Confederate War papers ... Second edition

Preface

. The war policy of the Confederate States Administra tion in the Autumn of 1861 — as shown by the conference, early in October, between President Davis and the three senior officers of General J. E. Johnston's Army — is the subject discussed in the first of the following series of papers. Apart from the inherent importance of this matter, the questions brought up by the Ex- President, in regard to it, give additional interest to what is believed to have been a turning point in the struggle made by the Southern States for political independence. The second paper of the series refers to the circumstances attendant upon the defence and the evacuation of New Orleans — the third relates to Confederate operations at Seven Pines or Fair Oaks — and the fourth treats of the defences of Richmond and of North Carolina in the latter part of 1862 and early months of 1863.

It is believed that, up to the present time, some of the sub jects discussed in these papers are in many essential points not clearly understood. The author has en deavored to furnish authentic data, and proof, in regard to principal facts in this connection — and hopes the fol lowing pages may aid in the formation of correct views in regard to the events referred to and be useful in obviating, at least in part, false impressions which are certainly liable to be conveyed by some of the writings heretofore published. New York City, October, 1883. CONTENTS.

Chapter I. Page

Mr. Davis disappointed when he received notice of his election to the Presidency of the Confederate States — thought himself better adapted to command in the field — Generals J. E. Johnston, Beauregard, and G. W. Smith favor an active campaign of invasion — statement of the proceedings of the conference at Fairfax Court House signed by these three Generals 13 *

Chapter II

Mr. Davis says Hiat he writes for the purpose of elucidating obscurity and correcting error — gratifying to him "only to notice for praise each and all who wore the gray" — the Generals in the conference at Fairfax Court House asked for " disciplined, seasoned troops" — his account of that conference — comments on the paper signed by the three Generals 21

Chapter III

Author's comments on Mr. Davis's statements — information received by the three generals — reasons for their writing an account of what occurred in the conference — more detailed notice of some of the incidents. President Davis CONTENTS. PAGE satisfied, at the end of the year 1861, with the results of his defensive war-policy 29

Chapter IV

General J. E. Johnston's army falls back to the vicinity of Richmond— conference at Richmond— President Davis orders the army to the Peninsula — service in the trenches — conscript law — election of new regimental officers — General Johnston withdraws from the Peninsula. 40

Chapter V

Ex-President Davis's account of the conference at Richmond — General Randolph's testimony — description of General Magruder's lines — works at Williamsburg — the retreat successfully conducted — inconclusive conversation with General Johnston — gunboats attack Drewry's Bluff — General Johnston crosses the Chickahominy river — Author's comments on Mr. Davis's statements 50

Chapter I

Description of the locality— President Davis warned, in February, 1861, of the "danger which at last proved fatal "—testimony of the Hon. Charles M. Conrad— Governor of Louisiana asks that the defences " be no longer neglected "—President Davis could not bring himself to believe the Governor's apprehensions would be realized— General Mansfield Lovell assigned to the command— testimony in regard to the condition of the Department at the time go CONTENTS. 7 PAGE; CHAPTER IT. Condition of the defences in November, 1861 — delayed by want of competent officers — heavy guns could not be obtained — preparations for defence pressed forward — organized, armed, and equipped, a brigade of 5000 men — ordered to seize, arm, man, and equip, fourteen, named, river steamboats — one million dollars appropriated by the Confederate Congress 6ft

Chapter III

Five thousand men sent from New Orleans to Columbus, Ky., by direction of President Davis. — General Lovell expresses regret at being thus deprived of all his available force — President Davis calls for more troops to be sent to Corinth — General Lovell protests against sending the ironclad Louisiana up the river — refusal of the Government to change the order — important letter from General Lovell to the Secretary of War 71

Chapter IV

Forts bombarded on 16th — guns from forts could not reach the enemy — On the 17th the Governor of Louisiana protests against sending the Louisiana up the river — President Davis replies — " The wooden vessels are below; the iron gunboats are above. The forts should destroy the former if they attempt to ascend " — enemy's ships passed the forts on the 24th — official reports of Generals Lovell, Duncan, and M. L. Smith 80

Chapter V

General Lovell applies for a Court of Inquiry — conduct approved by Generals R. E. Lee, J. E. Johnston, and Beauregard. Complaint made by the Governor of Louisiana — General Lovell's reply — application for Court of Inquiry renewed— General Van Dorn ordered to supersede General Lovell — the latter serves under the former in the CONTENTS. PAGE campaign against Corinth — relieved from duty in the field —renews his application for a Court of Inquiry— official correspondence called for by Congress— Court of Inquiry ordered 91

Chapter VI

Courtmet in April, 1863— the word " accused" not to be used to designate General Lovell — instructions from the War Department April 21st — instructions from the War Department June 15th — report of facts — opinion of the Court 99

Chapter VII

Comments upon the opinion of the Court. — General Lovell asks the War Department to inform him of the action of the Court— Congress calls for a copy of the proceedings — General Lovell applies to be assigned to duty — proceedings of the Court of Inquiry transmitted 108

Chapter I. Page

Preliminary movements: Report that McDowell was advancing on the 27th — General Johnston orders preparations to attack the Federal right on the north bank of the Chickahominy — McDowell's forces turn back — General Johnston reverts to his first intention to attack the Federal left on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy — letter from General Johnston to General Whiting 144

Chapter II

Ex-President Davis's account of preliminary operations around Richmond — Tells General Lee why and how he was dissatisfied — General Johnston'3 reported proposed plan — President rides out to see the action commence — account of that ride — Author's comments 152

Chapter III

Description of the battle ground of Seven Pines — Position and number of Confederates — of Federals — General Johnston's plan and intentions — documentary proof 158

Chapter IV

Operations on the Nine Miles road — casualties in G. W. Smith's division, under General Whiting — letter from one of General Whiting's staff officers — General Smith meets the President and General Lee— the situation after dark. .. 173

Chapter V

General Mindil's account of Federal operations on the 31st of May. Correspondence between Generals Johnston and Smith CONTENTS.

Chapter VI. Page

Ex-President Davis's description of operations on the 31st of May. Author's comments 194

Chapter VII

Operations on the 1st of June. General Longstreet directed to renew the fighting — notes calling for help — five thousand men sent to him from the crest of the Chickahominy Bluffs — General Lee assigned to the command of the Army — position held by Smith's division under Whiting ten days after the battle 204

Part IV. The Defences Of Richmond And Of North Carolina In The Latter Part Of 1862 And The Early Months Of 1863

CHAPTER L

Richmond in September, 1862— protection of General Lee'a line of communication— forces in and near Richmond— CONTENTS. 11 PAGE 263 negroes drafted to work on fortifications— General Smith asks why six of his juniors had been promoted over him — written reply to reasons assigned for the wholesale overslaughing to which he had been subjected 252

CHAPTER II.

Brigade from General Lee's army ordered to North Carolina by Secretary of War — forces under General Smith's orders check movements of the enemy against General Lee's rear — General Smith appointed Secretary of War ad interim — Enemy at Fredericksburg and on the Black Water — number and position of troops — reference to future operations.

CHAPTER III.

General Beauregard sends troops from Charleston to Wilmington — Evans fighting in front of Kinston, N. C. — General Frencli ordered to reinforce Evans — driven back, burns the bridge at Kinston — fight at Whitehall Bridge — enemy driven back with severe loss — troops from Richmond had not arrived — enemy burns one of the two bridges — General Smith's report to the Secretary of War — General Clingman's report — position of forces in North Carolina — political feeling in that State — another invasion anticipated 271

CHAPTER IV.

The state of affairs in North Carolina — Ransom's division (two small brigades) detached from General Lee's army — conflict of opinion in regard to the movements of Ransom's division — letter from General Smith to Secretary of War 279

CHAPTER V.

Federal expedition reported moving from Newbern against Wilmington — the North Carolina militia — enemy left Trenton, burned the bridge, and retired towards White Oak— memorandum sent by General Smith to General Davis — reply — Quartermaster-General in Richmond in- CONTENTS. 12 PAGE terferes with railroad transportation in North Carolina- Secretary of War orders General Smith to Richmond 290

CHAPTER VI.

Interview with President Davis— letter from General Whiting — General Smith's letters of resignation— anomalous organization — Secretary of War, by direction of President Davis, orders wholesale changes in the position of troops in North Carolina 296

CHAPTER VII

Endorsements made by President Davis on General G. W. Smith's letters of resignation — endorsement made by the Secretary of War — resignation accepted — letter from General Smith to President Davis in reply to endorsements 305

CHAPTER VIII.

Illustrative incidents — General Van Dorn ordered to General J. E. Johnston's army — President Davis appoints an Aide-de-Camp for General Smith — reorganizing brigades — alleged proposal to depose President Davis — his mind "poisoned " 316

Appendix

A. Letters addressed to General G. W. Smith in reference to his resignation 333

APPENDIX.

B. Extracts from sketch of life of Gustavus W. Smith 343

APPENDIX.

C. Severe Accusations— Refuted by plain facts 354 MAPS (at end of volume). I.— The vicinity of Richmond. II.— Battlefield of Seven Pines, May 31st. III.— Battlefield of Seven^Piees^-June 1st.

Chapter I

Mr. Davis disappointed when he received notice of his election to the Presidency of the Confederate States— thought himself better adapted to command in the field— Generals J. E. Johnston, Beauregard and G. W. Smith favor an active campaign of invasion — statement of the proceedings of the conference at Fairfax Court House signed by these three Generals. Before referring to the proceedings of the Confer ence held in October, 1861, at Fairfax Court House — in which President Davis enforced, for the time, a de fensive rather than active offensive war policy — it is but fair that he should be introduced to the reader in his OAvn words. He says:* " I had gone to my home, Brierfield, in Warren County, and had begun, in the homely but expressive language of Mr. Clay ' to repair my fences.' While thus engaged, notice was received of my election to the Presidency of the Confederate States, Avith an urgent request to proceed immediately to Montgomery for inauguration.

As this had been suggested as a probable event, and what appeared to me adequate precautions had been taken to prevent it, *"The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," by Jefferson Davis, Vol. L, p. 230. I was surprised, and, still more, disappointed. For reasons which it is not now necessary to state I had not believed myself as well suited to the office as some others. I thought myself better adapted to command in the field." In reference to the author it may be stated here, that, soon after he arrived within the Confederate States, in September, 1861, he proceeded to Richmond believing that the true policy of those States, at that time, was to make an active campaign of invasion before Winter set in. Within a week after his arrival in Richmond he was appointed Major General, ordered to report for duty, to General J. E. Johnston, and was at once as signed to command the Second corps of Johnston's army, then near Fairfax Court House, Va.

The first corps of that army was commanded by General Beau regard. Soon after the author joined the army he learned that Generals Johnston and Beauregard already favored an immediate offensive campaign, beyond the Potomac, provided an adequate force could be con centrated for that purpose: and he urged General John ston to request President Davis to visit the headquarters of the army with a view to discuss and determine this question. The President came in compliance with General Johnston's invitation. " The folloAving statement dated Centreville, Va., January 31st, 1862, signed by General Johnston and his two Corps Commanders, gives the substance of what occurred, at the October Conference, in reference to crossing the Potomac. "On the 26th of September, 1861, General Joseph E. Johnston addressed a letter to the Secretary of War in regard to the importance of putting this army in con dition to assume the offensive, and suggested that the CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 15 President, Secretary of War, or some one representing them should at an early day come to the headquarters of the army, then at or near Fairfax Court House, for the purpose of deciding whether the army could be re enforced to the extent that the Commanding General deemed necessary for an offensive campaign.

"The President arrived at Fairfax Court House, a f eAV days thereafter, late in the afternoon, and proceeded to the quarters of General Beauregard. On the same evening General Johnston and I called to pay our respects. No official subjects of importance were alluded to in that interview. At eight o'clock the next evening, by appointment of the President, a conference was had between himself, General Johnston, General Beauregard and myself — various matters of detail were introduced by the President, and talked over between himself and the two senior Generals. " Having but recently arrived, and not being well acquainted with the special subjects referred to, I took little or no part in this conversation. • Finally, with per haps some abruptness, I said, ' Mr. President, is it not possible to put this army in condition to assume the active offensive ? ' Adding that this was a question of vital importance upon which the success or failure of our cause might depend.

This question brought on dis cussion. The precise conA'ersation which followed I do not propose to give — it was not an argument — there seemed to be little difference of opinion between us in regard to general views and principles. " It was clearly stated, and agreed to, that the military force of the Confederate States was at the highest point it could attain without arms from abroad — that the portion of this particular army present for duty was in the finest fighting condition — that if kept inactive it must retrograde immensely in every respect during the winter, the effect of which was foreseen and dreaded by us all. The enemy were daily increasing in numbers, arms, discipline, and efficiency. We looked forward to a sad state of things at the opening of a Spring campaign. " These and other points being agreed upon without argument, it was again asked — ' Mr. President, is it not possible to increase the effective strength of this army and put us in condition to cross the Potomac and carry the war into the enemy's country?

Can you not by stripping other points to the last they will bear — and even risking defeat at all other places, put us in con dition to move forward ? Success here at this time saves everything — defeat here loses all.' " In explanation, and as an illustration of this, the un qualified opinion was advanced, that, if for want of adequate strength on our part in Kentucky, the Federal forces should take military possession of that whole state, and enter and occupy a portio'n of Tennessee, a victory gained by this army beyond the Potomac would, by threatening the heart of the Northern States, compel their armies . to fall back, free Ken tucky — and give us the line of the Ohio, within ten days thereafter. On the other hand should our forces in Tennessee and Southern Kentucky be strengthened so as to enable us to take, and to hold, the Ohio River as a boundary, a disastrous defeat of this army would at once be followed by an overwhelming wave of Northern invaders, which would sweep over Kentucky and Tennessee, extending to the Northern part of the Cotton States, if not to New Orleans.

" Similar views were expressed in regard to ultimate results in North-Western Virginia, being dependent upon the success or failure of this army, and various other special illustrations were offered. Showing, in short, that success here was success everywhere — defeat here, defeat everywhere, — and that this was the point upon Avhich all the available forces of the Confederate States should be concentrated. " It seemed to be conceded by all that our force at that time here was not sufficient for assuming the of fensive beyond the Potomac, and that even with a much larger force, an attack upon their army under the guns of their fortifications, on this side the river, was out of the question. The President asked me what number of men was necessary in my opinion to warrant an offensive campaign — to cross the Potomac, cut off the communica tions of the enemy with their fortified Capitol, and carry the war into their country.

I answered ' Fifty thousand effective seaso7ied soldiers ' — explaining that, by seasoned soldiers, I meant such men as we had here, present for duty. And added that they would have to be drawn from the Peninsula, about Yorktown, Norfolk, Western Virginia, Pensacola, or wherever might be most expedient. General Johnston and General Beauregard both said that a force of sixty thousand such men would be necessary, and that this force would require large additional transportation and munitions of war — the supplies here being entirely inadequate for an active campaign in the enemy's country, even with our present force. " In this connection there was some discussion of the difficulties to be overcome, and the probabilities of success; but, no one questioned the disastrous results of remaining inactive throughout the winter.

" Notwithstanding the belief that many in the North ern army were opposed on principle to invading the Southern States, and that they would fight better in de fending their own homes than in attacking ours, it was believed that the best, if not the only, plan to insure success, was to concentrate our forces and attack the enemy in their own country. " The President, I think, gave no definite opinion in regard to the number of men necessary for that purpose, and I am sure no one present considered this a question to be finally decided by any other person than the Commanding General of this army. Returning to the question that had been twice asked — the President expressed surprise and regret that the number of sur plus arms here was so small — and I thought spoke bitterly of this disappointment.

He then stated, that at that time ?io reinforcements could be furnished to this army of the character asked for — that the most that could be done, would be to furnish recruits to take the surplus arms in store here, (say 2500 stand) — that the whole country was demanding protection at his hands, and praying for arms and troops for defence. He had long been expecting arms from abroad but had been disappointed — he still hoped to get them, but had no posi tive assurance that they would be received at all. The manufacture of arms in the Confederate States was, as yet, undeveloped to any considerable extent. Want of arms, was the great difficulty; he could not take any troops from the points named, and without arms from abroad could not reinforce this army. He expressed regret, and seemed to feel deeply as did every one pres sent.

" When the President had thus clearly and positively stated his inability to put this army in the condition deemed by the Generals necessary before entering upon an active offensive campaign, it was felt that it might be better to run the risk of almost certain destruction fighting upon the other side of the Potomac, rather than see the gradual dying out and deterioration of this army, during a winter, at the end of which the term of enlistment of half the force would expire. The prospect of a spring campaign to be commenced under such discouraging circumstances was rendered all the more gloomy by the daily increasing strength of an enemy already much superior in numbers. On the other hand was the hope and expectation that before the end of winter, arms would be introduced into the country — and all were confident, that we could then not only protect our own country but successfully invade that 'of the enemy.

" General Johnston said, that he did not feel at liberty to express an opinion as to the practicability of reduc ing the strength of our forces at points not within the limits of his command. With but few farther remarks from any one, the;answer of the President was accepted as final, and it was felt that there was no other course left but to take a defensive position and await the ene my. If they did not advance we had but to await the winter and its results. " After the main question was dropped the President proposed, that, instead of an active offensive campaign, we should attempt certain partial operations — a sudden blow against Sickles or Banks — or to break the bridge over the Monocacy. This, he thought, besides injuring the enemy, would exert a good influence over our troops, and encourage the people of the Confederate States generally.

" In regard to attacking Sickles, it was stated in reply that, as the enemy controlled the river with their ships of war, it would be necessary for us to occupy two points on the river — one above, and another below the point of crossing — in order that we might, by our batteries, prevent their armed vessels from interfering with the pass age of the troops. In any case the difficulty of crossing large bodies over wide rivers, in the vicinity of an ene my, and then recr.ossing, made such expeditions hazard ous. It Avas agreed, however, that if an opportunity should occur offering reasonable chances of success that the attempt would be made. "During this Conference or Council Avhich lasted, per haps, two hours, all Avas earnest, serious, deliberate. The impression made upon me was deep and lasting; and I am convinced that the foregoing statement is not only correct, as far as it goes, but, in my opinion, it gives a fair idea of all that occurred, at that time, in regard to the question of our crossing the Potomac.

" Gustavus W. Smith, Major- General." " My recollection of the above Conference agrees fully with this statement of General G. W. Smith. " G. T. Beauregard, General C. S. A. " J. E. Johnston, Ge7ieral. Signed in triplicate. " Centreville, Va., January 31, 1862." The following extract is from a letter dated October 8th, 1861, written by General G. W. Smith to President Davis : " A fonvard movement is almost a positive ne cessity to the existence of this army. Every time the subject presents itself — and that is every hour of the day and night— I am tempted to ask again: 'Is it not possible to put us in condition to take the offensive ? ' As often comes the answer : ' Want of arms and the present impossibility of supplying them.' " CHAPTER n. Mr. Davis says that he writes for the purpose of elucidating obscurity and correcting error — gratifying to him " only to notice for praise each and all who wore the gray" — the Generals in the conference at Fairfax Court House asked for " disciplined, seasoned troops" — his account of that conference — comments on the paper signed by the three Generals.

As a preliminary Mr. Davis says : * " To such gene ral remarks in regard to campaigns, sieges, and battles as may seem to me appropriate to the scope and object of my work, I shall append or insert, from time to time, the evidence of reliable actors in those affairs, as well to elucidate obscurity as to correct error." On page 442, he adds : " I propose to set forth the facts by corre spondence and otherwise. So far as in doing this blame shall be transferred from me to others, it will be the in cident, not the design, as it would be most gratifying to me only to notice for praise each and all who wore the gray." A little later, in alluding to the troops being raised by the State of Virginia, in the spring of 1862, he says :f " The feeling heretofore noticed ' as arousing in Vir ginia a determination to resist the abandonment of her Northern frontier, and which caused the assurance of reinforcements, bore fruit in the addition of about thirty thousand men, by a draft made by the Governor of the State.

These, it is true, were not the disciplined, sea- * The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, by Jeffer son Davis, Vol. I, p. 371. f p. 466. soned troops which were asked for by the Generals in the Conference at Fairfax Court House." In reference to that Conference, he says : * " I will now proceed to notice the allegation that I was respon sible for inaction by the army of the Potomac, in the latter part of 1861 and in the early part of 1862. After the explosion of the fallacy that I had prevented the pursuit of the enemy from Manassas in July, 1861, my assailants have sought to cover their exposure by a change of time and place, locating their story at Fairfax Court House, and dating it in the autumn of 1861. When at that time and place I met General Johnston for conference, he called in the two generals next in rank to himself, Beauregard and G. W. Smith.

The question for consideration was, What course should be adopted for the future action of the army ? And the preliminary inquiry by me was as to the number of troops there as sembled. To my surprise and disappointment, the effec tive strength was stated to be but little greater than when it fought the battle of the 21st of the preceding July. The frequent reinforcements which had been sent to that army in no wise prepared me for such an announcement. To my inquiry as to what force -would be required for the contemplated advance into Mary land, the lowest estimate made by any of them was about twice the number there present for duty. Hoav little I was prepared for such a condition of things will be realized from the fact that previous suggestions by the generals in regard to a purpose to advance into Maryland had induced me, when I went to that confer ence, to take with me some drawings made by the vet eran soldier and engineer Colonel Crozet, of the falls of * p. 448. the Potomac, to show the feasibility of crossing the river at that point.

Very little knowledge of the condition and military resources of the country must have suf ficed to show that I had no power to make such an addi tion to that army without a total disregard of the safety of other threatened positions. It only remained for me to an swer that I had not power to furnish such a number of troops, and unless the militia bearing their private arms should be relied on, we could not possibly fulfil such a requisition until after the receipt of the small arms which we had early and constantly striven to procure from abroad, and had for some time expected. After I had written the foregoing and all the succeeding chapters on kindred subjects, a friend, in October, 1880, furnished me with a copy of a paper relating to the conference at Fairfax Court House, which seems to require notice at my hands.

Therefore, I break the chain of events to in sert here some remarks in regard to it. The paper ap pears to have been written by General G. W. Smith, and to have received the approval of Generals Beaure gard and J. E. Johnston, and to bear date the 31st of January, 1862. It does not agree in some respects with my memory of what occurred, and it is not consistent Avith itself. It was not necessary that I should learn in that interview the evil of inactivity. My correspondence of anterior date might have shown that I was fully aAvare of it, and my suggestions in the intervieAV certainly did not look as if it was necessary to impress me with the advantage of action. In one part of the paper it is stated that the reinforcements asked for were to be ' seasoned soldiers,' such, as were there present, and who were said to be in the ' finest fighting condition.' This, if such a proposition had been made, would have exposed its absurdity, as well as the loophole it offered for escape, by subsequently asserting that the troops furnished were not up to the* proposed standard.