Letters on recent transactions in India

Front matter

LETTERS ON RECENT TRANSACTIONS IN INDIA. BY AN OFFICER OF THE BENGAL ARMY. " Let us do what we please to put India from our thoughts, we can do nothing to separate it from our public interest, and our national reputation." — Burke. LONDON: SMITH, ELDER AND CO., 65, CORNHILL. MDCCCXLII. LETTERS ON RECENT TRANSACTIONS IN INDIA. "Let us do what we please to put India from our thoughts, we can do nothing to separate it from our public interest, and our national reputation." — Burke. LONDON: SMITH, ELDER AND CO., 65, CORNHILL. MDCCCXLII. London : Printed by Stewart and Murray, Old Bailey.

ADVERTISEMENT.

. Mr. Burke, in his celebrated speech upon Mr. Fox's India Bill, observes, " Mr. Hastings, in a letter to the Court of Directors, mentions the sums the Company never would have acquired, had the rigid ideas of public faith entertained by his colleagues regulated his con duct." Had the rigid ideas of public faith, to which Mr. Hastings alludes, regulated the conduct of the Board of Control in our Afghanistan policy, what sums would not the Company have saved I With the view to aid in correcting the erroneous impression which the speech of the late President of the Board of Control made in his place in the House of Commons, as published by Messrs. Ridgway & Co., the following Letters, written and partially circulated in 1838, 1839, 1840, and March 1841, are now laid before the public. A

Preface

. In submitting the following Letters to the public, on the affairs of our Eastern Dominions, over whose destinies the British Nation presides, I am fully aware that I expose myself to the imputation of being pre sumptuous for expressing opinions at variance with those entertained by the Local and Home Authorities. In adverting to our late proceedings in Afghanistan, I am uninfluenced by any motive, but the desire to see the Empire that has risen into being under the genius of the Nation, rendered secure and flourishing by the wisdom of its councils. The subjects to which I desire to call the attention of the public are : — The policy observed towards the Court of Ava ; — the advantage that might have been expected to spring from an alliance with Dost Ma humud, in preference to Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk; — the expediency of assuming, in our relations with the states comprised within certain boundaries, a para mount and controlling authority, and the character of the connexion we should maintain with our Asiatic possessions.

These are grave topics, demanding the most dis passionate deliberation ; as the consequences of our measures must be considered to involve the stability of the British Monarchy. And they have been touched upon, under a deep conviction that they demand stronger deliberative powers, more competent know ledge, and more extensive and varied talents than I can bring to the examination of the interests they embrace. Events are in progress, that it is essential the Nation should examine, freed from the bias of party feeling, as the interests of England and its Indian Empire are so intermingled, that one cannot be affected without the exciting cause exercising an influence over the other. The affairs of Central Asia have now assumed an aspect that demands the serious contemplation of Great Britain.

Russia has announced to the world her determination to occupy Khiva, till such time as the objects which have induced the measure have been realized. What these objects really are, it is not very difficult to fathom ; although her designs are said to be the redemption of her subjects from slavery, and se curity for the future against the lawless aggressions of her Toorkooman neighbours. There can be little doubt but that the position we have taken up in Af ghanistan has led her to determine upon the occupation of Khiva, and that she will continue to retain her position there, so long as we occupy Cabool. That we shall ever evacuate Afghanistan, and leave the Shah to his own resources, is not reconcileable with the policy upon which we have avowedly acted ; and that Russia will retire from Khiva without exacting a simi lar sacrifice upon our part, is by no means credible.

We have each taken up our out-posts ; and the first hostile shot in Europe must infallibly lead to collision in Asia. It is incumbent, therefore, upon those in whose hands the affairs of our Indian Empire are vested, to take a deliberate view of our present situation, the events that must follow the first outbreak in Europe, and of the means we possess for repelling an attack on Afghanistan, and preserving our established predomi nancy eastward of the Indus. We see that Russia has the control of the Euxine and the Caspian, and that she may, with little difficulty, secure the free passage of the Aral. The Oxus, at the cost of little labour, may be made available in event of any forward movement hereafter. The undivided resources of Persia are also at her command. There does not exist any insurmountable obstacle to be overcome between her advanced force and the sources whence its supplies are drawn.

The distance from Khiva to Herat, and the difficulties of the way, are less than from Cabool to that city. And if the Oxus be made available for the transport of stores, such impediments as do exist will be greatly lessened. Our situation at Cabool is very different. The Seikhs possessing all the country from the Sutledge to the Sooleman mountains, materially interferes with our supplies ; and the slightest reverse in Afghanistan, (should hostilities take place with Russia,) would most probably induce the Government of Lahore to seek a connection with our enemies. The consequences of such a course are not to be lost sight of. Our future well-being would seem to depend upon the sagacity with which arrangements are made for securing a free passage, at all times, through the Punjab. The Seikh government is at present distracted by contending parties ; and we are bound, as we value the security of our dominion, to avail ourselves of every opening to acquire, not only a dominant influence in her councils, but the acquisition of territory to the eastward of the Indus.

If a passage for the convoys, which are occasionally sent into Afghanistan, is obtained with difficulty, — which, although scarcely credible, is actually the case, — what ave we to expect in event of any reverse hereafter ? If the removal of an agent from the Court of Lahore,* is the price now exacted, for compliance with a requisition for a passage through the Seikhs' states, what demand may not be made when we are considered to be in a situation incapable of compelling acquiescence ? We pay one lakh of rupees annually to the robber chiefs of the Khyber pass, for unmolested egress and ingress, notwithstanding which, the greatest difficulties and danger are encountered in the passage. If such be the case, while the triumph of our arms is yet glowing in the minds of our Allies, what are we to look for if, in the course of future events, we should suffer any reverse ?

These are things requiring immediate con sideration. It is unwise to leave such important con tingencies to be dealt with as they may occur, when our armies are actually engaged at a distance from our frontiers. Confidence in our resources may be natural and admissible ; but a neglect of obviously prudent arrangements, calculated to facilitate an onward move ment when it may become necessary, is, to say the least of it, an act bordering upon neglect of a para mount duty. It is wise to avoid a catastrophe. When the storm rages, invocation may be vain ! * It is currently believed, that the removal of Liet.-Col. Wade from Lahore, was required by the Lahore authorities previously to granting a passage for a convoy in February or March, 1840. LETTERS, Ssc. Ssc.

Letter I

July 10, 1838. The period has arrived when the Governor-General of our Eastern Dominion would appear to be left with but few alternatives in providing for the safety of our empire. It would seem that the progressive consequences of each suc ceeding war have brought us into contact with those parts of the circle, which it has been the undeviating desire of the Legislature to avoid, — a contact which has been looked upon by our best Indian Statesmen and Politicians as the occasion upon which we should be necessitated to select between the assumption of a paramount controlling Sovereignty, or act in concert with confederated States for the preservation of the country from the ambitious designs of Russia. If it be allowed that we have arrived at this juncture, it behoves us to take a mature, deliberate, and extensive view of the consequences to which these courses will severally lead.

Having done so, we may then calculate with precision the wisdom of adopting the one, and rejecting the other. In examining the first alternative, — the assumption of a paramount controlling Sovereignty, — we should turn our eyes lo the line of policy that Russia has been steadily pur suing through the successive reigns of the last five Sovereigns who have presided over the destinies of that extraordinary nation. And in doing so, we shall find that they have acted upon a definite and consistent principle of aggrandizement, and that it has been actively and deliberately followed up by each Sovereign as he ascended the throne. The effects of this system are palpable in the gradual accession of territory which Russia has acquired in Asia; each war and each measure extending the limits of her dominion, till it has reached an extent and acquired a stability, that we ought not to behold without entertaining serious and wholesome doubts of the safety of our Indian possessions, if she is permitted to proceed, unmolested, in the prosecution and consummation of those plans which must, at no distant day, place her in possession of the undisputed Sovereignty of Asia.

She has succeeded in shutting us out of the Euxine Sea, by the closing of the Dardanelles, and her territory nearly embraces the Caspian. She has taken possession of all the country between these two Seas, from the Don, southward to Tiflis. The Persian Empire is at her disposal, and its Sovereign, under her dictation, is at the head of an army aided by the council of Russian Officers, before Herat, a strong city, on the high road to India. We further perceive the Chief of the Afghan Sirdars disposed to seek her aid and protection in support of his designs against the power of Runjeet Singh, and we also find the whole of our Northern and Eastern Frontier, from Cashmere to Rangoon, not only ready, but eager to coalesce with any power for the expulsion of their hated enemies. Having duly considered the foregoing actual condition of things, we may proceed to the consideration of the second part of our question, — the propriety of remaining within the present limits of our rule, and adopting measures with the powers that be, for the preservation of our dominion.

And here, upon the threshold of the matter under consideration, it is obvious, that a confederation with our independent and our subsidiary Allies, calculated to organize an effective combined resistance in the hour of danger, is a delusion, that nothing short of besotted ignorance of the character and history of our rule, or extreme infatuation, could seriously contemplate. Can it be supposed, that any confederation within the com pass of our power to organize, would be binding under the magical effects of a call upon the Kings and Chiefs to the eastward of the Indus, to rouse themselves, and throw off the shackles by which they have long been galled, and achieve, in concert with the united powers of Russia, Persia, and Afghanistan, an independence for which they have long secretly pined?

No, not for a moment. The talismanic thrill of such an invitation would act with the force and rapidity of a galvanic shock, to the most remote corners of our possessions. Not only every State, but every petty Zemindar throughout India, would yield a ready and hearty acquiescence to a call, a compliance with which, they might look upon as likely to restore them to that position in society from which they were expelled by our conquest, and which they can have no hopes of regaining so long as our power endures. Of this we have abundant historical evidence from the year 1790, up to this hour, in the increasing intrigues and combinations among the Native Princes and Chiefs to crush our power. Do we not remember the endeavours of Hyder Aly and his son, which were happily counteracted by the wisdom and firmness of the nobleman (the Marquis Corn wallis) then at the head of the Indian Government ?

Have we forgotten the danger which threatened our existence by the organization of a large force under French Officers by the Nizam, which was disbanded by the prompt foresight and energy which marked the commencement of Lord Wellesley's career in 1797, and served as a harbinger to those after-deeds which have engraved his name in bright and indelible cha racters in the annals of British India ? If these instances, and the intrigues of the late Sooltan of Mysore, are insuffi cient to prevent our entertaining the fallacious expectation, of the sincere and hearty co-operation of the Native States, in the hour of necessity, let us turn to the subsequent history of our proceedings for further evidence. In the pages that record the occurrences of those times, we find all that can be required to bring the deep conviction of the impolicy of depending upon the fidelity of our Allies and subjects (whose interests are antipodes to ours) in the hour of danger, home to our minds.

There, too, we shall find recorded the war waged in 1804 and 1805, by the confederated Maharatta States against our power, from which the transceudant talents of the Marquis of Wellesley, aided by his illustrious brother, and the justly celebrated Lord Lake, under Divine Provi dence, alone preserved our Empire. Proceeding further in history, we come to the Nepaulese War in 1814, which was intimately connected with the second Maharatta War which followed it in 1817, both originating in the desire of expelling us from India. And here our power was again upheld by that enlightened and comprehensive policy, (directed by that able statesman and soldier, the Marquis of Hastings,) which can alone uphold our dominion in India, placed as it is, at the distance of half the globe from the resources of the mother country.

Still further on we come to the first Burmese War, in 1824, which was confidently looked to by every Native power in India as the sure means of our annihilation. If all this will not suffice to satisfy the scepticism of the self-confident, have we not further corroboration in the ne gotiations now carrying on between the Courts of Ava and Katmandoo, and the recently detected desire of the latter, evinced by the embassy it has dispatched to Cabool ? When the demonstration of such interminable opposition to our power, and hatred to our rule, is substantiated by a conca tenation of hostilities, who can for a moment doubt the policy, that the preservation of our Empire would seem to dictate ? To establish and maintain the former, we must be pre pared to adopt measures that at first sight may appear wild and pregnant with danger ; but the more closely they are examined, the more evident will appear the wisdom of adopting them.

England must insist upon the free passage of the Dar danelles, and the uncontrolled navigation of the Euxine ; any opposition to this, should be considered as a declaration of war. Acting upon which it would be our policy to reor ganize and guarantee the independence of Poland ; to stimulate and aid the Porte in the recovery of her pro vinces in Asia Minor and Armenia; and whilst this was going on in Europe, we should in this country, restore the old King of Ava, confine him to the eastward of the Irrawaddie, parcel out the intermediate country between our present frontier and that river into petty subsidiary States, and have a military road from Munnypore to that river, and impose a subsidiary force on Nepaul and Bootan. To the west and northwest, the Indus, from its source to the Sea, must be our boundary.

The Afghan kijgdom must be regenerated, and an intimate connection#established between us. This course would be the work omime, but no delay in commencing the European part of it should take place. If we permit the second move of the Russian game to take place ; if we allow a Russian-Persian army to invest Candahar ; if we allow, by our supineness, a confederacy to be organized between Nicholas, Mahumud Shah and Dost Mahumud, our folly may be disastrous. Should the magnitude of the Empire thus faintly shadowed out, and the difficulties and dangers of acquiring it, scare us from the attempt, we must in that case look at the second proposition proposed in the commencement of these remarks, and in so doing, I think it will appear manifest, that we shall never be able to maintain our present situation : we must proceed onwards, or we must retrograde till our kingdom resolves itself into our commencement — a factory — and that we should not be long allowed to retain.

Russia, unchecked, will proceed, and her approach will advance those she compels to precede her. These events will be the signal for the Nepaulese and Burmese to unite ; an occurrence, which would excite into fearful action the abundant heterogeneous elements that exist within the boundaries of our rule. Considering, therefore, this vast and vital question throughout the extended line of its bear ings, upon the broad basis of its own merits, our safety would appear to depend upon our adoption of the first pro position. Wisdom, moderation and firmness would be neces sary to bring the plan into such a steady course of action, that every single act of our Government in the intermediate time, between the commencement and the completion of our arrangements, shall tend to the perfection of the grand design.

To enable the Indian Government to act upon uniform and consistent principles, instead of the vacillating policy of every successive President of the Board of Control, who may or may not have studied the history and nature of our Indian Empire, it is essential that the ulterior intentions of the Crown, with regard to its possessions in this country, be definitely fixed and distinctly pointed out to the Indian Board and the Court of Directors. The organization of neither of these bodies being such as lo fit them independently of each other, or collectively, independent of the Ministers of the Crown, to decide upon such measures and direct their execution, as may be necessary to secure and perpetuate our Asiatic sway ; a conquest that, for the most part, has been achieved by the genius of Clive, Hastings and Wellesley, acting under the influence of uncontrollable circumstances, and in opposition to the repeated injunctions of the Court of Directors.

The object of the Crown can only be the security of possessions, inextricably connected with the well-being of the British Empire, and every measure of the home and local authorities must keep that object incessantly in view. With it, the happiness of our subjects is inseparably interwoven. Having laid the foregoing down as a fixed principle to regu late all our proceedings, we should, regardless of sect or country, so remodel all our institutions, as to admit our sub jects to a free and full participation of the honours and emoluments of the State, making education, acquirements and moral character the only ground of preferring one .candidate to another. If this policy be adopted, India will necessarily cease to be considered and treated as a conquered State. All our institutions will undergo a gradual but complete change.

The care of Government will no longer be bestowed upon the remittance of a large annual tribute to Europe. It will, on the contrary, occupy itself upon matters connected with the improvement of this country, the development and cherishing of its resources, and everything tending to perfect its police, fiscal and judicial establishments, so as to render the inhabitants secure, tranquil and happy. Education, colonization and moral improvement will rapidly follow such a change in the nature of our rule. With the Sea, the Indus the Himalaya and the Irrawaddie for our boundaries ; and all within cemented into one mass, by the indissoluble tie of identity of interests, common safety, mutual dependence, and a reciprocity of feeling, we might, with prudence in our in tercourse with the nations with whom we should be brought into contact, set the intrigues of Russia at defiance.

The benefit that would fall to the share of England by such an alteration in our policy, would prove incalculable. The demand for her produce would be inexhaustible. The increase to her maritime establishment would be immense, and the field thus opened for the employment of her capital and youth, would prove commensurate to the demands.

Letter II

3rd Oct. 1838. The only legitimate object of interference with the powers to the westward of the Indus would seem to be the prospe rity and security of the British power in India. Any other plea must appear in the eyes of the world a compromise of our dignity, or a cloak to conceal acts of aggression and aggrandizement, unwarranted alike by good faith, by our constant professions, and by those interests which* we are bound by every principle of justice, honour, and the com mon rights of mankind to abstain from violating. Upon this principle, let us examine how far the measures, now in operation, and the statement put forth by Government are exposed to censure, or accord with our duty and our interest. To come to an accurate decision on the line of policy that Government has adopted towards the present rulers in Afghan istan, it is necessary to be informed of the nature of any Treaty that may subsist between the East India Company and Runjeet Singh, as its provisions must naturally have exercised some influence over the mind of the Right Honour able the Governor General, in the selection of the course upon which we have now entered.

Conceding, as we readily do, that the Treaty entered into by Lord William Bentinck in 1832, contains provisions calculated to hamper and perplex the Government in determin ing the party with which the interests of the State ought to be identified, what avails the admission, and in what manner can it affect the matter under investigation ? The admission and its consequences illustrate nothing beyond the fact of Lord William's Treaty being a most impolitic measure, which will be fully developed in the course of the present inquiry. The security, stability, and prosperity of the British possessions in Asia, is the sole object that ought to have been allowed any weight as to the expediency of entering into any contract with Runjeet Singh, and every thing tending in the remotest manner to interfere with the working out of this great object, should have been considered, and avoided as detrimental to the interests over which the Government has been called upon to exercise a watchful, prudent, and un compromising superintendence.

From the experience of past events, from the knowledge which we possessed of the conduct of Russia, and the purpose which directed it, it has long been manifest to the world, that she has eagerly, sedulously, and intermittingly endeavoured to acquire a controlling influence in the affairs of Asia, seeing that it would secure the means of advancing her commercial interest, and enable her more effectually to oppose Great Britain in one of her most vulnerable points, upon any occasion which might bring them into collision. To defeat this object, and avert the consequences of Russian intrigues in Asia, was the legitimate, and ought to have been the unvarying principle of all our political measures. To see how far, and in what way we have swerved from this obvious course, it will be necessary to take a view of the condition of Afghanistan, antecedent to the present moment ; its relations with the ruler of the Punjab, and the means possessed by that power to interfere effectually with such arrangements as we might have considered it advisable to have entered into with its several rulers.

Looking back thirty years into the history of that country, we find it divided into parties contending for the interest of the descendants of Ahmed Shah, and for those of the family of the celebrated Minister, Futteh Khan, who was barbarously murdered by the sons of a weak master, of whose government he had been the whole support ; and that Herat alone, out of the extensive possessions of the Doorannee Conqueror, remains in the possession of his descendants. In the progress of events, Shah Shoojah proving himself weak and unworthy, was deposed, and his brother, the imbecile and dissolute Mahmood, was raised to be the pageant of nominal power in his stead ; the substance, being retained by his able Vizier B Futteh Khan, which caused a combination in Court, headed by Prince Kamran, who was jealous of the power enjoyed by the Minister over his father.

In the mean time, Cash mere was subdued by the prompt and vigorous proceedings of the Vizier, who, by a bribe of nine lakhs of rupees, secured the concurrence and aid of the crafty ruler of the Punjab in the furtherance of his views. But a connection founded upon wrong, and cemented by corruption, for the purpose of rapine, was not destined to endure. The payment of the bribe being evaded, the Seikhs disgusted, retired from Cashmere, and their Chief, availing himself of the disloyalty of the officer in command of Attock, obtained that fortress for one lakh of rupees, upon which, Futteh Khan immediately returned to wreak his vengeance on his insidious Ally, and after a sharp attack by the van of his army under his brother Dost Mahumud, who was successful in his onset, most unaccountably, through the treacherous communications of pretending friends, each supposing that the other was de feated, lived lo perceive that a glorious and signal victory was turned by a false report into a most disastrous failure.

By this fatal mistake upon the plains of Chooch, the power of the Afghans ceased to the eastward of the Indus. Soon after which, Prince Kamran, having worked upon his weak parent, succeeded in his project and murdered Futteh Khan, the Warwick of Afghanistan, by whose sole ability and daring, Mahmood was raised to, and maintained upon the throne, from which he was virtually hurled upon the perpetration of the murder of the man to whom he was indebted for its occupation. Retiring before a small band of rebels, he took refuge in Herat, and sunk into a tributary to the Persian State. Upon which Shah Shoojah again erected the standard of sovereignty, but having neither energy, talent, nor character, his impotent attempt failed, and he became a pensioner of the British Government. Eyoob being constitutionally of a more tame and yielding disposition, and less jealous of the kingly prerogative than his brother Shoojah, was selected as a fitter tool by the Barukzye clan, and on the condition of being satisfied with the empty title of Sovereign, and the farce of the coinage being struck in his name, was elevated to a degraded throne, while the executive authority remained uncontested in the hands of his ministers.

These proceedings led to a civil war that soon exhausted the power of the State, when the feeble and distracted condition of Afghanistan was taken advantage of by Runjeet Singh, who soon subdued every thing to the eastward of the Indus, and finally on the field of Ghazie, in 1823, discomfited the confederated Doorannee chiefs, which secured to him the sway over Peshawur. Having given this condensed statement of Afghanistan from the year 1809, up to the present period, which has been taken from that intelligent traveller, Captain Burnes, I shall here give a short sketch of the state of the country, and the disposition of its rulers towards the British Government at the period of that officer's first visit to Candahar, and then notice what he remarks of Runjeet Singh, which I shall follow up by a condensed extract of the substance of the Manifesto recently published, and conclude this paper by a few succinct observations on the course we have adopted, its probable consequences, and a few remarks upon the advantage that must have accrued to the State from an alliance with the Ruler of Cabool.

Captain Burnes, in treating of the Commerce of Cabool in the second volume of his interesting and instructive work, regards the year 1816 as the epoch from which the Commer cial interests of England superseded those of Russia in the capital of Afghanistan, which circumstance he attributes to the justice and equity of Dost Mahumud, whose vigilant ad ministration has rendered the great road from Turkistan, passing through Cabool and Candahar, perfectly safe for the transportation of the lucrative commerce to which it gives egress. He describes Dost Mahumud as being much esteemed, owing to the mildness of his government and the security of property, and his justice as being a theme of praise by all. The peasant rejoices in the absence of tyranny and oppression, the citizen in the safety of his home, and the soldier in the regularity of his pay.

His equity and modera tion secure him many friends, and the warlike tribe of Junan- B shere, which has so often turned the tide of conquest in the various struggles for dominion, are his avowed adherents. The supremacy of the'Barukzye family in Cabool, he states, as being agreeable to the people and favourable to the prosperity of the country. He describes it as being the largest of the Doorannee tribes, and consisting of 60,000 families, while the Sudozye, of which Shah Shoojah is a member, de pends upon the support of other tribes. The head of the former, Hajee Jumal, is said to be the most influential of the Barukzye clan, and the principal means of the elevation of Ahmed Shah, whose descendants rewarded his services and devotion to the founder of their family by the murder of his son, Poynold Khan, and the atrocious assassination of his grandson, by Kamran of Herat.