An Essay on Genius; or, the Philosophy of Literature

Front matter

AN ESSAY ON GENIUS ; OR, THE of literatures SY JOHN DUNCAN, EDINBURGH: PRINTED FOR WILLIAM BLACKWOOD; LONGUAN, BURST, REES, ORME, AND BROWN, LONDON; ALEX. BROWN, AND F. FROST, ABERDEEN J AND JOHN BEATTIE, STONEHATEN. 1814, ENTERED AT STATIONER'S HALL. PMEFACE. In the following treatise, the author offers a new theory of genius, and has endeavoured to fix a certain standard for judging of intellectual ability. How far he has suc ceeded, the public will judge^ 'All that he requests is their attention, trusting that the importance of the subject will form a sufficient apology for obtruding himself upon their notice. In enforcing opinions not generally received, he has been under the necessity of a2 PREFACE, entering more deeply or abstrusely into the subject, than he otherwise would have done; but he flatters himself the illustrations he has given, will render his positions obvious, even to those least accustomed to think on such subjects. CONTENTS. ?«y*.

Chapter I

The true dignity of man consists in mental excellence ; and difference of mind is the only real difference between men .---..-j} CHAP. II. One idea equal to another ; subjects differ only in complexity -._.--. 27 CHAP. III. The importance of order in mental operations 33 CHAP rv. The improvement of the mind, or education 37 CHAR V. Memory the concomitant of education or experience ; dependant on judgment, or strength of mind 54 a Page, 65 U 9 9 143 150 CONTENTS. rl CHAP. VI. Classification the great instrument of judgment CHAP. VII. The greatness of minds known by the extent of objects which they embrace; or by their capability of tracing one cause, or arranging one set of facts CHAP. VIII. The mind excels in all things, according to its strength CHAP. IX. The mind governed by the passions, and directed by accident - > . - . . - 113 CHAP. X. Labour necessary to attain excellence ; and merit, to acquire fame - - - - - - 118 CHAP. XI.

The mind excels only by the appropriation of its powers -- -»_ - . 132 CHAP. XII. The treating of simple subjects no less peculiar to inferior minds, than that of extensive to superior CHAP. XIII. Some minds have too much genius for some subjects CONTENTS* Ml Page. CHAP. XIV. Genius not to be estimated by the degree of pleasure which any production affords - - - 167 CHAP. XV. Judgment and imagination only different applications of the mind - - - 181 CHAP. XVI. Fancy but an inferior degree of judgment, and subservient to a higher - - - - - -190 CHAP. XVII. Difference of subject creates difference of success, and enab'es one mind to excel another ... 206 CHAP. XVIII. Corporeal talents to be distinguished from mental - 226 CHAP. XIX. The importance of habit; some studies disqualify for others ........ 241 CHAP. XX. The universal criterion of genius * , *t Z 25f 3* AN ESSAY ON GENI US; OB, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LITERATURE.

CHAPTER I. THE TRUE DIGNITY OF MAN CONSISTS IN MENTAL EXCELLENCE

; AND DIFFERENCE OF MIND IS THE ONLY REAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MEN. lVlORAL science may be divided into three branches : — the theory of Evidence ; the the ory of Morality ; and the scale of Ability. The two former are considered as the more important. The latter has, indeed, been treated more as a subject of fancy than of science, and hence the many errors which prevail upon it. B Among the chief of these are those poetical rather than philosophical ideas, by which the mind is divided into a number of faculties, each inhabiting its own cell, and having no connection with another. The faculties of the mind are, in general, said to he judg ment, memory, imagination, &c. ; but their number seems capable of no other limita tion than the arbitrary will of the person who makes the division. The usual consequence of philosophical enquiry is to unite a multitude of phænomena or facts under one denomination.

It may, therefore, be presumed, that this mul tiplication of faculties arises from limited views, and that a more extensive enquiry would trace them to a common origin. The following Treatise is intended to prove the unity of the intellectual powers. We hope to be able to produce the most satis factory proof, that the seeming diversity of mental faculties arises from the various ob jects and circumstances to which the mind is directed ; and that these, however different, induce no change on the intellect it self. In treating of genius, or the various de grees of human ability, we ought, in the first place, to endeavour to ascertain whether there exists any original difference between the intellect of one man and that of another, arising from the peculiar nature of the mind itself; or whether all difference of mental talent does not proceed from the influence of external circumstances, including among these the effects of constitution.

In this case, however, research must, in one respect, prove fruitless. Mental and physical operations are so intimately blended, that we can never discover the exact degree of influence to be ascribed to the mind or to the body. Taking it for granted that the mind is different from the body.' although whee 2 1 We have equal evidence for the existence of that assem blage of qualities called the mind, as for the existence of that called matter. The most distinguishing property of the mind is the susceptibility of pleasure and pain; of matter, extenther or not is immaterial to this enquiry ; yet, as the former never acts separately from the latter, it is impossible to discover if it possesses any peculiarities arising from its own nature or not. But while all mental capacity may be referred to the nature of the constitution, as well as to the strength of the mind, it is remarkable that intellectual deficiency may be ascribed 10 the for mer of these causes.

While sedateness of temper fixes us to ideas, it may also obstruct their conception ; and while vivacity enables us to receive impressions, it may prevent us from attending to them.* A multitude of causes concur, however, to prove the important fact of the existence of some original difference of ability, arising either from the peculiar nature of the mind sion. These qualities appear so different, that not even a comparison can be drawn between them. The most judicious, therefore, have held them to belong to distinct substances, if such a thing as substance exists. * Both reasons are given for the intellectual deficiency of brutes. or the body, but most probably from that of the former. We find one man more susceptible of education, naturally more penetrating and distinct, and capable of car rying his ideas farther, than another.

We may, therefore, safely admit two species of ability ; the natural, and the acquired. This original difference of talent does not, however, seem great. In nature there are no prodigies. The various species are con nected by gradual links, and the varieties of any particular species confined to narrow limits. The difference of intellectual ability is not, in all probability, naturally greater than that of stature. Yet this difference is important; and if the influence of external circumstances be added, is sufficient to ac count for the most extraordinary instances of genius which have appeared in the world. The effect of cultivation on the mind is great — the power of industry immense. The most splendid talents are, therefore, perhaps no thing more than those lucky habits which correspond with excellence. bS Connected with the subject of genius there is one point left in the most vague and unsa tisfactory state, and which it may not be improper to settle here ; that is, personal dignity, or that greatness which has been so much talked of, and so little understood.

Personal greatness may be of two kinds. It may arise either from the possession of great talents, or of some other quality which has an important influence on the happiness of mankind. The latter species again may suffer division into great actions, and great possessions. The first of these may be con sidered as better evidence of superior talents than the second, though neither can be considered as good. But, it the mind be held as different from the body, intellectual ability can be viewed as constituting the only real personal dignity. All other is to be looked upon as fictitious ; and the term great, as applied to it, an in stance of the abuse of words. Mankind are, indeed, sensible of the charms of intellectual importance, and that wisdom and knowledge constitute human greatness. Every peison prefers the repu tation of ability to that of virtue, and would suffer the imputation of vice rather than of folly ; — every person is sensible that to im prove his mind is to raise him in the scale of existence, and that to increase intellectual acquisition is the only means of exalting a reasonable being.

Adventitious and extrinsic qualities are, however, often confounded with personal, and the things possessed taken for the pos sessor. Thus, a king is called great, be cause he has the direction of every thing important to a considerable portion of man kind, and the means of rendering many happy or miserable ; although, at the same time, in intellectual qualities, he may be inferior to the majority of his subjects. There is certainly a greatness of thing?. as well as of minds, because there are differ ences among them; but we can never acquire a title to their importance. External objects can, by no mode of possession, be B4 assimilated to the intellect, nor can they, to any great extent, even fall within our power, or minister to our enjoyment. In whatever manner a person may apply wealth, or exer cise authority, it can produce merely refinement of those pleasures which are common to all mankind ; (or nature always constrains him to remain within those precincts which she has assigned to individuals ; and he can be great to others only, as an inanimate ob ject can be, by forwarding, or obstructing, their happiness.

Those who hold elevated situations attract our attention more by the splendour of their rank than by their ability, and it is rather their station and circumstances which we admire than themselves. Even heroes and con querors, and the majority of those charac ters which appear in the roll of fame, must be considered only as marking those revolu tions which are continually happening from the motion of things, and as indicating great events rather than great minds. For it is obvious to the slightest reflection, that, in this case, opportunity holds the first rank, ability only the second, and that Darius might have been Alexander had he com manded an army of Grecians. No one feels himself satisfied with regard to the abilities of the powerful and successful, from the evidence of power and success alone.

We still wish to have an opportunity ot judging of them by their conversation, or literary attempts, which are the best means of obtaining a perfect knowledge of the mind. Literature is the fairest test of mental ability, and real greatness ; because no fortuitous cause can assist the labours of the mind, or whatever assistance an author derives from circumstances can easily be perceived and made allowance for : But to judge of any person's intellectual powers by those actions in which he has been engaged, is a very remote manner of estimating their value. Events form but an imperfect index to the mind, and we often take good fortune for capacity. A general may be victorious by the advice, care, or ability of his officers : by the superior number or spirit of his men ; by the neglect of his antagonist;3 by the advantages of his situation ; or by a thou sand other circumstances which are neither dependant on him, nor perceivable by others.

A statesman again may be successful from the temperature of the times, or the concurrence of causes which are unconnected with his determinations, and over which he has no control. Success is not the same in literature as in life. In the former, it must depend upon ourselves ; in the latter, it may depend upon things. Many men also, from particular habits and constitutional peculiarities, are not prudent in proportion to their capacity. The talents, therefore, of such, suffer great injustice among those who judge by the event. We are, in general, so much dazzled 3 The world is filled with characters whose celebrity depends upon the deficiency of their antagonists. It is also a vulgar error to ascribe so much to generalship. Discipline may be necessary as a subordinate cause ; but, in all battles, victorv is chiefly decided by courage, by the lustre of great events, that the con duct of every person, when fortunate, seems wise.

Each accidental success, whether pro ceeding from coincidence of circumstances, or peculiarity of character, is ascribed to wis dom and deliberate design; while, on the con trary, it is di tficult to save the reputation of the unfortunate, even among the most impartial.4 But those who wish justly to estimate characters, will endeavour to divest themselves of this prejudice. They will judge of men rather by their reasoning than by their con duct, and examine more their understandings than their passions ; for, as there are many persons who can think but cannot act, prudence of conduct, and those talents best adapted to active scenes, will perhaps be found to depend more upon constitutional character than upon deliberative wisdom.5 4 The difference between a mad attempt and a glorious action depends upon success. 5 Human nature is, no doubt, composed of body as well as of mind, and active faculties are, perhaps, as important as contemplative ; but still it is necessary to keep them scpa- Success would, indeed, be a mark of superior abilities, could it be shown that it were independent of concurring circumstances, and that the difficulties surmounted were great ; but, in active concerns, so many causes, different from personal talent, have an influence, that no conclusion drawn from them can, with regard to the mind, be de pended on.

There may, indeed, sometimes, be degrees of real greatness in the merit of rising in the world ; but there is oftener no thing more than good fortune, or a cast of character, which coincides with the situation of things and the dispositions of men. To succeed in life, the most probable means is to go with the stream. Worldly wisdom consists, not in thinking justly or acting reasonably, according to extensive views, but in humouring the times. Servi lity is, in general, the shortest road to pre ferment ; and intrigue, in most cases, an rate. The maxim, " judge of a person by his actions and not by his words," must apply to morals rather than to ability. overmatch for ability .* An artful man regards the end more than the means, and depends, for success, upon pliancy rather than talent; while a person of ability, judging of mankind by himself, imagines that merit is all that is necessary to acquire con sideration, and values himself upon his inte grity and independence.

A man of sense naturally perceives the beauty of noble and praise-worthy actions; and genius is general ly accompanied by an inflexible pride of sentiment, and propensity to integrity and honourable conduct. Besides, where there are strong ideas and great vigour of mind, there are commonly strong passions and ungovernable opinions. Mental exertion, therefore, often impels to actions inconsistent with the ordinary progress of things. Those who are most successful in life, frequently possess a contracted ness of mind which renders it suitable to all circumstances, 6 What are, indeed, the boasted dissimulation and art of politicians, but falsehood and dishonesty ? confines its powers to a narrow circle, and concentrates them always at the point of action. The common business of life is chiefly managed by habit and imitation, and a talent for it is often the emblem of a small mind.

The great employment of mankind is to live. Industry, therefore, will always be more valued than capacity. But, per haps, rank and riches are oftener determined by the circumstance of birth than by any extraordinary exertion or ability. Even the possession of virtue, which is much more valuable than either power or riches, cannot confer greatness on any one ; and it is a misapplication of terms to be stow the appellation of great upon a person entitled only to that of good."7 Virtue is merely a habit of the mind, or a species of education which is useful to mankind. Virtue, therefore, can display no extent of 7 Pope says, " An honest man is the noblest work of God." This has a fine sound, but nothing more. There is a cheat in common morality of which every candid person must be ashamed. thought, or intricacy of ideas.

Men are prone to flatter each other for qualities which are useful or pleasing, and hence arises their profusion of commendation to those who are virtuous ; but if we suppose the mind in it self unchangeable, its original force can neither be encreased by virtue nor diminished by vice — affected by praise nor dispraise. All the greatness of which man is capable belongs neither to his habits nor other circumstances, but to his understanding; and he who possesses such greatness can, by no concurrence of things, be deprived of it. Intellectual talents, however, are not of tener unjustly degraded, than exalted, by foreign causes ; and we have generally occasion to be on our guard against imposition of one species or another. Of this class is reputation, derived from inflated sentiment, such as the saying of Alexander, that he would contend at the Olympic games, if kings were his competitors.8 This is univers By which he evidently meant to contend in rank and no'. in skill, and to oppose adventitious qualities to personal. sally termed magnanimity, but is merely vanity, or conceit; and such conduct always receives that appellation in those who hold inferior stations in life.

Passions and habits ought, however, to be distinguished from judgment. Greatness of mind consists only in the superior power of discrimination, — not in admiring or despising, loving or hating, of which all men are equally capable. Nothing is indeed truly important in hu man nature, but mental ability. By the original force of mind which men derive from nature is their future greatness entirely determined ; for what men do not accom plish by the power of their minds, must be ascribed to some foreign quality from which they can claim no merit. On the same native superiority depends, in the first instance, the extent of that im provement which is not the least remarkable peculiarity of the human understanding, and which serves chiefly to distinguish mankind from the lower ranks of the creation.

The inferior animals, as they are evidently intended to act within a narrow circle, soon acquire reason sufficient for it, and reach the limits of their cultivation. The minds of beasts are so incapable of abstraction, and their perceptions arise so immediately from their senses, that they attain maturity along with their bodies ; and as soon as their instincts are complete, their understandings have arrived at their perfection. But the human mind contains higher powers, and admits of greater extension ; for, after the means of information which the senses furnish are exhausted, it retains the power of increasing its knowledge by its own inherent exercise. The perfection of the mind of man does not depend upon the maturation of his senses, but on that of experience ; and his mental faculties are capable of improve ment as long as they continue to be exercised.

The expansion of the intellect is, indeed, liable to be affected by those casualties which influence its exertion; and minds are re n- C dfcred different not less by education than by nature. Yet circumstances never actually affect the original degree of ability. As all edu cation is but information concerning the state of things, they can only assist or retard its developement. But before entering on the subject of education, it may be proper to say something on the nature of external objects, and those qualities which occasion intellectual exertion.

Chapter II

•NE IDEA EQUAL TO ANOTHER;— SUBJECTS DIFFER ONLY IN COMPLEXITY. V/ne idea is not more difficult of conception than another. The idea of a mountain and the idea of a grain of sand are conceived with equal ease. The mind is affected only by the relation of qualities ; continuity and uniformity are indifferent to it. It is not magnitude but number — the separation and division of things — which engages its atten tion, and furnishes the materials of its operation. All our ideas are merely intellectual properties called into exercise by the sug gestion of external objects. They are all equally abstracted from physical objects, and occupy, it may be said, for the sake of illustration, the same portion of the mind. c All subjects are, therefore, more or less difficult of comprehension, merely as they contain a greater or less number of different parts, and furnish many or few ideas ; and all things possess complexity only as they possess variety.

Thus, in viewing an ex tensive building, it is not the same to the mind as to the eye. The operation of the eye may be obstructed by the physical difficulties of vision, such as light or shade, by intervening objects, or by the extent and magnificence of the fabric : But the difficulty of the mind must be the labour of selecting its various parts, of removing their confu sion, and arranging them according to their natural dependance upon each other. How ever extensive any object may be, or how ever far any landscape may spread, or edi fice extend, it may still be easy of conception ; for, if all its parts be the same, they are but as one part ; and without diversity there can be no discrimination. What is great in nature is not always dif ficult to the mind. Notwithstanding the suffrage of Longinus, there appears no un common degree of talent in the passage, — " Far as a shepherd from some point on high.

O'er the wide main extends his boundless eye, Thro' such a space of air, with thund'ring sound. At one long leap th' immortal coursers bound ;" Nor in his attempt to surpass it, when he says, — " and who, considering the superla tive magnificence of this thought, would not, with good reason, cry out, that if the steeds of the Deity were to take a second leap, the world itself would want room for it."' Physical and moral importance are very different from intellectual. Physical consists in quantity; moral in event; and intellectual in number. Things may be both physically and morally important, without being intel lectually important ; that is, an object may be extensive, or an event violent, without c3 9 Nothing is so cheap and vulgar as descriptions of extension or magnitude. To such contentions as that between Lon ginus and Homer, there is no end.

However great any object may be, it is easy to conceive a greater. being complex. Physical importance, for the most part, regulates moral importance, but never intellectual. The view which the mind takes of objects is, however, sometimes arbitrary or acci dental. It may either view many things as one, or one thing as many. Thus, an army may be considered in whole, or with relation to the individuals composing it ; but the difficulty of conception will always be in proportion to the number of ideas. Some times the reduction of any set of ideas to a single idea, is accomplished by a long pro cess of reasoning. Simplification is, in fact, the object of all science, and one of the modes in which genius is best displayed. But although it may be difficult to reach a conclusion, it is, when attained, easily under stood.

The natural progress of the mind, however, is, first, to view all objects which the senses can grasp, as single, and after wards to examine more minutely their parts in detail. As magnitude is unconnected with difficulty of conception, there appears no quality in ideas which dignifies one more than ano ther. Thus the distinction of high and low wit arises merely from confounding mate rial qualities with mental ; for wit is the same, on every subject, in proportion as it discovers excellence of thought. Such a distinction belongs merely to the objects al luded to, and forms no application to the efforts of the mind ; for, considered intel lectually, there can be no difference between the apophthegm of the peasant and that of the courtier, excepting the degrees of com prehension and acuteness displayed in each.

Parmenio said, " I would accept these pro posals if I were Alexander." '■' So would I," replied Alexander, " if I were Parmenio." This is an instance of high or dignified wit, because regarding things important. The often-quoted passage of Hudibras, " And, like a lobster boil'd, the morn From black to red began to turn," again, is an instance of low wit, being ex pressly intended to degrade. Yet the acutec4 ness in the former idea does not show so much strength of mind as that comprehen sion which appears in the latter. Wit, indeed, receives a value from the quality of the objects on which it is exercised. The most brilliant flashes of imagination are sometimes insufficient to compensate the dis agreeable ideas which disgustful allusions create ; and often, while we admire the su perstructures of wit, we lament the coarse ness of the materials of which they are com posed.

For these imperfections, however, genius is not accountable, as it is merely by accidental association that mental exertions are united to those things which are dis agreeable; and the intrinsic qualities of the intellect, and those of the objects of its inge nuity, must remain for ever separated.

Chapter III. The Importance Of Order In Mental Opera

TIONS. Order is necessarily connected with num ber; and receives its value from the assistance which it gives to comprehension. The mind is limited : one acquisition is, in some degree, always balanced by the loss of a former; and, although attainment is, on the whole, progressive, the intellect is ca pable of containing only a certain number of images. On that very intricate subject, arithmetic, it can pass through but a very few parts without noting its steps by figures. Only one idea can indeed be present at a time. The most extensive contemplation appears to be nothing more than a succession and transition of individual thoughts. It has been remarked, that the art of thinking is to attempt but little at once. Order, by dividing extensive subjects into parts, suits them to the grasp of the mind, and leads it forward by gradual steps.

Without order, we should never reach an idea of the plan of nature. All would be a confused mass, appearing boundless, and de fying equally the judgment and the memory.' Order discovers the relation which one object or event bears to another, puts all things in their proper places, and offers them to the mind, like the tools of a workman, without the trouble of a search. Order is the essence of science, or it may be called science itself; for what would science be without order. In the military art, it constitutes strength. In business, it produces dispatch and ease ; and where it is not demanded as a requisite, it is sought as an ornament. In order, consists one of the principles of beauty — regularity. The de- 1 Many plans have been devised for the improvement of memory, but none are effectual except order. light which we have in viewing the array of an army, or the uniform disposition of cultivated fields, arises from the utility of arrangement, and the relation which we perceive between the means and the end.

Method is valued even in the most trifling sciences. In dancing and music, it is what chiefly pleases. But, in literature, and those employments which more immediately represent the mind, the effects of order are most conspicuous. When extensive subjects are arranged in such a manner, that one cause naturally leads to another, and every succeeding idea is suggested by the immediately preceding, comprehension follows without effort, or by necessity. But if the labour of arrangement be left to the reader in any piece of composition, nothing is accomplished towards di minishing the natural difficulty of the sub ject, and every exertion of the mind remains to be made upon it. Connection is, indeed, no less necessary than order. When transition is sudden or violent, the chain of ideas is broken ; but when it is gradual and easy, our progress is impercep tible.

But connection and order are inse parable. The rule of order is to place near est, or in succession, those things which differ least, or are most connected.* Order may be said to be the first of intellectual laws. In literature, order is beauty ; in science, demonstration. In it, are includ ed every energy and excellence of the art of thinking. Those, therefore, who wish to excel in composition, oratory, or argument, should make it their chief study ; for, as all conception is only a knowledge of the rela tion which parts bear to each other, no sub ject can be understood until its parts be arranged. 2 Order has several laws, or connection may be said to arise from various causes, viz. time, causation, and importance. But for precepts or reasoning, there is scarcely any absolute order ; as it is said, " from any one truth, all truth may be inferred."