The Military Operations at Cabul ... Second edition

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THE MILITARY OPERATIONS AT CABUL, WHICH ENDED IN THE RETREAT AND DESTRUCTION OF THE BRITISH ARMY January 1842. WITH A JOURNAL OF IMPRISONMENT IN AFFGHANISTAN. By LIEUT. VINCENT EYRE, BENGAL ARTILLERY, LATE DEPUTY COMMISSARY OF ORDNANCE AT CABUL. SECOND EDITION. LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. MDCCCXL1II. LONDON : Pnntcd by A. Spdttiswoode, New-Streetsquare. TO MAJOR-GENERAL W. S. WHISH, C.B. LATE COMMANDANT OF THE BENGAL ARTILLERY, tEhii Work ti iJrtJicatrt!, AS A SLIGHT MAKK OF ESTEEM FOR HIS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE WORTH, AND OF GRATITUDE FOR PAST KINDNESSES, BY HIS SINCERE FRIEND, VINCENT EYRE. NOTICE BY THE EDITOK. The original manuscript of this Journal was sent by Lieutenant Eyre in parts, as it was finished, and as opportunity offered, to a military friend in India. Even when the last part reached his hands, the eventual liberation of the Cabul prisoners was a matter of painful uncertainty ; and his judgment prompted him to transmit it entire, and without comment, to the Author's immediate relations in this country.

There is a point connected with its publication now, which must not be thought to have been disregarded from any anxiety that this account should be the first : — it is, the question whether it should have been a NOTICE BY THE EDITOR. VI withheld until the result of the inquiry now pending in India should be known. It is considered that sufficient delay has been already incurred to insure this end, and that all such investigations will have been closed before a copy of this book can find its way to India. The Journal is therefore at once printed as it came, in con currence with the writer's own idea that it cannot fail to interest the British public. E. Eyre. Athenæum Club, Dec. 29. 1842. The following notes were penned to relieve the monotony of an Affghan prison, while yet the events which they record continued fresh in my memory.

I now give them publicity in the belief that the information which they contain on the dreadful scenes lately enacted in Affghanistan, though clothed in a homely garb, will scarcely fail to be acceptable to many of my country men, both in India and England, who may be ignorant of the chief particulars. The time, from the 2d November, 1841, on which day the sudden popular outbreak at Cabul took place, to the 13th January, 1842, which witnessed the annihilation of the last small remnant of our unhappy force at Gundamuk, was one continued tragedy. The massacre of Sir Alexander Burnes and his associates, — the loss of our commissariat fort, — the defeat of our troops under Brigadier Shelton at Beymaroo, — the treacherous assassination of Sir William Macnaghten, our envoy and minister, — and lastly, the disastrous retreat and utter destruction* of a force consisting of 5000 fighting men and upwards of 1 2,000 camp followers, — are events which will assuredly rouse the British Lion from his repose, and excite an indignant spirit of inquiry in every breast.

Appendix

: List of Civil and Military Officers killed during the Rebellion at and near Cabul - - - GLOSSARY, The following List of Words used in this volume, with their meanings, may be useful to the English reader.* Akukzye, or Atchakzye, the name of one of the great Affghan tribes. Ameer, commander or chief; title assumed by Dost Mahomed Khan. Atta, ground wheat. Ayah, a nurse. Bala Hissar, royal citadel, upper citadel. Barukzye, name of one of the five great Durani or Dooranee tribes. Bourge, tower. Buniah, a trader, generally in grain. Cafila, a convoy. Char Chmtlc, public bazar. Chahua, or char, means house, the bazar being introduced at right angles in the centre. Chouk, bazar. Chuprassie, a servant bearing a badge or brass plate. Chuppao, a night surprise, or plundering attack. Cossid, a messenger.

Dehashee. Query whether this is an Indian or Kabul term. Bashe means principal, as Kafila Bashe, the principal of the convoy, &c. Dewan Kaneh, hall of audience. Doohlie, palanquin for carrying sick. * The Editor, having compiled this in haste from the inform ation of Indian friends, begs that inaccuracies may be excused, and invites corrections, to be addressed to him at the publisher's. GLOSSARY. XIX Dooranee, name of five great tribes, the Popul-zai, Barak-zai, Nur-zai, Barmi-zai, and Abkhu-zai. Ensofzycs, an Affghan tribe holding the territory north of Peshawur. Feringhee, European. Ghazee, champion of religion. Giljye, name of a great Affghan tribe. Godown, storehouse. Goorkha, a native of Nepal. Havildar, a sergeant. Hazirbash means " Be present.'1 Hurwah (uncertain). Janbaz, Affghan horse.

Jcergha, council. Jemandar, a native officer. Juzail, long rifle. Juzailchee, rifleman. Kafir, infidel. Khan, nobleman : the title in Kabul is assumed by every one, even the lowest. Kirkhce, a wicket, window. Kujawur, a pannier carried on camels. Kuzzilbash, descendant of the Persians, wearing a red cap. Lascar, Indian term, an attendant on guns, magazines, &c. Maund (of grain), 801b. weight. Meerza, an appellation generally given to Mahomedan writers. Meer Wyze {The) means a teacher ; generally conferred on some one eminent for sanctity. Mehnandar, a man of all work ; one who has charge of receiving guests, visitors, &c. Moollah, priest. Moonshee, interpreter or secretary. Musjeed, a temple, place of worship. Naib, deputy. Nallcee, a sort of palanquin. Nazir, steward. Nccncha, coat. XX GLOSSARY.

Nuwab, prince. Pilao, a dish of fowl with rice, &c. Postheen, a sheepskin cloak. Rajah, prince, an Indian term. Ressala, a troop. Sepoy, soldier, an Indian term ; always native soldier. Shah bagh, king's garden. Shroff, a native banker. Sirdar, a chief. Subschoon, or Shub-khoon (the proper term), night surprise, Sunga, stone breastwork. Surwon, a man who takes care of camels. Syud, a priest. tVuzeer, vizier. Taboo, Affghan pony. Zuna, dwelling; (Kuneh) private dwelling. ■/ 9/i,jtf^Sr OPERATIONS OF THE BRITISH ARMY AT CABUL. R [lNTROD- 4 PARTIAL DISTURBANCES. to cause, during the months of July and August, a partial rising of the tribes, which, however, the valour of our Hindoostanee troops, under Colonel Wymer, at Huft-aseer, and of the 5th Bengal Cavalry under Col. Chambers at Mookoor, speedily suppressed.

Some of the principal chiefs delivered themselves up as hostages, and quiet was restored. To the west of Candahar, a no torious freebooter, named Akter Khan, having collected about 7000 followers, horse and foot, was signally defeated near Girhisk, on the banks of the Heermund, in the month of July, by a detachment of the Shah's regular troops under Capt. Woodburn, consisting of only one infantry regiment, two H. A. guns, under Lieut. Cooper, besides two regiments of Janbaz, or Affghan horse: the latter, however, behaved ill, and can hardly be said to have shared in the glory of the unequal conflict. Capt. Griffin, with the Bengal 2d Native Infantry, was, a few days after, equally successful in an attack on the enemy in the same quarter. Akter Khan fled to the hills with a few followers, and the land again enjoyed repose.

Kohistan, whose wild and turbulent chiefs had sturdily maintained their independence against the late ruler, Dost Mahommed Khan, seemed at last to have settled down into a state of quiet, though unwilling, subjection to Shah Shoojah. The Nij- INTROD.] 5 THE NIJROW CHIEFS. row chiefs formed an almost solitary exception to this show of outward submission; and Sir William Macnaghten had strongly urged upon Lord Auck land, at an early period of the year, the expediency of sending a force into that country as soon as practicable. Since our first occupation of Cabul, Nijrow had become a resort for all such restless and discontented characters as had rendered them selves obnoxious to the existing government. The fact of our having permitted them so long to brave us with impunity, had doubtless been re garded by the secret enemies of the new rule as a mark of conscious weakness, and may have encouraged them, in no slight degree, to hatch those treasonable designs against the state which were so suddenly developed in November, 1841, and which were for the time, unhappily, but too successful.* Major Pottinger, having been appointed political agent in Kohistan, arrived from Calcutta in May, 1841, and was one of the first to prognosticate the coming storm.

He lost no time in represent ing to the Envoy the insufficiency of our military force in Kohistan, consisting at that time of merely two 6-pounder guns, and the Kohistanee regiment raised by Lieut. Maule of the Bengal Ar- * The reader is particularly referred to a note at the end of the book. B MAJOR POTTINGER'S PRECAUTIONS. [iNTROD. 6 tillery ; which excellent young officer was, on the first outbreak of the rebellion, cruelly butchered by his own men, or, which is the same thing, with their consent. This regiment was stationed at Charekar, a post of no strength, and ill adapted for making a protracted defence, as was afterwards proved. The Major was, however, considered in the light of an alarmist, and he only succeeded in procuring a few Hazirbash horsemen and a 17 pounder gun, with a small detachment of the Shah's artillery, and a very scanty supply of am munition.

About the end of September, Major Pottinger came to Cabul for the purpose of impressing on the Envoy that, unless strong measures of pre vention were speedily adopted, he considered a rise in Kohistan as in the highest degree probable. His apprehensions were considered by the Envoy as not altogether unfounded, and he was em powered to retain as hostages the sons of the leading chiefs, whose fidelity he suspected. The first interruption to the state of outward tran quillity, which I have described above, occurred early in September. Capt. Hay, in command of some Hazirbashes, and Lieut. Maule, with his Kohistanee regiment, (which had been relieved at Charekar by the Goorkah, or 4th regiment, the Shah's subsidized force officered from the line, INTBOD.] CAPT. HAY'S EXPEDITION. 7 under Capt. Codrington,) and two 6-pounder guns, had been sent into the Zoormut valley to collect the annual revenue, with orders likewise to make an attempt to seize certain noted plunderers, among whom were some of the murderers of Col. Herring, who had long infested the road between Ghuznee and Cabul.

The revenue was in the course of being quietly paid, when Capt. Hay was mischievously informed by Moollah Momin, collector of revenue in Zoormut (who shortly after distinguished himself as one of our bitterest foes), that the men, whom he wished to seize, were harboured in a certain neighbouring fort of no strength whatever, and that the inhabitants would doubtless give them up rather than risk a rupture with the government. Capt. Hay immediately proceeded thither, but found the place much stronger than he had been led to expect, and the people obstinately prepared to resist his demands. On approaching the fort, he was fired upon ; and finding the six-pounder shot, of which he gave a few rounds in return, made no impression on the mud walls, he had no alternative but to retreat. The Envoy, on receiving Capt. Hay's report, immediately despatched a sufficient force to punish the rebels.

It consisted of 200 of H. M. 44th Inf., 5th N. I., 6th regt. S. S. F., 4 guns of Abbot's battery, 2 iron nine-pounders mountain b [INTROD. 8 DEFEAT OF THE REBELS. train, 2 comp. Shah's Sappers, and 2 squadrons of Anderson's horse. These were under the command of Lieut.-Col. Oliver, and were accompanied by Capt. G. H. Macgregor, the poli tical agent at Gundamuck, who happened to be then at Cabul on business. The force com menced its march on the 27th September, and reached the Zoormut valley without the slightest interruption. On the approach of our troops the rebels had fled to the hills in the greatest con sternation, leaving their forts at our mercy. The principal strongholds were destroyed with powder, and the force prepared to return to Cabul. Meanwhile the hydra of rebellion had reared its head in another far more formidable quarter.

Early in October three Giljye chiefs of note sud denly quitted Cabul, after plundering a rich Cafila at Tezeen, and took up a strong position in the difficult defile of Klioord-Cabul. about ten miles from the capital, thus blocking up the pass, and cutting off our communication with Hindo stan. Intelligence had not very long previously been received that Mahomed Akber Khan, se cond son of the ex-ruler Dost Mahomed Khan, had arrived at Bameean from Khooloom for the supposed purpose of carrying on intrigues against the government. It is remarkable that he is nearly connected by marriage with Mahomed INTROD.] MAHOMED AKBER KHAN. 9 Shah Khan and Dost Mahomed Khan*, also Giljyes, who almost immediately joined the above-mentioned chiefs. Mahomed Akber had, since the deposition of his father, never ceased to foster feelings of intense hatred towards the En glish nation ; and, though often urged by the fallen ruler to deliver himself up, had resolutely preferred the life of a houseless exile to one of mean dependence on the bounty of his enemies.

It seems therefore in the highest degree probable that this hostile movement on the part of the Eastern Giljyes was the result of his influence over them, combined with other causes which will be hereafter mentioned. The march of Gen. Sale's brigade to their winter quarters at Jellala bad, and ultimately to India, had only been de ferred until the return of the force from Zoormut, but was now hastened in consequence of this un welcome news. On the 9th October the 35th regt. N. I. under Col. Monteath, C.B., 100 of the Shah's Sappers under Capt. G. Broadfoot, a squadron of the 5th cavalry under Capt. Oldfield, and 2 guns of Capt. Abbott's battery under Lieut. Dawes, were sent on in advance to the entrance of the pass at Bootkhak, where, on the following night, it was attacked by a large num- * This chief must not be confounded with the ex-ruler of the same name.

B GENERAL SALE'S MARCH. [INTROD. 10 her os rebels, who, taking advantage of the high ground and deep ravines in the neighbourhood of the camp, maintained a sharp fire upon it for several hours, by which 35 Sepoys were killed and wounded. On the morning of the llth Gen. Sale marched from Cabul with H. M. 13th Lt. Inf. to join the camp at Bootkhak, and on the following morning the whole proceeded to force the pass. Intelli gence had been received that the enemy, besides occupying the heights of this truly formidable defile, which in many places approach to within fifty yards of each other, rising up almost per pendicularly to an elevation of 500 or 600 feet, had erected a sunga, or stone breastwork, in the narrowest part of the gorge, flanked by a strong tower. The advance guard, consisting of the Shah's Sappers, a company of H. M. 13th foot, another of the 35th N. I., and 2 guns under Lieut. Dawes, was met about midway through the pass, which is nearly five miles long, by a sharp and continued discharge of juzails from the strong posts of the enemy.

This was returned by our men with precision and effect, notwithstanding the disadvantages of their situation ; flanking parties gallantly struggled up the height to dislodge the enemy from thence, while the Sappers rushed on to destroy the above-mentioned breast- INTROD.] 11 HE FIGHTS HIS WAY. work : through this, however, the stream which flows down the middle of the defile had already forced a passage; and, as the enemy abandoned it, as well as the flanking tower, on the approach of our troops, Lieut. Dawes passed his guns through the interval at full speed, getting them under the shelter of a rock beyond the sustained and mur derous fire of the enemy's juzailchees, it being impossible to elevate the guns sufficiently to bear upon them. The flankers did their duty nobly, and the fight had lasted for about half an hour, during which the conduct of the Shah's Sappers under Capt. Broadfoot was creditable in the highest degree, when the approach of the main column under Gen. Sale, who had been already shot through the leg, enabled Capt. Season of the 35th regiment, who commanded the advance guard, to push on.

This he did, running the gauntlet to the end of the pass, by which time the enemy, fearful of being taken in rear, abandoned their position, and retired towards Kubbur i-Jubbar, on the road to Tezeen. The 35th re giment, Shah's Sappers, Lieut. Dawes's guns, and a party of Hazirbash under Capt. Trevor, encamped at Khoord-Cabul, H. M.'s 13th Lt. Inf. returning to Bootkhak. During their return, parties who still lurked among the rocks fired upon the column, thereby doing some mischief. b [INTROD. CONTINUATION OF HOSTILITIES. 12 In these positions the divided force remained encamped for several days, awaiting the return to Cabul of the troops from Zoormut. During this time several shub-khoons, or night attacks, were made on the two camps, that on the 35th regi ment at Khoord-Cabul being peculiarly disastrous from the treachery of the Affghan horse, who admitted the enemy within their lines, by which our troops were exposed to a fire from the least suspected quarter : many of our gallant Sepoys and Lieut. Jenkins thus met their death.

On the 20th October, Gen. Sale moved with his force to Khoord-Cabul, having been previously joined by the 37th regiment under Major Griffiths, Capt. Abbot's guns, the mountain train under Capt. Backhouse, 100 of Anderson's irregular horse under Lieut. Mayne, and the remainder of the Shah's sappers and miners. About the 22d the whole force there assembled, with Capt. Macgregor, political agent, marched to Tezeen, encountering much determined opposi tion on the road. By this time it was too evident that the whole of the Eastern Giljyes had risen in one common league against us. Their governor, or viceroy, Humza Khan, had in the interval gone forth under pretence of bringing back the chiefs to their allegiance ; on his return, however, which took INTROD.] 13 OTHER WARNINGS. place nearly at the time at which Gen. Sale marched from Khoord-Cabul, the treacherous nature of his proceedings had been discovered, and he was placed by the Shah in confinement : he was suspected, indeed, before.

Gen. Sale remained at Tezeen until the 26th October. It must be remarked that, for some time pre vious to these overt acts of rebellion, the always strong and ill-repressed personal dislike of the Affghans towards Europeans had been manifested in a more than usually open manner in and about Cabul. Officers had been insulted and attempts made to assassinate them. Two Europeans had been murdered, as also several camp followers ; but these and other signs of the approaching storm had unfortunately been passed over as mere ebullitions of private angry feeling. This incredulity and apathy is the more to be lamented, as it was pretty well known that, on the occasion of the shub-khoon, or first night attack on the 35th N. I. at Bootkhak, a large portion of our assailants consisted of the armed retainers of the different men of consequence in Cabul itself, large parties of whom had been seen proceeding from the city to the scene of action on the even ing of the attack, and afterwards returning.

Although these men had to pass either through the heart or round the skirts of our camp at SALE'S MARCH CONTINUED. [INTROD. Seeah Sung, it was not deemed expedient even to question them, far less to detain them. On the 26th October, Gen. Sale started in the direction of Gundamuck, Capt. Macgregor, political agent, having, during the halt at Tezeen, half frightened half cajoled the refractory Giljye chiefs into what the sequel proved to have been a most hollow truce ; for the term treaty can scarcely be applied to any agreement made with men so proverbially treacherous, as the whole race of Affghans have proved themselves to be, from our first knowledge of their existence up to the present moment. Of the difficulties experienced by Gen. Sale during his march to Gundamuck, and of the necessity which induced him subsequently to push on to Jellalabad, the public are aware.

On the day of his departure from Tezeen the 37th N. I., 3 companies of the Shah's sappers, under Capt. Walsh, and 3 guns of the mountain train, under Lieut. Green, retraced their steps towards Cabul, and encamped at Kubbur-i-Jub bar, to wait as an escort to the sick and conva lescent. The sappers continued their march back to Cabul unopposed ; the rest remained here unmolested until the 1st November, when they broke ground for Khoord-Cabul. Here, in the afternoon of the 2d, Major Griffiths, who commanaed the detachment, received a peremp- INTROD.] LEADERS OF THE REBELLION. 15 tory order from Gen. Elphinstone to force his way without loss of time to Cabul, where the insurrection had already broken out in all its violence. While striking his camp he was attacked by the mountaineers, who now began to assemble on the neighbouring heights in great numbers ; and his march through the pass from Bootkhak to Cabul was one continued conflict, nothing saving him from heavy loss but the steadi ness and gallantry of his troops, and the excellence of his own dispositions.

He arrived in cantonments before daybreak on the morning of the 3d November. The two great leaders of the rebellion were Ameenoollah Khan, the chief of Logue, and Ab doollah Khan, Achukzye, a chief of great influence, and possessing a large portion of the Pisheen valley. Ameenoollah Khan had hitherto been consi dered one of the staunchest friends of the existing government ; and such was the confidence placed in him by the wuzeer, that he had selected him to take charge of Humza Khan, the lately super seded governor of the Giljyes, as a prisoner to Ghuznee. This man now distinguished himself as one of our most inveterate enemies. To illus trate the character of his coadjutor, Abdoollah Khan it will be sufficient to relate the following [INTROD. 16 ORIGIN OF THE anecdote. In order to get rid of his elder brother, who stood between him and the inheritance, he caused him to be seized and buried up to the chin in the earth.

A rope was then fastened round his neck, and to the end of it was haltered a wild horse : the animal was then driven round in a circle, until the unhappy victim's head was twisted from his shoulders. This same man is also mentioned in terms of just abhorrence by Capt. A. Conolly in his Travels. But though the two above-named chiefs took a leading part in the rebellion, there can be little doubt that it had its origin in the deep offence given to the Giljyes by the ill-advised reduction of their annual stipends — a measure which had been forced upon Sir William Macnaghten by Lord Auckland.* This they'considered, and with some show of justice, as a breach of faith on the part of our government : at all events, that was surely mistaken economy which raised into hostility men, whose determined spirit under a sense of wrong the following anecdote may illus trate.

When oppressed by Nadir Shah, the Giljye tribes, rather than succumb to the tyrant's will, took refuge in the mountains amidst the snow, where with their families they fed for * The editor invites particular attention to a note on this subject at the end. INTROD.] 17 ANIMOSITY OF THE CHIEFS. months on roots alone : of these they sent a handful to Nadir, with the message, that, so long as such roots could be procured, they would con tinue to resist his tyranny. Such were many of the men now leagued together by one common feeling of hatred against us. A passage occurring in a posthumous memo randum by the Envoy, now in Lady Macnaghten's possession, requires insertion here : — " The immediate cause of the outbreak in the capital was a seditious letter addressed by Ab doollah Khan to several chiefs of influence at Cabul, stating that it was the design of the Envoy to seize and send them all to London !

The principal rebels met on the previous night, and, relying on the inflammable feelings of the people of Cabul, they pretended that the king had issued an order to put all infidels to death ; having pre viously forged an order from him for our destruction, by the common process of washing out the contents of a genuine paper, with the exception of the seal, and substituting their own wicked inventions." Such at least is the generally received version of the story, though persons are not wanting who would rashly pronounce the king guilty of the design imputed to him. But, however that may be, it is certain that [INTROD. SIR WILLIAM MACNAGHTEN. the events, which I have already narrated, ought to have been enough to arouse the authorities from their blind security. It ought, however, to be stated that, alarmed by certain symptoms of disaffection in different parts of the country, and conscious of the inadequacy of the means he then possessed to quell any determined and general insurrection, Sir William had, a few months previously, required the presence of several more regiments: he was however induced to cancel this wise precautionary measure.

But, even had this additional force arrived, it is next to certain that the loss of British honour, subsquently sustained, could only have been deferred for a period. A fearfully severe lesson was necessary to remove the veil from the eyes of those, who, drawing their conclusions from their wishes, would consider Aff ghanistan as a settled country. It is but justice to Sir William Macnaghten to say that such re commendations from him as were incompatible with the retrenching system were not received at head-quarters in a way encouraging to him as a public officer. CHAP. L] MURDER OF SIR ALEXANDER BURNES. 19