An essay concerning human understanding ... The twentieth edition, etc

Front matter

AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. WRITTTEN BY JOHN LOCKE, GENT. ALSO, EXTRACTED FROM THE AUTHOR'S WORKS, I. Analysis of Mr. Locke's Doctrine of Ideas, on a large Sheet. II. A Defence of Mr. Locke's Opinion IV. Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman. V. Elements of Natural Philosophy. concerning personal Identity. MI. A Treatise on the Conduct of the VI. A New Method of a. Common-place Book. Understanding. A NEW EDITION. IN TWO VOLUME& VOL. I. EDINBURGH: PRINTED FOR JAMES ROBERTSON. MACRI DIE. SKELLY, ASD CO. ADAH SLACK, AND ADAM DICKINSON AND CO. — M. OGLE, J. WYLIF. AND CO. CHARLES JOHNSTON AND CO. AND THOMAS OGILVIE, GLA-GOW— WM. ALEXANDER, AND THOMAS W1MYSS. York — T. AND 3. ALLMAN, OGLE, DUNCAN AND CO. AND JAMES NIoBET, LONDON. isiy. fO SHE RI6HT B0N0UBA1J.E THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE AND MONTGOMERT, Baron Herbert of Cardiff, Lord Ross of Kendal, Parr, Fitzhugh, Marmion, St. Q.uintin, and Shurland s Lord President of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, and Lord Lieutenant of the County of Wilts, find of South Wales.

MY LORD, T^HIS Treatise, which is grown up under your Lordship's eye, and has ventured into the1 world by your order, does now, by a natural kind of right, come to your Lordship for that protection, which you several years since promised it. It is not that I think any name, how great soever, set at the beginning of a book, will be able to cover the faults that are to be found in it. Things in print must stand and fall by their own worth, or the Reader's fancy, But there being nothing more to be desired, for truth, than a fair unprejudiced hearing, nobody is more likely to procure me that than your lordship, who are allowed to have got so inti mate an acquaintance with her, in her more retired recesses. Your lordship is known to have so far advanced your speculations in the roost abstract and general knowledge of things, beyond the or dinary reach or common methods, that your al- THE EPISTLE DEDICATOTY. lowance and approbation of the design of this treatise, will at least pieserve it from being con demned without reading ; and will prevail to have those parts a little weighed, which might other wise, perhaps, be thought to deserve no considera tion, for being somewhat out of the common road.

The imputation of novelty is a terrible charge amongst those who judge of men's heads, as they do of their perukes, by the fashion ; and can allow none to be right but the received doctrines. Truth scarce ever yet carried it by vote any where at its first appearance : new opinions are always sus pected, and usually opposed, without any other reason, but because they are not already com mon. But truth, like gold, is not the less so for being newly brought out of the mine. It is trial and examination must give it price, and not any antique fashion : and though it be not yet current b) the public stamp ; yet it may, for ail that, be as old as nature, and is certainly not the less genuine. Your Lordship can give great and con vincing instances of this, whenever you please to oblige the public with some ot those large and comprehensive discoveries you have made of truths hitherto unknown, unless to some few, from whom your lordship has been pleased not -wholly to conceal them.

Book I. Of Innate Notions

CHAP. I. 3. Universal consent proves nothing innate. 4. What is, is; and, it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be not universally assented The Introduction. SECT. 1. An enquiry into the understanding,plea3ant and useful. to. 5. Not on the mind natu- 2. Design. 3. Method. rally imprinted, because not known to children, idiots. &c. 4. Useful to know the extent of our comprehension. 5. Our capacity proportioned to our stateand concerns, to discover things useful to us. 6, 7. That men know them when they come to the use of reason, answered. 8. If reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate 9 — 11. It is false that reason 6. Knowing the extent of our capacities, will hinder us from useless curiosity, scepticism, and idleness. discovers them. 12. The coming to the use of reason, not the time we come to know these 7.

Occasion of this essay. " 8. What idea stands for. maxims. 13. By this they are not distinguished from other knowable truths. CHAP. II. 14. If coming to the use of reason were the time of No innate principles in the mind, and particularly no innate speculative principles. their discovery, it would not prove them innate. 15, 16. The steps by which the mind attains several truths. SECT. 17. Assenting as soon as proposed and understood proves them not innate. 18. If such an assent be a 1. The way shown how we come by any knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate. mark of innate, then that one and two are equal to three; that sweetness 2. General assent, the great argument. VOL. I. e THE OONTENTS. but because profitable. 7. Men's actions convince is not bitterness; and a thousand the like, must be innate. us, that the rule of virtue is not their internal 19.

Such less general propotions known before these principle. 8. Conscience no proof of any innate moral rule. 9. Instances of enormities universal maxims. 20. One and one equal to two, &c. not general, nor useful, answered. practised without re- 21. These maxims not being known sometimes till morse. 10. Men have contrary practical principles. 11 — is. Whole nations reject several moral rules. proposed, proves them not innate. 22. Implicitly known before proposing, signifies, that the mind is capable of understanding them, or else signifies nothing. 23. The ..rgument of assenting on is first hearing, upon a false supposition of no precedent teacher. 24. Not innate, because not 14. Those who maintain innate practical principles, tell us not what they are. IS — 19; Lord Herbert's innate principles examined. 20 Obj Innate principles may be corrupted, answered 21.

Contrary principles in the world. universally assented to. 25. These maxims not the 22 — 26 How men commonly come by their principles 27. Principles must be examined. first known. 26 And so not innate. 27. Not innate, because they appear least, where what is innate, shows itself CHAP. IV. clearest. Other considerations about innate principles, both speculative and practical. 28. Recapitulation. CHAP. III. No innate practical princi- SECT. pies. 1. Principles not innate, unless their ideas be innate, 2, 3. Ideas, especially those belonging to principles, not burn with children. 4, 5. Identity an idea not in- SECT. 1. No moral principles so clear and so generally received as the forementioned speculative maxims. 2. Faith and justice not owned as principles by all men. nate. 6. Whole and part, not innate ideas 3.

Obj. Though men deny them in their practice, yet they admit them in their thoughts, answered. 4. Moral rules need a proof, ergo, not innate. 5. Instance in keeping com- 7.Ideaofworsbipnotinnate. 8 — 11. Idea of God, not innate- 12. Suitable to God's goodness, that all men should have an idea ot him, therefore naturally imprinted by him, answered. 13 — 16. Ideas of God various in different men. pacts. Virtue generally approv ed, not because innate, 17. If the idea of God be not innate, no other can be supposed innate. 18. Idea of substance not in- 21. Principles not innate, because of little use or little certainty. 22. Difference of men's disnate. coveries depends upon the different applications of their faculties. 19. No propositions can be innate, since no ideas are innate. 23. Men must think and know for themselves 20. No ideas are remembered, till after they have been introduced. 24. Whence the opinion of innate principles. 25. Conclusion.

Book II. Of Ideas

without knowing it, the sleeping andwaking man CHAP. I. Of ideas in general. are two persons. IS. Impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming thattheythink. 14. That mtn dream without SECT. 1. Idea is the object of thinking. 2. All ideas come from senremembering it, in vain urged sation or reflection. 3. The objects of sensation one source of ideas 15. Upon this hypothesis the thoughts ofa sleepingman ought tobe most rational. 16. On this hypothesis the soul mu-t have ideas not 4. The operations of our minds, the other source of them. 5. All our ideas are of the one or the other of these. derived from sensation or reflection, of which there 6. Observable in children. 7. Men are differently furnished with these, accordis no appearance 17. If I think when I know it not, nobody else can know it ing to the different objects they converse with. 8.

Ideas of reflection later, because they need attention. 9. The soul begins to have ideas, when it begins to perceive 10. The soul thinks not al- 18. How knows any one that the soul always thinks? For if it be not a self evident proposition, it needs proof. 19. i liat a man should be busy in thinking, and yet not retain it the next moment, very improbable. 20 — 23. No ideas but from sensaways ; for this wants proofs. 11. It is not always conscious of it. 12. Isa sleepingman thinks tion, or reflection, evident, if we observe children. XX 24. The original of all our knowledge. 25. In the reception of simple ideas the understanding is most of all passive. CHAP. vir. Of simple ideas both of sensation and reflection. SECT. 1 — 6. Pleasure and pain. 7- Existence and unity. 8. Power. 9. Succession. 10.

Simple ideas the mateterials of all our know- CHAP. II. Of simple ideas. SECT. 1. Un compounded appearances. ledge. 2, 3. The mind can neither make nor destroy them. CHAP. VIII. CHAP. III. Other considerations concerning simple ideas. Of ideas of one sense. SECT. SECT. 1 As colours, of seeing ; sounds, of hearing. 2. Few simple ideas have 1 — 6. Positive ideas from privative causes. 7, 8 Ideas in the mind. 9, 10. Primary and secondary qualities. 11, 12- How primary qualities produce their ideas. 13, 14 How secondary. 15 — 23. Ideas of primary qualities, are resemblances; of secondary, not. 24, 25. Reason of our mistake in this. names. CHAP. IV. Of solidity. SECT. 1. We receive this idea from 'ouch 2. Solidity fills space. 3 Distinct from space. 4 From hardness. 5. On solidity depend impulse, resistance, and protrusion. 6.

What it is. 26. Secondary qualities twofold ; first, immediately perceivable; secondly, mediately perceivable. CHAP. V. CHAP. IX. Of simple ideas by more than one sense. Of perception. SECT. CHAP. VI. 1. It is the first smple idea of reflection. Of simple ideas of refection. SECT. 2—4. Perception is only when the mind receives the impression 5, 6. Children tho* they have ideas in the womb, have none innate 7. Which ideas first, is not evident. 1. Simple ideas are the operations of the mind about its other ideas. 2. The idea of perception, and idea of willing, we have from reflection. — 10. Ideas of sensation often CHAP. XII. changed by thejudgment. 11 — 14. Perception puts the difference between animals Of complex ideas. and inferior beings. 15. Perception the inlet of knowledge. SECT. 1. Made by the mind out of simple ones 2.

Made voluntarily. 8. Are either modes, sub- CHAP. X. stances, or relations. 4. Modes. Of retention. 5 Simple and mixed modes. 6. Substances single or collective. SECT. 1. Contemplation, 2. Memory. 3. Attention, repetition, pleasure and pain, fix ideas. 7. Relation. 8. The abstrusest ideas from the two sources. 4, 5. Ideas fade in the memory, 6. Constantly repeated ideas can scarce be lost. CHAP. XIII. Of space and its simplemodes. SECT. 7. In remembering, the mind is often active. I, 9. Two defects in the memory, oblivion and slowness. 1. Simple modes. 2. Idea of space. 3. Space and extension. 4. Immensity. 5. 6 Figure, 7—10. Place. 11 — 14. Extension and body not the same. 10. Brutes have memory. CHAP. XI. Of discerning, fye. 15. The definition of extension, or of space, does not explain it. 16.

Division of beings into bodies and spirits proves not body and space the SECT. 1. No knowledge without it. 2. The difference of wit and judgment. 3. Clearness alone hinders same. confusion. 17, 18. Substance, which we know not.noproof against space without body. 19, 20. Substance and accidents of little use in philosophy. 21. A vacuum beyond the utmost bounds of body. 22. Thepowerofannihilation 4. Comparing. 5. Brutes compare but imperfectly. 6. Compounding. 7. Brutes compound but little. 8. Naming. 9. Abstraction. 10. II. Brutes abstract not, 12, 13 Idiots and madmen, 14. Method. proves a vacuum. 23. Motion proves a vacuum. 24. The ideas of space and body distinct. 25, 26. Extension being inseparable from body, proves it not the same. 15. These are the beginnings of human knowledge. 16. Appeal to experience. 17.

Dark room. 27. Ideas of space and solidity distinct 28. Men differ little in clear CHAP. XV. Of duration and expansion considered together. simple ideas CHAP. XIV. SECT. 1. Both capable of greater and less. Of duration and its simple modes. 2. Expansion not bounded by matter. 3. Nor duration by motion. 4. Why men more easily admit infinite duration, than infinite expansion. 5. Time to duration, is as SECT. Duration is fleeting ex tension 1 2 — 4. Its idea from reflection on the train of our ideas. 5. The idea of duration applicable to things whilst we sleep. 6 — 8. The idea of succession place to expansion. 6. Time and place are taken for so much of either as are set out by the existence and motion of bodies not from motion. 9 — 11. The train of ideas has a certain degree of quick- 7. Sometimes for so much of either as we design by measure taken from the bulk or motion of bodies. ness 12.

This train, the measure of other successions. 13 — 15. The mind cannot fix long on one invariable idea. 8. They belong to all beings. 9. All the parts of extension, are extension ; and all the parts of duration are duration. 16. Ideas, however made, include no sense of motion. 17 Time is duration set out by measures. 18. A good measure of time must divide its whole 10. Their parts inseparable. 1 1. Duration is as a line, exduration into equal peri ods. pansion as a solid. 12. Duration has ntver two 19. The revolutions of the parts together, expansion all together. sun and moon, the pro perest measures of time. 20. But not by their motion, but periodical appear- CHAP. xvr. ances. 21. No two parts of duration can be certainly known to be equal. 22. Time not the measure of Of number. SECT. 1.

Number, the simplest and most universal idea. motion. 23. Minutes, hours, and 2. Its modes made by addition. years, not necessary measures of duration, 3. Each mode distinct. 24 — 26. Our measure of time applicable to duration before time. 4. Therefore demonstrations in numbers the most precise. 5, 6. Names necessary to num- 27 — 30. Eternity, bers. Xxiii 7. Why children number not earlier. 8. Number measures all measurable!. CHAP. XVII. Of Lifinity. »ECT. 1. Infinity in its original intentions attributed to space, duration, and number. 2. The idea of finite easily got. 3. How we come by the idea of infinity. 4. Our idea ol space boundless. 5. And so of duration. 6. Why other ideas are not capable of infinity. 7. Difference between infinity of space and space infinite. 8. We have no idea of infinite space. 9.

Number affords us the clearest idea of infinity. Iq 11. Our different conception of the infinity of number, duration, and expansion. j 2. Infinite divisibility. 13 14. No positive idea of infinity 15 19. What is positive, what negative, in our idea of infinite. IS, 17. We have no positive idea of infinite duration. 18. No positive idea of infinite space. 80. Some think they have a positive idea of eternity, and not of infinite space. 21. Supposed positive idea of infinity, cause of mistakes. 32. All these ideas from sensation and reflection. CHAP. XVIII. Of other simple modes. SECT. 1, 2. Modes of motion. 3 Modes of sounds. 4. Modes of colours- 5. Modes of tastes and smells. 6. Some simple modes have no names. 7. Why some modes have and others have not, names. CHAP. XIX. Of the modes of thinking.

SECT. 1, 2. Sensation, remembrance, contemplation, & . 3. The various attention of the mind in thinking. 4. Hence it is probable that thinking is the action, not essence of the soul. CAHP. XX. Of modes of pleasure and pain. SECT. 1 Pleasure and pain simple ideas. 2. Good and evil, what. 3. Our passions moved by good and evil. 4. Love. 5. Hatred. S Desire. 7. Joy. 8 Sorrow. 9. Hope. 10 Fear. 11. Despair. 12. Anger. 13. Envy. 14. What passions all men have. 15,16 Pleasure and pain, what. 17. Shame. THE CONTENTS. 18. These instances do show 36. Because the removal of how our ideas of the uneasiness is the first step passions are got from to happiness sensation aud reflection. 37. Bee .use uneasiness alone is present. . 38. BecauseaIl,whoallowthe CHAP. XXI. joys of heaven possible, pursue them not.

But a Of poiner. great uneasiness is never SECT. neglected. 1. This idea how got. 39- Desire accompanies all 2. Power active and passive. uneasiness. 3. Power includes relation. 40. The most pressing uneasi- 4. The clearest idea of ne*s naturally determines active power had from l"e . , spirit. 41 All desire happiness. 5. Will 'and understanding, 42. Happiness, what. two powers. 43. What good is desired, 6. Faculties. what not. 7. Whence the ideas of li- 44. Why the greatest good is berty and necessity. not always desired. 8. Liberty, what- 45. Why, not being desired, 9. Supposes understanding !t moves DOt th? wlU: and will. 46. Due consideration raises 10. Belongs not to volition. desire. 11. Voluntary opposed to 47. The power to suspend the involuntary, not to neprosecution of anydesire, cessary. makes way for consider- 13.

Liberty, what. ation. 1 . Necessity, what. 48. To be determined by our 14— 20. Liberty belongs not to own judgment, is no rethe will. straint to liberty. 21. But to the agent or man. 49 The freest agents are so 22 — 24, In respect of willing, a determined, man is not free, SO, Aconstantdetermination 25, 26, 27. The will determined to a pursuit of happiness, by something without it, no abridgement of liber- 28. Volition, what. ty. 29. What determines the 51. The necessity of pursuing will. true happiness, the foun- 30. Will and desire must dation of all liberty. not be confounded. 52, The reason of it. 31. Uneasiness determines 53. Government of our pasthe will. sions, the right improve- 32. Desire is uneasiness. ment of liberty, 33, The uneasiness of desire 54, 55, How men come to pursue determines the will. different courses, 34, This is the spring of 56.

How men come to ehuse action, ill, 35. The greatest positive 57. First, from bodily pains. good determines not the Secondly, from wrong dewill, but uneasiness. sires arising from wrong power, have been most judgment modified. S8, 59. Our judgment of pre- II. Several words seeming to sent good or evil always signify action, signify but r'ght. the effect. 60. From a wrongjudgment 12. Mixed modes, made also of what makes a necesof other ideas. sary part of their happiness. 61, 62. A more particular account „„,„ TTm of wrong judgments. UHAT. XAIII. 63. In comparing present and future. Of the complex ideas of sub- Si, 65. Causes of this. stances. 66. In considering consequences of actions. 67. Causes of this. SLCT. 68. Wrongjudgment of what h Ideas of substances, how is necessary to our hapmade. piness. 2.

Our idea of substance in 69. We can change the agreegeneral ableness or disagreeable- 3> 6- Of the sorts of substances. ness in things. 4. No clear idea of substance 70. Preference of vice to vir in general. tue, a manifest wrong 5. As clear an idea of spirit judgment. as body. 70 — 73. Recapitulation. 7. Powers a great part of our complex idea of substances. 8. And why. CHAP. XXII. 9. Three sorts of ideas make our complex ones of sub- BtSflfififl Of mixed modes. 10. Powers make a great part of our complex ideas of SECT. substances. 1. Mixed modes, what. 11. The now secondary qua- 2. Made by the mind. litiesof bodies would dis- 3. Sometimes got by the exappear if we could displication of their names. cover the primary ones 4. The name ties the parts of their minute parts. of the mixed modes into 12.

Our faculties of discoveone idea. ry suited to our state. 5. The cause of making 13. Conjecture about spirits. mixed modes. 14. Complex ideas of sub- 6. Why words in one Ianstances. guage have none answer* 15. Idea of spiritual sub ing in another. stances as clear as of 7. And languages change. bodily substances 8. Mixed modes, where they 16. No idea of abstract subexist. stance. 9. How we get the ideas of 17. The cohesion of solid mixed modes. parts, and impulse, the 10. Motion, thinking, and primary ideas of body. VOL. I. D 18. Thinking and motivity the primary ideas of spirit. 19 — 21. Spirits capable of motion. 5. Change of relation may be without any change in the subject. 6. Relation only'betwixt two things. 7. All things capable of relation. 8. The ideas of relation 22- Idea of soul and body conpared. fS — 27.

Cohesion of solid parts in body, as hard to be conceived as thinking in clearer often, than of the subjects related. 9. Relacions all terminate in simple ideas 10. Terms leading the mind beyond the subjects denominated, are relative 11. Conclusion. a s. ul. 28, 29. Communication of motion by impulse or by thought, equally intelligible. 30. Ideas of body and spirit compared. 31. The notion of spirit involves no more difficulty in it than that of body. 32. We know nothing beyond our simple ideas. 33— S5. Idea of God. CHAP. XXVI. Of cause and effect, and other relations. 36. No Ideas ' w our complex ones of spirits, but those got from sensation or rereflection. SECT. 1. Whence their ideas got. 2. Creation, generation, making alteration. 3, 4. Relations of time 5. Relations of place and 37- Recapitulation. extension.

CHAP. XXIV. 6. Absolute terms often stand for relations. Of collective ideas of substances. SECT CHAP. XXVII. 1. One idea. 2. Made by the power of composing in the mind. 3. All artificial things are collective ideas. Of identity and diversity. SECT. 1. Wherein identity consists. 2. Identity of substances. 3. Identity of modes. 3. Principium individuationis 4. Identity of vegetables. 5. Identity of animals. 6. Identity of man. 7. Identity 6uited to th« idea. CHAP. XXV. Of relation. SECT. 1. Relation, what. 2. Relations, without correlative terms, not easily perceiyed. 3. Some seemingly absolute terms contain relations. 4. Relation different from the things related. Same man. 9. Personal identity. 10. Consciousness makei personal identity. 11. Personal identity in change of substances. 22 — 15.

Whether in the change of thinking subscances 16. Consciousness makes the 19. We have ordinarily as clear (or clearer) notions of the relation, as of its foundation. 20. The notion of the relation is the same, whether the rule, any action is compared to, be true or false. same p. rson. 17. Self depends on consciousness. 18 — 20. Objects of reward and punishment. 21, 22. Difference between identity of man and person. 23 — 25. Consciousness alone CHAP. XXIX. makes self. Of clear and distinct, obscure and confused ideas. 26, 27. Person a forensic term. 28. The difficulty from ill use of names. 29. Continued existence SECT. makes identity. 1. Ideas, some clear and distinct, others obscure and confused. 2. Clear and obscure, explained by sight 3. Causes of obscurity. 4. Distinct and confused CHAP. XXVIII.

Of other relations. what 5. Objection 6. Confusion of ideas, is in SECT. 1 Proportional. 2. Natural. 3. Instituted. 4 Moral reference to their names. 7. DefaultsvvhichmaKeconfusion First, complex ideas made up of too few simple ones. 8. Secondly, or its simple ones jumbled disorderly together. 5. Moral good and evil. 6. Moral rules. 7. Laws Divine law, the measure of sin and duty 9. Civil law, the measure of crimes and innocence. 9. Thirdly, or are mutable or undetermined. 10. Confusion, without reference to names, hardly conceivable. 11. Confusion concerns al- 10, 11. Philosophical law, the measure of virtue and vice. 12. Its inforcements, commendation, and discredit. 13. These three laws the rules of moral good and ways two ideas. 12, Causes of confusion. 13. Complt-x ideas nay be distinct in one part, and confused in another. 14.

This, if not heeded, causes evil. 14, 15. Moralityistherelationof actions to these rules. 16. Thedenominationsofactions often mislead us. 17. Relations innumerable. 18. All relations terminate in confusion in our arguings. 15. Instance in eternity. 16. Divisibility of matter. simple ideas. 2. Metaphysical truth contains a tacit proposition. 3. No idea, as an appearance in the mind, true CHAP. XXX. Of real and fantastical ideas. CT. or false. 1. Real ideas are conforma- 4. Ideas referred to any thing may be true or false. ble to their archetypes. 2. Simple ideas all real. 3. Complex ideas are voluntary combinations 4. Mixed modes, made of 5. Other men's ideas, real existence, and supposed real essences, are what men usually reter their ideas to. consistent ideas, are real. 5. Ideas of substances are real, when they agree with the existence of 6 — 8.

The cause of such references. things. 9. Simple ideas may be false in reference to CHAP. XXXI. others of the same name, but are least liable to be Of adequate and inadequate ideas. so. 10. Ideas of mixed modes most liable to be false in SECT. 1. Adequate ideas are such as perfectly represent their archetypes. 2. Simple ideas all adethis sense. II. Or at least to be thought false. 12. And why. 1 3. As referred to real exisquate. 3. Modes are all adequate. 4, 5- Modes in reference to settled names, may be inadequate. 6, 7. Ideas of substances, as referred to real essences, tences, none of our ideas can be false, but those of substances 14 — 16. First, Simple ideas in this sense not false, and why. 15. Though one man's idea of blue should be differnot adequate. 8 — 11. Ideas of substances, as collections of their qualities, are all inadequate. 12.

Simple ideas iKTt>rx,and ent from another's. 17. Secondly, Modes not false adequate. 13. Ideas of substances are 18. Thirdly, Ideas of substances, when false. 19. Truth or falsehood alixTura., and inadequate. 14. Ideas of modes and reways supposes affirmation or negation. 20. Ideas in themselves neilations are archetypes, and cannot but be adether true nor false. quate. 21. But are false, 1st, when judged agreeable to another man's idea with- CHAP, xxxir. Of true and false ideas. out being so. 22. Secondly, When judged to agree to real exist- SECT. 1. Truth and falsehood properly belongs to propositions, ence, when they do not. 23. Thirdly, When judged adequate without being so. CONTENTS. XXIX 24. Fourthly, When judged to represent the real essence- 25 Ideas, when false. 26, More properly to be called right or wrong. 27.

Conclusion. CHAP. XXXIII. Of the association of ideas, SECT. 1. Something unreasonable in most men. 2. Not wholly from self-love. 3. Nor from education. 4. A degree of madness. 5. From a wrong connexion of ideas. (J. This connexion how made. 7, 8. Some antipathies an effect of it. 9. A great cause of errours 10 — 12. Instances. 13. Why time cures some disorders in the mind, which reason cannot. 14 — 16. Farther instances of the effects of the association of ideas. 17. Its influence on intellectual habits. 18- Observable in different sects 19. Conclusion.

Book III. Of Words

4. Words often secretly referred, First, to the ideas in other men's minds. CHAP. I. Of words or language in general. 5. Secondly, To the reality of things. 6. Words by use readily excite ideas. SECT. 1. Man fitted to form articulate sounds. 7. Words often used without signification. 8. Their signification perfectly arbitrary. 2. To make them signs of ideas. 3, 4. To make general signs. 5. Words ultimately derived from such as signify sensible ideas. CHAP. III. Of general terms. 6, Distribution. SECT. 1. The greatest part of words general. 2. For every particular thing to have a name, is impossible. 3, 4. And useless. 5. What things have proper CHAP. II. Of the signification of words. SECT. 1. Words are sensible signs necessary for communication. names. 6 — 8. How general words are made. 2, 3.

Words are the sensible signs of his ideas who uses them. 9. General natures are nothing but abstract ideas. THE CONTENTS. 10. Why the genus is ordinarilj made use of in desi- 11. Simple ideas why undefinable further -x iained. nitions. 12, 13 The contraiy snored incomplex ideas by instances of a statue and rain- 11. General and universal are creatures of the understanding 12. Abstract ideas are the bow. 14. The names of complex ideas when to be made essences of the genera species. 13. They are the workmanship of the understanding, but have their foundation in the similitnde intelligible by words. 15 Fourthly, Names of simple ideas least doubtful. 16. Fifthly, Simpleideas have few ascents in linea prædicamentali 17. Sixthly, Names of simple ideas, stand for ideas not at all abitrary. of things, 14.