest ties of friendship and devoted to each other to the death.

This lochos was maintained at the public expense, w_as con stantly drilled, and, being actuated by the noblest sentiments, proved one of the principal supports of the power of Thebes. It filled Hellas with the fame of its achievements, and fell only on that fatal day when the autonomy of Hellas disappeared. Thus Epaminondas was in the service of his country from the very beginning of its freedom, although during the first seven years Pelopidas held a higher rank than he. It was Pelopidas who first conquered the Spartans, and first restored the hegemony of the Thebans over Bœotia. He was unlike Epaminondas both in his circumstances and habits of life. He was younger than the latter, rich, and a happy father of a family, while Epaminondas was never married. He delighted more in bodily exercises, and amused himself in the wrestling-ring or in hunting, while Epaminon das spent his hours of leisure in philosophical researches.

But they were united by the strictest and most inviolable friendship, which remained constant to the last, in all the high posts which they held, both military and civil. This was a rare instance indeed of such union between two leaders and fellow aspirants in ancient Hellas. In fact, the names of these two men are usually mentioned in history side by side. One of the greatest historians of antiquity, the Pelo ponnesian Polybius, who flourished during the second cen tury b. c, said that the supremacy of the Thebans was formed, flourished, and declined with the lives of Epaminon das and Pelopidas.* But this parallel between the virtues and achievements of Pelopidas and Epaminondas is true only in part. Pelopidas was the best of the Thebans — Epam inondas, the best of the Greeks. Pelopidas began the work * Kal yap o-W7iv£i}d-r] Ka\ avvitK^aae Kal avyKaTe\vd-r) to.

Qrjfiaiwv epya Tip too 'EiraiJ.elvdjvSov ical tov TlzKoniSov j3iw wpotyavws. of the freedom and supremacy of the Thebans, but to Epaminondas are due its completion and the Panhellenic achievements of Thebes. After the death of Pelopidas the city continued to grow under Epaminondas ; but after the death of the latter it fell as if by magic. In a word, if the daring of Pelopidas and his devotion to his country were in every point similar to those same virtues in Epaminondas, yet the victor of Lcuktra and Mantineia, and he who glori ously advocated in the national congress the rights of his own country, the restorer of Messenia, the founder of Mega lopolis, proved himself without doubt greater than his great and noble friend. Humiliation of the Spartans — Rattle of Tegyra. After the return of Kleombrotus from Bœotia, the Spar tans persuaded Agesilaus himself to undertake the war against the Thebans.

This veteran warrior repeatedly in vaded Bœotia during 378 and 377, but accomplished nothing of importance. The Thebans, assisted by the Athenians, manfully met all the attacks, and in fact began to extend their operations to other Bœotian cities. While Agesilaus was returning from Bœotia in 377 he ruptured a blood-vessel, and his one healthy limb was also injured, rendering him for a long time unfit for service ; and the command again passed to Kleombrotus. The latter marched in 376 against Bœotia, but was unable even to cross the Kithæron, which was already occupied by a force of Athenians and Thebans, and turned back without effecting his purpose. The Spartans, who were daily losing their prestige and becoming humbled, resolved to try their fortunes at sea, hoping to detach the Athenians from the alliance of the Thebans.

But their admiral Pollis, in command of sixty triremes, was totally defeated near Naxos in September, 376, by the Athenian Chabrias with eighty triremes. The Athe nians, availing themselves of the victory, began to extend their naval sway, and their influence was felt as far as the Ionian Sea. In like manner did the Thebans continue to prosper. No new invasion of Bœotia was made by the Lacedæmonians during 376 and 375. In the former year Kleombrotus was unable to cross the Kithæron, and in 375 the attention of Sparta was directed to the movements of the Athenian Timo theus on the Ionian Sea. Hence the Thebans daily gained strength in Bœotia. They had frequent skirmishes with the Lacedæmonian garrisons there, which gave them considerable drill and improvement. " For their spirits," says Plutarch, " were raised, their bodies were inured to labor, and, by being used to these encounters, they gained both experience and courage."

The most noted of these combats was the battle of Tegyra, in which the Thebans, led by Pelopidas, achieved a splendid victory, which served as a sort of prelude to that of Leuktra. Pelopidas, learning that the Lacedæmonian harmost, with two divisions from the garrison at Orchomenus, had gone on an incursion into the Lokrian territory, made a dash from Thebes with the Sacred Band and a small party of horse to surprise the place. On approaching Orchome nus, he was informed that there were other Spartan troops in the town, and that no surprise could be effected. He therefore retraced his steps, but on reaching Tegyra met the Lacedæmonian polemarchs, Gorgoleon and Theopompus, who were returning from the Lokrian foray. The Lace dæmonian force was twice as numerous as that of Pelopidas, and the polemarchs accordingly welcomed this encounter.

The Thebans were at first much dispirited, and one of them ran and told Pelopidas, " We are fallen into the enemy's hands." " And why not they," said he, " into ours ? " But it was only after repeated exhortations from their leader that they finally regained their courage. A severe battle ensued, which proved how unconquerable was the united strength and courage of the Sacred Band. The shock began on the spot where the generals fought in person, and raged there furiously. The Spartan commanders, who attacked Pelopi das, were among the first that were slain, while all that were near them were either killed or put to flight. This so terrified the whole army that they opened a lane for the Thebans, through which, if they had pleased, they might have passed safely and continued their route. But Pelopidas, disdaining to retreat, charged those who yet stood their ground, and made such havoc among them that they fled in great con fusion.

The neighborhood of Orchomenus forbade any long pursuit, so that Pelopidas could only erect his trophy and strip the dead before returning to Thebes.* This battle, in which the Lacedæmonians were for the first time routed in fair field by numbers inferior to their own, produced a marked sensation throughout Hellas, and raised the hopes and strengthened the energies of the Thebans. About 374 b. c. the latter controlled all the cities throughout Bœotia except Orchomenus, with its dependency Chæroneia. This battle first taught the Hellenes that it was not the Eu rotas which alone produced brave warriors, but that wherever the youth are ashamed of what is base, are resolute in a good cause, and more inclined to avoid disgrace than dan ger, these are the men who are terrible to their enemies.f At the same time the Thebans began to retaliate upon their neighbors the Phokians, who were not only the allies of Sparta, but also their auxiliaries in the recent attacks on Thebes.

They were, however, compelled to withdraw, since Kleombrotus was sent across the gulf to their aid, with four Lacedæmonian divisions of troops and an auxiliary body of allies. Athens now became jealous of the growing influence and prosperity of Thebes, and hastened to send envoys to Sparta to propose terms of peace. What these terms were * Plutarch. 4 Ibid. we are not told, but Sparta accepted them at once. For tunately for the Thebans, this peace did not last long. Timo theus, who had been dispatched with a powerful fleet to cir cumnavigate the Peloponnesus, alarm the coast of Laconia, and acquire new allies in the west, was now ordered home. On his return he landed at Zakynthus, which had remained faithful to the Lacedæmonians, certain Zakynthian exiles who had served with him during his voyage.

The Zakyn thian government lodged complaints at Sparta, which de manded redress of Athens. This was refused, wherefore the peace was at once broken off, and war again declared. In 373 a Lacedæmonian squadron besieged Korkyra, which Timotheus had prevailed upon during his periplus to declare itself for Athens. The Korkyræans, assisted by the Athe nians, compelled the Lacedæmonians to decamp in such haste that much corn and wine, many slaves, and even the sick and wounded soldiers, were left behind. The Athenians after ward sent out another powerful fleet under Iphikrates, and so they fairly ruled the Ionian Sea. Thus in 372 b. c. the Spartans were humbled on all sides. Their despondency was heightened by the terrible earthquakes and rains which during that year occurred in the Peloponnesus, and which they regarded as tokens of the wrath of the god Poseidon.

These formidable visitations were more disastrous than any that ever before or since occurred in the Peloponnesus. Two towns, Helike and Bura, were destroyed, together with a large portion of their population. Ten Lacedæmonian triremes, which happened to be moored on this shore, were sunk with their crews by the tremendous rush of the waters. The Lacedæmonians again, as fifteen years before, sent Antalkidas to Persia, to solicit money and seek once more the interference of the great king in Hellenic affairs. But the king simply recommended to all the cessation of hostilities, on the basis of the peace of Antalkidas. Hence Sparta was little assisted by her ancient ally, and would have come to still greater stress had not the Athenians again decided to make peace. Congress at Sparta. The reasons for abandoning the alliance of the Thebans which existed three years previously had daily become stronger.

The fear which caused the union of the Athe nians with the Thebans in 378, to fight against the Lacedæ monians, had entirely disappeared. The Athenians, having established their new naval dominion, had no longer ground on which to continue the war, since their supremacy was in no danger whatever from the Lacedæmonians. The war was only prolonged for the sake of the Thebans ; and the Athenians justly deemed it unwise to sacrifice their resources, not for the sake of the autonomy of Thebes, but merely to secure their rule throughout Bœotia, which they ever re garded as dangerous to their own interests. It was accord ingly voted by the Athenians, and by the majority of her. allies, to send to Sparta for peace, where it was well known that similar dispositions prevailed. Notice of this intention was given to the Thebans, who were also invited to unite in sending ambassadors thither if they wished.

In the spring of 371 b. c, at the time when the allies of Sparta were assembled in that city, there came also the ambassadors of the Athe nians, as well as those of the Thebans and of the various cities which composed the new hegemony of the Athenians. Kallias and Autokles, the most prominent of the Athenian ambassadors, both belonged to the best families of the city. They were accompanied by Kallistratus the orator. Epam inondas, then one of the Bœotarchs, was the only prominent delegate from Thebes. Of the debates which took place during this memorable assembly of the Hellenic nation we have very imperfect knowledge. Xenophon only alludes to the speeches of each of the three Athenians. Kallias spoke as a friend of Sparta, and his speech is eminently philo-Laconian in spirit. Auto kles, on the contrary, bitterly censured the conduct of the Lacedæmonians.

Kallistratus, who spoke after the other two, kept a middle course, acknowledged the mistakes of both, and concluded that the war was damaging to the best in terests of all, and that the general welfare demanded peace on both sides. " Sparta," said he, " now commands on the land, and the Athenians rule on the sea ; they must be con tent with this distribution of power, and not continue wran gling, and resembling those foolish dice-players who, if they win, risk double stakes." The words of the orator were at least conscientious, but they did not please the remaining cities, which saw them selves surrendered to the discretion of Sparta and Athens. Hence the orator added that peace should be made on the basis of the freedom of all the Hellenic cities. But this principle did not meet the views of the others respecting the ■supremacy of Sparta on the land and that of the Athenians on the sea.

It was evident that a peace concluded on such terms would at once produce new causes of discontent. In deed, such was the result. The Lacedæmonians accepted the proposals of the Athenians " to take away their governors from the cities, disband their armies, both those on sea and land, and leave the cities free. If any city should vio late these conditions, all were at liberty to take arms for the support of the injured party ; but no one who did not feel disposed was bound to take arms." When the hour came for the stipulated conditions to be voted upon, the absurdity of the terms became apparent. The Athenians restricted themselves to taking oath only for their own state, and their allied cities also swore each inde pendently. The Lacedæmonians vouched both for them selves and their allies.

Now, according to the truce, the cities were autonomous, and the first principle of indepen dence is the right of concluding peace and declaring war. Thus the Lacedæmonians, by vouching not only for them selves, but also on behalf of the allies, interfered with one of the most precious rights of complete liberty. When, therefore, the turn of the Thebans came, Epami nondas insisted on his privilege of taking the oath, not for Thebes separately, but for Thebes as president of the Bœo tian federation, which included all the Bœotian cities. The ephors, and above all Agesilaus, opposed this measure vehe mently, and demanded that Epaminondas should swear for Thebes alone, and each Bœotian city separately for itself. Thus matters became much complicated. Epaminondas daringly opposed the dictatorial conduct of Sparta, while most of the other ambassadors, frightened by her suprem acy, lowered their heads before the haughty Agesilaus.

Epaminondas declared that only the unjust claims of the Lacedæmonians prolonged the war, and that a lasting peace could not be concluded unless they should agree to lay aside these claims. He alone preserved a proper dignity and free-. dom both in his manner and his propositions. His speech was in favor, not only of the Thebans, but of Hellas in gen eral. He showed that war tended to aggrandize Sparta at the expense of the other states, and insisted that the peace should be founded upon justice and equality.* " The The bans," said he, "are ready to answer only for themselves, leaving the other Bœotian cities each to vouch for itself, but only when Sparta swears for herself alone, leaving not only the allies, but the cities of Laconia itself, to vouch each in its own name." The representatives were terrified at this daring proposition.

But Sparta presided over this congress, and Agesilaus over Sparta ; and the bare idea of the equality of the The bans with the chief city of Hellas made that ruler almost beside himself. Springing up in anger and interrupting further discussion, which he considered insulting to Sparta, * Plutarch. he said to Epaminondas, " Speak plainly. Will you, or will you not, leave to each of the Bœotian cities its separate autonomy?" To which the other replied, "Will you leave each of the Laeonian towns autonomous ? " Without another word Agesilaus caused the names of the Thebans to be struck from the roll, and declared war against them upon the spot. Such was the result of that memorable congress of the Hellenic nation which took place during June of 371 b. c. Sparta thought that Thebes, as formerly, would succumb to her will without battle, or, in case of battle, that she could easily be crushed.