The Founding of the German Empire by William I. ... Translated by M. L. Perrin ... assisted by G. Bradford

Front matter

EMPEROR WILLIAM I THE FOUNDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE BY WILLIAM I. BASED CHIEFLY UPON PRUSSIAN STATE DOCUMENTS BY IIEINRICH VON SYBEL TRANSLATED BY MARSHALL LIVINGSTON PERRIN, Ph.D. (Gott.) OF BOSTON UNIVERSITY ASSISTED BY GAMALIEL BRADFORD, JR. Vol. I. "Rerum cognoscere causas" NEW YORK THOMAS Y. CROWELL & CO. 46 East Fourteenth Street Copyright, 1890, By Thomas Y. Cuowell & Co. C. J. PETERS &. SON, TVPOGRAPHER8 AND ELECTROTYPERB, 145 high street, boston. TO THE MEMORY OF EMPEROR WILLIAM I. WITH REVERENCE AND GRATITUDE.

Preface

. After having pictured in my " History of the Revo lutionary Period from 1789 to 1800 " the downfall of the Holy Roman Empire among the Germans, nothing could have more interest for me, in view of the great events of 1866 and 1870, than now to describe, with the aid of authentic documents, the re-birth of the German Empire. It was naturally, for a long time, impossible to carry out this plan, for political reasons ; but after Prince Bismarck allowed the publication of his Frankfort reports and letters, I was so fortunate as to receive from him, March 19, 1881, the permission to make use of the contents of the Government Archives, as well as of the registry of the Department of Foreign Affairs, with a view to publishing a history of Prussia during the years 1850-1870. Here I found an almost unlimited supply of most useful material : ministerial decrees, ambassadors' reports, minutes of Sessions and Conferences, telegrams, correspondence of all kinds, numerous diplomatic com munications and despatches from foreign powers, im portant transactions of the Chambers, and newspaper clippings, — all well arranged in long rows of many hundred packages of State papers. These were supplev

PREFACE.

. VI mented by the papers of the State Department, and of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, by oral information obtained from persons who took part in the events, or were closely connected with them; also, as far as the antagonistic party was concerned, by the old Archives of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Nassau. Thus it was possible, for the most part, to write the history of these decades from the very documents which had been issued during the course of Prussia's career or had determined the same. It was possible to follow very exactly every turn in Prussian politics during the deci sive crises, often day by day, sometimes even hour by hour. I think I may be allowed to express my conviction that after so many incomplete, partly incorrect, and even untrue presentations of the subject, we have here an accurate and comprehensive picture of the Prussian aims and efforts.

The reader will be sur prised to see how many important facts and considerations appear in this connection for the first time, or, at least, in a new light. I have not troubled myself about other archives, for the simple reason that there was not the slightest prospect that a petition to make use of them would be granted. I should gladly and thankfully accept any further information or correction in any special line, if, as was the case with my History of the Revolutionary Period, the appearance of this book should occasion, in other quarters, documentary investigation, and, at the same time, an extension of our historical knowledge. In no part of the book have I tried to conceal my

PREFACE.

. VII Prussian and National Liberal convictions ; and yet I hope that the reader will not misjudge my endeavor to recognize, without palliation, faults and mistakes in my own camp, and to judge justly and fairly the conduct of my opponents, that is to say, not to refer their motives to foolishness or baseness, but to explain them as the result of the traditional premises upon which their whole position is based. The struggles of 1866 did not arise from the arbitrariness of personal passions ; they sprang rather from the inevitable conflict between old rights, which had been growing for centuries, and the national sentiment which made itself felt more and more. This caused an unhealthy condition of things, which became at last unendurable, and only a violent crisis could bring about a state of convalescence.

Hap pily for Germany, the period of recovery was reached. The opponents of 1866 are not simply reconciled to one another, but united more firmly and lastingly in the bonds of friendship than ever before. The times of the old Bundestag are behind us, and they form a closed chapter of our past history. We are able to talk as dispassionately about Koniggratz as about Kollin and Leuthen. My most earnest wish will be realized, if I shall have succeeded in making this way of looking at things clearly felt in every word of this book. Then the diag nosis of the disease and of the crisis cannot but serve to establish more firmly the newly acquired health and concord. >• The two volumes now published bring the narration

PREFACE.

. to the commencement of the last war with Denmark ; those next following, which bring the history down to the formation of the North German Confederation, will appear in the course of the coming year. I cannot now definitely set a time for the completion of the entire work ; but I shall do all in my power to hasten it. HEINRICH VON SYBEL. Berlin, October, 1889. CONTENTS OF VOLUME I.

Book I. Retrospect

CHAPTER PAGE I. THE EARLIEST TIMES 3 II. AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA 14 III. FOREIGN RULE — WAR OF INDEPENDENCE . 28 IV. FIRST YEARS OF THE DIET 52 V. INFLUENCE OF THE REVOLUTION OF 1830 . 82 VI. FREDERICK WILLIAM IV. .:.... 108

Book II. First Attempt At German Unity

I. THE MARCH REVOLUTION 145 The Movement in the Lesser States. — Conference at Heidelberg. — Fall of Metternich. — Attitude of Frederick William. — Excitement in Berlin. — The March Days in Berlin. — Berlin in the Hands of the Rioters. — National Plans of the King. — Failure of the Design. — Schleswig- Holstein and Posen. — The coming Parliament. II. THE PARTIES 169 Results of the Convention. — Rebellions in Baden and Posen. — Suppression of the Rebellions. — Discussion of a Constitution. — Dahlmann's Constitution. — Rejection of Dahlmann's Scheme. — Opinion of the Prince of Prussia. — Attitude of Frederick William IV. — Position of Austria. III. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND IMPERIAL REGENT . 191 Sentiment of the Majority. — Heinrich Von Gagern. — Proposition of a Directory. — Gagern favors a Regency. — Increasing Prospect of a Regency. — Proposition to abolish the Confederate Diet. — Decree of the 28th of June. — Criticism of the Articles. — Recognition of the Regent. — The Archduke takes the Oath. — Clever Manœuvre of the Diet.

CONTENTS. X CHAPTER PAGE IV. COMPLICATIONS 218 Beginning of the Reaction. — Postponement of the Constitution.— Ludolf Camphausen. — Gagern and Camphausen. — Peucker's Circular. — Prussia's Proposal. — Rejection of Prussia's Proposition. — The Fundamental Rights. — Debate on Polish Affairs. — Growth of Party Hatred. —Republican Preparations. — Growing Discontent.

Book III. Failure Of The Projects For German Unity

I. SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 247 Wildenbruch's Mission. — Outbreak of the War. — The Foreign Powers, favor Denmark. — Swedish Preparations. — English Mediation. — Prussian Embarrassment. — Count Pourtales in Malmo. — Negotiations about a Truce. — Wrangel prevents a Truce. — Fresh Negotiations. — Reception of the Truce. — The National Assembly indignant. — Attitude of the National Assembly. — Republican Insurrection. — General Reflections. II. THE PARLIAMENT AND THE POWERS . . .280 First Articles of the Constitution. — Functions of the Government. — Affairs in Berlin and Vienna. — Count Brandenburg. — The Prussian Diet. — Prussia and Bavaria. — Bavaria's Proposition. — Gagern in Berlin. — Changes in Austria. — Schwarzenberg's Programme. — Changes in the Parliament. — Schwarzenberg's Views. — Prussia's Memorial. — System of Groups. — Frederick William's Note. — Schwarzenberg's Comments. — The King's Note. — The Lesser States.

III. THE QUESTION OF THE SUPREME AUTHORITY . 320 Gagern's Programme. — Dissension in the Assembly. — Deliberations at Berlin. — Austria's Proposals. — Further Deliberations at Berlin. —Austria's Note of February 4th. — Postponement of the Second Reading. — Electoral Law. IV. THE CATASTROPHE 340 The Olmiitz Proclamation. — Welcker's Motion. — Coalition. — The Second Reading. — Indecision of the King. - Reply to the Frankfort Deputation. — Prussia and Austria. — Camphausen. — Mission of Von Beckerath. — Condition of the Lesser States. — Prussia rejects the Constitution. — End of the National Assembly. CONTENTS. XI

Book IV. The Prussian Union

CHAPTER pAOE I. LEAGUE OF THE THREE KINGDOMS . . . .369 General von Radowitz. — Democratic Uprisings. — Prussia's Propositions to Austria. — Frederick William's Plan.— Feeling of the Lesser States. — Draft of the 26th of May. — Reservations of Saxony and Hanover. — Prussia and the Regent. — Revolt in Baden. — Suppression of the Revolt. — Success of Prussia. — Subjection of Hungary. — Compact of the Interim. — Opposition of the Diet. II. THE COUNTER-LEAGUE 403 Schwarzenberg's Plans. — Federation of the four Kings. — Opinions of Frederick William. — Parties in Prussia. — Acceptance of the Union. — Close of the Interim. — Revival of the Confederate Diet. — Indignation of Frederick William. — Meeting of Princes in Berlin. — The Congress at Frankfort. III. RUSSIAN INFLUENCE 430 Danish Offers. — Renewal of the War by Denmark. — Preliminaries of Peace. — Prussia's Proposal of a simple Peace. — Prussian Proposals. — Visit of the Prince to the Czar. — Czar Nicholas. — Negotiations with the Czar. — Prince Schwarzenberg. — Discussion about the Danish Peace. — Louis Napoleon. — Utterances of Louis Napoleon. —Their Effect upon Frederick William.

IV. THE CRISIS 457 Schwarzenberg's Plan. — Prussia's Refusal. — Division in the Berlin Cabinet. — Views of the King. —Radowitz advises Preparations. — The Czar displeased with Austria. — Views of Schwarzenberg. — Agreement of Russia and Austria. —The Elector, of Hesse-Cassel. — The Minister Hassenpflug. — Attitude of the Confederate Diet. — Prussia and Hesse-Cassel. — Advice of Radowitz. — Schwarzenberg and Radowitz. — Preparations for War. — Brandenburg sent to Warsaw.

Chapter I. The Earliest Times

We know about when the Germans arrived in their present dwelling-place* and entered the arena of Euro pean civilization, but it is by no means so easy to deter mine when there began to be a German nation, which exerted an influence as a political community. In the very earliest times there seems to have been among the Germans no trace of a national conscious ness. The small, isolated tribes are sometimes friendly to one another, and sometimes hostile ; they break up into their component elements, or unite for the time with each other into larger groups, regardless of kin ship, and then separate again, just as external circum stances may require. Only the most closely related hold together constantly, such as members of the same family, district, or retinue, where their common interest, the community of blood or fate, forces itself upon their material apprehension in their daily intercourse with one another.

They are strong and self-reliant people, who can get along only with natures like their own. and who feel as much repelled by the slightest dissimi larity as by the greatest. Whenever they hold together as a whole, no adversary can be a match for them ; and all their later enemies have agreed with Tacitus in exclaiming, " How fortunate that they are always quar relling among themselves ! "* Thus, then, they hold naturally to the individual. A national consciousness appears first as the outcome of an advance in civiliza tion. So it was in the earliest times, and so it has been at every stage of our history. A long training in poli tics, in economics, and in mental discipline was neces sary before the Germans succeeded in establishing a German national government. 'i? Now, what form did this training of the German people take?

What part did the state and religion, literature and political economy, play in developing them into a nation? We cannot blind our eyes to the fact : their influence was as unfavorable as possible. We shall entirely leave out of consideration the ques tion whether the course of events was in other respects desirable, advantageous, or inevitable. We shall simply show conclusively that for long series of years the conditions were inimical to the establishment of a German nation upon a firm basis. The step which was decisive in the advance of Ger man civilization for a full thousand years was their admission into the Roman Empire and into the Roman Church. In connection with these they formed monar chies of considerable size, and learned to appreciate the SUPREMACY OF THE CARLOVINGIANS. 5 significance of large political and ecclesiastical bodies.

But whereas their former combinations included only small portions of the German race, their connections now reached far out beyond the limits of any one people. The small provinces and clans of earlier times did not become elements of a national unit, but of a universal empire, and of a universal Church. Like Augustus Cæsar, Charlemagne was served by a heterogeneous body, composed of the most widely differing races. Not only all the Germans of the Continent, but also Romanized Gauls, Spaniards, Italians, and even countries of the Slavs and Avars, were subject to him. After its union with the Romish Papacy this sover eignty claimed even more : the right to force the whole world into the acceptance of the Christian faith, and to demand from all Christendom obedience to the Emperor and to the Pope.

No common bond was to be formed, no common feeling to be created, between Franks and Saxons, Swabians and Bavarians; on the contrary, every national peculiarity was to be given up in view of the universal Christian idea. It has been properly said that this Empire was not yet a State. It was at once more and less than a State: more, for it was State and Church combined, a hierarchy under two leaders, one monarch for war and one for peace ; and less, inasmuch as, in the zeal for further conquest and for a more firmly established or thodoxy, all interest in the simplest questions of poli tics, and all means of settling the same, dwindled into nothing. It gave up, in ever increasing measure, to local rulers or communities the most important duties of state, as well as all participation in matters concern ing jurisprudence, — the executive, and the army.

So it came about, that in the midst of a dominion which sought to embrace the entire Occident, the old Germanic individualism, the exclusive interest in only those who were most nearly related, the devotion to the special interests of the community or of the feudal connection, sprang up again into a full and vigorous growth. The contrast could not have been more striking between their actual narrow life and their political and ecclesiastical ideals, which knew no bounds. It is true that when the Carlovingian universal empire was broken up, the German duchies, whether owing to the accident of inheritance or to the unconscious influ ence of national relationship, united into a German monarchy. Hardly had this taken place before the Saxon Otto took up again the universal ideas of Char lemagne, the protectorship over the universal Roman Church, and, consequently, the seizure of the Roman imperial crown and the claim to the supreme authority throughout all Christendom.

Three powerful imperial dynasties put their whole energy into the realization of this object, and the temporary successes of the first Otto, the third Henry, and the first Frederick, have fixed the wondering gaze of all succeeding generations upon the mighty forms of these iron conquerors. Yet each time the proud structure, built as it was on a loose foundation, fell to pieces even more precipitately than in the days of the Carlovingians. For these later THE MEDIÆVAL EMPIRE. 7 emperors also were obliged to purchase the assistance of their subordinate princes by granting them further privileges, thereby, of course, weakening still more the power of the monarchy. But just at this time, at the very central point of the system, broke out the ruinous quarrel between the two leaders, the Pope and the Emperor.

The spiritual and secular potentates both north and south of the Alps took sides in the quarrel, and for two centuries the civil war which had been kindled by Rome devastated both Germany and Italy. No wonder that the Germans became gradually indifferent to the ambitious plans of their emperors, and that the last Staufens waged the war against the papacy almost wholly supported by Italian adherents. Their final and overwhelming downfall is well known. The victory of the universal spiritual and temporal sover eign was complete. It was at this time that the saying was uttered, " All great empires must be broken up into tetrarchates, that the crowned priest may rule over them all." It is easily seen that during these long civil wars which finally split up into countless local quarrels, no conscious national feeling could be developed.

North and South Germany were as foreign to each other as if they were people of different races. The great Swabian and Bavarian poems of chivalry and love were as incomprehensible to the Northern Germans as the fables of Low Germany were to the people of the South. The commerce of the Levant, which was increasing rapidly, lay exclusively in the hands of the High Germans, while the growing power of the Han seatic League was kept in the possession of the Low German cities. In only one important matter was there any successful co-operation of all the races, — in the great colonization of the East. The Bavarian East Mark (afterwards the archduchy of Austria) had been Germanized long before; now followed German settlements in Bohemia and Mora via, in Silesia and Transylvania, invited and favored by the rulers, who were themselves foreigners, but often looked upon with envy and hatred by the natives.

The German element spread even more thoroughly through out the Baltic region, by means of conquests over the Slavs and the old inhabitants of Prussia,1 and by con stant accessions from all the German races. Flemings, Westphalians, and Low Saxons poured into the Marks of Brandenburg, into Mecklenburg and Pomerania. The German Order summoned Saxon and Swabian, Thuringian and Frankish nobles to the conquest of Prussia, and these were soon followed by the corre sponding contingent of citizens and peasants. The natives were either destroyed in war, or outnumbered and absorbed by the new-comers. Here, then, there was no more distinction of races. They were simply Germans, and the country became German land. While in the old home political disintegration grew apace, constant dangers, both internal and external, forced large colonial territories to hold together, and to or ganize a stronger central government. 1 Die Prutenen. — Trans.

DECAY OF THE EMPIRE. 9 Yet, however significant was the progress in this direction, everything remained unsettled as long as the German people did not succeed in establishing a well ordered constitution for the whole empire. But of this there seemed to be no hope. There was nothing more said about the old idea of imperial authority over all Christendom. Rudolph of Hapsburg and his two fol lowers were German kings, without the vain show of the empty title of emperor, and this title remained almost meaningless when the later rulers assumed it again. Not only in Italy and Burgundy, in Hungary and Poland, was it all over with German rule ; even in Germany itself the royal power had sunk into im potence, and no longer controlled the independent will of its vassal princes. The great houses of Hapsburg, Wittelsbach, and Luxemburg quarrelled for the su premacy.

Every State sought to extend its rights and possessions at the expense of its neighbors or its sub jects. The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were for Germany a time of universal and almost uninterrupted anarchy. The strength and zeal of the nation spent itself in the establishment and extension of principali ties and communities of various sizes, into which the German land gradually split up, and they were more than three hundred in number. Here was an instance of what it means to a great people when the central authority, the source of all strength and justice, is seen to be resting upon so slight a support. That the lords of these territories, by their constant quarrels, disturbed the general prosperity, was the least of the resulting evils. In the interior of each country, by reason of the weakness of the imperial authority, might made right; the prince, the clergy, and the nobility divided among themselves the power and the possessions.

The smaller cities lost their independence ; throughout the Empire the free peasants sunk under the yoke of servitude. Externally, too, the tion Empire was unable to protect any one of its parts against its neighbors. East and West Prussia were yielded to the superior might of Poland; Schleswig-Holstein chose voluntarily to place itself under the Danish King ; all the Netherland provinces fell into the power of the French house of Burgundy; and the Swiss Confederation no longer belonged to the Empire but in name. For many generations, under Charles IV. and his sons, as well as under their successors of the house of Hapsburg, no attempt to restrain the evil, and to reassert the power of the Empire, had any lasting effect. It was not until the time of the Emperor Maximilian I. that there seemed to be a promise of better things.

After endless pains, and in spite of the persistent opposition of the Emperor, a number of Imperial institutions of wide-reaching importance were brought into existence in the States, — an Imperial court, tbe organization of Imperial districts, an Imperial revenue law, and a State contingent of the Imperial army. Upon this ground the definite political frame-work of a great national life might have been developed, especially since the fruitful basis of such a life was already pro vided. The efforts of the Humanists to refresh the ATTEMPTS AT REFORM. 11 mental powers at the newly-opened springs of classical antiquity had started a movement which spread far and wide ; and the bold demand of Luther for a reform of the too-worldly Church was filling all the German provinces with a harmonious religious enthusiasm, at the same time that he created for his translation of the Bible a language which was just as easily understood by the Low Germans as by the High, and which ever afterwards remained a tangible expression of the national unity.

It is not our business to decide whether the mediæval or the remodelled Church offers its adherents the surest passport to heavenly bliss ; but two quite earthly considerations bear incontrovertibly upon our subject: a great majority of the German people, according to Romish testimony over seven-tenths, joined the mighty reform ; and secondly, until this time the Pope had not only been the highest judge in matters of faith, but he had received from Germany enormous revenues, had exerted an omnipresent judicial power, had decided the occupancy of the throne in many Ger man principalities, and had had the right to exert a powerful influence on the election of the German mon arch. Had it come at that time to a complete throwing off of his authority, the most important step towards national unity, and towards the political independence of Germany, would have been taken.

At this moment, however, the young King Charles of Spain and Naples, of the Netherlands and of America, obtained the throne of Germany. He had a German name, but a Spanish heart. In accordance with his religious convictions, as well as with the extent of his possessions, upon which the sun never set, he fell once more into the ruts of the mediæval Church policy ; he consequently came into close relation with the Papal Chair, and became the most persistent and determined opponent of the German Reformation. To be sure, he was not able to carry out his purpose to its fullest extent, since his ambition, which did not stop short of the whole earth, called forth the resistance of every one, sometimes even the disfavor of the Curia, and finally opposition in his own family. He was unable to crush out the German Protestants ; but he did succeed in gathering about himself once more in the Empire a strong Catholic party.

Thus was the nation torn by a bitter religious dissension ; for the Protestant princes could not be forced back into the old Church, and the Catholic States were quite as unwilling to grant to their subjects permission to join the new. The Augsburg Diet of 1555 granted to each secular State the right to choose a Confession for itself and its subjects ; so that the results of the strife which had begun so promisingly for a national unity, turned out to be exclusively favor able to individualism ; and such ambiguous decisions were made at Augsburg, and of such questionable validity, about spiritual princes and their subjects, that the dispute between the two religious parties continued uninterruptedly, and at last led to the explosion of 1618, which, spreading further, brought upon Germany the woes of the Thirty Years' War.

In this war the last gasps of a national consciousness were smothered, THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR. 13 at first in religious hatred, and later in desperate self defence, and in the relapse into barbarism. Against their own countrymen the one party led into the field Italians, Spaniards, and Poles, the other, Danes, Swedes, and Frenchmen. At last, German mercenaries and deserters were to be found in every branch of the army of either party. At the beginning, the Emperor and the Pope had every expectation of obtaining absolute sovereignty throughout all Germany ; but then the fortune turned, and the end of it was the utter defeat of the Emperor, the recognition of each of the three contending Churches, and the increased sovereign rights of the German princes. The expenses of this horrible war were borne by all Germany in the shape of the fearful desolation of the country and of the wretched condition of the people, as well as in important cessions of territory to Sweden and France. Imperial authority and national sentiment had sunk to zero. Individualism had taken entire possession of the German land and of the German spirit.

Chapter II. Austria And Prussia

It is very evident that under such conditions as the Peace of Westphalia had brought about for Germany, the re-establishment of a successful imperial government could no longer be expected from the nominal central authorities, — the Emperor and the Imperial Diet (Reichstag}. The spirit of Individualism had torn the Empire into pieces. Only the further development of this very spirit in the special governments could produce a remedy. Whenever any one State could so far extend its dominions and influence according to this traditional and selfish principle, as to overshadow all the others and force them to recognize its ascendency, then, so far as this State was concerned, selfishness and national feeling would be once more united ; then it would naturally become the representative of the common national interests. •In the same way, formerly, the kings of Wessex, by subduing the other Anglo-Saxon States, welded them into an English crown.

In the same way the Capet ian princes of France gradually forced all the West- Frankish princes and counts to recognize their royal supremacy, and thus created the French nation. THE RISE OF AUSTRIA. 15 For the whole subsequent development of German politics, the circumstance is decisive that for the solu tion of this problem there arose not one power only, but two powers side by side. Both of these, Prussia and Austria, which had been founded in the old colonial region of the East, had as rivals risen to a height of power which enabled them to lay claim to the leader ship of the entire nation. Austria was the first to arise in the century succeeding the Peace of Westphalia. To the old inherited lands of the House of Hapsburg, which had always been parts of the German Empire, were added as a result of the great victories of Prince Eugene, the whole of Hungary with its outlying prov inces, Belgium and Lombardy ; later followed the ac quisition of Tuscany and Modena through younger sons of the imperial house, and finally of Galicia as the spoils of the first division of Poland.

A dominion so extensive raised Austria to the first rank of the Euro pean powers, and made it seem to be far more than a match for the other German States, even when com bined. Accordingly in Vienna they were conscious that they were in a position to reassert all the claims of the old Roman Empire of the Germans ; and since the title of this highest of all honors in Christendom had been for centuries almost an inheritance of the House of Hapsburg, to take exception to this seemed to the leaders of Austrian politics to be a State crime. It was, to be sure, impossible to declare, as in the days of Charles V., that all the earth was subject to Austria ; but at least the nucleus of the old Empire, Germany and Italy, was to continue to recognize the imperial suprem acy. Accordingly, from the inheritance of the old Empire, that cardinal principle, namely, the union with the Romish Church, was unswervingly maintained by its successor.

From the first days of the Reformation, the House of Hapsburg had labored to root out Prot estantism ; and even the humane Maria Theresa was convinced that a Protestant was more dangerous than a Jew, and that a successful political organization could be established only on the basis of the Most Holy Church of Rome. So it happened that in Austria the Catholic clergy enjoyed the highest honors, enormous wealth, and a favored position in the assembly of the States ; they controlled the secular instruction and exercised a strict literary censorship. In return for this they gladly allowed the State to secure the con stant support of the Church by the assertion of far reaching rights of supremacy and superintendence, and were pleased that the subordination of the people was assured by the concurrence of them both.