Too Late for Gordon and Khartoum: the testimony of an ... eye-witness of the ... efforts for their rescue ... With ... unpublished letters of the late General Gordon

Preface

. The chief object of the author in this volume is to give his readers a more complete account of the recent Nile Expedition than either himself or the Press colleagues who accompanied him were at the time able to supply. Owing to the demand for the rapid despatch of news made by the journalism of the present day, the telegrams of war correspondents take precedence over their letters. These telegrams are unsatisfactory as a medium of information, for they comprise only a synopsis of the most important current events. Under the trying circumstances of the expedition, and owing to the rapidity with which its events followed one another during the period of active operations, it was physically and mentally impossible to take into account in our subsequent despatches by mail, and deal satisfactorily with, the subsidiary events which so largely contributed to the failure of the heroic struggle made by Lord Wolseley and the force he commanded to rescue Gordon and his brave garrison from the fate which befell them.

Even his lordship's published despatches were in this respect, and evidently from the same causes, regarded as unsatisfactory. Upon my return from the Soudan I was therefore met by a wide-spread demand for fuller information than had as yet been supplied to the public on important points respecting the expedition, and especially on those to which its disastrous failure was due. There were also grave misconceptions prevalent about some of the more serious incidents of our desert march on Metammeh, the battles we fought, and the gallant effort made by Sir Charles Wilson to open up communications with General Gordon. In fact a most unfair attempt was made to fix upon him the blame of what must ever be regarded as a great national disaster. A desire to correct these misconceptions, and do full justice to the distinguished General who so patriotically undertook at the eleventh hour the conduct of the expedition, and to the gallant forces of which it was composed, was the incentive to the task I have now completed.

In its prosecution I have depended chiefly on my own observations along the whole line from Cairo to Metammeh, and when events had to be noticed with which I was only partially or indirectly acquainted, I have taken every possible care to avoid misstatement. Some questions arose the solution of which caused me, from their gravity, much anxiety. Amongst these were, for instance, the choice of routes for the expedition, the arrest of Sir Frederick Stephenson's preparations for an advance to Dongola at high Nile in the autumn of 1884, and Lord Wolseley's detention at Korti after he had ex pressed his earnest desire to accompany the desert

PREFACE.

column. There were also purely military questions which, from their bearing on the movements of various parts of our force, had to be answered in order to explain such incidents as the accident to the square at Abu- Klea, and the late Sir Herbert Stewart's double journey to Jakdul before his advance on Metammeh. I am under deep obligation to Lord Wolseley, not only for the interest he expressed in the task I had undertaken, but for his readiness to give me whatever information I thought myself at liberty to ask from him. I am further indebted to his lordship for advance copies of maps and plans issued by the Intelligence Depart ment — specially of the battlefield of Abu-Klea. I am also desirous of expressing my thanks to many of the officers of the expedition for valuable informa tion which either confirmed my own observations and impressions on important points, or enabled me to explain others about which I was uncertain.

Major Dixon's journal, which that officer kindly per mitted me to make use of, illustrates, in a manner which no description of my own could, the battle of our troops with the difficulties of their advance up the Nile by the Cataracts. The Misses Janson very kindly placed at my disposal several interesting letters of General Gordon to their late brother, which also throw light upon various points in my narrative. I have been encouraged by the expressions of many friends, both civil and military, in the task I had under taken, and by their assurance that as I had accompanied the expedition, a great many things must have come under my notice which have hitherto not been sub mitted to the public, and that my opinions would have great value ' as those of an unprejudiced looker-on.' But these encouragements deepened the sense of my responsibility in dealing with matters affecting personal and official character and the policy of the rulers of the land, and made me doubly careful in criticising the conduct of the expedition.

I have endeavoured to keep to the title I had chosen, which was suggested to me by one deeply in terested in the conduct of the expedition, and for whom as a military commander I have always entertained the greatest admiration and respect. ALEX. MACDONALD. London : October 13, 1887. PAGE I CONTENTS.

Chapter II

Delayed departure for Egypt —An old acquaintance — Stuck in the canal — Cairo — After the regulation license for Press correspondents — Personal criticisms thereon — Cameron's denunciations of boat press restrictions — Engaging servants — Dusty ride to Assiout — Embarking for Assouan — Scenes on the way — Signs of expedition — Freight boats — Kroomen's barge — Approach to Assouan — Camp and British bugles up the Nile ....... 23

Chapter III

Assouan — Looking for lodgings — Mixed population — Ababdeh and Bisharee tribes — Railway round cataract and transport facilities — Whalers' stores and rations — Tiffin baskets — The camp — Officers at work — Transition from club to camp life — Sickness and camp-site — Responsibility of A.M.D. — Old Assouanites and their Mammour — Native medical treatment — Ready to move on — Collapse of coal supply and irksome delay — Shellal and Philæ — Our steamer accommodation — Mosquitoes — Off at last . . '34

Chapter IV

Agility of the Kroomen — How these auxiliaries were secured — Interesting and amusing characteristics — Slow sailing — British river patrol — Korosko — A surgeon's adventures on Lower Nile — Beats GORDON AND KHARTOUM PAGE 45 the ' Fayum' in his dahabiyeh— Foraging for eggs and chickens- River scenes and people— Rats' antics— Steam versus sails— Effects of the failure of north wind and of coal supply on advance of expedition— Lord Wolseley's complaint— All about Nile crocodiles .....•••'••

Chapter V

Stir at Wady-Halfa— Ethnological peculiarities of expedition— Camp — Its unhealthy position— Hospitals, diseases and mortality connected with ages of the troops— Personal camp discomforts — Cavalry detachments and their new steeds— Wolseley's order about camels— Guards' first mounted drill— Camels and their riders — Serious errors about these animals — Short supply and consequences — Second and third cataracts — Obstacles to the expedition — Geological descriptions — Bab-el-Kebir portage and Egyptian troops — Wolseley's first impressions therefrom — Gordon and rock-borers — His letters — Red River and Nile expeditions compared — Difficulty of latter 56

Chapter VI

Connections of Wady-Halfa — Railway and Soudan question — Gordon's plans for opening river to Khartoum — Completion of road beyond Sarras countermanded — Probable reasons — Gordon's letter, Nov. 4 — Erroneous interpretation by headquarter staff at Haifa — Wolseley's hurried visit to Haifa — Must fight to release Gordon — Boat plan substantially adhered to — Position of troops and store? when Gordon's letter was received — Available native craft above Hannek and camel supply at Uebbeh — Facilities for sending advance column to Khartoum — British Government and Wolseley's July appeal — Gemai and whalers — 19th Hussars — Marines at Haifa — Rose Cottage and rigged out in spurs — Shortness of camel supply — Forces all on the move — Last night at Haifa, and Royal Irish .......... 72

Chapter VII

Departure of Marines and Artillery, &c, for Korti — Oft to Gemai Bivouac with Canadian contingent, and their indignant denial of statements about them in a London paper — Cheap military correspondents as sources of information — Sarras, Marines at sea in the desert — Dust storm — Departure for Ambigol — At head of column CONTENTS PAGE — Afternoon tea with Lieut. Vidal — Railway permanent way — Moonlight march — Optical delusions — Rock-cutting — Sleepy officers and roar of cataracts — March on of the Marines and Artillery— Fun with the camels— Rest over Sabbath — Cataract of Ambigol — Difficulties of passage— Wrecked whalers and their con struction—Hospital — Colonel Burnaby and his new appointment — Unfortunate selections ........ S6

Chapter VIII

Bound for Akasheh and landed at Tanjur — Order for accelerating the progress through the cataracts — Sarkamatto and an old Reis on Nile navigation above Dongola — Uncomfortable lodging and small-pox — Off for Mograkeh — Turning out the ladies for visitors — A night :n the Mograkeh desert — A warm-up before breakfast — The family donkey and who rode it — Ancient Nile levels and irrigation — Home-like Dulgo — Sunset and bivouacking — Nile landscapes at Faredi — Colonel Stanley Clarke and unpleasant quarters — Lieut. Inglefield and his jolly tars — Arrested on suspicion — Bravery of Egyptian sentries — Colonel Butler and the whalers — Restrained anxieties — Off again after Wolseley — St. George's ensign on the Nile — Fantastic boulders and the station's beacon light — Observations for longitude under difficulties — Tommy Atkins and the tobacco question . . . . . . . . .102

Chapter IX

Abu-Fatmeh to Dongola — Two marches — Camel troubles — Pebbles and pottery— Halt for breakfast with Carmichael — Bivouac near Argo Island and native girls — Hot weather — Timing camels — Bivouac at Akadeh — Chance of playing Mahdi — Dragoman's view of the natives — Hydrostatic puzzle — Native cemeteries — Dongola from the right bank of the Nile — Another sand-storm — Crossing to left bank — Quarters at Dongola — The fodder question — Bazaar and population — General Earle — The Mudir and our short supplies — Bashi-Bazouk extortions ....... 120

Chapter X

Departure from Dongola- -Fortified villages — Tekhameh — Soudane**e Christmas weather — A reminiscence of Mahomet — Sun umbrellas and Soudanese donkeys— Foraging for a Christmas dinner — Topo- GORDON AND KHARTOUM PAGE graphical observations— Handak— Soudanese agricultural scene- Camel in a hole — Camp at Shabudat — Plum-pudding under difficulties— Christmas under the palms with our boys— December in the Soudan— Trading for eggs but not for donkeys— Native inquisitiveness— Lost in the moonlight— Cold quarters — A queer neighbour — Marching in battle array and effects on population— Abu-Gus and its surroundings— Start for Debbeh— Instead en route for Khartoum — A Nile landscape— Debbeh at last '37

Chapter XI

Camp at Debbeh and our house — Fort and its garrison — Wadi Malik and road to Khartoum — Travelling by moonlight— Hasty halt and bivouac — Ambukol at last — A night with the Bashi-Bazouks — Patriarchal law administration — Scenes on the road — Our base camp — Physical results of boating up the Nile — Discussing Lord Wolseley's intended movements— Gordon's critical position — News from Jakdul — More arrivals — Speculations about Berber and Khartoum by whalers . . . . . . . . 151

Chapter XII

Convoy to Jakdul — How it was delayed — Ready for the march — An untrustworthy Greek — Lord Wolseley's adieu — Our first desert meal — Waiting for the moon — Early rising and rosy-fingered morn — How we marched and halted — Not a desert after all — Its inhabitants and how they live — Antelopes — Lost after breakfast — Last news of a missing colleague — An inopportune stellar invisibility — Intricacies of the road — A stem chase of the convoy — Scenery near Hambok — An unpleasant welcome from our rear-guard — Done up and dying camels — The convoy as seen in the fading sunlight — El-Howeiyat at last — Replenishing water-skins and a thirsty crowd— That three-legged pump — Watering in the dark — Oversights and omissions — Sportive donkeys — More antelopes Indications of water — Magaga wells — Desert scenery — A thirsty ride in the hot sun — Leakages and water trading — Demoralisation of the Egyptian contingent — A despatch from Jakdul . . .171

Chapter XIII

Out of water, an opportune supply — Entrance to Jakdul gorge Colonel Sawle and luncheon — Choice of quarters and maintaining CONTENTS PAGE the rights of the Press — Arrival of convoy and condition of its camels — The Jakdul wells hydropathically and geologically — Stewart's column and the water question again — -Our Mountdd Infantry vete rans — The zereba outside the gorge— Stewart's march in — Crowds of camels and how they were watered — Climate and scenery of the gorge — Almost a patient — Kitchener's domicile and his latest news — The crisis of the expedition and how it ended . . . .191

Chapter XIV

Final preparations for march on Metammeh — Arrival of Burnaby and early interview — Characteristic message for a colleague — Rendezvous outside of the gorge — Our column — How its camels were driven — F'irst signs of the enemy — Morning of January 15— Imposing appearance of the force — Spirit of the men — The dog of the Grenadiers and the ox of the Coldstreams — Sight of the enemy's scouts — Colonel Barrow's reconnaissance on 16th — Contact with the enemy — Successful occupation of a strategical point — Halt for breakfast with Cameron near the general — News from Barrow — Prompt preparations for attack — Off to the front with the general and staff 206

Chapter XV

Preparing for action — First sight of the enemy — Burnaby and our prospects — Stewart's decision and sunset — Our zereba and its defences — Activity of the enemy on our right — How a shell startled them — Study for a pyrotechnist —Hard beds — What the bullets seemed to say and the music they made — Unpleasant surroundings and nocturnal disturbances — Stand to your arms — An Arab war-dance by firelight — Sunrise on the 1 7th and its accompaniments — Burnaby and his remount — Driven under cover — Consultation with Cameron and mutual arrangement — The hospital fort and its wounded, dying, and dead — Nearly gazetted — More British shells — The Abu-Klea square — How formed and crowded . . . 217

Chapter XVI

Defence of the zereba — Attempted flank movement by the enemy — Countermove by the Hussars — Advance of square— Attracts hot fire from Arab sharpshooters —Efficient skirmishing — Approach to AGE 230 enemy's position — Deceptive illusions dispelled — The Arab trap avoided by Stewart — Masterly flank movement— Sudden appearance of the foe — Drifting camels and the consequences — Danger ous position of the Naval Brigade — Why Colonel Burnaby opened the rear face of the square— How he was killed — The Arab charges — Curious formations of the enemy — Effects of the sharp fire of Guards and Mounted Infantry — Disadvantageous position of Lancers and Greys at critical moments — Penetration of the square by Arabs — Hand-to-hand fight — Escape of General Stewart — Enemy's full charge — Jamming of Gardner and disastrous consequences — Heavies driven back against the camels — Final repulse of the Arabs — Our losses — Care of the wounded and burying of dead — March to wells and bivouac — Reply to Mr. Bright — Success ful defence of the zereba — Interviewing an Arab prisoner — Forces of the enemy and their retreat — Threatened resistance by the Mahdi — Another uncomfortable night in the Wady — Scenes on the battle-field — Bivouac at the wells .....

Chapter XVII

Abu-Klea — Interview with Stewart — Wolseley's orders — Capture of Metammeh and joining hands with Gordon — How a war correspondent wrote his despatch and sent it — Disquieting rumour — Proposed return to Jakdul and how it fell through — Preparations for march out— Insufficient water supply— No rest to be given the enemy — Delayed march out — Our column and its camels — Mountains beyond the Nile — Sunset and no supper — Our last bugle sound — A night march with its uncomfortable restrictions — The enemy's beacon signals — First experiences of coming troubles Frequent halts and their causes — Condition of the camels— Stewart's prediction— Entanglement in a forest — Confusion worse confounded — Dangerous condition of affairs — The Guards dismounted — Shebecat Wells and Wolseley's suggestion — Evidently baulked of our object— The camels again — Taking bearings of our position and new departure— First fresh Nile water — Natives and their goats— Metammeh reported— Enemy on the alert — Last ride with Cameron— Reconnoitring with Stewart— Metammeh and Nile in sight— Intervening country— The general's view of the siiuation — Delays advance for breakfast — Untenable position selected for zereba- Crowding in amongst the camels — First bullets from the enemy— Breakfasting under difficuliies — Stewart wounded and serious consequences — Along sleep and a rude awakening — Hunted CONTENTS by bullets— Hospital redoubt and the wounded— Our six hours' halt and general view of situation — Preparing to fight for water — Defences of the zereba — An effective square organisation — Casualties at the zereba — Advance of the square — Watched and aided from the redoubt — What our shells did — Dangerous position of the square — Wilson's estimate of his men — Their spirit and steadiness— Charge of the enemy and gallant repulse — Number and losses of the Arabs — The Nile at last — Our night in the re doubt — Plundering— Alarms — Sufferings of the wounded — A neglected duty ......... 253

Chapter XVIII

Anxiety at the zereba — Reappearance of our square — Hearty welcome and vote of thanks — A first night on the Nile — Counting our losses — Removal under difficulties — Hot mutton broth — Abu- Kru, alias Gubat — March out on Melammeh — Proposed plan of attack — Our Hussar scouts— Reconnoitring under difficulties — How its conclusions were nullified — Where is the enemy ? — On the wrong side of the town — Gordon's steamers* at last — Gubat reoccupied — Junction wilh Gordon's troops — New troubles— Force withdrawing — Only a reconnaissance after all— Our new camp on the Nile — Our wounded — Scope and objects of expedition — Official recognition of its success ........... 2S0

Chapter XIX

Gordon's ironclad ' penny boats ' — Start for Khartoum — Dangers ahead — A sad reminiscence — Preparing for the voyage — Routing out the ' hens ' and ' heroes ' — Foraging for red coats — Sending for food — Despatches to Korti — Half-rations — Departure of Sir Charles— Hopeful anticipations— Being wise after the event— Too late anyhow — Our defences and position — Harvesting — Sheltering the wounded— Our skilful surgeons — Building and furnishing — Too short for comfort — Scouting under difficulties — Serious blunder about our cavalry — Our one ' ironclad ' and its cruisings —Inaction of the enemy at Metammeh — Tl eir nocturnal concerts — How they disturbed our confidence — Running short of supplies — When is Wolseley coming ? — Why he did not — Without a general — Days of anxiety and suspense— Return of Captain Talbot's convoy — Sudden fall of the Nile — Our rude awakening on February 1 — Message from Sir Charles — His gallant and smith ss struggle to reach Khartoum — Shipwrecked — All lost .....

Chapter XX. Page

ESects of the fall of Khartoum on Soudanese crews and soldiers — Collapse of Khasm-el-Mus and the gun-captain — How Sir Charles met the disappointment — Treachery and wreck of both of his steamers — Landing at Mernat Island — Its indefensible position — Proposed march down the river abandoned — Stuart-Wortley sent tb Gubat for aid — Despatch of Lord Charles Beresford from the camp in ' Es Safia ' — Comes to grief in passing first battery of the enemy — Gallant defence of his steamer while the boiler was being repaired — Opportunely aided by Sir C. Wilson from right bank — Embarkation of his party by Lord Charles, and safe arrival at the camp— Last attempt to rescue Gordon — Its gallantry overlooked by Wolseley — His explanation as to the ultimate cause of his failure to relieve Khartoum criticised — Condition of the town after December 14 — Desperate condition on January 18 — An un published telegram — Gordon's last struggle for the defence of Khartoum — The Mahdi's tactics — Starvation of the garrison — Assault and capture — WTiy it fell — Gordon's faithfulness to the end— His gloomy foreboding sadly realised— Mistakes in conduct of the expedition 324 APPENDICES 343 MAPS AND PLANS.

Sketch Map of the Nile, showing Second and Third Cataracts To face page 64 Map showing River and Desert Routes from Dongola to Khartoum, &c. ....... j-iS Plan of Zereba at Abu-Klea, with Sketch Map showing Relative Position of Battlefield, &c. 220 Plan of Battlefield of Abu-Klea, showing charge of Arabs „„,- ,, 236 Sketch Map showing Position and Movements of Stewart's Column after Daylight on January 19 c Sketch Map, Abu-Kru and Metammeh, with movements of Sir C. Wilson's Column on January 20 . ot TOO LATE FOR GORDON AND KHARTOUM PRINTED BV SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET SQt'ARE LONDON TOO LATE FOR GORDON and KHARTOUM

Chapter I. Introductory

Early in October 1882 disquieting rumours began to circulate in Cairo relative to the state of affairs in the Egyptian provinces in the Soudan. The false prophet, of whose appearance there we had already heard, had, it was said, made great progress since our communi cations with that region had been interrupted by the rebellion of Arabi, and having gathered round him a number of Arab tribes, he had raised the standard of revolt against the Khedive. This startling news naturally toned down our elation over the decisive results of Tel-el-Kebir, and made it very probable that more battles would have to be fought before the work we had undertaken for Egypt could be accomplished. A greater than Arabi in many respects had arisen to trouble us in a region whose geographical position made it more difficult to reach than had been the scene of our recent successful military operations.

It was also apprehended that after capturing Kharis GORDON AND KHARTOUM CH. 1. 2 toum he might advance down the Nile and draw after him the whole Mussulman population. And there were good reasons for this apprehension, for subsequent to Arabi's overthrow the masses in Egypt proper were quite open to the seductive influences of a successful native leader, especially if he came clothed with the prestige of the predicted prophet, who when he appeared would, revive Islamism and extend it over the whole world. At first it was very difficult to trace these alarming reports to any trustworthy source, on account of the reticence maintained about them in official circles. They however daily gained strength, and soon their substantial correctness was admitted to the writer by Riaz Pasha, the minister for the interior.

Later on it became known that Lord Granville had received a memorandum drawn up by Sir Charles Wilson respecting the Soudan, which described affairs there as being 'in the greatest disorder.' It also included the following telegram from Khartoum, dated September 17 : 'Owing to telegrams sent by Arabi Pasha to the Soudan order ing people not to recognise the authority of the Khedive, revolt had broken out in the country, and the pretended Mahdi had gained more adherents. . . . The Governor of the Soudan asks for 10,000 Remington rifles to be sent in order to arm a force under Said Pasha to crush the Mahdi. . . . The Mahdi is now two hours from Kordofan (Obeid), and has a large force.' . . This, Sir Charles says, must be regarded as a favourable account of the state of affairs then existing, and therefore he deemed it advisable to send two English officers to the Soudan to report on the state of the country and the steps which will be necessary to CH. I. FATAL SOUDAN POLICY 3 ensure its pacification.

He further says that as the Mahdi can approach Egypt by routes only traversible by small bodies of troops at a time, a small disciplined force could block him easily; but he adds, 'At present, however, if the Mahdi attempts a forward movement, there is no Egyptian force to meet him.' At the very outset of our intervention in the affairs of Egypt we were thus confronted by difficulties of an embarrassing character. As the welfare of the whole country was now seriously endangered by the rebellion which had broken out in the Soudan, it appeared to be the duty of her Majesty's Government to deal with it as it had dealt with that of Arabi. Unless it did, then the task of pacifying Egypt and reorganising its administration could not be so easily or so satisfactorily accomplished as had been anticipated when it was undertaken.

There seemed so little reason at Cairo at the time to doubt that her Majesty's Government would shirk the new responsibility which had been thrust upon them, that some of my military friends there busied themselves in arranging the details of a campaign to smash the Mahdi. But these were not the views entertained by the more stolid diplomatists in Downing Street with respect to the scope of British responsibility for the welfare of Egypt, for they denied all obligation to restore order in the Soudan, announcing their intention to pursue a policy of absolute non-interference in its affairs. But the Gladstone Cabinet found it impossible to maintain this position, and the disastrous results which followed their attempts to do so fully justified the warnings they had received on the subject from competent authorities in England and Egypt.

B ch. r. GORDON AND KHARTOUM 4 The events and circumstances which eventually compelled this active interference in the affairs of the Soudan are matters of too recent history to require any further reference to them here than may add to the interest of our narrative. It is therefore now only proposed to recall the attention of our readers to such of the incidents in that history as have a direct bearing on General Gordon's last mission to Khartoum, and which not only necessitated the expedition undertaken for his rescue, but also seriously contributed to its failure. Our first reference is to the destruction of Hicks Pasha's army. When the news of this disaster reached Cairo on November 24, 1883, Sir Evelyn Baring informed Lord Granville that General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood with himself were of the opinion that the successes of the Mahdi were a source of danger to Egypt, which would be increased if Khartoum fell, and that it now seemed impossible to hold that town.

To this communication Lord Granville replied that her Majesty's Government could do nothing in the matter that would throw on them any responsibility for military operations in the Soudan. This despatch from Downing Street was crossed by another from Cairo, telling his Lordship that the Egyptian Government, finding it impossible to hold the Soudan, had decided upon withdrawing their garrisons and falling back on Egypt proper. It is not necessary here to refer to the discussions which then ensued between Sir Evelyn Baring and Cherif Pasha, and which ended in the Egyptian Govern ment placing itself entirely in the hands of our Govern ment, with the suggestion that either Turkish troops should be employed to save the Eastern Soudan for CH. t. WITHDRAWAL FROM KHARTOUM 5 Egypt, or that the whole country should be abandoned to the Sultan.

We come therefore to January 9, 1884, when Sir E. Baring telegraphed to Lord Granville that all doubts about the necessity for withdrawing from Khartoum were removed by the decided opinion of Colonel Coetlogon, late Governor of Khartoum, who recommended an immediate withdrawal from that town, and asserted that if it was ordered at once it could be safely effected. It was then proposed that Abdel-Kader, minister of war, ' should proceed to the Soudan and superintend the withdrawal of its endangered garrisons, and Egyptian officials and their families.' He agreed to do so on con dition that the intention of abandoning the country should not be openly avowed, for in his opinion any such avowal would prevent the success of his mission. Her Majesty's Government not acceding to this request, he declined the task, although General Gordon had already informed them that the moment it was known we had given up the game in the Soudan, every one would go over to the Mahdi.

The name of General Gordon had, early in December 1883, been mentioned in connection with this hazardous undertaking, but Sir Evelyn Baring seems then to have assumed that he would not be acceptable to the Egyp tian authorities on account of the movement in the Soudan being a religious one. If appointed to a high office there, he said it was feared the Mussulman tribes who were loyal to the Government would go over to the Mahdi. It is difficult to ascertain whether this view was that of our able representative at the time or not, for, so far as experience goes, the incompleteness of the despatches published in the Blue Books often puzzles GORDON AND KHARTOUM CH. I. those who devote themselves to their perusal. Still, if General Gordon had then been asked to proceed to the Soudan, he could have reached Khartoum from Pales tine, through Cairo, on January I, 1884, and before the Mahdi had had time to take advantage of his defeat of Hicks's army.