The War in the Crimea ... With portraits and plans

Chapter I. Events Which Led To The War In The Crimea

Why Russia covets Constantinople — Why other Powers oppose her Desire — Why the Time seemed Favourable — The Czar's Confidence in his Design — The Quarrel of the Churches — The Sultan accedes to the Czar's Claim — Russia puts forth Fresh Pretensions — The Vienna Note — Turkey declares War with Russia — How England was drawn into War — How the Czar was misled into War— His False View of the English Spirit— England supports Turkey — Why Louis Napoleon joined with England— Result of sending Allied Fleets to the Bosphorus — Russia chafes the Western Nations — France and England declare War — The War at first on the Danube — Austria's Summons to the Czar — The Russians leave the Danube — The Allies turn their Designs to the Crimea — Feeling excited in England, . i

CHAPTER 1

1. THE LANDING IN THE CRIMEA. Prospects of the Invasion — Instructions to the British Commander — A Siege contemplated — Preparations for Invasion — The Cholera — The Fleets and Flotillas— Composition of the English Army — Its Commanders — The French Generals — Description of the Crimea — Its Products and Population — The Coast reconnoitered — The Landing Place — The Troops landed— Transport obtained, . 24

Chapter III. Battle Of The Alma

Operations open to the Russians — The Bulganak reached — The Valley of the Alma — The Russian Bank — Omissions of the Russian Commanders — The French ascend the Heights — Position in Front of the British — Russian Forces there — Delay to allow French to gain Heights— English ordered to advance — First Onset of the English — The Light and Second Divisions — The Russian Heavy Guns withdrawn — Our First Onset fails — Advance of the Guards and Highlanders — English Artillery in the Action — General Retreat of the Russians — The Losses — Tactical Views of the Battle — General Advance wanting in ensemble — The Cavalry, .......... Contents. IV

Chapter IV. The March Round Sebastopol To Balaklava

March to the Belbec— Question of attacking the North Side — Menschikoff bars the Harbour— Reasons against Attack of North Side — Todleben's Strange Contention — Impolicy of moving Allies Inland — The Flank March begun — Rencontre with MenschikofTs Rear — The English reach the Tchernaya— First View of Balaklava — Question of Bases for the Two Armies — Lord Raglan chooses Balaklava — Features of the South Side — Positions of the Allies, . 66

Chapter V. Beginning Of The Siege

Sir John Burgoyne — Our First Siege Batteries — Chapman's and Gordon's — The First French Batteries — Co-operation of the Fleets demanded — The Fleets to join in the Cannonade — Ships versus Forts — Risk to no Purpose — Positions of the Fleets — The Cannonade begins— French Fire silenced — English Fire successful — Losses on both Sides — Action of the Fleets — English Batteries still efficient, .......... 91

Chapter VI. Attacked At Balaklava And On The Upland

Outworks before Balaklava — Russians capture Them — Movements of the Heavy Brigade — Charge of the Heavy Brigade — Russian Cavalry defeated — The Orders to the Light Brigade — Russians both sides of Valley — Nolan and Lord Lucan — Charge of the Light Brigade— Charge of the Chasseurs — Return of the Light Brigade — Close of the Action — No Attempt at Recapture — Weak Point in Allied Defences — French Measures too exclusive — First Action of Inkerman — Object of it — The Sandbag Battery — Preparation for an Assault —Assembly of Russian Forces, ... .... 109

Chapter VII. Battle

OI? INKERMAN. Rumours before the Battle— Description of the Ground — British Position — The Russian Plan of Battle— How carried out — Proximity of Corps to Battlefield — Soimonoff attacks — Effects of the Fog — Soimonoff s Right in Advance — The British repulse Him— PaulofFs Troops engage — Pauloff also repulsed — Causes of Russian Repulses — Dannenberg's Attacks — Greater Obstinacy of the Attack— Action and Death of Cathcart— The French drive back the Russians — Allies defeat another Resolute Attack— Allied Artillery begins to prevail — What delayed Bosquet- Crisis before the French arrived — Gortschakoff's part— Close of the Battle- Terrible Carnage— The Operations discussed— The Attack suitably met — The Sandbag Battery — Russian Exaggeration— What was at Stake — Consequence of Victory, .......... Contents. V

Chapter VIII. The Hurricane And The Winter

The Hurricane— Its Effects — Privations of the Troops — Want of Transport — Transport done by the Men — The Cavalry Horses starved — Sufferings of the Sick — The Hospitals— Indignation in England — The French take part of our Duties — Relief begins — Why a Road was not made at first — Roads now made — Improvement in the Hospitals — Miss Nightingale arrives — The Influence she acquires — The Ratio of Deaths — Resignation of the Ministry — The Crimean Commission — The Commissary-General blamed — Defends himself — General Airey refutes Charges — Departments have their Proper Limits — The Fault lay in the System, .......... 163

Chapter IX. Extension Of The Siege Works And Defences

Burgoyne's Proposal for our Relief — The French prefer another Mode— Want of Fuel in the Camps — Fortress increasing in Strength — New System of Rifle-pits — Underground Warfare — New Russian Works — Failure of the French Attack — Great Sortie against the French and English Trenches — The Burial Truce — Charles Gordon's Experiences — Russians recross the Tchernaya — Niel's View of the Operations — Burgoyne goes Home — Renewed Preparations— Another Cannonade — The Russians slow to reply— Severity of Fire upon the Fortress— Two Well-fought Batteries— Carnage in Sebastopol — Impatience for Assault, .......... 190

Chapter X. Important Events Elsewhere

Death of the Czar — The Vienna Conference— Louis Napoleon's Plan — He intends to go to the Crimea— Lord Clarendon sent to dissuade him — The Emperor visits the Queen — Terms proposed at Vienna — Austria frames a Proposal — The Emperor abandons his Intention — English Advocates of Russian Interests — First Embarkation for Kertch— The Expedition recalled— Conference of Commanders — Canrobert resigns the Command, . . . . 215

Chapter XI. The New General

Errors in the Emperor's Theory — Pelissier's View of the Problem— His Previous Action in May— He declares his Determination — Niel remonstrates in vain— Displeasure of the Emperor— Course taken by Vaillant— New Russian Work— The French attack it — And capture it— Expedition to Kertch— Its Complete Success— The Extended Position — Ancient Remains— Valley of Baidar, . . Contents. VI

Chapter XII

A SUCCESSION OF CONFLICTS. The Emperor persists in his Plan — Pelissier opposes it — The Objects of the Attack —Assault of the White Works — Assault of the Mamelon — The Struggle for it — Assault of the Quarries — The Emperor still persists— Error of Pelissier — His Second Error— His Insufficient Reason — Failure at the Malakoff— Failure at the Redan — A Partial Success — Todleben wounded — Pelissier's Persistency in Prosecuting the Siege — Vaillant sides with Pelissier — Death of Lord Raglan — His Funeral— Sufferings of the Defenders — Russian Plans of Battle — Russian Advance for Battle — Battle of the Tchernaya — Retreat of the Russians — Russian Losses in the War, ...... 246

Chapter XIII. The Destruction Of Sebastopol

What Gortschakoff saw in Sebastopol— Yet he resolves to sustain an Assault — French Plan of Assault — The Final Bombardment — The French Attacking Forces — The English — The Assault — Cost of taking the Malakoff — Failure of the French elsewhere — Failure at the Redan — Predominance of the Malakoff — Incidents on Following Days— Constancy of the Garrison — Final Destruction of the Fleet, ......... 273

Chapter XIV. The Close Of The War

A Further Question— Views of the Emperor and his Generals — Fresh Operations — Destruction of the Docks — The Government's Wish to push on — Vaillant's Views — Pelissier's Views — Excellent State of the British Army — A Diplomatic Difficulty — The Emperor and the Queen — New Proposal of Russia — Good Faith of Louis Napoleon — The Treaty of Peace — Strength of the British Army — The Results of the War — Russia repudiates the Treaty later — England retains Interest in the Crimea— The Graves of the Crimea— All that remains of the War, . . . . . . . . . . LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. PACE PORTRAIT OF LORD RAGLAN Frontispiece MAP OF PART OF THE CRIMEA, ...... 35 PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF THE ALMA, ..... 47 MAP OF THE CHERSONESE UPLAND, ..... 75 PLAN OF SEBASTOPOL, ....... 89 PORTRAIT OF GENERAL TODLEBEN, ..... 90 PLAN OF THE BATTLEFIELD OF INKERMAN, ....

I35 PORTRAIT OF THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS, .... 2l6 COUNCIL OF WAR BEFORE THE ASSAULT OF THE MAMELON, . 248 * * The plates 0/ Lord Raglan and the Council 0/ War are engraved by permission 0/ Messrs Henry Graves &> Co. The War in the Crimea.

Chapter I. Events Which Led To The War In The Crimea

Why Russia covets Constantinople — Why other Powers oppose her Desire — Why the Time seemed Favourable — The Czar's Confidence in his Design — The Quarrel of the Churches — The Sultan accedes to the Czar's Claim — Russia puts forth Fresh Pretensions — The Vienna Note — Turkey declares War with Russia — How England was drawn into War — How the Czar was misled into War — His False View of the English Spirit — England supports Turkey — Why Louis Napoleon joined with England — Result of sending Allied Fleets to the Bosphorus — Russia chafes the Western Nations — France and England declare War — The War at first on the Danube — Austria's Summons to the Czar — The Russians leave the Danube — The Allies turn their Designs to the Crimea — Feeling excited in England. In considering the Empire of Russia it might at first sight appear that a country at once so vast and so back ward in civilisation would find ample employment for the wisest and most energetic ruler in endeavours to develop in all directions — physical, intellectual, and moral — its latent resources, rather than in the maintenance of great armies for designs of conquest.

And that this course would greatly increase the wealth and influence of Russia, and the happiness of its people, cannot be A Why Russia covets Constantinople. 2 doubted. But there are other considerations which have prevailed to dictate a policy of aggression. In the first place, what we call progress is opposed to absolutism. If the immense populations of such vast portions of the earth were imbued with the ideas of the peoples of Europe, they would no longer submit to the will of one man ; and when under these circumstances a Czar should become impossible, no one can say what kind of government, or what number of separate governments, might replace him. For the maintenance of his power it is necessary to keep the people ignorant, and, further, to divert their attention from their own lot by fixing it on the alluring spectacle of foreign conquests.

Yet, besides this motive, it must be confessed that a great temptation stands for ever before the eye of a Czar when he looks towards Turkey. He sees there all that Russia wants to give her power and prosperity commen surate with the extent of her dominion. He sees the beautiful harbours of the Bosphorus, whence a Russian navy, secured from all enemies by the narrow passage of the Dardanelles, might dominate the Mediterranean ; and he sees, too, a city marked out by nature to be come a splendid capital, and an overflowing emporium of commerce. Possessed of these, he need set no limit to his dreams of the greatness of Russia. It is not surprising, therefore, if a race of rulers, not less un scrupulous and ambitious than autocrats in general have proved to be, should always have looked on Constantinople as what ought to be their own.

Fortunately for Turkey, and the world, there are Why other Powers oppose her Desire. 3 many difficulties in the way of the realisation of these aspirations. No other Power can desire that a rival should attain to such an overshadowing height. Neither England, nor France, nor Italy, nor Germany, could with indiffer ence see Russia acquire such means of bringing her huge force to bear. And Austria has an interest beyond others in preventing the design. For Russia, if established in Turkey, would enclose within her new territory a large portion of the Austrian Empire, producing there a state of permanent insecurity and alarm, and would, more over, include and control the lower Danube. It is, therefore, only at some favourable conjuncture that Russia can hope to prosecute her cherished design.

And in the beginning of 1853 circumstances seemed to be exceptionally promising. The Emperor of Austria, almost a boy, repaid with affection and rever ence the kindness evinced for him by the potent and experienced autocrat. He was, too, under an obli gation of the most onerous kind to his great neighbour, who, when Austria was almost crushed by Hungary, had intervened, suppressed the revolt, and restored the discontented kingdom to its allegiance. Moreover, the Kaiser had allowed himself just then to assume an attitude menacing to the Porte, for, in sup pressing an insurrection in Montenegro, the Turkish troops, operating near the Austrian frontier, had re ceived from him a peremptory notice to withdraw. The Czar had readily joined in enforcing the demand, and thus it happened that Austria found herself acting with Russia against Turkey — a position which illus- Why the Time seemed Favourable. 4 trates the consequences that may ensue when a State allows itself to be drawn into trivial issues divergent from its main policy.

Nicholas, therefore, assumed with confidence that he would meet with no opposi tion from the Kaiser. Prussia's interest in the question was not so obvious or pressing as Austria's, while the King (the Czar's brother-in-law) had always expressed for him the utmost deference, a sentiment which was found to be a constant source of difficulty when endeavours were made for the concurrent action of the Four Great Powers. As to France, it was not easy to foresee what policy might commend itself to Louis Napoleon. New to the throne, and engaged in feeling around for support in that as yet precarious seat, no indications were visible of the course to which his interests might incline him. But whatever his tendencies might prove to be, it seemed very unlikely that the Empire would begin its career as a belligerent either by singly opposing Russia, or by ranging itself against England, who, in the course of the summer, gave proof, in a great naval review, of her ability to bring a paramount influence into any military enterprise in which command of the sea would be a main condition.

Assuming, then, that Austria were favourable, or neutral, the course which England might take became the prime consideration. Hitherto she had done no thing to encourage the design of Russia, for to maintain Turkey as an independent state was her traditional policy. But, in the long interval of peace since Waterloo, The Czars Confidence in his Design. 5 not only had we given no sign of an intention to support that policy by force of arms, but we were believed to be absorbed as a people in those commercial pursuits of the success of which peace is one very favouring condition ; while, as if to emphasise this supposed state of feeling, Lord Aberdeen, our Prime Minister, had become noted for his repugnance to any course which might tend to a resort to arms. The Czar was led by all these considerations to believe that the opportunity had come for giving effect to the idea which, during his visit to England in 1844, he had conveyed to the British Government.

While expressing his conviction " that it was for the common interest of Russia and England that the Ottoman Porte should maintain itself in a condition of independence," yet "they must not conceal from themselves how many elements of dis solution that empire contains within itself: unforeseen circumstances may hasten its fall"; and thence he came to the conclusion that "the danger which may result from a catastrophe in Turkey will be much diminished if Russia and England have come to an understanding as to the course to be taken by them in common." It was in unison with these utterances that he addressed to Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador at St Petersburgh, on the 9th of January 1853, the parable which has become historical. Meanwhile, a cause of dispute already existed be tween Russia and Turkey.

A jealousy had long been cherished between the monks of the Greek and Latin Churches in the Holy Land — which of these should The Quarrel of the Churches. enjoy most privilege and consideration was a question that, some little time before, had once more risen into prominence. Which of them should enter earliest in the day into the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem, or should have possession of the key of the Great Church of Bethlehem, were the questions of immediate concern. The Czar took up warmly the cause of the Greek Church, of which he was the head, and which looked to him as its champion ; and it may be urged in reply to those who look on the dispute as trivial, that it did not seem so to the Russian people, and, therefore, could not seem so to the Czar. The French Emperor had taken the side of the Latin Church.

It is not to be supposed that he could be actuated by any superstitious, or even earnest, feeling in favour of such claims. But he was only following the policy pursued by the French monarchy in 1819, during a similar ferment of the question, when it claimed to act as the hereditary protector of the Catholics in the East since the time of Francis the First, and he must therefore be acquitted of taking his course merely from a desire to do what was hostile or provocative to Russia. Each of these sovereigns endeavoured to put pressure on the Sultan for a decision in favour of his own clients ; and that hapless potentate, who could not be expected to evince any warmer sentiment than tolera tion towards either of the two infidel sects, which every true Mahometan must hold in abhorrence, made it his aim to satisfy both sovereigns, and offend neither.

But his attempt, though clever, was ineffectual, and the The Sultan accedes to the Czars Claim. 7 result was that he only partially satisfied the Latin sect, while he excited such indignation, real or simu lated, in the Czar, that Nicholas at once moved two army corps to the frontier of the Danubian Princi palities as a menace, and immediately afterwards sent Prince Menschikoff as a Special Envoy to Constantin ople, whose instructions must have been such as were quite inconsistent with a desire for an amicable settle ment, for the British Ambassador described the language conveying his demands as " a mixture of angry com plaints and friendly assurances, accompanied with per emptory requisitions as to the Holy Places in Palestine, indications of some ulterior views, and a general tone of insistence bordering sometimes on intimidation."

Thus the hostile menace was made to appear to turn on the matter of the Holy Places. But, in con sidering the origin of the war, it must not be forgotten that all the Czar professed to demand was the posses sion, and possibly the monopoly, of certain religious privileges, whereas the event which he desired to pre cipitate was something very different, and entirely dis proportionate, namely, the dismemberment of Turkey. This was presently made plain when the Sultan put an end to the immediate dispute by acceding to the claims of Menschikoff. The question of the Holy Places, thus settled, could no longer supply the pretext for war ; what it did supply was the opportunity for prolonging the quarrel, by confusing fresh demands with the original dispute, and for rousing religious feeling in Russia against Turkey.

Accordingly, the Russia puts forth Fresh Pretensions. Czar's Envoy, instead of accepting the concession as closing the dispute, put forth a fresh and larger pretension, requiring the Sultan to join in a convention which would virtually give Nicholas the protectorate of all the Christian subjects of the Porte. The nature of this demand was thus characterised by our Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon : " No sovereign, having proper regard for his own dignity and independence, could admit proposals which conferred upon another and more powerful sovereign a right of protection over his own subjects. Fourteen millions of Greeks would henceforth regard the Emperor as their supreme protector, and their allegiance to the Sultan would be little more than nominal, while his own independence would dwindle into vassalage."

And, indeed, there was a terrible precedent to warn Turkey, for the Empress Catherine had claimed a similar protectorate in Poland, in which she had very soon found the means of extending her dominion over its territory. The Sultan's Ministers, therefore, no doubt counselled and supported by our Ambassador, Lord Stratford, who exercised a control over our relations with Turkey of a singularly independent character, promptly refused to entertain MenschikofTs proposal. To this refusal the Czar responded by causing his troops, on the 2d of July, to pass the frontier river, the Pruth, and occupy the Danubian Principalities ; and next day he issued a manifesto, stating that in doing so " it was not his in tention to commence war, but to have such security as would ensure the restoration of the rights of Russia."

The Vienna Note. 9 This invasion might have been justly met by the Sultan with a counter declaration of war, and the martial spirit of his people was so thoroughly roused as to render the step imminent. But the Western Powers, in their solicitude to preserve peace, stayed it for a moment, while the representatives of France, England, Austria, and Prussia, met in conference at Vienna, in the hope of finding a means of averting war. They framed a diplomatic instrument known as the Vienna Note, which, in their eagerness to soothe the Czar, was couched in terms that might be interpreted as sanctioning his pretensions, and which indeed (as the Austrian Government had taken means to ascertain) he would accept. On receiving this Note he at once signified his readiness to assent to it. The reply of the Turkish Government was not so speedily given, and the Mediatory Powers strongly urged it to signify acceptance.

But when its reply came, it was found to point out that the Note could be construed as re-embodying the dangerous pretensions of the Czar, and that, unless certain specified modifications were introduced, the Porte must refuse its assent ; while Lord Stratford advised his Government that these objections were well founded. This made fresh correspondence necessary, in the course of which it slipped out that the Russian interpretation of the Note confirmed the apprehensions of the Porte. The Mediatory Powers, at last aware of their singular error, perceived that their Note could be held to affirm new rights of interference on the part of Russia, and not merely (as the Czar had hitherto pretended) the confir- Turkey declares War with Russia. 10 mation of old privileges. They could no longer, there fore, support their original Note ; the Czar, on his part, refused to accept the Turkish modifications of it, and the Porte felt itself compelled to demand the evacuation of the Principalities within fifteen days, with war as the alternative.

This summons being disregarded, a state of war between the two countries ensued on the 23d October 1853; but for some time no acts of hostility took place beyond the assembly and movement of their respective forces. The course of events that led to war between Russia and Turkey having been thus traced, it remains to follow the steps by which the Western Powers were drawn on to join in it. It has often been said that England drifted into the war. This was so far true that there was for us no sharp crisis, no clash of great national interests, which only the appeal to arms could compose. Our part in the war was the result of a state of feeling gradually aroused by observation of what was passing in the East, and of the steps which the British Government, with intentions anything but warlike, had slowly taken, tending to commit it to the active support of Turkey.

Up to the time (after the issuing of the Turkish ultimatum) when the French and English fleets were ordered to move to the Bosphorus, it had been possible for England to restrict her part to the field of diplomacy. And that she should have committed herself to the side of Turkey was not due to her traditional policy only, for the ostensible grounds of quarrel between the two Eastern Powers were not such as necessarily to draw How England was drawn into War. 11 her from her attitude of mediator. What had impelled her on her course was the knowledge that below these grounds lurked the true design of the Czar. This had been made clear by his own words to the British Ambassador, already adverted to, and in various conversations in January and February 1853. "We have on our hands a sick man, a very sick man. ...

If your Government has been led to believe that Turkey retains any elements of existence, your Government must have received incorrect information. I repeat to you that the sick man is dying, and we can never allow such an event to take us by surprise. We must come to some understanding." But this view was not left to stand alone ; it was enforced by an inducement. " I can only say, that if, in the event of a distribution of the Ottoman succession, upon the fall of the Empire, you should take possession of Egypt, I shall have no objection to offer. I would say the same thing of Candia : that island might suit you, and I do not know why it should not become an English possession." The voice which uttered this was the voice of the one potentate who had an interest in precipitating the catastrophe, and who was then taking such a course as might immediately lead to it.

Vain in deed the effort to spread his net in the sight of those whom he had thus himself enlightened. But it seems likely — indeed there is no other explanation — that he had forgotten, or dropped out of sight, this complete showing of his hand. As was natural in an autocrat whose faculty for rule lay in the strength of his will, not of his judgment, he had accustomed himself to How the Czar was misled into War. 12 confound what he desired with what he believed in ; and absorbed for the moment in his parade of sym pathy with the Christians in Turkey, he had come to consider this as his true motive, and expected others to adopt that view also. So complete was this illusion, that it was long before he had begun to realise the possi bility of being opposed by England. At first he had assumed her toleration, if not her concurrence, to be certain.

And even when he was at war with Turkey, and the fleets had been despatched to the Bosphorus, he sent an autograph letter to the Queen, expressing sur prise that there should be any misunderstanding between the Queen's Government and his own as to the affairs of Turkey, and appealing to Her Majesty's " good faith " and " wisdom " to decide between them. Thus it is evident that it was Russia that had been the first Power to " drift " into war, and this was owing to the false view taken by the Czar. Starting with the belief that Turkey would be left unsupported, he had gone on to assume that he would, by the display of his forces, coerce her into com pliance with the measure which would give him the means of, at any time, quarrelling with and crushing her, that England would acquiesce, and that, if she did, he might disregard the other Powers ; and thus he had been led into a position from which he could not recede without war.

And the delusion under which he took these steps contains one of the important lessons that render history of value as a guide and a warning. There is a general concurrence that he confided in the belief that England was entirely absorbed in the pursuit of wealth, His False Views of the English Spirit. 13 through manufactures and commerce, and could no longer be induced to fight for a principle, a sentiment, or an ally. Even after Lord Aberdeen had been im pelled to take action directly tending to war, the Czar still believed that a community which made the exalta tion and worship of trade the mainspring of its policy, and which listened complacently to the denunciation of war as an unmixed evil, would never be roused into armed resistance to his projects. How far a more deter mined tone on the part of our Ministry, at an early stage of his course of aggression, would have effectually checked it, may be matter of speculation.

But there can be no doubt, judging from his own language and his own acts, that his not unreasonable persuasion of the degeneracy of our national character was a main element in producing the state of mind which rendered him so fatally domineer ing and precipitate in the pursuit of his ends, and so regardless of the decencies of public law. At the time of MenschikofTs mission, Lord Stratford, having resigned his post, was in England. But the diffi culties which that mission was creating seemed again to demand his commanding influence on the spot, and he had been desired to resume his functions. The instructions given to him, conceived in a spirit of conciliation to Russia, in a matter which, on the surface, did not vitally concern us, were to admonish the Porte to show increased consideration for its Christian subjects.