Sketches of Intellectual and Moral Relations

Preface

. The Reader having just finished a critical perusal of my title-page, his curiosity, or, perhaps, some motive even less complimentary, may put him upon inquiring what one, whose business it is to repair the body, has got to do with the mind ? or how one, whose profession is at least in part mechanical, and altogether, as it may appear, averse to speculation, could presume to interfere with a department so much above his proper sphere ? It must be allowed that there is some reason in these exceptions ; but I will reply to them by claiming an apology from the customary practice of men, which is, first, to project and to execute their designs, and afterwards inquire how far they were qualified for the undertaking. To some such inversion of the appropriate

PREFACE.

. IV order, these Sketches may trace their origin. An early propensity to speculation led to desultory readings upon speculative topics ; and the result of a confused information, and a hasty judgment, was a vivid apprehension that the state of opinion upon the subjects which most concerned us, was that of a perfect chaos — a conflict of assumptions, and con jectures ; of truths, errors, and deceptions ; sophisms, prejudices, and contradictions ; from amidst which it was impossible to choose a creed, upon which the mind might repose with satisfaction. Upon this conviction was founded the chival rous design of making for myself an analysis of relations, both in the physical and moral departments ; and with no better, or more systematic preparation than that just confessed, this task was commenced ; and has since been pursued, if not always with energy, at least with no very considerable interruption, except from more imperative duties.

The proposed order of this enterprise was, first, an analysis of the laws of the organic life ; and, as a sequel to it, one of intellectual, and moral relations. The first was prosecuted with all the advantages of a professional pursuit, which derived aid from habitual practice and reflection, and with the

PREFACE.

. V confidence also of a first ardour, and of un broken energies : the second has been pro ceeded in with the hesitation, diffidence, and apathy of one, who is not sure of his footing — who is sensible of his temerity in mingling his poor reflections with those of the greatest geniuses, and who has, moreover, lived long enough to suffer a considerable abatement of that enthusiasm, which is only in full vigour, before experience of life has dissipated its illusions. It has been the custom of Authors to make some sort of propitiatory invocation to the reader — deprecating his severity by the epi thets, gentle, courteous, liberal, indulgent reader ! For my own part, I do not think readers are often very gentle, or even merciful : but although I have no very great faith in these qualities, I am sensible that the following performance will stand in need of them in a more than common degree.

In apology, there fore, for the numerous defects which I cannot but anticipate, I will beg the reader to remem ber that I profess only to make partial sketches ; that there is no attempt at laboured classifica tions ; that the customary classifications are either neglected, or not known ; and that the discussion of no single topic is assumed to be VI

PREFACE.

. complete. If it should be inquired why, con fessing these imperfections, I hazard the pub lication of my remarks ? my answer is, That I believe they will contribute something to a more comprehensive analysis of human nature than could have been attempted by a mere scholar, or metaphysician, without some such aid. It may be doubted whether mankind are sufficiently alive to the importance of this design. They cannot, however, have failed to remark the prevalent inconsistency of principles — how greatly practice is at variance with rules, and how little, in an ill-digested mass of contrivances, is contributed towards human happiness. The source of the failure I believe to be that men have either not sought truth honestly, or else have thought it incumbent upon them to disguise it, in order that opinions may be perverted to an accommodation with existing institutes.

This, however, is an erroneous order: legislation should follow truth, upon which, of whatever kind, it ought to be founded ; and instead of throwing obstacles in the way of its discovery, the cause of humanity requires that it should be promoted by every species of encouragement. It was originally intended to connect this attempt at an analysis of intellectual relations,

PREFACE.

. VII with the " Indications on Organic Life," and to publish both under one title. It was accordingly finished in conformity with this design ; and, in this shape, embraced extensively the discussion of a moral system, which, partly to avoid offence even to the most fastidious, and partly from an ignorance how far the liberty of inquiry was permitted, has, at no trifling increase of labour, been entirely omitted. Owing to this omission, to say nothing of other defects, the proposed second part has been rendered incomplete ; and an additional reason for abandoning the design of uniting this to the former publication is, that one is addressed to the medical profession, and the other to the public ; and therefore, in connection, the entire work would have been appropriate to neither. Bath, November \9th, 1829. CONTENTS.

Part I. On The Physiological History And Connec- Tions Of The Human

MIND. PAGE Chap. 1. Origin of the Mind 3 Chap. 2. Relation of Sensibility with the Causes of Sensation ...... 21 Chap. 3. Relation of the Mind with the Organic Life, 30 Chap. 4. Relations of the Mind with the Structures, 40 Chap. 5. General Account of the Constitution, Phenomena, and Maintenance of the Human Mind 140

Part II. Moral Relations

Chap. 1. Summary of the Moral Constitution . . 231 Chap. 2. On the Influence of Moral Beauty . . 248 Chap. 3. On the Nature and Influence of the Moral Sense 301 Chap. 4. On the Nature and Obligation of a Sense of Honour ...... 317 Chap. 5. On the Influence of Political Expediency . 341 Chap. 6. General Comparison of Moral Principles and Obligations ..... 347 Chap. 7. On the Principles and Institutes of Mnr.nl 7. On the Principles and Institutes of Moral Government .....

PART I. ON THE PHYSIOLOGICAL HISTORY AND CONNECTIONS OF THE HUMAN MIND.

PART I ON THE PHYSIOLOGICAL HISTORY AND CONNECTIONS OF THE HUMAN MIND.

Chapter I

On the Origin of the Mind. 1 §. 1 here is nothing in the mode of the origin of the mind, which is not common to the other properties of life, of which the structures are possessed : like them, it is derived from parents; it is developed by the changes of the constituents of the ovum ; it is matured by the processes of growth, by which the fœtal state is perfected ; it is, like the other properties of life, allied with its appropriate organization ; and, like them, it displays, subsequently, the phenomena which result from its own nature, and the agency of related causes. 2§. If a view of the origin of the mind, which is so agreeable with common sense and received opinion, require the formality of proofs, there is no difficulty in finding them. It is alone sufficient to establish 2n the derivation of the mind from parents, that the being who exhibits the possession of it, is a production from parents; that he is so endowed by an internal formation, the materials of which are furnished obviously from a parental source.

We observe, also, that the being thus formed, is not cotemporary with parents, but is a pro duction peculiar to a more or less advanced period of their existence. There are no ova in the early stages of life; or if it should be objected that, from their minuteness, they are not objects of the senses, the same objection does not apply to the endowments of the foetus, conferred by the male progenitor — these are incident to a certain age ; they inhere with an habitual secretion, and are formed in connection with a process of this kind : this secretion is frequently expended, and as often renewed, by the repetition of the same functional processes. 3§. The peculiar features, also, of the mind in the offspring, are sometimes found to resemble conspicuous ones which belonged to the parents; or, like the here ditary peculiarities remarked in the structures, the men tal characteristics of parents are not manifested in the succeeding generation, but remain latent, and are displayed by the one which follows.

Thus insanity is as conspicuously transmitted from parents to the offspring, in certain families, as any one of the hereditary corporeal diseases. 4§. The resemblance of the characteristics of mind, is, however, perhaps more rarely traced in the offspring, than that of peculiarities of structure, organic dispo sition, colour, or physiognomy: and this defect of resemblance must necessarily follow from the nature of the mind, which has innumerable external relations, by which an original bias may be repressed or encouraged ; by which the weaker powers may be stimulated into habitual activity, while the stronger ones are but rarely exercised — from the influence of these external relations, the modifications of character will be as diversified as the circumstances of situation, intercourse, &c, to which individuals might be exposed. 5§.

The case is different with the corporeal characteristics : if these become active or efficient by the pro cesses of growth, they are exhibited in phenomena, which are, in many instances, permanent. Whether a person lives in the town, or in the country ; whether he associates much, or little, with the good, or the bad, with the well-informed, or the vulgar; whether he is familiarized with scenes, or sentiments, which captivate the imagination, or with topics that exercise his reason, or confined to a sphere, in which his impressions and exercises are little more varied than those of a horse in a mill — the shape of his nose will be pretty much the same ; the colour of his skin, hair, eyes, the pecu liarities of the internal organization, which he might derive unmixed from either parent, will be but little affected ; while every one of these diversities will have its effect upon the character of the mind, and will con cur, with previous relations of growth, to disguise its resemblance to the original from whence it proceeded. 6§.

But, without looking for resemblance of charac teristic traits, which, in this department of the mind, owing chiefly to the causes just enumerated, will very frequently fail, it is sufficient to establish the derivation of mind from parents, that such is its obvious source, or the only one which can be assigned. If any other mode of formation were supposed, it can have no weight superior to that of unfounded conjecture, or pure imagination ; and there seems no more reason to seek for it in an inquiry concerning the origin of the mind, than in one relating to the principle which presides in the organic department, and determines its phenomena. (i ORIGIN OF THE MIND. 7§. Supposing it to be conceded, that the mind, like the vital properties which subserve organic purposes,. is derived from parents; in the case of the maternal ovum, to which our considerations are now chiefly con fined, the following modes may be suggested by which the intellectual principle is possessed by this rudiment : either, first, the ovum is endowed with mind by a local function of the ovarium, in which it is produced ; or, second, this seat (the ovarium) is a centre, to which the maternal properties tend, whether those of the in tellectual, or of the organic system. 8§.

Without discussing these alternatives at any great length, it may be observed, that if the formation of the ovum were the result merely of a local function of the ovarium, there is no reason why peculiarities of parents, possessed by distant seats, should be perpetuated in the offspring ; and the participation of the offspring in such peculiarities, seems a sufficient proof, that the endowments of the ovum are not merely from properties of the ovarium, but that they are communicated from all parts of the parent ; and that the ovum is a miniature representation of the properties both of the organic, animal, and intellectual systems, which occupy respectively the structures of the parent. 9§. If this conclusion may be deduced from the observation of direct facts, it acquires additional weight from the more distant ones of analogy.

Some such intercourse as is here supposed, is perpetually exhibited between parts, apparently no otherwise connected than by a mere continuity of the textures : these instances are furnished by the immense variety of the sympathies. 10§. But more to our present purpose, the brain affords a striking example of a centre of communication between distant seats. The natural function of this viscus subjects it to the influence of sensations from the whole nervous system ; and it participates also, very generally, in the diseases of distant parts, which affect chiefly the organic system. 1 1 §. The difference between the brain and the ovarium, as centres, to which the properties or affections of dis tant parts are communicated, seems to be that the former obtains, as a result of natural function, only the animal properties of the structures — at least, thus much only can be remarked distinctly ; while the ovarium is a centre to which not only the animal and intellectual properties of remote seats are communicated, but those also, with equal uniformity, of the organic life. 12§.

Presuming that the formation of the ovum is not the result of an exclusive, or independent function of the ovarium, but rather that it is endowed by a contribution from all parts of the mother, and thus possesses the properties of every seat, it is next to be inquired, further, concerning the mode, and period, of this endowment. On these points, two alternatives may be proposed : first, that the mind, (confining ourselves to the present subject,) which is possessed by the fœtus, is conferred on the ovum by the habitual intercourse of the ovarium with the properties of distant seats, of which it is the centre ; as if by a natural, spontaneous tendency of properties towards this part: secondly, that the ovum obtains the properties of mind, as well as those of life, which afterwards distinguish it by a determination from all parts of the maternal sys tem, sub coitu. 13§.

We shall scarcely decide between these alterna tives with much certainty. It is presumed that we have, in regard to the formation of the human ovum, no direct testimony of experience; and with respect to analogy, we observe, in favour of the first alternative, or of the spontaneous tendency of the properties of distant seats to the ovarium, that the ova of fishes are produced and fecundated without sexual connection ; and the offspring furnish, by a resemblance to their proge nitors, the evidence of a derivation from all their parts. 14§. But, although the endowments of the ova appear, in these examples, to be conferred by a spontaneous tendency of the diffused maternal properties to the ovarium, it is contrary to general experience, that the act by which any species is multiplied should be unattended with the sensation of pleasure.

It there fore appears not improbable, (whether dependent on a turgescence of vessels, which progressively attains a certain degree, or on any unknown laws peculiar to the economy of these animals,) that the generative pro cesses in fishes are the result of a spontaneous excite ment, similar in character and effect to that which, in other animals, occurs sub coitu. Hence, the testimony derived from this source of analogy must appear of doubtful importance. 15 §. On the other hand, confining our observation to the laws of sympathy, and of intercourse between the properties of distant seats, in the human species, a general disposition may be remarked in the vital pro perties of seats to preserve their place in these seats, unless the relations by which they were assumed are disturbed by change, whether for the purposes of a function, or for the occurrence of disease.

Thus all the parts which are subjected to the influence of the brain, are free from this influence as long as this viscus is at rest ; and the brain is not impressed by sensations from the distant systems with which it is connected, as long as these systems are undisturbed by preternatural agency. In disease, also, if a metastasis occur, it is perhaps most generally from an excitement in the seat to which disease, before occupying a distant one, is derived. 16§. Hence, of these two alternatives, it appears most probable that the ovum acquires the properties which it afterwards manifests, and which include those of the mind, by a general determination or derivation of the properties of every maternal seat towards the ovarium ; that the mode by which this universal derivation is pro duced, is that of a local excitement, incident to the act of generation ; and all that is required of the previous constitution of the ovum, is a disposition to imbibe or adopt the properties which are at this time conferred upon it, and which are afterwards displayed in com plicated relations. 17§.

Without insisting upon the truth of this account, which is always unbecoming where alternatives may be proposed, to the decision of which the evidence we possess is inadequate, it may be remarked of the mode, whatever it is by which the maternal ovum obtains the characteristic properties both of the species and of the individual, that a similar one may be inferred with regard to the contribution of the male ; the act of procreation being the same in character, and the resemblance of the offspring to both progenitors, being equally manifest. 18 §. It is observed of the properties which govern the organic system, that those of the progenitors are generally possessed by the offspring; that some of them are so related as to modify each other ; and that others, derived from either parent, produce their characteristic effects without suffering any change. 19§- These results do not occur with regularity, even in the same structures, but are occasionally intermixed, or separate.

Thus the exterior of the offspring some times resembles that of neither parent, but exhibits the mixed character of both. The colour of the skin, in the offspring of black and white parents, shews a mixed resemblance, or is neither black nor white ; and in other instances, perfect black, and perfect white, at different places. The same is remarked of other dispositions in the organic department : propensities to disease, or peculiarities of growth, belonging to either parent, are counteracted, or are continued, in the offspring, according to the relations of parental properties with each other. The most regular example of the distinct and exclusive prevalence in the offspring of the organic properties of either parent, is that of sexual resemblance : and even in this instance, the relation by which a peculiarity of either parent is modified by the influence of the other, is sometimes, though very rarely, displayed. 20§.

The same general tendencies may be remarked of the mind, which is conferred on the offspring by either parent, as those which have just been traced in the life of the organic system. 21 §. Without attempting a vain inquiry concerning the laws on which the separate or mixed efficacy of the properties of either parent depends, or without attempting an arrangement of examples under either head, since we see that the phenomena are capriciously irregular, it is sufficient to observe, that the two dispositions of the mental endowments of the parents respectively, to a separate or mixed efficacy in the offspring, are also exhibited : and thus conspicuous traits of mind or character, belonging to either parent, are sometimes preserved, sometimes counteracted, moderated, or aug mented, in their degree ; according to the absence of relation, or the nature of the relation, subsisting be tween the properties of mind conferred respectively by parents upon their offspring.

But owing to causes before enumerated, which are comprised chiefly in the diversity of circumstances to which the mind is exposed, and by all of which it is liable to be more or less influenced, the resemblance of traits in the offspring to those of the parents is rarely preserved ; and the endowments of mind or character which may be supposed to be derived from either parent, whether illus trating a distinct or a mixed efficacy, are less clearly marked in this, than in the organic department; the original tendencies in which are less likely to be modified or counteracted, because its relations are more simple. 22§. The mental qualities which are conferred by parents on the offspring, are those only of disposition. However copiously the minds of parents may be fur nished with ideas, these are not communicated to the ovum: the disposition alone is bestowed, by which similar or other mental stores may be accumulated, by subsequent exposure to the same, or other causes, which are the sources or means of information.

To quote a trite illustration : if a child, whose intellectual disposition was of the highest order, were shut up for the first twenty years of his life in a dark room, never suffered to hear an articulate sound, or to exercise the other senses upon any objects, except those to which, in his confined situation, he was inevitably exposed, a being so circumstanced would have no language, no ideas, save those of the walls and furniture of his room. It would appear from this fact alone, that a mental disposition only is transmitted from parents to their offspring. 23§. At the same time, we observe that properties are conferred by parents on their offspring which remain latent ; and the proof of their possessing these properties is, that a conspicuous characteristic of one generation is frequently retained, although passive, in the succeeding one, and does not declare itself by its effects until a third or a fourth generation.

But the proof that such characteristic is possessed, though not declared, rests upon the circumstance, that in a future. and no very distant generation, it is manifested ; which proof, in regard to the ideas possessed by proge nitors, it may be presumed, would not be afforded: if the race of human beings who were never presented with appropriate objects of the senses, were to be per petuated by procreation ad infinitum, the knowledge of language, of historical events, of laws, of physical relations, &c, would never be manifested by any generation of such a race. 24 §. Hence, as this indication of analogy, drawn from the latent preservation of characteristics, chiefly perceived in the organic system, seems defective, inas much as the proofs which establish the preservation of such characteristics in the one instance would fail in the other, we have no grounds for proceeding beyond our experience; which is, that the mental endowment of the offspring is confined to a disposition, by which information also, with the aid of externals, may after wards be obtained. 25§.

If any exception may be proposed to the truth of the remark, that the ideas which are possessed by parents are not communicated to the offspring, it is that the knowledge which is called instinctive (and if knowledge, it must, at least in the first instance, have been prior to any possible experience,) may, in the per petuation of the respective species, be conferred on the ovum in the same manner as the mental disposition is conferred. This exception suggests, that as much in formation of the mind of parents is bestowed upon the offspring, as is necessary to his preservation. 26 §. This degree of information, however obtained, is commonly allowed to the offspring of everv species ; for, it may be alleged, unless a young animal were acquainted with the existence of the teat, for example, it would no more seek for this instrument of nutrition than it would seek for a teapot, or any thing else, of which it was not informed : and, being instructed of the existence and use of the teat, if it were not also acquainted with its situation, it would be as likely to seek for it at the mouth or fore-legs of the mother, as at the place where it is found : and if, further, the young animal were not acquainted with the figure, properties, &c, of the teat, it would be very likely to mistake the part, and to suck the tail or the nose of the mother, and to arrive rather by accident, than by fore knowledge, at the source from whence it is to derive nourishment ; to which, however, it is guided with great certainty, even if its pursuit should not be aided by the sense of vision, as in animals which are born blind. 27§.

It may be objected, that the search for nourish ment is prompted by the spontaneous sensation of want, or by appetite ; but this suggestion is not enough : the sensation of hunger may prompt the search after food, but it does not arise in other instances, merely out of this sensation, that the information is obtained of the place and mode by which this want is to be supplied. 28§. But, although we should concede to our young animal this degree of instruction, namely, the possession of instinctive ideas, our concession must stop here : all other information is the result of the exposure of the mental disposition to the influence of appropriate causes, by which knowledge is obtained; and though the new being from his birth should manifest the possession of instinctive ideas, yet if he were afterwards precluded totally the exercise of his senses, he would exhibit no others of which the minds of his progenitors were possessed.* * These remarks are, in great measure, conformable with prevalent opinion : it may, however, be suggested, that all the actions of instinct may be produced in the same manner, by experience, as different sensations, ideas, or affections, are otherwise produced 29§- It appears, agreeably with these facts, that the instinctive propensities result from natural wants, which relate chiefly to nutrition, the causes of which are com municated from parents to the offspring of every species ; that the actions of instinct are directed by ideas, which may be conferred on the offspring in the same way ; and that to this extent, if the customary relation of causes with modified sentient principles should be thought inap plicable, the possession of innate ideas may be allowed.

To me, however, it appears that all the actions of instinct may be explained by supposing, as in subsequent periods of life, that certain objects related with the senses produce certain affections ; to which succeed actions in conformity with them — these actions being produced by excited affection or propensity rather than directed by a fore-knowledge of final purposes. 30 §. The question may arise on the origin of the intellectual characterestics of the foetus, as on the for mation of the structures, whether the properties con ferred by the parent on the ovum, and afterwards manifested by their effects, are identical, or predisponent ? Whether the properties which form a muscle, or the desire for food, and the knowledge of the mode in which this desire is to be gratified, are conferred identically by parents, or arise out of the processes and relations of growth, to which the properties identically bestowed by parents on the ovum, were only determinate or predisponent ?

On this question it is not here necessary to remark further, than that the possession of the identical properties of the parents, by the offspring, has been elsewhere* considered a proof of their being identically by the same causes; viz., by relation of these causes with different sentient predispositions ; a mode which supposes that the first, or the instinctive actions, are excited by appropriate objects, in rela tion with peculiar sensibilities. * Indications on Org. Life : Book II., Chap. 2. conferred, chiefly because no other mode of their origin can be proposed ; and because also the processes of growth, the formation of the textures, the peculiarities of character, &c, exemplify, in respective stages, corresponding changes in the combinations only of the pro perties which were derived by the ovum from parents. 31§.

With the possible exception of the instinctive ideas, it appears that the fœtal mind is a disposition of properties, by which, in relation with other causes, the information is attained which afterwards distinguishes it. It remains to inquire concerning the nature of this disposition, which seems to be the ground-work of so stupendous a superstructure. 32§. The only physical proofs of the nature of the mind, are those which are furnished by its phenomena : these phenomena are common, or particular ; the general nature of the mind is deduced from the former, and the varieties of the latter afford the distinctions of individual character. 33§. All the phenomena of the mind, which are within the scope of our experience, agree in being only varieties of consciousness ; and this consciousness, although in terms it is generally distinguished from sensation, appears to be essentially the same.

The most that can be said of a sensation is, that it is a particular kind, or individual instance, of consciousness ; and the most that can be said of an idea is, that it is one variety of sensation.* If a person receives a wound, his con- * That all our ideas, whether of perception or reflection, are essentially sensations, is admitted by Mr. Locke, who proposes to call the ideas of reflection, those of " the internal sense." — (On the Human Understanding. 1700. p. 42, 321, Sec.) He, how ever, suggests a convenience in the customary distinction of terms, which does not facilitate a physiological inquiry. I shall therefore illustrate, so far as may be required by our future argument, the identity of every form of consciousness with that which we call sensation. sciousness is that of pain ; if he is not conscious of pain, he does not feel any : if a person has the idea of a substance, possessing certain physical properties, or if the idea of an historical fact is present to his mind, he is sensible of this idea ; and if the proof of his having it does not consist in the sensation of it, it would be diffi cult to say on what other testimony it rests. 34§.