Chapters of the Modern History of British India

Introduction

. The following Chapters are designed to furnish an ac count of the most interesting events in the History of British India, during a period of nearly thirty years, which elapsed between the close of the administration of the Marquess Wellesley and the relinquishment of trade by the East-India Company. Nothing need be said in vindication of the design. The period chosen for illustration is one fraught with much calculated to excite the feelings, and to give exercise to the powers of reflection. With regard to the execution, the Author would only observe, that he has laboured assiduously to ensure accuracy as to facts ; and that the opinions interspersed, whatever their value, are in every instance the honest result of careful and unbiassed consideration. His VI sole objects have been to relate the truth, and to render jus tice to all.

In some of the chapters comments will be found more sparingly interspersed than in others ; the reason is, that the Author was anxious to offer no opinions of the soundness of which he did not feel entirely convinced ; and where he has been unable to divest his mind of doubt, he has abstained from any attempt to influence the judgment of the Reader. The arrangement differs from that usually adopted in historical works. Each chapter, instead of comprehending all the events which took place within a given period of time, is devoted to a particular series of events connected with each other by succession, and by their relation to a common object. The presumed advantages of this plan are, that it allows of the exclusion of occurrences comparatively trifling and unimportant, while it gives to each narrative a unity and distinctness which could not otherwise be secured.

Whether these advantages are sufficient to warrant the deviation from ordinary practice, is a question which the Author will not discuss. He is satisfied with stating the motives and reasons which have led to the departure. It is proper to observe, that the volume now submitted does not profess to contain a complete History of British India during the period chosen, but only portions of its history. It will be manifest, also, that the events selected as subject for the various chapters are apparently of very unvn equal degrees of importance. Those, however, which seem to possess the humblest pretensions, have not been taken up without reference to the illustration of some great principle of legislation or government — a purpose which, if effected, confers both dignity and interest upon events which, in themselves, are but of sectmdar}' importance.

Chapter I. The Mutiny Of Vellore

The extraordinary fact, that England maintains her empire in the East principally by means of a native army, renders the connexion between the ruling powers and the military, one of extreme delicacy. One great point of reliance, which is afforded by almost every other army, is wanting in that of India. The pride of country offers one of the best securities for the fidelity of the soldier, and all judicious commanders are well aware of the importance of preserving it unimpaired. In India, the case is different. The national feeling of the troops can afford no ground of confidence ; what ever portion of this quality they may happen to possess, must operate to the prejudice of their rulers. The men who govern India are not natives of India; strangers to the soil command the obedience of its sons, and if national pride entered largely into the i1. character of the natives, that obedience, if yielded at all, would be yielded reluctantly.

Generally, in India, this feeling is any thing but strong ; and its place is occupied by a sense of the benefits derived by the individual from the maintenance of the European supremacy, combined with a somewhat indefinite, and perhaps almost super stitious feeling of respect for the people who, within the compass of a very brief period, have, as if by enchantment, become masters of an em pire splendid beyond comparison with any other ever held in a condition of dependency by a foreign state. Yet, with all the allowances that must be made on the grounds of selfishness, and admira tion, and fear, it must not be supposed that natives always look on the existing state of things with entire satisfaction. It is not easy for the Mahomedan to forget that, very recently, men of his own race and creed wielded the sceptre which is now transferred to Europeans ; and though the passive character of the Hindoo, and the estrange ment from political power consequent upon the previous subjugation of his country, may gene rally be sufficient to preclude him from meditating schemes of conquest and reprisal, he is under the influence of other feelings little calculated to pro mote military subordination or secure military fidelity.

The pride of caste, and the bigotted attachment with which the Hindoo clings to an unsocial superstition, which interferes with almost every action of daily life, have a direct tendency to foster habits which in Europe must be regarded as altogether inconsistent with the character of a soldier. Between an array composed of Hindoos and Mahomedans, and the Europeans who command them, there can be but little community of feeling. Differing, as they do, in country, in religious belief, in habits of life, in form and complexion, they have not even the bond of a common tongue ; the European officers generally possessing but a slender knowledge of the languages of the men under their command, and the men no knowledge at all of the language of their officers. The elements of discontent are, therefore, sufficiently powerful, while the means of allaying it are small ; and it is obvious that, in an army so constituted, vigilance must never for a moment be permitted to slumber.

This important truth can never be lost sight of without endangering the safety of the British do minion in India, and, by consequence, the well being of the people committed to its care. The event which forms the subject of this chap teroccurred shortly after the retirement of the Mar quess Wellesley from the scene where he had acted so brilliant a part. His splendid career in India had closed too soon for the interests of his country,* * The period at which these recollections commence pre cludes the possibility of any attempt to do justice to the match less union of genius, judgment, and energy displayed by the Marquess Wellesley in his administration of the government of b 2 India. and the appointment of governor-general was pro visionally held by Sir George Barlow. A later governor-general, Lord William Bentinck, administered the affairs of Fort St. George.

It was at a station under that presidency that those disastrous occurrences took place, which at the time excited no inconsiderable alarm both in India and at home, and which are recorded in characters of blood. India. Happily it is rendered unnecessary by the recent pub lication of his important and valuable Official Papers, which have admitted the reader into the council-chamber and the closet of the most distinguished statesman of modern times, and which will expound to future generations, not his actions merely, but the motives and views under which they were per formed. The singular lot of this eminent servant of his country may be regarded as truly enviable. The advanced age which he has attained has enabled him to receive in person that tardy justice, which is seldom meted out to the truly great until they have been removed from the scene of their labours.

The feeling called forth by this extraordinary circumstance may best be described in his own beautiful language, in acknowledging an honorary grant from the East-India Company, in testimony of their mature estimation of the value of his services : — " To such an extent have my days been prolonged, that I have seen my Indian administration tried by the unerring test of time, and subjected to the ordeal of a new age and of a new generation. After the lapse of thirty years — after all my principles, motives, and views, have been fully disclosed, and all their results and consequences fully ascertained and proved, the Company has awarded to me a meed of fame which gives to living honour all the weight and authority of a judgment of posterity." — Letter lu lite Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the EasUlndia Com pany, 18th Nov. 1837.

In the spring of 1806, symptoms of insubordination were manifested by a part of the troops under the presidency. They seem scarcely to have excited the degree of attention which they called for : and at the very moment when the authorities were congratulating themselves upon their entire suppression, Vellore became the scene of open mutiny and ferocious massacre. The ostensible cause of the disturbance was a partial change in the dress of the troops. The old turban had been thought inconvenient, and it was proposed to replace it by one lighter, and better adapted to the military character. The alteration was recommended by two officers of long experience in the Company s service, was sanctioned by the commander-in-chief, Sir John Cradock, and finally was submitted to the governor, Lord William Bentinck, who approved it, and ordered the new turban to be adopted by a corps of fen cibles under his own especial command.

The use of this turban, however, either actually violated the prejudices of the men, or was seized upon by designing agitators as affording the means of ex citing disaffection to the European authorities. Acts of insubordination occurred connected with an alleged reluctance to the adoption of the new turban. Neglected for a time, it at length became impossible to avoid noticing them. They were confined principally to two battalions of different regiments ; — one of them stationed at Vellore, the other at Wallajahbad. The irregularities were more general, as well as more marked, in the battalion stationed in the former place, and when they attracted attention, it was deemed inexpedient to suffer the battalion to remain there. It was accordingly ordered to proceed to the presidency, where a court-martial was assembled for the trial of two men, whose conduct had been especially reprehensible.

They were convicted, and sentenced to corporal punishment. At Wallajahbad, a native subahdar, who had been guilty of apparent connivance at the disorderly proceedings which had taken place, was summarily dismissed from the service, and, on the recommendation of the commander at that station, three companies of European troops were marched thither from Poonamallee. The intimations of disorder now appeared to subside at both places. The commanding officer of the battalion stationed at Vellore reported it to be in as perfect a state of discipline as any other native corps on the establishment. At Wallajahbad subordination appeared to be entirely restored. A general order had been prepared, for the purpose of removing any apprehensions which the native troops might entertain as to future interference with their reli gious prejudices ; but the apparent calm lulled the authorities into a persuasion of security, and it was deemed judicious to suspend the publication of the order.

The seeming tranquillity was deceitful. The assurance of the re-establishment of discipline at Vellore, conveyed from that station to the com mander-in-chief, and by him forwarded to the Government, reached the presidency on the 10th of July, and, on the same day, the smouldering embers of sedition and mutiny burst into a flame. Early in the morning of that day, the native troops rose against the European part of the garrison, consisting of two companies of his Majesty's 69th regiment, whom, with every other European with in their reach, they doomed to indiscriminate slaughter. The attack was totally unexpected, and consequently no preparations had been made for resisting it. The hour chosen by the conspirators, two o'clock in the morning, was well adapted to their murderous intentions, the execution of them being aided by darkness, and by the fact of a con siderable portion of their destined victims being asleep.

But, notwithstanding all these unfavour able circumstances, the British troops did not dishonour their country. For a considerable time they maintained possession of the barracks, ex posed to a heavy fire from their assailants. When this position became no longer tenable, a part of the garrison effected their escape to the ramparts of the fortress, where they esta blished themselves, and of which they retained possession for several hours after all the officers of the corps had been killed or disabled, and after their ammunition had been entirely ex hausted. About four hours after the commencement of the attack, intelligence of it was received by Colonel Gillespie, at the cantonment of Arcot, a distance of about sixteen miles, and that officer immediately put in motion the greater part of the troops at his disposal, consisting of the 19th regi ment of Dragoons and some Native Cavalry, of the strength of about 450 men.

Putting himself at the head of one squadron of dragoons and a troop of native cavalry, he proceeded with the greatest celerity to Vellore, leaving the remainder of the troops to follow with the guns under Lieut. -Colonel Kennedy. On his arrival Colonel Gillespie effected a junction with the gallant residue of the 69th ; but it was found impracticable to obtain any decisive advantage over the insurgents until the arrival of the remainder of the detachment, which reached Vellore about ten o'clock. The main object then was to reduce the fort. The mutineers directed their powerful force to the defence of the interior gate, and, on the arrival of the guns, it was resolved that they should be directed to blowing it open, preparatory to a charge of the cavalry, to be aided by a charge of the remnant of the 69th, under the personal command of Colonel Gillespie.

These measures were executed with great preci sion and bravery. The gate was forced open by the fire of the guns ; — a combined attack by the European troops and the native cavalry followed, which, though made in the face of a severe fire, ended in the complete dispersion of the insurgents, and the restoration of the fort to the legitimate authorities. About 350 of the mutineers fell in the attack, and about 500 were made prisoners in Vellore and in various other places to which they had fled. The number of Europeans massacred by the insurgents amounted to 113. Among them were Colonel Fancourt and thirteen other officers. Vel lore was the only station disgraced by open revolt and massacre ; the symptoms of disaffection ma nifested at Wallajahbad, Hyderabad, and other places, were by seasonable and salutary precau tions suppressed.

In some instances, the murderous proceedings at Vellore impressed the commanding officers at other stations with such an undue degree of apprehension, as to lead them to disarm their native troops without sufficient cause —an unreasonable suspicion thus succeeding to an unreasonable confidence. Indeed, the European officers seem generally to have taken but small pains to inform themselves of the feelings and dispositions of the native troops. Looking at the events which preceded the unhappy affair at Vellore, it seems impossible to avoid feeling sur prise at the unconsciousness and security displayed by the European authorities up to the moment of the frightful explosion. No apprehension appears to have been entertained, although the massacre was preceded by circumstances abundantly sufficient to justify it; and though the approaching danger was not left to be inferred from circumstan ces.

Positive testimony as to the treacherous inten tions of the native troops was tendered, but, unfortunately, treated with disregard and contempt. Amidst the disgusting exhibition of almost uni versal treachery, a solitary instance of fidelity to the ruling powers occurred, and the name of Mustapha Beg deserves on this account to be recorded. This man, who had become acquainted with a part, if not the whole, of the designs of the conspirators, proceeded on the night of the 16th of June to the house of one of the officers of the garrison, and there stated that the Mussul • mans of the battalion had united to attack the barracks, and kill all the Europeans, on account of the turban. The course taken upon this occasion by the officer to whom the communication was made, was certainly, under the circumstances, an extraordinary one : he referred the matter to the native officers, and they reported that no objection existed to the use of the turban.

One of the parties implicated admitted having used certain expressions attributed to him, but gave them an interpretation which rendered them harmless ; and the evidence of the informant was alleged to be unworthy of credit — first, on the ground of general bad character ; and secondly, because he laboured under the infirmity of madness. The charge of habitual drunkenness, which was brought against Mustapha Beg, was certainly not sufficient to warrant the rejection of his evidence without further inquiry ; and the imputation of madness appears never to have been thought of before, but to have been fabricated at the moment for the especial purpose of destroying the force of his testimony. That it should have obtained the implicit belief and acquiescence of the European officer in command is inexplicable upon any reasonable grounds.

The men who made the charge had a direct interest in establishing it — something more, therefore, than mere assertion was requisite before it could reasonably be credited ; yet no evidence that Mustapha Beg had ever previously displayed symptoms of insanity seem to have been afforded, or even required. His story was at once rejected as the effusion of a distempered mind, and thus success was ensured to the atrocious design, which a rational caution might have frustrated. The degree of information possessed by Mustapha Beg has been the subject of question. It has been said that he knew much more than he avowed ; that he was, in fact, acquainted with the entire plans and objects of the conspirators, and studiously concealed a part of them. This may be true, inasmuch as, in most cases, it is nearly impossible for any degree of labour or ingenuity to draw from a native witness " the whole truth ; " but it must be remembered that this charge rests upon testimony in no way preferable to that of Mustapha Beg himself ; and, if well-founded, the fact of the informer con ceal ing'a part of what he knew, cannot justify the unaccountable inattention displayed towards that which he revealed.

The communication made by Mustapha Beg was disregarded, and the massacre of Vellore followed. This event, in connexion with the in subordination displayed at other stations, demanded careful and minute inquiry as to the cause. The greatest confidence had been reposed in the native troops ; that confidence had been continued even after much had occurred which ought to have shaken it ; but the disaffection of a part of the troops was no longer matter of mere report or mere suspicion — it had been manifested too plainly and too terribly to admit of denial or of doubt. The Government, therefore, now commenced the business of inquiry in earnest. From the national characteristics of the native troops, it must be always a work of some diffi culty to trace their actions and impressions to their genuine origin.

The obnoxious turban was put forward as the main ground of dissatisfaction, combined with some orders which had been re cently issued, by which the men, when on duty, were forbidden to wear on their faces certain marks of caste, and were required to trim their beards in a uniform manner. It appears that the latter regulations were not altogether new : they had been enforced in certain regiments and neglected in others, and the orders only required a general conformity to practices which had for some time been partially adopted. The objection to the new turban (as far as any sincere objection was felt at all) lay principally with the Mahome dans, who thought themselves degraded by being required to wear any thing approaching in ap pearance to an European hat. The restrictions in regard to marks of caste were applicable to the Hindoos ; but the regulations relating to the beard seem to have been obnoxious to both classes.

As the two officers, by whose recommendation the regulations were adopted, had been long in the Company's service, it may seem that they ought to have been better acquainted with the feelings and prejudices of the native troops than to have risked the affections of the army, and the consequent safety of the British dominion, upon a point so perfectly trifling as a change of dress. As far, however, as the turban is concerned, it is but justice to those officers to state, that they appear to have had little reason to apprehend any opposition to its introduction, and still less to an ticipate the criminal excesses for which it afforded a pretext. The proposed change was long a mat ter of publicity. In the first instance, three tur bans were made, and three men — a Mahomedan, a Rajpoot, and a Gentoo — wore them at the presidency for inspection.

These men declared that they preferred them to the old ones. The pattern turbans were afterwards publicly exhibited at the adjutant-general's office, where they were seen by officers and men of all ranks and classes. The new turban bore a near resemblance to that which had been long worn by one of the battalions of Native Infantry ; in another regiment, one of the battalions wore a turban little differing from a Scottish bonnet, and turbans not very dissimilar were in use in various regiments. With such precedents, it might have been presumed that no resistance would have been offered to an innovation calculated materially to promote the comfort of the men. On the other points, it is not perhaps easy to acquit the framers of the regulation of having somewhat rashly impaired the real efficiency of the army, from an over-anxious desire to improve its appearance.

The Hindoos are, of all people upon the earth, the most alive to any interference with their superstitious observances. This fact must have been familiar to officers of so much experience as those who proposed the offensive orders, and to outrage the feelings of the troops for no better purpose than to render their appearance more agreeable to the eye of military taste, was ill-advised and im prudent. Yet, though this gave considerable offence and, if the prejudices of the Hindoos are to be respected, the feeling of offence was not unwar ranted — it was not the main cause of the mutiny ; for it appears that few of the Hindoos joined in it except by the instigation of the Mahomedans. The latter class were every where the promoters of the disturbances, and it remains to be seen by what motives they were actuated.

The Mahomedans objected to the new turban, and this led the Hindoos to dwell upon their own grievances ; but the turban itself was but a pretext, artfully used by the emissaries of those hostile to the British sway, to excite discontent and rebellion. The native officers, both before and after the occurrences at Vellore, declared that there was nothing in the new turban inconsistent with the laws and usages of their religion, or in any way degrading to those who were required to wear it ; and the chief conspirator at Vellore, a few days previously to the insurrection, being questioned by his commanding officer as to the existence of dissatisfaction, offered, in the presence of the other native officers, to place the Koran on his head and swear that there was none, and that the whole corps were prepared to wear the turban.

The feeling against it was certainly far from universal ; for, in many instances, much alacrity was shewn in adopting it ; and, after the mutiny, some corps requested permission to wear it as a testimony of their unshaken fidelity. Something, indeed, must be allowed for the habitual dissimulation which is one of the national characteristics ; but all the evidence tends to show that, had no political causes intervened, the change would have been effected as quietly as others had been, which in themselves were more likely to give offence. But Vellore was, at that time, the seat of deep and dark intrigues, directed to the destruction of the British Government, and the elevation of a Mahomedan sovereignty upon its ruins. The Fortress of Vellore was the residence of the sons of Tippoo Sultan, and the whole neighbourhood swarmed with the creatures of the deposed family.

The choice of this place for their abode was an inj udicious one, and the circumstances under which they were permitted to reside there enhanced the dangers arising from their situation. An extravagant revenue had been placed at their disposal, which enabled them to purchase the services of a host of retainers — an advantage which they did not neglect. Many were to be found who, from old associations, possessed a feeling of attachment to the family of Tippoo ; many more who, from religious bigotry, or other motives, were willing to engage in any scheme having for its object the destruction of a European and Christian power ; and a still greater number ready to sell themselves to the best bidder, and to lend their assistance to any cause in the prosperity of which they hoped to participate.

The Mahomedan power had de clined with extraordinary rapidity, and the number of those whose fortunes had declined with it was considerable. Many of these persons had entered the army of the conquerors ; and our own ranks thus comprehended a body of men, whose feelings and whose interests were arrayed against us. Over every class of those who cherished sentiments of discontent, or hopes of advantage from change, the sons of Tippoo were imprudently allowed the means of establishing and retaining unbounded in fluence. The place chosen for their residence was in the immediate neighbourhood of their former grandeur — the restraint under which they were placed, of the mildest character — the accommoda tion provided for them, of the most splendid de scription — their allowances on a scale of Oriental magnificence.

The imprudent bounty of the Bri tish Government thus furnished them with an almost unlimited command of the means of corrup tion, and enabled them to add to the stimulus of hope, the more powerful temptation of immediate reward. These opportunities and advantages they abundantly improved, and the consequence was, that, in the town and garrison of Vellore, their numerical strength was greater than that of the Government which held them in captivity. It appears that not fewer than 3,000 Mysoreans settled in Vellore and its vicinity subsequently to its becoming the abode of the princes ; that the number of their servants and adherents in the Pettah amounted to about 1,800 ; that the general c population of the place had astonishingly increased, and that some hundreds of persons were destitute of any visible means of subsistence.

These were circumstances which ought to have excited suspicion — which ought to have called forth vigour : unfortunately, they were regarded with apathy. Instead of the strict and vigilant superintendence which ought to have been exer cised over such a population in such a place, there is the strongest ground for concluding that the utmost laxity prevailed. It is clear that, for the purposes of security, the military power ought to have been paramount ; but authority was at Vel lore so much divided as to destroy all unity of purpose, all energy, and nearly all responsibility. The commanding officer, of course, controlled the troops — the collector was charged with the care of the police — and the paymaster of stipends with the custody of the princes. This was a departure from the original plan by which the whole of those duties had been entrusted to the military com mander, and the change was far from judicious.

With so many chances in their favour, the sons of Tippoo were not likely to be very scrupulous in availing themselves of the opportunities which fortune had thrown in their way ; and that, at least, two of them were implicated in the atrocities, is beyond question. The connexion of those events with simultaneous disturbances at Hyderabad, and other places, was not distinctly traced ; but there can be little doubt of their having originated in the same cause, and little clanger of error in treating them all as ramifications of the same conspiracy. The means resorted to of exciting disaffection were invariably the same. The changes of dress, which, but for the sinister arts employed to pervert them, would have attracted no more attention than matters so trivial demanded, were declared to be part of an organized plan for forcing Christianity on the troops and the people.

The turban was held up to their hatred as a Christian hat, as the turnscrew attached to the forepart of the uniform was converted into a cross, the symbol of the Christian faith. Even the practice of vaccination, which had been for some time introduced, was represented as intended to advance the cause of Christianity. The reports, circulated for the purpose of inflaming the minds of the people, differed only in the greater or less extent of their demands upon popular credulity. At Hyderabad, the most outrageous rumours were propagated and believed. Among other extravagances, it was currently reported that the Europeans were about to make a human sacrifice, in the person of a native ; that a hundred bodies without heads were lying along the banks of the Moose river ; that the Europeans had built a church, which it required a sacrifice of human heads to sanctify ; and that they designed to massacre all the natives except those who should erect the sign of the cross on the c2 doors of their dwellings.