The Vicksburg Campaign and the battles about Chattanooga under the command of General U.S. Grant in 1862-63. An historical review

Front matter

THE Vicksburg Campaign, AND THE BATTLES ABOUT CHATTANOOGA VNDER THE COMMAND OF GENERAL TL S. GRANT, IN 1862-63; AN HISTORICAL REVIEW! BY SAM. ROCKWELL REED Dedicated to the Patriotic American Volunteers, the Best Soldiers in the World, whose Heroic Valor, Intelligence, and High Spirit, Without Reward and Without the Aid of Great Generalship, Fought the Great War through to the Triumph of the Nation. CINCINNATI: Robert Clarke & Co., 61, 63 & 65 W. Fourth St. 1 Copyright, 1882, By Samuel Rockwell Reed.

Preface

. Of heroic histories of generals of the great Civil War, written to show that the Nation was saved by a phenomenal military genius, there are enough. Enough of egoizing military biographies, brazenly self-exalting, and derogating from officers of better service, who are kept silent by army subordination, or are silent in the grave. Enough of military lives written for political campaign live*, with the superlative rodomontade of such party literature. Enough of hero-worshiping myth which slights the heroic army. It is time to lift the history of the great war out of the degradation of selfish prescription; of menial body service; of time serving party necessity; of the fungus of popular myth, up to the plane of inde pendence and true criticism. It is time for real history to be written, to do justice to the patriotic volunteers, the best soldiers in the world, who, without the leading of a great military genius, and notwithstanding the leading of great military blunders, which multiplied their hardships and slaughter, and prolonged the war, fought it through with indomitable resolution, to the dearly earned triumph of the Nation. In this aim is this review written. The Vicksburg Campaign.

Chapter I

Grant's department, and urder Halleck's general command, and it waited for Halleck. After a battle our army always had a season of inactivity, rather the more after a victory thaii a defeat. The battle ended on the 7th of April, 1862. Halleck ordered Pope's army of 25,000 from Missouri to Pittsburg. He kept Buell's army. He laid open the entire West to gather troops to put into a state of sus pended animation. The destroyed equipment of Grant's army was replaced. Halleck left. St. Louis, April 19, to come and take com mand of an army raised to more than 100,000, to begin his famous siege approaches to Corinth, fifteen miles away, held by not half his number, and these recently repulsed with great slaughter. THE -NATION'S REJOICING — THE PREPARATION OF THE PUBLIC MIND BY THE PRECEDING YEAR OF FAILURE.

The rejoicing of the country over the sur render of Vicksburg to Gen. Grant's army, July 4, 1863, and its extravagant estimate of the importance of that event, may be better appreciated by a glance at the previous long course of the consuming of mighty energies, boundless patriotic sacrifices, and vast ex penditure without adequate results, with very little to feed national glory, and without any positive progress toward ending the war. This seemed continually expanding, and the task of putting down the rebellion more dis couraging. Yet the people never -flinched. Still, volunteers continued to rise up in a continuous tide, rushing with eagernessto the slaughter under a combination of civil and military incompetency of leadership. Injus tice would be done to the patriotism and pluck of a great people by pretending that all was then capable, successful, and glorious.

It was an awful waste of brave and intelligent volunteers, and of colossal resources, and ex penditure, by incapacity, and it was a long time of great discouragement. Yet the great people never weakened in their resolve to preserve the Union. It is time for the truth, and the truth is most glorious to the people. Halleck put Grant into disgrace; on the other hand, he dispatched the War Depart ment that it was the opinion .of the army that Gen. Sherman saved the day, and he rec ommended his promotion to be Major Gen eral. This was done. It is an example of the way war reputations are made. Grant was still nominally in command of the District of West Tennessee, but his army, which was now divided between right wing and reserve, was under the immediate command of Thomas and McClernanii, to whom Halleck sent orders direct, ignoring Grant.

Halleck now moved on Corinth by siege approaches, intrenching in every part at 'each move, and moving at the average rate of half a mile a day. It was like McClellan's approach to ward Richmond. He was in constant appre hension of attack, and he made the evacuation of Corinth by the enemy his whole ob jective. There was no attempt to flank Cor inth or cutoff the enemy's .retreat. Hal leck's only thought was of being attacked. After the slaughter at Pittsburg Landing, in which an army of as brave men as ever trod tiie soldier's brogans was sacrificed by sheer neglect in its Commanding General of all that belongs to the practice of a soldier, the national army rested. With Buell's troops it was strong enough to have followed the enemy at once to Corinth, but it was in He was only too glad to have the enemy go away.

His strategy was upon the advice of the Messina Magistrate to the watch : liit.li. Northern Alabama, and Chattanooga. his line of communications and of movement. For a distance of more than eighty miles this line was along the enemy's front. To protect this railroad was an impossibility. But all of Halleck's movements were as if afraid that the war would end too soon. Buell proceeded to obey orders by repairing th's road, and fortifying its stations and bridges. It was a great work, and at this time he asked the War Department for au thority to feed and clothe the escaped slaves for this intrenching labor, but was informed that Congress had not appropriated for it. This, we think, was the first systematic proposal for the employment of the escaped slaves in a straightforward manner. Buell, while obeying Halleck's order to repair the Mem phis & Charleston road for his base line, pro ceeded also to provide one for practical use by giving orders for the repair of the roads from Nashville through Tennessee.

While our army was thus scattering, and wasting its energies, part on the defensive and part on impossible undertakings, the Confederate armies in the great Interior, as in the East, were concentrating for a grand advance. Dogberry— You are to bid any man stand in the prince's name. Watch— How if he will not stand? Dog.— Why then take no note of him, but let him go; and presently call the watch together, and thank God you are rid of a knave. When he had* cautiously reached Corinth he found that the Confederate army had with drawn at leisure. To cover up this impotent conclusion he dispatched Washington that he was making vigorous pursuit of the demoralized enemy, and that Gen, Pope reported the canture of 10,000 prisoners and 15,000 stand of arms. Pope had report ed none and captured none, and there was no chance for this pursuit.

But this achievement with the longbow got Halleck present and lasting glory, and because of that he was presently, after McClellan's retreat, called to Washington and made General in Chief to direct all things from Washington, and to be President Lincoln's military ad viser. Thus was the nation organized for victory. This is another example of the way that the war made great military reputations and high ranks. And now that great army, which had been organized and disciplined by all tliis daily marching, bivouacking, intrench ing, outpost duty, and constant vigilance in the face of the enemy, and which Sherman in the Memoirs says could have gone anywhere, was broken up and placed for the defensive. Thatof Bragg, assisted by the co-operative columns of Kirby Smith on the east, and of Van Horn on the west, was to carry forward the line of the Confederacy to the Ohio River, reinstate the rebel State government in Ten nessee, set up a rebel State government in Kentucky, and make these States the great field for recruits and supplies, and the military base the Ohio.

It was a brave undertak ing, and the imbecility on our side made its opportunity. Buell had brought from Corinth little over 24,000 men; about 16,000 more were distributed through Middle Ten nessee and Northern Alabama, holding places which he had taken before he went to Pitts burg Landing. While he was repairing and fortifying railroads for his flank inarch in the enemy's front to East Tennessee, Bragg's grand advance began with 60,000 veteran troops, his movements veiled by a cloud of cavalry, and his lines of advance taking him into the friendly inhabitants of Kentucky. This compelled Buell to desist from his vain labors, and to gather up his troops from a wide region and take the field in the offensive defensive against Bragg's combined forces. Leaving a garrison to hold Nashville , he marched eastward to meet Bragg, where In this as in all the war, in nearly all the commanders as in the administration, the paralyzing error was in the idea that the Union was to be restored by recovering territory and places, instead of destroying the Confederate armies.

Halleck had no need of Buell for Corinth, even if with a capable commander he had at Pittsburg Landing. Buell would have gone on from Nashville to Chattanooga or through Alabama. And now Halleck ordered Buell to move into East Tennessee. This was Lincoln's pet desire, and Halleck supported it. Lincoln fancied a great Union population there which, if pro tected, would restore Tennessee to the Union, and this political idea overruled military con ditions. Halleck insisted, against Buell's' judgment, that he should make the Memphis ifc Charleston Railroad, running through Corhe might be expected to debouch from the I with Grant to attack, waiting w,hilc Price Cumberland ridge. Keeping his well disciplined troops completely in hand, protecting all his trains, his men never demoralized by this return march, nor by Bragg's superior numbers, but, consilient and high spirited, Buell meved first to osier battle to Bragg, but upon his own ground; then, Bragg avoiding this, Buell moved in a parallel line, always ready for battle, Tmt with the condition that it must be upon his own ground, always threatening Bragg while moving toward his own re-enforcements.

The result of this skillful generalship was that when Bragg got within about twenty-five miles of Louisville he found that he wanted to face about. Buell, now re-enforced, as promptly faced about to march with him and attack him. • drew away from its front and marched on the double quick three miles and fell with his whole force on Rosecrans. Rosecrans, as was his wont, spoke his mind on this. Sub sequently Rosecrans, with about half the number of the enemy, gave Van Dorn a slaughtering repulse at Corinth. Although this was in the defensive line, yet it disabled Van Dorn for his part in the grand plan of invasion. After this Rosecrans, much to Grant's relief. Badeau says, was ordered t< > the command of Buell's army. Rosecrans' victory at Corinth was on the 4th of October. Badeau says that on the 25 th Grant "assumed command of the Depart ment of the Tennessee, which included Cairo, Forts Henry and Donelson, Northern Missis sippi, and the portions of Kentucky and Ten nessee west of the Tennessee River."

Thus it appears that at this time Grant was stilly re instated and his coinniandenlargcd in hounds, and that it followed Rosecrans' victory at Corinth, for which the latter was promoted Major General. In the same month Grant was largely re-enforced from the Northwestern States, and now he proposed to Halleck, October 26, 1863, a concentration for an ad vance. He said: "I think I would be able to move down the Mississippi Central road, and cause the evacuation of Vicksburg." For this stroke of generalship, which against such heavy chances saved his army, saved Kentucky >and Middle Tennessee, and saved the North, and whose skill and com plete success has not been surpassed in any war, Buell was summarily removed from command. This is another example of the »ay war makes reputations and dispenses re wards.

The splendid success was marred by 4 reverse to a part of one wing of the army at Perrysville, where the disregard of instructions by the commander of that wing spoiled well laid plan for a general battle. But fen army of 60.000 or 80,000 men spreads over a wide region, «nd the non-co-operation of its several commanders can' defeat any Com manding General. Such disregard of instructions by the commander of a corps, in this in stance, unknown to Buell, defeated a plan of generaL battle, which would have made de feat destruction to Bragg. It enabled him to have a nominal success in a dash at a few of our brigades, to carry back with his Ken tucky State Government and great plan to plant, the boundary of the Confederary on the Ohio. Badeau says, with due sense of the im portance of this germ of the idea of the Vicksburg campaign: "This was the first mention, in the correspondence of the two commanders, of the place destined afterward to become so renowned."

This was the initiative of the Vicksburg campaign, which was to occupy a great army and a great steamboat fleet and gunboat squadron for more than eight months, and which was now to begin after eight months, in which great forces and enormous expenditure were con sumed in merely defensive operations, or in futile attempts, all of which had made no progress except to expand the war, and call continually for more men and money. In following articles we shall see how sped this great offensive campaign, which after long waiting, and immense consumption of men and means, at last brought rejoicing to a patriotic nation. Meanwhile, in July, Halleck had been ordered to AVashington. On leaving he restored Grant to command of his former troops, with headquarters at Corinth. TJie defensive policy and the holding of territory were pursued.

A combined operation against Price, who had seized Iuka, failed by the neglect of that division which was ordered Sherman to co-operate by moving two divisions from Memphis, but on the 8th of November he informed Sherman that he estimated Pemberton's force at 30,000, and that he felt "strong enough to handle that number without gloves." Therefore he coun termanded the march from Memphis). CHAPTER H. the campaign on the interior line — its energetic start, its pause, irresolution, racking, and filling, until relieved by van dorn's destruction of its supplies. Gen. Grant, now in command of a department embracing the Mississippi River, and of a large army, wrote Gen. Halleck, then in chief command at Washington, November 26, proposing an advance down the Missis sippi Central Railroad, his objective being Vicksburg.

Still the notion disabled all our military plans, that the recovery of places, not the destruction of armies, was the way to restore the Union. But Grant's line of operations was better than his main objective, for it was toward the enemy's main army. This was under Pemberton, who had been placed over Van Dorn, and was holding the line of the Tallahatchie which crosses the Central forty miles south of Grand Junc tion. * This is on the same road, where crossed by the road from Memphis ihrough Corinth, and is about midway between Corinth and Memphis, and was a central point for Grant's concentration of his divided forces. And yet. although Grant's forces were on three sides of Grand Junction, he had not occupied that place, and that road to Memphis was closed to him, and he had to communicate there with by way of Columbus, Ky.

Unfortunately Grant's advance, which be gan so energetically, halted. A disturbing element had now come in. Badeau relates it with charming simplicity. McClernand was one of those whom Sherman and Badeau call political Generals. He had proved him self a good soldier, but this only aggravated his fault. McClernand had obtained Irom Lincoln a special order to raise troops for an expedition to open the Mississippi River. Halleck disapproved, but this was one of those peculiajmilitary operations which Lincoln took in hand. Grant heard of Mc- Clernand's expedition through the news papers, and it diverted his energies from Pemberton. He saw that such an expedition would gather up or at least subordinate Sherman, and would reap the glory of occupying Vicksburg if his operations caused its evacuation.

For, not to destroy the enemy's army, but to occupy the evacuated Vicksburg, was Grant's objective with his great army. He also suspected that this telegram from Halleck. November 5, pointed to the diversion of troops from his command at Memphis to Mc- Clernand: "Had not troops seyt to re-enforce you better go to Memphis hereafter? 1 hope to give 20,000 additional men in a few days." Grant, on the 9th, sent this feeler: "Re-en forcements are arriving very slowly. If they do not come in more rapidly I will attack as 1 am." In fact Grant had only the day be fore countermarched Sherman's two divisions back to Memphis, because, he said, he had force enough to handle Pemberton without them. Badeau narrates that next day, grow ing more uneasy about McClernand, Grant telegraphed: "Anil to understand that 1 lie here still while an expedition is fitted out for Memphis, or do you want me to push as far south as possible?

Am I to have Sherman subject to my orders, or is he and his force re served for some special service?" Grant announced to Halleck November 2: "I have commenced a movement on Grand Junction with three divisions from Corinth and two from Bolivar. Will leave here to morrow and take command in person, if found practicable I will go to Holly Springs, and may be Grenada, completing railroad and telegraph as I go." Holly Springs is on the Central road, twenty-five miles south of Grand Junction, and about half way to the Tallahatchie. Grenada is about sixty miles further south, and is where the Yallabusha crosses the railroad. Halleck replied: "I approve of your plan of advancing upon the enemy as soon as you are strong enough for that purpose." This was permission enough, properly leaving him discretion as to sufficiency of force and line of operation.

Grant had force enough. His good fortune in all this operation was that he was supported by abundance of men, and supplies and appointmpnts of every sort. November 4 he had moved to Grand Junction. He had No one had caused Grant to lie there still. He had Halleck's consent to his going, and he had turned back lories to Memphis, saying he had enough. Halleck answered promptly : "You have command of all troops sent to your department, and have permission to li^ht the enemy when you please." Badeau relates that thereupon Grant on the 14th informed Sherman: "I have now complete control of my department," and accordingly ordered him to "move witli two divisions of twelve full regiments each, and if possible, with three divisions, to Oxford, or the Talla hatchie, as soon as possible. I am now ready to move from here (La Grange) any day, and only await yourmdYements." and his headquarters were a't Holly Springs, being an advance of twenty-five miles in twenty-three days, since the 4th; also, that "Sherman, too, was up, and would cross the Tallahatchie at Wyatt," which is six miles westof the railroad crossing, and that on the same day Grant telegraphed Halleck: "Our troops will be in Abbeville (just south of the Tallahatchie) to-morrow, or a battle will be fought."

But the main body would not be at Abbeville for several days, and there was no enemy near for a battle. Sherman says in his Memoirs: Thus were his plans backing and filling be cause of McClf^nand. And now he had changed his mind again, and had ordered Sherman to join him with all his movable force for the march on Pemberton. This at last was a rational plan, but it was naught without execution, and the delay had already given the enemy time to recover. But so earnest was Grant now in this plan that he telegraphed Sherman November 15 to meet him at Columbus, Ky., where he gave Sher man full instructions as to co-operation by moving three divisions so as to join Grant at the Tallahatchie. Sherman marched promptly November 24. We reached Wyatt on the 2d day of December, and there learned that Pemberton's whole army had fallen back to the Yallabusha, near Grenada, caused, in great measure, by alarm at the demonstration on their rear from Helena. * * * We had to build a bridge at Wyatt, which consumed a couple of days, and on the 5th of December my whole command was at College Hill, ten miles from Oxford, whence I reported to Gen. Grant aj Oxford.

Oxford is ten miles south of the Talla hatchie, and twenty-five from Holly Springs. Halting as Grant's movement had been, the campaign was full of promise to a resolute General, and Grant had double Pemberton's force. But Badeau shows that the shadow of McClernand, with an independent command, coming down the Mississippi, weakened Grant. At this point, where he had all in his hands for a campaign against Pember ton's army, he wanted to turn back. He asked Halleck from Abbeville: "How far South would you like me to go?" He had lost his object and his resolution. Halleck ordered the forces at Helena to co-operate by crossing the Mississippi and tutting the Central Railroad in Pemberton's rear. And now all seemed resolved and promising. But again McClernand's shadow loomed across Grant's horizon.

Badeau says: "On the 23d Halleck again broached the subject of the river expedition, doubtless urged on by the President. * * He inquired how many men Grant had in his department, and what force could be sent down the river to Vicksburg. Grant replied that he had in all 72,000 men, of whom 18,000 were at Memphis, and 16,000 of these could be spared for the river expedition." He also announced next day that he had given orders for the advance of his entire force, including Sherman; had written to Steele' in Arkansas to threaten Grenada, and had asked Admiral Porter to send boats to co-operate at the mouth of the Yazoo. He asked: "Shall I countermand the orders for this move?" He now wanted another change of plan. December 5 be suggested this to Halleck: "If the Helena troops were at my command I think it would be practicable to send Sher man to take them and the Memphis forces south of the Yazoo River, and thus secure Vicksburg and the State of Mississippi."

This was to turn his back on the Confederate Army to recover places by avoiding it. Hal leck's answer gave Grant the asked for addition to his command, and now Grant countermarched Sherman again back to Mem phis to eommand a river expedition to attack Vicksburg from the river, Grant to await his operation and to "co-operate." But how to co-operate when, even with all his forces, he had decided it not safe to go further, is what Grant could not tell. He ordered Sherman to "proceed to reduce Vicksburg, assisted by But Halleck had not asked Grant to tarry, nor to let any of his troops go in the river ex pedition unless he could spare them, and Grant had said he could spare 16,000. Hal leck answered no. Badeau says Grant's cavalry crossed the Tallahatchie on the 20th, the gunboats," and he said, with a vagueness befitting such co-operation : "I will hold the forces here in readiness to co-operate with you in such manner as the movements of the enemy may make necessary." more a cause for rejoicing.

This, however, does not include Sherman's "co-operating" part; further along we shall see how that sped. Badeau tells the objective of all this re version of the plan of the campaign. He says :

Chapter III. The Change Of Base

— RETREAT FROM THE IN- TERIOR LINE — HOW SHERMAN WAS MARCHED UP AND DOWN — THE MANY REASONS WHY. Grant was still anxious lest McClernand should obtain the command, of the river expedition, and therefore had hurried Sherman to Memphis on the very day that he secured the authority, so that if possible the latter might start before McClernand could arrive. Halleck, too, sent the permission without that deliberation which he sometimes dis played. Gen. Grant's movement^own the line of the Mississippi Central Railroad, in the best time of year, when the roads were good, had ad vanced his headquarters frofu Grand Junction, November 4, to Oxford, December 5, forty five miles in thirty-one days. Here he tarried till Van Dorn's visit at Holly Springs on the 20th, when he decided to go no further in a country of such impolite practices.

This was not such a constant pressure as keeps an enemy busy in defense and retreat. And there is a being always at hand to find mis chief still for the idle to do, as was exempli fied by Van Dorn and Forrest behind Grant's back. If Badeau may be believed, Grant's campaign had turned from Pemberton toward McClernand, and Halleck was co-operating. But they had not yet circumvented Lincoln. Says Badeau: On the ISth came at last the unwelcome word from Washington : "It is the wish of the President that Gen. McClernand's corps shall constitute a part of the river expedition, and that he shall have the immediate command, under your direction." This would put McClernand in command of that which Grant's altered plan had de signed to be the winning side of the "co operation;" then the subsequent proceedings would interest Grant no more.

His strategy was beaten. Gen. Sherman, Grant's energetic coadjutor, marched three divisions from Memphis, which is straight west of Grand Junction, November 24, by three roads, stopped two days at the Tailahatchie to make a bridge, and reached a point on Grant's flank with his whole command December 5. All this was to find that he must march back again as fast, while Grant waited for the new operation. Scraps which Badeau prints from Halleck's dispatches make appear that he was as irresojute as Grant; but they show that he gave Grant full discretion and sup port, and that when the enemy fell back from the Tallahatchie Halleck became sanguine as to the interior line, and gave Grant plenary authority, including the command of the Arkansas army. In conclusion he said: "Telegraph what are your present plans."

Ba deau prints only this clause. GRANT'sanswer told the change of plan to a river expedition, he to co-operate on the interior line. But there was one turn left: If Grant should return and take command of the river expedition, McClernand would be subordi nated. And now did Grant's proverbial luck come to his relief in the shape of Van Dorn's cavalry, which, December 20. made a de scent on Holly Springs, and destroyed tbe stores of Grant's army. With the same trust in luck us at Pittsburg Landing, he had taken little care to fortify his supply depot. The rebels estimated the destruction at $4,008, nno; but this, perhaps, was at Confederacy prices. Whatever the figure, it was enough for Grant, who now decided that a river for a base, and gunboats to hold it, was the only practicable way of war in this country.

So he decided to countermarch, and to join Sherman, and subordinate McClernand, and, leaving Pemberton free to go to defend Vicksburg, to himself undertake to reduce that place from the river. Thus ended the first stage of the Vicksburg campaign. AU this tended to make the final victory the Grant wrote Sherman December 8 inclos ing Halleck's dispatch, and asking Sherman to come to Oxford and confer on a plan, say imr: My notion is to send two divisions hack to Mem phis and fix upon a day when they should effect a landing, and press from here with this command at the proper time to co-operate. If I do not do this I will move our present force to Greuada, including Steele's. * '■■ * When a good ready is had to move immediately on Jackson, Miss., cutting loose from the road. Ot these two plans I look more favorably on the former. pediment as to make Van Doun's visit a friendly service, yet he pauses to tell what might have been: Grant has told me that had he known then what he soon afterward learned— the possibility of sub sisting an armv of 30,000 men without supplies other than drawn from an enemy's country— he could at that time have pushed on to the rear of Vicksburg, and probably have succeeded in captur ing the place.

In the former plan he was distinctly to meet Sherman at Vicksburg in a concerted attack. In the latter plan he would have only about as far to march from Grenada to Jackson, as he marched to the same place from Bruinsburg, after consuming a great army and navy and transport fleet for near six months. And the country was much bet ter for the march. Very likely! but McClernand might have been the first to get in. Badeau says: "Grant was now convinced of the impossibility which he had foretold, of maintaining so longaline of supplies through hostile territory." He had undertaken a campaign to demonstrate his foretold impossibility. The Irish pilot was engaged by the skipper upon his solemn affirmation that he knew every rock in the channel; and when the ship struck, he exclaimed: "That's one of them!"

When Generals set out on cam paigns which they have foretold to be impos sible, they generally succeed in proving their foretelling. Gen. Sherman had marched from Memphis with two divisions to join Grant; had coun termarched; had marched from Memphis again with three divisions, and by energetic movement had joined Grant south of the Tallahatchie. And now he was to go back. Badeau does not state what argument con vinced Sherman of the propriety of this new back action ; but Sherman started back im mediately. As Badeau lets out that this was to snatch the river expedition from McCler nand, we might suppose that Grant took Sherman into his confidence, if it were not that Sherman, who is a very George Wash ington for inability to prevaricate, says that the idea of McClernand's coming did not en ter into his dreams at that moment.