The Germans in France. Notes on the method and conduct of the invasion ... partly reproduced from the 'Times,' etc

Front matter

THE GERMANS IN FRANCE NOTES ON THE METHOD AND CONDUCT OF THE INVASION ; THE RELATIONS BETWEEN INVADERS AND INVADED AND THE MODERN USAGES OF WAR. BY H. SUTHERLAND EDWARDS. PARTLY REPRODUCED FROM THE "TIMES" (BY PERMISSION OF THE PROPRIETORS). LONDON: E. STANFORD, 55 & 8, CHARING CROSS. CONTENTS. CHAPTER PAGE I. NATURE AND CHARACTER OF INVASIONS . . I II. INVADERS OR INVADED? 1 6 III. COMPOSITION OF THE PRUSSIAN INVADING FORCES 22 IV. ENTRY INTO THE INVADED COUNTRY ... 38 V. AN OCCUPIED TOWN 48 VI. JOURNEY THROUGH AN OCCUPIED DISTRICT . 67 VII. INVASION OF A DISTRICT HELD BY THE ENEMY 93 VIII. SEDAN 126 IX. AFTER THE BATTLE 134 X. FRANCS-TIREURS AND THE RIGHT OF SELF- DEFENCE 151 XI. THE SIEGE OF STRASBURGH AND THE BOM BARDMENT OF FORTIFIED TOWNS . . . CONTENTS. CHAPTER PACE XII. OCCUPATION OF STRASBURGH 1 88 XIII.

AN OCCUPIED LINE OF RAILWAY 202 XIV. ARTILLERY TRAINS 224 XV. OCCUPATION OF DESERTED DISTRICTS . . . 235 XVI. THEORETICALLY OCCUPIED DISTRICTS ... 252 XVII. OCCUPATION OF ROUEN AND NORMANDY . . 263 XVIII. PRINCIPLES OF WAR LEGISLATION .... 28 1 XIX. THE MODERN USAGES OF WAR 288 APPENDICES. A. THE PRUSSIAN NEGOTIATORS AT SEDAN . . . 299 B. THE BOMBARDMENT OF FORTIFIED TOWNS . . 304 C INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD THE GERMANS IN FRANCE.

Chapter I. Nature And Character Of Invasions

HE recent invasion of France by the Germans differed not only in magnitude but in character, from all other invasions which had taken place in Europe since 1815. It must not be compared, then, with the invasion of the Crimea by the French and English, nor with the invasion of Lombardy by the French, nor with the invasion of Schleswig-Holstein by the Prussians and Austrians, nor even with the invasion of Austria and various German countries by the Prussians. The French and English, at war with Russia, did not enter any truly Russian country, but only occupied a portion of an outlying Tartar province ; the French, in invading the Austrian province of Lombardy, did so as the friends and liberators of the inhabitants ; the invaders, too, of Schleswig-Hol stein arrived there in the character of liberators.

Finally, the war of Prussia against Austria was not a national but a political war. In invading France, however, the Germans met, at every step, the men whose nation and govern ment had challenged them to fight ; the men whose brothers and sons were actually in arms against them, not merely as conscripts but as national enemies. Such an invasion, with whatever degree of discipline it might be conducted, could not be otherwise than intolerable. In private life invasion is bad enough even in its mildest form ; when, for instance, an unwished-for acquaintance calls and persists in staying. The case is worse when the visitor is a thoroughly un desirable person, who, notwithstanding hints to the contrary, still remains. But the case is insufferable when the visitor or visitors are armed foes who come in a body ; march in without any of the usual forms of civility ; take possession by force ; eat the meal which has not been prepared for them, or, if no meal is ready, cause one to be cooked ; clear the larder of food ; empty the cellar of wine ; go to bed in the best bedrooms ; cause themselves, in the absence of ser vants, to be waited upon by the master of the house ; and retire to rest, impressing upon him that he must have coffee ready for them next morning by five.

That, however, is invasion in its mildest — its very mildest — form in time of war. Nor is the position of the invaders an enviable one. They know that their entertainer wishes them every possible evil. His demeanour may be sulky, servile, affable, with an effort, studiously cold. His secret prayer is, in every case, that plague, pestilence and famine, battle, murder, and, above all, sudden death may carry off those whom he is compelled to house, feed, and serve, and for whose safety, in the meanwhile, he is held per sonally responsible. For to him these invaders, even if they behave with all possible consideration, are, none the less, intruders who have disturbed his peace, tax-gatherers who are unjustly levying tithes, bailiffs who are wrongfully devouring his substance, burglars who have broken into his house, brigands who only do not take his life because they are left free to deal as they please with his goods.

Nevertheless, even between invaders and invaded not wholly unfriendly relations will sometimes spring up ; when, for instance, the invaders possess good feeling and the invaded good sense. Such a com bination is sure to be rare ; but in this last invasion instances of it were to be met with. For the most part, however, there was no combination at I — all — the antagonistic elements would not com bine. The forcible introduction of Germans among Frenchmen produced all sorts of strange, grotesque, painful, and occasionally tragic results. In the following pages some such results will be found noted — less in logical order than in the order of time in which they presented themselves to the writer's observation. It will be seen, too, that the German commanders took great pains to conduct the invasion according to certain rules, which, for the most part, were published wherever and immediately their troops entered a fresh place.

They carried with them a rough but regular system of government, and were followed by a large staff of officials, who established bureaus, and even started newspapers in the occupied towns. At the same time, no unattached camp-followers were tolerated along the line of march ; so that one frequent cause of demoraliza tion to troops and danger to inhabitants, was, in the case of the German armies invading France, entirely avoided. At a later period, when invasion had become occupation, dealers of various kinds arrived, and, duly licensed, offered cigars and other manufactures for sale in the occupied towns ; but during the invasion, properly so called, every non combatant who accompanied the armies (with the exception of a few privileged visitors) had fixed duties assigned to him; and even the unhappy French peasants who, with their carts and horses, were impressed into the service of the invaders, received numbers, and were duly ticketed and registered.

Nevertheless, the commissariat arrangements were not found perfect during the war by the Prussians themselves — their own severest critics ; and changes before the war broke out had already been undertaken in connection with the body of inarketcnders, or sutlers, to which, among other extensions and reforms, a more decidedly military character will henceforth be given. A complete account of the organization of the invasion in regard to civil as well as military matters, including in particular the proclamations of all kinds published by the German authorities in France, would form a very valuable book ; for which, however, it would be difficult to collect all the necessary materials. In the present volume I have only touched upon such features and results of the system as came directly beneath my notice • and as the conduct of the Germans in France has been much criticised and often severely blamed, it may be interesting to see what they did, and in obedience to what rules.

Then to determine the precise character of the invasion, it would be neces sary to compare these rules with the rules observed in previous invasions, and with those generally accepted by civilized nations in the present day. There exists no international military code for regulating the conduct of armies in the field, though there is a perfect understanding between nations, in regard to a few important points sure to arise when hostile armies are face to face. Thus it is generally agreed that soldiers who surrender shall, if possible, receive quarter,* and that the bearers of flags of truce shall not, if it can be avoided, be fired upon;f while it is expressly stipulated, by the terms of the St. Petersburgh^Convention, that ex plosive bullets shall not be used ; and by those of the Geneva Convention, that surgeons and persons actually engaged in hospital service shall not be made prisoners.

Moreover, by common consent, civilians offering no resistance, and conforming to the terms of authorized requisitions, are protected in person and property. Civilians, however, who take up arms against an invading army are, according to some military codes, treated as brigands ; while, by others, they are, under certain circumstances, regarded as soldiers, and entitled, if captured, to be treated as prisoners of war. * See American Instructions, art. 60, in Appendix. + Ibid., art. 112, 113. The principles that prevail among civilized nations on these and similar points, have been observed and put together by various writers ; among others in recent times, by Professor Bluntschli,* of Heidel berg, whose work on the " Law of Nations," published in 1868, contains the latest and most complete collection of rules — or, perhaps I should say, maxims — for the guidance of combatant armies that has appeared.

But cases occur in war for which Professor Bluntschli has not provided ; and some of the rules he puts forward — as, for ex ample, that money contributions are not to be levied, that military " executions " are to be avoided, that hostages are not to be taken, and that a duly authorized rising en masse is to be considered a legitimate operation of defence — are disregarded by the government Professor Bluntschli serves. The German commanders who entered France in 1870 seem, for the most part, to have regulated their conduct towards the French by German his torical precedents ; as, for instance, in the invasion of 1792, of which Gothe has left an admirable me moir,f and in that of 18 14, of which a valuable documentary history was published, two years be- "Das moderne Volkerrecht." Von Dr. T. C. Bluntschli, Nordlingen, 1868. t Gothe's " Campaign of France." fore the late war broke out, by M. Steenackers* New rules had, of course, to be introduced, to suit new circumstances (in 1814 there were no railways to break up, no telegraph wires to cut down — no cigars to include in the daily requisitions) ; but, in general, the principles on which the war of 1870 was carried on may be said to have been those observed in 1792 and in 18 14.

If the invasion of 1870 was conducted less harshly than previous in vasions, that is to be accounted for, not by any modification of the German Laws of War, but by the general softening of manners during the last half century. As an indication of this change, it may be no ticed that, for the last five-and-twenty years, cor poral punishment has been unknown in the Prussian army. In 18 14, and for 30 years afterwards,-fit was freely administered ; and men who receive blows are generally the most ready to give them. In this last invasion, apart from military " executions," violence towards individuals — illegal vio lence, that is to say — was almost unknown. On the other hand, the war, in a military point of view, was conducted with all possible severity — * " L'Invasion de 1814 dans la Haute Marne."

Par F. F. Steenackers, Membre du Conseil General de la Haute Marne. Paris, 1868. t Restricted, 1845; suspended, 1848; abolished, 1852. or apparent severity ; for sharp action in war is not severity in the end. Thus the fortified towns attacked — except in the case of Strasburgh, where the attempt failed, and of Metz, where the system was impracticable — were reduced by " simple bombardment ;" bombardment, that is to say, not of the fortifications, but of the town itself* As one of the results, however, of the " simple bombardment " system, no town had to be entered by assault ; and that the vanquished were everywhere spared is sufficiently shown by the half million prisoners taken. In the proclamations affixed to the walls of oc cupied villages and towns, reference was constantly made to the " Code Militaire de la Prusse," under which certain penalties were to be inflicted ; as, for instance, upon civilians taking up arms.

I have not been able to find any such code. The Prussian Articles of War, the Prussian Book of Punishments (Strafgesetzbuch), are addressed to Prussian soldiers alone ; who, for example, are warned not to maltreat civilians, or prisoners, in the enemy's country, but are, of course, not empowered to take the law into their own hands against enemies of any kind. In fact, the only government which has ever publicly issued a complete set of instructions for * See, on this subject, " Siege of Strasburgh," page 162. regulating the conduct of its armies towards the enemy and the hostile civil population, is that of the United States. This species of code* was drawn up by Professor Lieber, submitted to and approved by a committee of officers, sanctioned by President Lincoln, and made public just before the commencement of hostilities between North and South.

Its author seems to have foreseen every case demanding judicial treatment, every question requiring a prompt decision, every difficulty, of whatever kind, that could arise during war ; and, as a matter of fact, no case presented itself during the war of 1870 which had not been provided for in the American Instructions. Perhaps an excep tion might be pointed out in regard to the offence — so difficult to bring home to an individual — of concealing, in an occupied district, arms or provisions for the enemy. Such offences were punished by the Americans during the civil war much as they were three years ago by the Germans in France. In America, the house in an occupied district found to contain stores for the enemy was sacked and burned.f In France, the village in an occupied district harbouring francs-tireurs, or, in- * " Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field. 1863."

See Appendix C. t From a communication made to the Author by an American (Federal) general who carried out instructions to that effect. deed, troops of any kind making an attack by sur prise, was burned, or, at least, set on fire. On one or two points the American rules are in direct opposition, or seeming opposition, to the Prussian. Thus, the former expressly tolerate a levy en masse — but under these conditions ; that it shall have been formally commanded by the government, and that it shall take place in a part of the country not yet occupied by the invader. The latter do not accord the civilian the right, un der any circumstances, to take up arms. In order to be treated as a soldier, he must wear uniform, act under officers bearing commissions from the government, and belong to a corps carrying on regular operations of war ; must be a soldier, in fact.

Moreover, the American Instructions (art. 81) permit the employment of guerilla bands apart from the main body of the army, provided they be composed of regular soldiers, wearing the uniform of the army, and acting under officers ; nor would the Prussians deny to the operations of such bands — under the conditions prescribed by the American Instructions — the character of legitimate warfare. The Prussians, however, only recognize as warriors those who play the game of war according to Prus sian rules ; and their government — resembling, in that respect, every other government in Europe — has not yet told the world what those rules really are. The American Instructions are distinguished by a liberal and humane spirit, and it is to be noticed that they contain all the essential points in regard to the neutrality of surgeons, the inviolability of hospitals, and so on, which were afterwards adopted by the Geneva Conference.

Some few of the " in structions," however, are not of universal applica tion, and seem to have been drawn up with a special view to the interests of the Northern States. Thus, while one of them describes civilized warfare as " the kind of warfare carried on by Europeans and their descendants in other portions of the globe " (article 25), another sets forth that " the law of nations knows no distinction of colour" (art. 58), which might be made to justify the absolutely un justifiable employment in European warfare of Turcos by the French, or of Tcherkesses by the Russians, or (retrospectively) of North American Indians by the English, in the war against she American colonies ; a practice which, as every one knows, was indignantly condemned at the time by Lord Chatham in the British Parliament.

The value of a general statement to the effect that " hostages are rare in the present age " (art. 54),* was shown by the fact that, during the * See Chapter entitled " The Usages of War." American war, hostages were repeatedly taken by the government which, in a platonic manner, had declared the practice all but obsolete. It is to be observed too, that the levy en masse, which, under certain conditions, the American instructions allow, was a means more likely to be adopted by the North than by the South. Generally, however, it is a means for the invaded alone ; and, as such, is universally condemned by invaders. It may be said that the Prussians condemn it everywhere. But, on its own territory, the Prussian, like every other government, approves and com mands it. Not to speak of 1813, a general rising and arming of the local population was ordered in July, 1870,* when the French were expected to land on the Prussian coast.

Would General Vogel von Falkenstein, who decreed the levy, have per mitted, without making reprisals, that all members of the coast population falling into the hands of the French should be shot as brigands ? Or are laws against civilians taking up arms, laws, not of principle, but of expediency ; to be applied abroad, to be ignored at home ? * A remarkable conversation on this very subject between Prince Bismarck and M. Jules Favre is re ported by the latter in his " Gouvernement de la * " Kolnische Zeitung," July 27, 1870, and Schlosser's " Geschichts Kalender, 1870," under the head of " July 26." Defense Nationale,"* from which it appears that according to M. Favre the civilian has an absolute right to take up arms against invaders ; while ac cording to Prince Bismarck, armed men subject to no regular discipline, cannot be recognized as soldiers, but are simply "assassins."

When M. Favre reminded Prince Bismarck that the Prussians had, as a nation, taken up arms against the French in 1813, the Prince replied: "Yes; but our trees preserve the traces of the inhabitants whom your generals hung upon them." The French, in fact, mistook the Prussian patriots of 1813 for "assassins;" and the Prussians in 1870, made the same error, if error it was, in regard to the French. Similarly, Napoleon's generals, in Spain, executed members of guerilla bands as " assassins," which did not prevent Napoleon from ordering a levy en masse in France when the country was invaded by the allies in 18 14; nor Prince Schwarzenberg from treating as " assassins," or would-be " assassins," all who took part in it. Practically the Germans had nothing resembling a levy en masse to deal with in France during this last war.

Neither had they in 1814 ; while in 1792 it was only after the Duke of Brunswick's army had begun its retreat that the peasants rose against it. So, as a rule, it will always be. The population * In the section entitled " Entrevue de Ferrieres." will not rise against invaders until the invaders are already defeated ; and it is then too late to enforce laws against civilians bearing arms. But, if only to remove occasions for sanguinary reprisals, there should and might be a law, clearly understood and generally accepted, on this and other points of warfare about which there is at present much igno rance and consequent misunderstanding, to say nothing of positive disagreement. One necessary first step towards such a desirable result is to bring the questionable points to light ; and many such points which, among other matters of perhaps more general interest, came directly beneath the writer's notice during the late war, will be indicated in this volume.

Chapter II. Invaders Or Invaded

? .VERY one, and especially every Frenchman, is astonished that the French Go vernment should have thought, with the limited and uncertain resources at its disposal in July, 1870, of declaring war against such a for midable military power as Prussia. The popular view of the matter in France, if not in Europe generally, is that the Emperor Napoleon, with an army barely 300,ooostrong,challengedapowerwhich could bring a million men into the field. That, no doubt, is the truth, but it is far from being all the truth. The million men could not be brought into the field forthwith, and as a matter of course ; and the Em peror Napoleon reckoned on commencing hostilities with an army not of 300,000, but of 600,000 men. " We are only waiting now for your dispatch," wrote the Duke de Gramont to M. Benedetti on the 10th of July,* " to call in the 300,000 men who are ready to be called in.

If the King will not advise the Prince of Hohenzollern to renounce, it is war immediately, and in a few days we are on the Rhine." There the French expected to meet a portion of the North German army, which, on a peace footing, was 300,000 strong. Preparations had already been made for sending a fleet to the North Sea,t and a Prussian army would be required, and was, in fact, formed, to guard against a landing. Then, whatever good understanding there might be between the Prussian and Bavarian Govern ments, it was quite certain that the Prussians were not liked in Bavaria ; and even if the French were not quick enough to profit by this feeling, they might still count on the unfriendly, or at least doubtful attitude of Austria towards Prussia. On the latter head they were so little wrong, that the Crown Prince, when the rest of his army was enter ing France, thought it desirable to leave in Silesia the 6th or Silesian army corps, to watch the Austrian frontier.

In the end it appeared that France had no more to expect from Austria than * " Ma Mission en Prusse," par Benedetti. t These preparations, however, had been mismanaged, as appears from the curious telegrams on the subject published in the " Papiers Secrets de l'Empire," ? from her own navy, or from her own reserves for the army; but it cannot all the same be said that the position of France was obviously hopeless when she declared war. The French did indeed underestimate both the quality and the numbers of the Prussian troops. " The Prussian army," said the Military Almanack for 1870, published at Metz, "is only a school for the landwehr. Of doubtful value for defensive purposes, it would be useless for an attack." Similarly they had overestimated their own mili tary and naval strength ; and when, after war had been declared, the French army still made no sign, possible neutrals, possible allies become actual enemies.

Austria, however, still maintained her de meanour of unfriendly neutrality ; until at last, but not until after Worth and Spicheren, it became quite certain that the Austrian " corpse" of a few years before would make no alliance with the newly made French cripple ; and the Silesian army corps marched after the rest of the Crown Prince's army, and joined it in plenty of time to take up a strategi cal position near Sedan on the 1st September. The French, then, if they had commenced the war as they originally intended to do, the morning after its actual declaration in the Chamber, would have had some slight chances in their favour, which, as it was, they missed ; and the long inactivity of ? 19 Napoleon's army must, at least as regards a portion of it, be attributed less to its alleged unreadiness to take the field, than to a political check received by the French Government.

Enough troops for the surprise meditated by the Duke de Gramont, could have been sent into Germany the day war was de clared ; and arrangements were in fact made for crossing the frontier the day afterwards. It is believed that a march, or rather a passage by railway through Luxemburg, formed part of Marshal Niel's plan for a campaign against Ger many, and on the 15th of July, the day war was effectively declared in the French Chamber, M. van Suylen, Minister of the Netherlands at Paris, was asked what his government would say to a brief violation of the Treaty of London. M. Jonas, diplomatic agent of Luxemburg at Paris, spoke to M. van Suylen on the same point, when the Dutch minister replied that the French might pass through the Grand Duchy but must not remain there. In any case, M. Jonas sent his secretary, M. Weber, to Luxemburg, where he arrived the next day (Satur day, July 16), saying that his chief despaired of saving the neutralized territory from the violation contemplated by France.

The Luxemburg Govern ment telegraphed to M. Jonas that they would send a representative to meet the French troops at the frontier, and protest against their entry ; and, more- 2 — over, that they were about to make a formal appeal to the signatory powers of the Treaty of London. The commissary of the arrondissement through which the French troops would enter was instructed to meet them ; and he remained for that purpose at the frontier station of Bettingbourg, from Satur day to Sunday. On Saturday, too, the French Vice Consul at Luxemburg, Baron de Cussy, accompanied by the superior officials of the Chemin de Fer de l'Est (of which it must be remembered the administration was entirely French), went to the Luxemburg station to receive the expected invaders. Meanwhile, in reply to the remonstrances of the Luxemburg Government, the French minister of foreign affairs had telegraphed to say that France would respect the neutrality of Luxemburg if Prussia would do the same.

Prussia, on her side, promised observance of the London Treaty, condi tionally on its observance by France. At the same time Prussian workmen took up the rails and broke the railway bridge close to the frontier station of Wasserbillig, by which troops would pass moving from Thionville, through Luxemburg upon Treves. The line from Luxemburg through Gouvy to Aix la Chapelle, by which, if the Duke de Gramont had been in a position to carry out his original idea, the French would also have profited, was not interfered with ; and far from being surprised on the Rhine or even on the Moselle, it was not until nearly three weeks after the effective declaration of war* that the Prussians were seriously threatened on the Saar. * Col. Rustow assigns the same date — July 19th — to the reception of the official declaration of war and the issue of the order for mobilisation ; but the order for mobilisation was issued July 16th, the day after the effective declaration of war in the French Chamber.

Chapter III Composition Of The Prussian Invading Forces

HE most remarkable thing, in a social and historical sense, about the German invasion of France was that every class and condition of men took part in it. Indeed, about one-half of the invaders bearing arms were, until the order of mobilisation appeared, engaged in peaceful occupations. Without counting the landwehr (upwards of 300,000) who did not march to Strasburgh, Metz, Paris, and the little fortresses in Alsace and Lorraine until some time afterwards, the North German regular army of about 300,000 had forthwith to be increased by about 300,000 men of the reserve.* The men of from 23 to 27, * Baron Stoffel's correct numbers are 300,000, more or less, for each of the three great classes. Each = 1 per cent, of who having finished their three years' service in the regular army, were still liable as reserve men to be recalled, went back to their old regiments, some from agriculture, some from industry and trade, some from mercantile, professional, and official pur suits.

Each man of the reserve as of the landwehr belongs to a regiment included in the army corps, recruited from and permanently established in the province to which, as a civilian, he belongs. Thus, to join his regiment, or, rather, his battalion* he cannot have to travel far ; and he knows beforehand where his regiment is stationed and where he must apply for his arms and equipment. He joins, in fact, as he and the others about him are in the habit of joining for the manœuvres in which annually, or once in two years, reserve men the population. These, however, are not precisely the figures given by the Officier d'Etat-Major de l'Arme'e du Rhin, writing during the war, nor by Lieutenant Talbot (Analysis of Prussian Army), writing after the war. * The Prussian army is recruited and mobilised, not by regiments but by battalions, and the whole of Germany (Ger man empire) is now divided into seventeen army-corps dis tricts, including each two divisional districts, including each two brigade districts, including each two regimental districts, including each three battalion districts.

In every German village a board is exhibited inscribed in black and white with the number of the regiment and battalion to which the male inhabitants, with scarcely an exception, belong, or have belonged, or will belong. and regulars are exercised together. The great difference is that, this time, he will be longer out, that he will have to fire with ball instead of blank cartridge at a real instead of a sham enemy, and, when he has once passed the frontier, will be quartered not upon Germans but upon Frenchmen. In the Rhine province, which may be taken for an example as the Prussian province best known to Englishmen, a reserve man cultivating his vineyard in the neighbourhood of the Seven Mountains, would, on the order for mobilisation being issued, report himself to the burgomaster of some such place as Godesberg or Konigswinter, whence, with other reserve men, he would be sent on to Bonn, the chief town of the Circle, whence, with more reserves, he might be forwarded to Cologne, where we will suppose the head-quarters of his regiment or battalion to be.